Entangled Deterrence and Doctrinal Drift: Reassessing South Asia’s Nuclear Stability
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37540/njips.v9i2.220Keywords:
India, Pakistan, nuclear entanglement, doctrinal shifts, risk reduction, CBMsAbstract
Advanced conventional and dual-use non-nuclear capabilities increasingly threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) assets, which can lead to unintended nuclear escalation. This ‘entanglement’ of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities heightens the risk of inadvertent escalation through ‘crisis instability’, ‘misinterpreted warnings’, and the disruption of the ‘damage-limitation window’, as identified by James Acton (2018). This study explores how the vulnerability of dual-use early-warning systems exemplifies these risks in the India–Pakistan context. This paper also analyses how the targeting of early-warning assets during a conventional conflict could unintentionally undermine either state’s nuclear monitoring capabilities. The recurrence of such targeting in successive crises reflects an emerging pattern of doctrinal momentum towards escalatory postures, rather than isolated incidents, underscoring the cumulative erosion of crisis stability over time. The doctrinal adaptations among the South Asian arch-rivals may further add to the volatility of the regional deterrence stability framework. Additionally, the paper explores the dangers of cyber interference, especially in the fragile deterrence environment of South Asia, where cyber vulnerabilities might compromise deterrence stability. Consequently, these events could lead to an inadvertent escalation pattern that may interact with strategic nuclear affairs. To address these risks, the paper suggests measures such as organisational reforms to address these risks in planning and decision-making, subsequently leading to further enhanced cooperative measures in the future
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