CPEC as a ‘Peace Corridor’: Revisiting ‘Indivisible Security’ Across the Durand Line

Li Yonghui; Faruzan Anwer Butt

doi:10.37540/njips.v9i2.218

Authors

Li Yonghui Professor at the School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing Foreign Studies University, China
Faruzan Anwer Butt Pursuing PhD from the Beijing Foreign Studies University, School of International Relations and Diplomacy

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.37540/njips.v9i2.218

Abstract

In 2022, President Xi Jinping announced the ‘Global Security Initiative’ (GSI) at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference, with ‘indivisible security’ as its core underlying logic. A 2023 concept paper on the GSI expands on this indivisibility, signifying both the non-zero-sum nature of security interests and the need to prioritize a holistic stability focus that integrates traditional and non-traditional security. Thus, Section II, point 4, of the GSI concept paper cites the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as ‘advocating the indivisibility between individual security and common security, between traditional security and non-traditional security, between security rights and security obligations, and between security and development.’ It follows that the escalation of tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan presents an opportunity to examine and realize the GSI’s core logic, with China’s role as a neutral facilitator prompting the exploration of both economic and security engagement. A key variable at play concerns the stability of the Afghan state under the Taliban regime, as the retreat of Western donors, compounded by pervasive sanctions, risks economic collapse.

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