India’s Shifting Nuclear Doctrine and Its Impact on the Strategic Stability of South Asia

Abstract

The paper analyzes the potential implications of transitioning India's nuclear doctrine from a No First Use (NFU) policy to a First Use (FU) policy. Based on neo-realist theory, the paper argues that India has been experiencing a shift in doctrine in its quest to acquire relative power vis-à-vis Pakistan and China. India’s current policy, defined by strategic ambiguity, can be adjusted in response to evolving regional security dynamics. Nevertheless, the introduction of FU brings new complexities, and it may lead to the destabilization of the strategic balance and possibly an arms race in South Asia. India's aggressiveness underscores the logic of relative gains, in which maintaining its advantage over Pakistan is prioritized over the stability of the two nations.  This may further lead to major economic problems for Pakistan, which is already struggling with heightened investment in national security, and raise the risk of entanglements between the two countries. The inherent ambiguity in India’s nuclear doctrine also makes the command-and-control problems highly severe; hence, the risk of unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons could also be on the rise. The research suggests that China’s evolving strategic position may be a key factor driving this potential doctrinal shift, adding further complexity to regional security dynamics, particularly for Pakistan. The paper also highlights the importance of preemptive diplomacy, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), and greater transparency in India’s nuclear policy for enhancing regional and global security.