Decoding Operational Latitude of Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs): A Case Study of Wagner Group in Syria
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37540/njips.v7i2.172Keywords:
Private Military Companies, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, Sudan, Wagner Group, Operational Latitude, NATOAbstract
The usage of private military companies (PMCs) has remained rampant among significant world powers since the Cold War. Historically, PMCs emerged as small contractors initially but gradually attained multiplicity with distinctive capabilities. The Russian Wagner Group provides multi-dimensional and sophisticated support to the Putin Administration. The Group accounts for an advanced, diplomatic, and target-oriented operational latitude that maneuvers Russian strength in Syria and Ukraine. Russian mercenaries are state-specific, i.e., the use of the Wagner Group in Syria and Ukraine, making it challenging for the opposition to understand the functioning and administration of these companies. By 2019, the Group remained covert yet precarious for its enemies. However, the new advancements suggest that the idea of plausible deniability is now shifting towards overt use and far-reaching proprietorship of the Group as a branch of Russian military interests. The research focuses on the private structure of Wagner Group paving the way for new challenges towards the NATO countries, shifting from conventional military threats from Russia towards overt, opportunist, and task-oriented PMCs.
References
Asgarov, R. (2021). Private Military Company in the Russian Manner: the Wagner Group and Business on the Blood in the Central African Republic. Ulusal Strateji Araştırmaları Merkezi Center for National Strategy Research. https://www.ulusam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Private-Military-Company-in-the-Russian-Manner-the-Wagner-Group-and-Business-on-the-Blood-in-the-Central-African-Republic.pdf
Barabanov, I., & Ibrahim, N. (2021). Wagner: Scale of Russian mercenary mission in
Libya exposed. BBC News. https://bv-04.bubblevault.com/3014f7e3-1662-45ba-8468-6fc29ba8b08c/20e69203-5b37-ec11-aaaa-06685e255467/20e69203-5b37-ec11-aaaa-06685e255467.pdf
Benaso, R. (2021). Invisible Russian Armies: Wagner Group in Ukraine, Syria and the
Central African Republic. https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/1384/
Herd, G. P. (2018). Russia’s Hybrid State and President Putin’s Fourth-Term Foreign
Policy? The RUSI Journal, 163(4), 20-28.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1529890
Kumar, R. (2023). The Wagner Group in the Central Sahel: Decolonization or
Destabilization? https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/2023-12/Wagner_in_CS_121523.pdf
Leander, A. (2005). The power to construct international security: On the significance
of private military companies. Millennium, 33(3), 803-825.
https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330030601
Marten, K. (2019). Russia’s Use of semi-state Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner
Group. Post-Soviet Affairs, 35(3), 181-204.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2019.1591142
Østensen, Å. G., & Bukkvoll, T. (2018). Russian Use of Private Military and Security
Companies-the implications for European and Norwegian Security. FFI-rapport.
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2564170
Port, J. M. (2021). State or Nonstate: The Wagner Group’s Role in Contemporary Intrastate Conflicts Worldwide [Doctoral dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill].
Rizzotti, M. A. (2019). Russian Mercenaries, State Responsibility, and Conflict in
Syria: Examining the Wagner Group under International Law. Wis. Int’l LJ, 37, 569. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/wisint37&div=24&id=&page=
Reynolds, N. (2019). Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and
The Wagner Group (Vol. 8). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Rezvani, B. (2020). Russian foreign policy and geopolitics in the Post-Soviet space and
the Middle East: Tajikistan, Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Middle Eastern Studies, 56(6), 878-899. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2020.1775590
Rondeaux, C. (2019). Decoding the Wagner group: Analyzing the role of private military
security contractors in Russian proxy warfare. Washington, DC: New America. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/issues/Mercenaries/WG/OtherStakeholders/candace-rondeux-submission-1.pdf
Sukhankin, S. (2019). “A black cat in the darkroom”: Russian Quasi-Private Military
and Security Companies (PMSCs) ―‘Non-existent,’ but Deadly and Useful.
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/Vol19/No4/page43-eng.asp
Sukhankin, S. (2018). ‘Continuing war by other means’: The case of Wagner, Russia’s
premier private military company in the Middle East. Russia in the Middle East, 290-319.https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Russia-in-the-Middle-East-online.pdf?x75295#page=303
Sukhankin, S. (2020). Wagner Group in Libya: Weapon of war or geopolitical
Tool? The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 11(13).
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/TM-June-26-2020-Issue.pdf?
Strong, C. (2022). Wagner Group and Opportunism in Russian Foreign Policy: Case
Studies of the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Mozambique [Master’s Thesis, Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd] https://dspace.cuni.cz/handle/20.500.11956/171305
Ulyanov, I. (2015). Assessing The Obama–Medvedev Reset in US–Russia Relations. E
International Relations.
https://www.e-ir.info/2015/09/03/assessing-the-obamamedvedev-reset-in-us-russia-relations
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
1.png)
