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Sustainability of the UN Nation-Building Measures in Post-Mandate Countries

Humayun Hassan[1]

Abstract
The first UN peacekeeping mission was authorized in 1948, during the first Arab-Israeli War. Since then, the peacekeeping missions have been established in many countries, with varying mandates. The existing literature on the subject focuses primarily on the changing nature of the UN missions, over the past 70 years. Moreover, there is considerable literature on the factors that pertain to the gaining of a peacekeeping mandate and how the UN resources are utilized to complete the overall objectives. However, the literature is quite limited in the evaluation criteria and frameworks for peacekeeping and nation-building. Furthermore, the minimal existing literature focuses on evaluating the present-time effectiveness of UN missions, based on their mandated objectives. This paper, therefore, aims to address a prevailing gap in the literature by focusing on evaluating the sustainability of the UN missions. The Diehl and Druckman's Framework of peace operations evaluation is used to measure the sustainability of the UN nation-building missions. The cases of UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL), El Salvador (ONUSAL), and Timor-Leste (UNMIT) are considered for this purpose. These countries provide some resemblance with their assigned UN mandate, yet differences exist in their cultures, historical backgrounds, and economic situation. This paper concludes by providing retrospective lessons and potential areas of improvements for future UN missions.

Keywords
Sustainability, Evaluation Framework, United Nations, nation-building, peacekeeping

Introduction
With the failure of the League of Nations to prevent, mitigate, and resolve global conflicts, the establishment of the United Nations Organization, with a much broader mandate, was illustrative of universal longing for peaceful and diplomatic settlements of prevailing global conflicts. The UN peacekeeping missions, since then, have served in some of the most war-torn and volatile regions of the world. During the past seven decades, the scope and complexity of UN peacekeeping missions have grown in size. The history of the UN peacekeeping missions could be traced back to that of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), founded on May 29, 1948.

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This paper, therefore, aims to provide a brief historical context of the UN peacekeeping missions and how their mandate has evolved, over the decades to address contemporary complexities. The primary focus of this paper is on understanding the sustainability of UN nation-building measures.

However, the term 'nation-building' has been used in varying contexts, by different sources, ranging from the UN itself to think tanks and the media. To address this, the author has used only the official UN definitions and scope of the 'peacekeeping' and 'nation-building', whereas the historical buildup of the UN mandates will help the reader further understand the scope and evolution of these terms. Later in the paper, the nation-building measures are examined, concerning the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which served from 2003-2018. Liberia is regarded as one of the more prominent success stories of UN peacekeeping and nation-building programs. Before the UN intervention in 2003, the West African country experienced two of the bloodiest and economically draining civil wars. The UN and the international community generally attribute the relative peace and stability observed today to a collective effort. There seems to be a significant contrast in Liberia's internal security situation, before and after the UN involvement. Therefore, this case will be placed central to addressing the fundamental questions in this paper.

To provide the reader with a comparative framework, this paper further examines the UN missions in Liberia, El Salvador, and East Timor. The rationale for focusing on these three particular cases includes the prevailing social and political differences in all of these countries. This will provide an understanding of how the variation of the above-mentioned factors may affect our results. Diehl and Druckman's Framework for peace operations evaluation is used to measure the sustainability of the UN efforts in cases of UNMIL, ONUSAL, and UNMIT. Although 'sustainability' is not a defined objective for these UN missions, it is still important to understand how the peacekeeping and nation-building measures taken by UN so fare when it is no longer there to enforce them.

The paper uses empirical research, using both primary and secondary data. For any statistical references, with regards to the cases of Liberia, El Salvador, and East Timor, the author has used primarily the official sources of the UN, Human Rights Watch, and other NGOs that were present in the area. These are the focal entities that have carried out primary research and data collection in the above-mentioned countries. Another possible limitation is the lack of strict definitions of our term 'sustainability'. This creates more room for subjective interpretations of the results. Therefore, this study measures the sustainability of the UN nation-building, in terms of the primary objectives defined by the UN missions of the respective countries. Diehl and Druckman's Framework has remained relevant; for others, the key questions and progress measures are defined based on the official mandate for their UN missions.

Literature Review

The UN peacekeeping operations began in 1948, during the first Arab-Israel War, resulting in the establishment of UNTSO. Since then, the UN has had more than 70 peacekeeping operations, which have varied considerably in terms of their assigned mandates (United Nations, 2020). For more than seven decades, the implicit understanding of the term 'peacekeeping' has varied and been used rather loosely. UN peacekeeping is predicated upon the principles of "consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except to protect the assigned mandate." Consent, for a majority of the

UN missions, has been acquired primarily from the recognized authority of a particular country. Therefore, 'consent' is defined as the host government's acceptance and facilitation of the peacekeeping force as well as that of the UN peacekeeping mandate for that country (Sebastián & Gorur, 2018). The second aspect, 'impartiality', may be defined as conscious behaviour and actions to remain bipartisan and not to favour any of the conflicting factions, inside the area of the UN mandate. This also implies not to favour any particular interest group or to deviate from the assigned mandate of the UN to further one's national or personal interests (Rhoades, 2016). Johan Galtung first discussed the term 'peacebuilding in 1976 (Galtung, 1976). The UN defines peacebuilding as an action to solidify peace and avoid a relapse into conflict. The UN Secretary General's Policy Committee describes peacebuilding as "a range of activities targeted to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels, for conflict management and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development" (U.N. Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010). From this, one can infer that the peacekeeping activities are a part of peacebuilding, as defined by the UN (Dobbins et al., 2007).

Nevertheless, the term nation-building itself has had varying interpretations among International Organizations (IOs), such as NATO and the European Union (EU). NATO defines nation-building as the involvement of a legally sanctioned party to suppress conflict, stabilize, and alleviate the country's governance and political process of transitions (Dobbins, 2005). This definition, however, may not entirely encapsulate nation-building, in the modern UN context, as it fails to recognize the internal aspect of lessening societal fragmentation, providing people with a sense of identity, and a national cause. These aspects of nation-building are highlighted by Alesina and Reich (2015), as she provides the historical context of nation-building measures, in France and Italy in the context of the post-Napoleonic eras where the countries rulers made deliberate efforts to inculcate a sense of unified culture, language, and national identity among their citizenry. This study defines nation-building as a process in which the inhabitants of a country feel a significant level of homogeneity of interest, perspectives, and goals, giving them a sense of identity and nationalism.

Similarly, Talentino (2010) identifies two primary forms of nation-building measures, internal and external, where state-building and identity-building are the two different areas of focus. Another important point highlighted by the author is the need for a functioning state to achieve durable success. The expansion of the scope of UN peacekeeping missions and its increasing mandate in restricting and kick-starting the political economies of their respective countries is examined by Juergenliemk (2012). The author also provides a contextual understanding of the UN Charter (Chapters 6 and 7) and how they mandate different roles for a UN peacekeeping mission.

The contemporary understanding of nation-building cannot be developed without first understanding what constitutes a state-failure. State failure is defined as a legitimate governing authority's failure or severe inability to deliver the essential level of security, functioning economic framework, and some kind of public welfare to its citizenry (Bogdandy, 2005). Grotenhuis (2016), has discussed the examples of fragile states of Afghanistan, D.R. Congo, Iraq, and others, making the case that the nation-building measures taken by the third party have either not been able to produce any significant results, or have proved to be completely counter-productive. He further argues that fundamental to institutional-building and, consequentially, nation-building is the cultural, ethnic, and religious identities of any concerned diaspora. The world community has, thus far, failed to provide adequate considerations of these

factors, that, none the less, from the very psyche and ways of life of people. It is, therefore, pertinent to revisit the current nation-building strategies and acquiesce to the fact that without cultivating a sense of shared identity, be it along the cultural, ethnic, or religious lines, people will have no incentive to believe in the newly-created government and to cooperate with it.

Nevertheless, how the UN itself defines and implements peacekeeping and nation-building is another question. To understand this, we need to consider four primary documents that have helped shape the UN outlook on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and nation-building since 1945: The UN Charter, the Agenda for Peace (1992), the Brahimi Report (2000), and Capstone Doctrine (2008). The UN Charter Chapter 6 outlines the guidelines for dispute resolution and the role of The Security Council in it, while Chapter 7 defines the mandate and the jurisdiction of the Security Council, in case of a conflict, breach of peace, and acts of aggression.

The UN outlook of peacekeeping witnessed a significant change after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, this was manifested in the landmark 1992 report called, The UN Agenda for Peace. It recognized the changing nature of political and militant stakeholders, the role of increased global connectivity and commercialism, a shift from an immediate threat of nuclear war to more tacit and decentralized types of war, which could deteriorate established infrastructure from *within*. Furthermore, the evolving nature of global threats, such as rise in income disparity, refugee settlements, environmental degradation, and rise in localized terrorism, along ethnic and religious lines was conceded as worthy of a rethink in original forms of dialogue engagement, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and most importantly nation-building (United Nations, 1992). This report significantly broadens the scope of what would later be known as nation-building, by defining preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, confident building measures (CBMs), and creation of demilitarized zones as parts of the UN peacemaking process. The Brahimi Report, published in 2000, concluded with providing recommendations, such as capacity-building of the peacebuilding missions, to make war-to-peace transitions more accessible, more focus on the use of UN police cognizant of the aspirations of the local community, and more resources on ground intelligence and the defensive capacities of the UN forces. One issue identified in this report is the inability of the UN missions to develop long-term peace without their active involvement. Almost all of the measures suggested point to a much broader and incisive role of the UN, in conflict-areas, which is essentially an indication of a shift from a mere conflict-prevention to building sustainable communities, infrastructure, and political machinery. The Brahimi report was a landmark shift in redefining the scope of future UN missions.

The Brahimi Report reiterated increased expectation from the UN, since the early 1990s, where the UN peacekeepers were not merely entrusted to maintain peace, but also establish peace, negotiate settlements, establish demilitarized zones — all while keeping in regard the wrested interests of the signing parties. The breakout of conflict in Central Africa and the Rwandan genocide was highlighted as examples of how the pre-cold war strategies of peacekeeping were proving to be counter-productive. In the context of this paper, perhaps the most important facet of this report is the introduction of a new term, called 'peacebuilding ', which by the very definition closely resembles that of the modern nation-building measures of today (Brahimi, 2000). It is this report that justifies the expanded mandate of the UN missions, which is evident in UNMIL, ONUSAL, and UNMIT.

The 2008 Capstone Report was the first effort to codify the UN peacekeeping efforts, in the context of the contemporary complexities. The report was primarily focused on the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). The Capstone Report enlists new initiatives capable of leading and ensuring that all national and international peacekeeping actors work in coordination with each other, providing a suitable and peaceful environment to a legally recognized state. Thereby allowing it to provide its citizenry security and fundamental human rights, and supporting the political process, reconciliation, and peace process to achieve peace and establish a government in that country. It mentions the existing limitations of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), due to their inability to entertain any sustainable, long term objectives.

Furthermore, The Capstone Report also emphasizes the need to include economic development and prosperity as an essential part of the UN peacebuilding efforts. Mainly, most of the recommendations of this report illustrate what we now regard as the role of a nation-building process. This further built upon the Brahimi report, by characterizing the political and administrative involvement as not only acceptable but an essential part of the UN nation-building missions.

The UN peacekeeping efforts in Liberia have been subject to many examinations. The Liberia Peacebuilding Plan and the Capacity Mapping Exercises (CMEs) were both aimed at understanding the priority UN work during the political transitions and measurement of the extent to which the UN, in its limited capacity could undertake those responsibilities post-UNMIL (Forti & Connolly, 2018). The role of the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO), after the withdrawal in 2018, was mentioned in this report as well. This, however, is being done after more than a decade of active UN involvement in the country. The fact that even in post-war Liberia, the UN needed to provide financial and political support to the government raises concerns about the nation-building activities carried from 2003-2018 (Ibid). It is argued that the UNMIL was assigned a mandate of preventing conflicts among the local warring factions, providing humanitarian aid to the people, strengthening the democratic government, and conducting fair elections to kick start the process of political transition. Therefore, by virtue of having significant success in those aspects, the UNMIL could be branded as a success story (Howard, 2018). The fundamental role of UNMIL in the Liberian elections of 2005, and the development of economic revival led by The World Bank and the EU, was classified as a success.

However, a key point highlighted was the act that this plan also created distress in Liberia, and many saw it as a violation of their sovereignty (Wiharta, 2006). This brought about the controversial Governance and Economic Assistance Management Program (GEMAP), proposed by the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The effectiveness of Diehl and Druckman's Peace Evaluation Framework is questioned by (Farrall, 2012). McCandless addresses the primary sources of conflict in Liberia and the initiatives taken by the government and UNO (2008). She highlights critical conflict drivers like food insecurity, the weak justice system, poor leadership, identity-based divisions, and a lack of national identity, among others. Serious concerns were raised about the sustainability of the UN initiatives and a need for an Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBS) and integrating it with the existing policy frameworks. These references illustrate that the UN mandate is often issued unilaterally; the measures are often not durable due to a lack of local involvement, and conflict between the UN goals and those of the local population.

The available literature lacks retrospective analysis of the UN mission in Liberia, and the success of its nation-building measures, across the board. The post-2018 literature, on this subject, is primarily that of the UN reports, which has to be viewed with caution. Similarly, the prevailing narrative of 'the Liberian success story' seems to be dominant, where the actual progress made by Liberia is often exceedingly attributed solely to the UN. Therefore, caution also needs to be exercised in entirely attributing the Liberian transitions from a war-torn country to a peaceful, politically functioning state. Moreover, there are examples of countries where considerable progress was made, without any substantial involvement of the UN. Perhaps the biggest impediment to most the studies done on this subject is the dearth of available data, especially concerning economic, human well-being, and security indicators, which could be used to draw any substantial conclusions on the impact of the UN nation-building in concerned countries. Another critical aspect to consider is the disparity in the assigned mandate of the UN blue helmets, in various countries, which is why the criteria to measure the efficacy of nation-building may vary from counter to country.

Evaluation Framework for UN Nation-building Success

We have identified in the literature review that the traditional understanding of the term 'peacekeeping' forms merely a part of 'peacebuilding'. Peacekeeping constitutes only a small part of the overall mandate assigned to the UN missions of UNMIL, OUNSAL, and UNMIT. Among the most widely used peace operations evaluation frameworks is the one designed by Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman, in their book *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). Before this, Diehl created another peacekeeping evaluation parameter, based primarily on two main factors; the extent to which these operations limit armed conflicts and the extent to which they promote conflict resolution (Diehl, 1993).

The Evaluation Framework, presented by Diehl and Druckman, considers the peace operations evaluation as a series of interrelated steps. It starts by identifying the primary goals and objectives of a peacekeeping mission. Therefore, it automatically creates flexibility in the framework to apply to all the countries and areas where the UN has had to operate under different sets of objectives. The second step is the formation of an evaluation question. Moreover, the key indicators are then derived from the main objectives and the overall mandate. Each main generic objectives and part of the mandate may have multiple qualitative or quantitative indicators. For example, in the case of UNMIL, the crucial part of the assigned mandate was to stop conflict and start the democratization process. According to the Framework, the key indicators could be the number of terror attacks in a given timeframe, number of armed militia members, public participation in the general elections, and human rights indicators in the country (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). The next dimension of this framework is to identify measures of success or failure to answer the questions stated in the previous step. After that, the framework mentions the limitations and benefits of choosing the success measures as identified in step three. The final step of the Diehl and Druckman's Framework is to ascertain the extent to which primary goals have been accomplished. The above-mentioned measures were used by Diehl and Druckman to evaluate the success of the UN missions. The sustainability will be examined using the same framework; however, the effectiveness of the UN efforts will be measured in the post-mandate times. This is not to imply that sustainability was or could have been an objective of those

missions. Instead, it did understand the longevity of the efforts of UN missions beyond completion.

Sustainability Evaluation Framework for UNMIL

To apply the Diehl and Druckman's framework, we first analyze the core objectives of any UN mission. In the case of UNMIL, the objectives are 'conflict prevention', 'resolution', and 'peacebuilding'. The second step is to identify critical questions that may help us evaluate the success of failure of the UMIL. With this regard, the second step of the framework would be to identify the relevant key question. Diehl (2013) identifies the question as:

1) Is violence still present?
2) Have the violence levels decreased?
3) Has the number of armed combatants decreased?
4) How has the inter-group fighting casualty rate changed?

The next step is to establish measures of progress. For violence reduction and conflict prevention in Liberia, these would be the time without war, the number of new crimes and shooting, terror incidents registered in Liberia, and the change in the number of child soldiers. The Peace Operations Evaluation defines the final step as the recognition of certain benefits and drawbacks of our chosen progress measures. In the context of Liberia, we have limited or lack of quantitative data available and a lack of quantitative, first-hand data about other variables.

Analysis

To evaluate the overall success of the UN efforts in Liberia, under Diehl and Druckman's Framework, we need to address the above-mentioned indicators separately. Since the UNMIL mandate ended in March 2018, the indicators and statistics will be compared both during and after the departure of the UN mission.

The UNMIL mandate ended officially on March 30, 2018. In that year, the rate of both violent and non-violent crimes increased, compared to the previous year. Liberia 2019 Crime & Safety Report implies an overall increase in all the constituent crimes in these categories, including sexual assaults, 'snatch and grab', carjacking, and rape. The second key indicator for Liberia is to identify how the crime level has varied post-UNMIL. From the available data of the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), US Department of State, one can observe a steady increase in violent and non-violent crimes. In terms of the number of armed combatants, their reintegration in the society, and the level of inter-group fighting, the only available source is of the UN. The progress experienced by Liberia during the time of UNMIL is well-recognized. However, there is a dearth of reliable post-2018 figures, and the only measurable factor that we do have is that Liberia, despite its weak governance, is not facing any significant increase in internal armed conflicts (Council, 2018).

This paper considers the standards, key indicators, and initially identified questions, under the Diehl and Druckman's Framework, for the sustainability of the UNMIL. It may be concluded that although during the time between 2003-2018, Liberia made considerable strides in terms of democratization, human rights protection, and overall security situation, the post-mandate indicators show only partial sustainability (Council, 2018). In terms of crimes, security situation, Liberia has faced a decline since 2018. However, concerning democratization steps and human rights protection measures, there has not been any significant decline. One aspect that we need to consider in the case of Liberia is that the country still has a

newly established democratic government, police force, and bureaucracy. Therefore, some level of decline, in the sustainability of the nation-buildings factors, could be attributed to the void felt by the absence of UNMIL and the prevailing lack of capacity in the Liberian state.

El Salvador

The United Nations has had two major missions in El Salvador. El Salvador was ravished with civil war, in the 1980s, when the United Nations established its first observer group for Central America (i.e., ONUCA). It was one of the lowest involvement missions of the UN history, with its assigned mandate only limited to reporting inter-state rebel movement and support logistics for the insurgent groups in the Central American region (Montgomery, 1995). ONUCA was initially able to achieve success with its original mandate. Many contra fighters were disarmed, and weapons caches were taken into custody.

However, during the early 1990s, a new wave of intense civil war in El Salvador exacerbated a need for international intervention. In May 1991, under the UNSC resolution 693, the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established (Defence, 2018). The mandate was inclusive of many aspects of nation-building such as reinforcement of the terms of the peace agreement between the government and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). Furthermore, the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1995) shows the Security Council mandating OUNSAL to create a new police force, reforms in the judicial and electoral systems, and to ensure human rights protection. Here the Diehl and Druckman's Framework might be applied under different parameters. According to the Framework, the main objectives are; ensure peace agreement reinforcement, build and reform the national police force, observe and promote human rights, and introduce electoral and judicial reforms. The key questions could be:

1) Did the parties practice the terms of the agreement?
2) Did ONUSAL help to create a national police force?
3) Did the human rights situation improve in El Salvador?
4) Were the judicial and electoral reforms introduced?

The second step would be to identify the key indicators, which, in case of ONUSAL include the number of casualties and violent acts committed by members of FMNL and the government, police force members, their training, and SOPs, before and after the ONUSAL initiative, human rights indicators, such as the number of crimes, quality of life, and acts of violence. The number of war-related casualties is quantifiable and can be compared over time. However, police reforms may not be empirically qualified due to their subjectivity and the limited availability of the literature. Similarly, human rights indicators will include judicial reforms, human rights, and socioeconomic goals.

Analysis

The ONUSAL was officially present in El Salvador from 1991-1995. During that time, a few of the mission-related steps taken included disarmament and demobilization of the FMLN combatants and the creation of special disarmament zones for the of FMLN combatants inside the country. However, their reintegration proved to be much more difficult. Due to the lack of infrastructure and economic resources, the goal of disarmament and reintegration was only partially achieved.

Although the demobilization of FMLN combatants was fulfilled, the structural barriers present in the Salvadoran land laws, lack of government machinery, and the inability of the judiciary to resolve prevailing land disputes made reintegration of the former combatants especially difficult (Stein, 2012). The UN partly mediated the 1992 Peace Accord. The Chapultepec Accord opened the way for FMLN for political integration (Negroponte, 2012). Even today, FMLN is a major political party and has been in power up until recently (Renteria & Torres, 2019). Therefore, by our first measure of progress, we may attribute the ONUSAL initiatives to be not only fulfilling the initially assigned mandate of that time but also being sustainable, more than two decades after the end of the mission.

Before the civil war, the armed forced controlled most of the internal security inside El Salvador. The Chapultepec Accord of 1992 allowed for the creation of a new police force under the supervision of OUNSAL (Montgomery, 1995). By the time OUNSAL was leaving in 1995, the structural and operational weaknesses of the National Civil Police Force (PNC) were evident. As the primary authority over the civil law and order of El Salvador, the creation and functioning of PNC, along with the sustainability of its makeup and operational capacity can be assessed by measuring the crime rate and other related indicators in the country. Today, the country has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, along with that of extra judiciary killings, and many types of other violent crimes. The PNC proved inefficient to control these threats. However, in the past three years, the Salvadoran government has taken several policy reforms, such as 'Model Police Precinct' (MPP) that provides the PNC equipment and intelligence to focus on targeted operations. The MPP reforms did help bring down the homicide rate to some extent (Affairs, 2019). Thus far, the MPP reforms have been instituted in 19 departments and more than 50 local stations. The caveat is that the high crime rates and instability are not unique to El Salvador. Most of the Central American countries face a similar situation.

El Salvador also introduced judicial reforms, indicating many of its former leaders under the changers of corruption and misuse of power. This has, however, only been done in recent years, and is opposite to the principles of the amnesty granted to the combatants in the 1990s. Moreover, many of the suggestions of the UN Truth Commission, with regards to the judicial reforms, were never realized. Many of the judges that were identified as partisan are still in office, while neither a s specialized criminal justice system nor a prosecutorial system was implemented to allow for easy investigation of the human rights violations (Arteaga, 2016). By evaluating the progress measures and the key indicators for sustainability, we may conclude that despite the progress made in El Salvador during the mandate of ONUSAL in from 1991-1995, these measures have proved to be only partially sustainable, with diminishing success over time. This could be attributed to the inability and lack of willingness of the local government to follow-up on the ONUSAL efforts. The establishment of a police force, the reintegration of the combatants in the mainstream, and the restart of the political process are the areas where the ONUSAL measures have proved to be durable and sustainable. However, the lack of police reforms, creation of political factions inside PNA, rising crime rate, and the inability of the local judiciary to protect the human rights and prosecute the war criminals, raise serious concerns about the unsustainability of the OUNSAL measures, in this regard. Even the very few police and judicial reforms that have been made in the past few years have been in direct disparity to the guidelines and suggestions present either by ONUSAL or the UN Truth Commission. With the use of Diehl and Druckman's Framework in the context of ONUSAL, we may conclude that

the mission proved to be partially sustainable, with the most successfully achieved in the short-term objectives of the ONUSAL mandate.

Timor-Leste

The UN involvement in East Timor started in 1975, when the UNSC condemned the Indonesian invasion of the territory, although it had been on the UN agenda before that. To maintain brevity and to follow the same method as our previous cases, we will skim through the history of the conflict and focus only on the latest UN mission in the territory, i.e. United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT), lasting from 2006-2012 (Smith, 2010). East Timor was administered by Portugal, with significant autonomy for the locals. The conflict started in 1973 when Portugal intended to make East Timor one of its provinces. This led to a pushback by the Indonesian government, which invaded the territory and annexed it as its 27th province. The UN did not recognize Timor-Leste as an Indonesian Province. In June 1998, Indonesia proposed a limited autonomy plan for East Timor, which was signed in 1999. Resultantly, the first UN mission, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), was set to ascertain the reaction of the local population to the proposed Indonesian plan. Since then various missions have been sent, with different mandates: The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), from 1999-2002, and the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), from May 2002-2005.

On August 25, 2006, the UNSC Resolution 1704 established the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). It was given the mandate to assist in furthering capacity for monitoring, protecting, and promoting of human rights, provide support to the national police, support Timor-Leste in all aspects of the presidential and parliamentary election in the country, and Cooperate and coordinate with UN and other NGOs to assist in capacity-building and post-conflict peacebuilding. These were also the main objectives of UNMIT, as per Diehl and Druckman's Framework. Therefore, the critical questions for the UNMIT mandate could be as follows:

1) Do the existing institutions in East Timor help protect human rights?
2) Did the police force receive any funding, equipment, or other forms of support from UNMIT?
3) Did UNMIT provide any financial, technical, logistical, or other types of support to further the democratic process in the country?
4) Did UNMIT and INGOs help in conflict-prevention, peace sustenance, or institutional capacity of the East Timor government?

For East Timor, we have to rely on key questions from the cases of other UN missions, with similar mandates. In the existing literature on the subject, there seems to be a dearth of reliable application of the Diehl and Druckman's Framework for UNMIT. The critical progress measures for assessment question could be the human rights index, the number of violent and non-violent crimes, size and strength of the police force, funding, experts, logistics, or volunteers provided to East Timor, by the UN to conduct elections, and training, funding, or any other form of capacity-building offered to the peacekeeping institutions. The benefits and limitations of these

measures could be human rights indicators, which are present in all three cases. The second factor, too, is a consistent theme across all three cases. The third measure, size, and strength are easily quantifiable, and any increase in that could be attributed to the efforts of UNMIT, as it was the only entity in East Timor at that time with this mandate. Finally, the last two factors may not offer observable trends over the years and need to be compared to other sources.

Analysis

The UNMIT worked closely with the government of Timor-Leste and other relevant state institutions, during 2006-2012. The UN human rights workers were free to examine the detention centers of the country. Since 2008, the government publishes annual National Priorities and Developmental Sectoral Plan (UNESCO Office Jakarta and Regional Bureau for Science in Asia and the Pacific, 2013). The NP. listed several crucial areas as the government's intent to deliver goods to the people. A few of the top priorities, according to these documents, were good-governance, public safety, access to justice, and gender equality. The government penalized violence against women and adopted the Law Against Domestic Violence (LADV), in 2010.

An Asian Development Bank report in 2014 recognized the bridging gender gap in education, politics, and employment. At that time, Timor Leste had the highest rate of female parliamentarians in Asia and the Pacific, at 38%. (Asian Development Bank, 2014). Similarly, the economic indicators of Timor-Leste indicate a steady GDP growth, a trend that continued even after the departure of UNMIT (Asian Development Bank, 2014). However, the country continues to rank very high in corruption index and has an increasing crime rate in the past few years (Macro Trends, n.d.). The yearly health spending has increased annually as a total % of the GDP. As of 2016, the country spends more than 4.02% of its GDP on healthcare.

The number of violent and non-violent crimes peaked in 2007, followed by a steadily declining trend ever since. A similar trend was observed in the homicide trend, which peaked in 2007 at 5.82 per 100,000 and reached the lowest level in 2009 at 2.93. However, since then, the rate has increased steadily and was observed at 3.95 in 2015 (Macro Trends, n.d.; Atlas, 2015).

As mandated, the UNMIT undertook several measures to build and train national police for Timor-Leste. The first batch of 25 members of the *Policia Nacional de Timor Leste* (PNTL) was sent on field duty, under the supervision and the mentoring of the UN Police. Pakistan was one of the most active contributors to the UN police in the country, with over 900 members serving under the UNMIT mandate (UNMIT, 2012). The UN forces primarily supervised the elections of 2012. In the parliamentary elections of 2012, the UNMIT assisted on many fronts, such as policing (UNPOL assisting PNTL to provide security), Secretariado Tecnico de Administracao Eleitoral (STAE) and Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE) with voter registration, voter education, and information technology, as well as logistical support (UN, 2012). The subsequent elections conducted were mostly without any international support (U.S. Department of State, 2017).

To understand the sustainability of the UNMIT measures, we have considered data and reports both from 2006-2012 and after the departure of UNMIT in 2012 (ADB, 2014; Atlas, 2015; World Bank, 2018). In terms of human rights progress measures, the country continues to make strides in terms of education, political inclusivity, and gender equality. There has been, however, an increase in the crime rate in recent years. The creation and training of the police force was another key objective of the UNMIT. Since the 2012 elections, PNTL has taken control of the

internal security of the country. The PNTL forces alone, without the assistance of any international policing force, supported the 2016 elections. In this regard, the nation-building measures seem to prove sustainable. Another critical mandate was to help kick-start the political democratic process in the country. The 2012 elections were heavily reliant on the support of UNPOL and technical support of UNMIT.

However, the elections afterward have been carried out using the resources of the local government. Despite a few instances of political violence, there seems to be a sense of confidence in the public over the democratic process. Hence, we may conclude that under Diehl and Druckman's Framework, the UNMIT was largely successful. By accessing the relevant indicators post-2012, we may ascertain that the measures taken by UNMIT have generally proven to be sustainable.

Conclusion

The reason for evaluating three different UN missions was to provide overall conclusions and results in a holistic frame of reference. UNMIL, OUNSAL, and UNMIT were all created under different political and security situations of Liberia, El Salvador, and Timor-Leste, respectively. Nevertheless, we also observe that the UN mandates in these missions had a considerable similarity. This helped us use Diehl and Druckman's Framework for evaluation to develop a better understanding of the factors that impact the sustainability of the nation-building measures when the mandate of the UN missions has considerable similarities. We find that the UN often becomes too ambitious in terms of defining missions' mandate. The use of loose and subjective terms, such as 'democratization', 'community-building', and 'civil liberties' are often not limited and defined by quantitative parameters. Therefore, it becomes rather tricky to use these objectives, to measure the sustainability of the UN missions. In the case of ONUSAL, we find that with time, the mandate of the mission may change, which may result in infarction between the UN peacekeepers and the local population. This also implies that, while evaluating any UN mission, one must be open to the possibility of the said mission members having their vested interests, which may sometimes contradict those determined by the UN headquarter. The example of UNMIL is quite relevant, where the locals accused a few UN officials of extortions and sexual misconduct.

Any unilateral action of the part of the UN often proves to be counter-productive, especially if the objectives are long-term, such as the civil transition of power and creation of a self-sustaining police force. Whether or not a specific mandate is fulfilled depends mainly upon the cooperation of the local community. In the case of ONUSAL, the UN faced significant obstacles in establishing a peace force, while the same was achieved with great success, in UNMIT. It is concluded that the reason for this disparity was the fact that the former was done unilaterally, without including the local stakeholders, while the latter was achieved after a national consensus and the will of the warring factions to cooperate with the UN.

The originally assigned mandate to the UN forces is generally vague, highly optimistic, and often not quantitatively measurable. It, therefore, leaves much room for subjectivity, speculative opinion, and even conflicting political interests to gauge and interpret the UN performance in any particular country, according to one's political and national interests. Building upon the previous point, it may be more reliable to define mandate focusing on small objective goals, such as 'disarmament of the combatants', 'brokering a peace deal', or providing 'professional training to the local police', compared to rather broad goals of 'political inclusiveness' or 'democratization. The departure of the UN forces led to the resumption of violence, a

rise in crime, and the resurgence of militant factions, in all of the three countries. For a newly instituted government, there seems to be a lack of capacity to completely overcome these threats, as observed in the case of rising crime in Timor-Leste after 2012. It is, therefore, worth considering to end a peacekeeping mission, in two stages: peacekeeping and nation-building (capacity building as a mandatory component of the latter). The UN priorities in the beginning and the end of a mission may change completely. It is, therefore, advisable to update the mandate of the UN forces. For example, in 1992 and amnesty was granted by the UN to the combatants of the El Salvadoran civil war. The UN Truth Commission reiterated the same. However, after the departure of ONUSAL, these war criminals started militancy again and could not be prosecuted due to the amnesty granted to them. In the case of a peacekeeping mandate, the UN forces must remain non-partisan and aware of the violence and human rights atrocities committed by the government. A certain level of flexibility must be maintained as long as negotiations are being carried out. However, any inadvertent proclivity towards the government's side might result in post-UN-mission violence, as was witnessed in El Salvador after the end of the ONUSAL mandate.

In all three cases, it was observed that the overall sustainability of the UN nation-building measures relies primarily on the police and judicial systems. Therefore, in a post-peacekeeping stage, the UN mission priorities should include human rights metrics, economic prosperity, and gender equality, and improvements in police and judicial system. Political integration and economic incentives may halt the on-going trend of resurging violence. The window between Disarmament, Demobilization Reforms (DDRs) and Security Sector Reforms (SSRs) are often very short. The chances of conflict relapse increase if the transition phase is prolonged. It is, therefore, necessary to keep these elements in the loop and allow them to absorb the progress made during that time so that there is more incentive for them to work with the UN forces for the next phases of the missions.

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Cyber Peacekeeping: Critical Evaluation of Digital Blue Helmets Program

Fahad Nabeel[1]

Abstract

In 2016, the United Nations (UN) launched the Digital Blue Helmets (DBH) program under its Office of Information and Communications Technologies (OICT). The launching of DBH was a continuation of a series of steps that the UN and its related agencies and departments have undertaken over the past decade to incorporate cyberspace within their working methodologies. At the time of inception, DBH was envisioned as a team capacitated to act as a replica of a physical peacekeeping force but for the sole purpose of overseeing cyberspace(s). Several research studies have been published in the past few years, which have conceptualized cyber peacekeeping in various ways. Some scholars have mentioned DBH as a starting point of cyber peacekeeping while some have proposed models for integration of cyber peacekeeping within the current UN peacekeeping architecture. However, no significant study has attempted to look at how DBH has evolved since its inception. This research article aims to examine the progress of DBH since its formation. It argues that despite four years since its formation, DBH is still far away from materializing its declared objectives. The article also discusses the future potential roles of DBH, including its collaboration with UN Global Pulse for cyber threat detection and prevention, and embedding the team along with physical peacekeepers.

Keywords
Cyber peacekeeping, Cyberspace, Digital Blue Helmets (DBH), peacekeeping

Introduction
Since 1948, United Nations peacekeeping missions have undergone gradual transformation (Akatyev & James, 2017). From the initial deployments for solely dealing with inter-state conflicts, the structure of peacekeeping missions transformed in the late 1980s to incorporate deployment for intra-state conflicts and civil wars (Kenkel, 2013; Solà-Martín & Woodhouse, 2011). Over the decades, peacekeeping missions followed the traditional model of military deployment for various political purposes like monitoring ceasefires and patrolling buffer zones between hostile parties. However, a growing number of UN operations are becoming multidimensional with the involvement of multiple stakeholders and wide-ranging mandates (United Nations, 2003). The current thirteen UN peacekeeping missions have diverse nature of mandates from observing ceasefire line in disputed Jammu and

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Kashmir to protecting civilians and consolidating peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.).

While technological advancements have transformed the global political and economic landscape, the same technologies are also being used to disrupt the political, economic and social orders in various parts of the world. The disruption is occurring in the form of cyber-attacks, cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns and other strands of cybercrimes. However, the UN peacekeeping operations currently do not deal with challenges emanating from cyberspace and lack functionality with respect to the launch of cyberspace operations (Akatyev & James, 2017). This is primarily so because the traditional UN peacekeeping operations are not authorized to employ potential cyber peacekeepers in the following four situations which generally lead towards peacekeeping mandate (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.);

- Preventing or limiting the spread of conflicts;
- Facilitating the implementation of peace agreements;
- Stabilizing conflict regions after a ceasefire is reached;
- Assisting post-conflict states in their transition to a stable government.

Therefore, the UN makes itself incapable of incorporating cyber component in peacekeeping missions (Almutawa, 2020). Additionally, the UN is handicapped in terms of knowledge and human resources in dealing with cyberspace related threats (Dorn, 2017). The international organization also lacks in-depth knowledge about threats emanating from cyberspace and cyberwarfare capabilities possessed by various countries. The rapid advancement in information and communications technology demands further transformation in UN peacekeeping (Nabeel, 2019). In this regard, the United Nations launched the DBH program in 2016. It was one of the several measures taken by the organization in the past few years for promoting cyber safety worldwide (Office of Information and Communications Technology, n.d.).

The DBH unit was created under the UN's Office of Information and Communications Technologies (OICT). It was formed to "enhance cybersecurity preparedness, resilience and response" to protect the UN and its agencies. By incorporating the term *Blue Helmets*, there is a possibility that the unit can prevent, mitigate and deal with future global cyberattacks (Dorn & Webb, 2019, p. 22).

Before DBH's launch, some research studies re-centred their focus to conceptualize cyber peacekeeping (Akatyev & James, 2015; Cahill et al., 2003; Kleffner & Dinniss, 2013). Some scholars viewed DBH as starting point for cyber peacekeeping (Akatyev & James, 2017) while others were proposing various models for integrating cyber peacekeeping within current UN peacekeeping architecture (Robinson et al., 2019; Almutawa, 2020). However, no significant study has so far attempted to explore how DBH has evolved since its formation in 2016. Considering this gap, this research article investigates the objectives behind the formation of DBH and how the programme has evolved to fulfil those objectives.

Despite its formation in 2016, there is still limited data points and limited availability of literature regarding day to day functionality of the DBH program. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, DBH has to maintain secrecy regarding its internal operations. This practice is in lines with how traditional intelligence agencies operate in terms of their routine functionality. Secondly, the mandate of DBH is not very expansive in nature. Simply put, it is not for cyber peacekeeping. DBH is doing for the UN what any cybersecurity department does within an

organization to secure it from external attacks (Personal communication, June 12, 2020).

To overcome this limitation, this article heavily relies on the publically available information released by UN OICT, interviews given by UN Chief Information Technology Officer (CITO) Atefeh Riazi about the DBH initiative and what former employees have publically shared about their activities at the DBH. Additionally, an interview was also conducted with Professor Walter Dorn of Royal Military College & Canadian Forces College who has been in contact with the DBH team and has been following the initiative since its formation. The analysis of the literature gathered from primary and secondary sources has facilitated the conclusion that DBH is still far away from materializing its proposed objectives.

In the first part of this article, a synopsis of how the UN and its related agencies and departments are incorporating cyberspace within their operations is presented. The second part provides an introductory profile of the DBH program. This is followed by the current progress of DBH in materializing its objectives and how it has evolved ever since its creation. The concluding section of the article aims to understand the potential roles that DBH can play in future and provides recommendations on how an entity can further improve itself in the long run.

Understanding UN Cyberspace-related Activities

Before discussing the DBH programme, it is essential to develop an understanding of the activities undertaken by the UN concerning cyberspace. In this technological era, different agencies and departments within the UN are paying attention to cyberspace in various ways. In 2009, the UN Global Pulse program was initiated to employ big data and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to large-scale data analysis for humanitarian challenges and predict humanitarian catastrophes (UN Global Pulse, 2012; Global Pulse, n.d.).

Since 2011, International Multilateral Partnership against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) — an organization bringing together various stakeholders to enhance the global community's capabilities in dealing with cyber threats — has acted as the cybersecurity executing arm of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Due to this role, it has been offering assistance and support to ITU member states and organizations within the UN system in terms of cybersecurity and cybercrime-related issues (Digital Watch, n.d.). However, IMPACT has limited scope due to several factors which include no involvement of major national cyber powers and a focus of the organization on training and monitoring for businesses (Akatyev & James, 2017, p. 5).

In 2016, four UN-related agencies and departments — the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime — collaborated with World Bank and other organizations to create 'Combatting Cybercrime: Tools and Capacity Building for Emerging Economies' toolkit. This toolkit aimed to empower policymakers, legislators, public prosecutors & investigators, and civil society of developing countries to enhance their capacity in the policy, legal and criminal justice aspects to combat cybercrime (Combatting Cybercrime, n.d.).

The UN Secretary-General António Guterres convened a High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation in July 2018. The objective behind convening such a panel was to strengthen cooperation in the digital space among various stakeholders ranging

from governments to the technical community (Digital Cooperation, n.d.). Additionally, the prime functions of the Panel are raising awareness about the impact of digital technologies across society and contributing to public discourse pertaining to safe and inclusive digital future for all while taking into account relevant human rights norms.

The Panel submitted a report titled *The Age of Digital Interdependence* to the Secretary-General in June 2019 (United Nations, 2020). The report explained how digital technology could help in achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and a more inclusive digital economy. Taking into account issues related to human rights, human agency and security in the digital realm, the report proposed on how to improve digital cooperation architecture (United Nations, n.d.). The report and follow-up discussions have been incorporated in UN Secretary-General's Roadmap on Digital Cooperation. The report states that "digital technologies can support United Nations peacekeeping efforts globally, including by ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers" (Report of the Secretary-General Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, 2020).

The ITU also maintains the Global Cybersecurity Index. The index is a multi-stakeholder initiative to measure the commitment of countries to the ITU's Global Cybersecurity Agenda. The rationale behind the formation of the index is to forge international cooperation and promote knowledge exchange on this topic (International Telecommunication Union, n.d.). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime oversees Global Programme on Cybercrime. The programme has been formed to assist member states in terms of capacity building and technical assistance against cyber-related crimes (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, n.d.). Currently, increased usage of technology by peacekeeping operations has been observed. However, the operations are limited in data, tools analysis and human resources for information processing. Similarly, there is no keen interest in incorporating cyberspace into peacekeeping efforts (Akatyev & James, 2017, p. 5).

Introductory Profile about Digital Blue Helmets Program

The DBH team consists of cybersecurity practitioners specializing in cyber audit and assessment, big data, data analysis, event monitoring, digital forensics, operations and environment testing. It currently functions out of the OICT, Department of Management in New York (United Nations Careers, n.d.). UN CITO Atefeh Riazi explained the rationale behind the formation of DBH as potential peacekeepers who "can operate in the cyber world protecting the UN from cyber intrusion, and helping our substantive arms in delivering their missions in the cyber world" (Tucci, 2016).

Recruitment for DBH started around February 2016. Human trafficking was one of the primary issues which the team was to focus upon its formation in addition to playing a decisive role in cybersecurity and combating cybercrime. The ultimate aim of DBH, as explained by Atefeh Riazi, was "a model for creating what we are calling the light web. When we dream about developing a light web to counteract the evil part of the dark web, this is how we start." Furthermore, the program was to serve as a nodal platform for information exchange and coordination of protective and defensive measures against information technology security incidents against the UN and its related agencies and initiatives (United Nations, n.d.). The DBH brochure (Office of Information and Communications Technology, n.d.) issued by the UN's OICT has identified nine responsibilities of DBH which include uncovering suspicious activities in cyberspace through Big Data and analytics; undertaking

SWOT analysis of UN cybersecurity regime; formulation of cybersecurity strategy for the UN to support its goals; building partnerships and collaboration across the UN on cybersecurity; building capacity to counter current and future threats in cyberspace; building cyber defences beyond firewalls and anti-virus software; building resilience against infrastructure penetration; building digital tools for new ways of cybersecurity and undertaking all efforts through Cyber Operations Centres.

Additionally, the DBH programme is mandated to proactively research and coordinate potential mitigation of at least 19 potential cyber threats (United Nations, n.d.). By doing so, the program is aimed at supporting the UN and its partners in the implementation of 10 out of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, n.d.). In terms of managing cyber risks about SDGs and UN Global Compact's Principles, the DBHs have to undertake action in the five areas of focus which primarily include protecting food chains, supply networks and commodities trading markets from cyber-attacks; stopping cyberbullying, exploitation of children, online human trafficking and online illicit trafficking; protecting critical infrastructure, financial markets and institutions from cyber-attacks; preventing cyber corporate espionage, online exploitation, identity theft and financial cybercrime and combating online recruitment of terrorist groups.

The DBH framework comprises of five key action lines, which include help in preventing and combating cyber warfare; protection of critical infrastructure from cyberattacks; facilitating dialogue to ensure a peaceful, open, secure, and cooperative cyberspace; prevent and stop trafficking and online exploitation of people and counter cyber threats to human and economic development (Office of Information and Communications Technology, n.d.).

Materializing DBH's Objectives: Progress and Constraints

Currently, IT professionals and data scientists who work for companies like Google, Amazon, or Tableau are contributing two to three hours of their time to look at problems as part of DBH (Scruggs, 2018). It remains unclear as to how not having a full-time dedicated specialized staff is impacting the functionality of the programme. These professionals have expertise in cybercrime, cyber protection, cybersecurity monitoring. The model which the UN has employed to incorporate their contributions is almost identical to a Code for America model, a model wherein tech and design industry professionals help state and local governments to serve their communities in a better manner (Code for America, n.d.). A review of DBH activities reveals that its current scope of activity is primarily focused on protecting the UN infrastructure (Almutawa, 2020). The program appears to focus primarily on Dark Web and critical infrastructure issues (Akatyev & James, 2017). Additionally, the team has been actively monitoring social media and support projects for achieving SDGs. The programme has built partnerships with several UN entities, including Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and UN Women. (Fosse, n.d.).

Moreover, no line of action has been taken so far to protect member states from cybersecurity threats (Dorn, 2017). It was hoped that the UN would be able to assist member states in future once a cadre of cyber protectors is developed (Dorn, 2017). However, no lead has been taken in this regard so far. This is primarily because DBH is not a cyber peacekeeping unit as considered earlier when it was formed (W. Dorn, Personal communication, June 12, 2020).

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are not interested in allowing the UN to assist member states against cyber-attacks. This is a major strategic objection which prevents the UN from facilitating member states in terms of cybersecurity. However, the incumbent UN Secretary-General has offered his good offices "to contribute to the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflict stemming from malicious activity in cyberspace" (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2018, n.d.) through Actions 30 and 31 of the Implementation Plan for Agenda for Disarmament (Implementation Plan, n.d.). Apart from this, an inventory of potential human resources was identified through ITU for undertaking cybersecurity investigations. However, no progress was achieved in this regard (W. Dorn, Personal communication, June 12, 2020).

Some of the activities undertaken by the DBH team include monitoring trafficking of people in the dark web or cryptocurrency and money laundering (Maguire, 2018). In terms of combating terrorism, not much is known except that the DBH team is currently reviewing 'Forensics in a USB stick' solution developed by a team at Singapore Institute of Technology. The solution can be employed for collecting forensic data from computing equipment used by terrorists (Sitizen, 2020).

Along with the UN Office of Information, Communication & Technology Innovation, DBH has been co-hosting the blockchain lab. Like other related agencies, UN Women's work on the blockchain is actively supported by the DBH (UN Women, n.d.). The team has also been working on various applications of Ethereum blockchain (Kryptomoney, 2017). In August 2017, the DBH hosted UN Blockchain Day. The team led a summit in October in New York to speak about how blockchain and other innovative technologies are aiding their humanitarian agenda (Su-Kyong Park, 2017; United Nations, 2017). According to an August 2017 desk review, fifteen United Nations programs were carrying out blockchain initiatives (Starkie, 2017). DBH has also been able to assist peacekeeping operations in terms of securing their online systems and identifying vulnerabilities in their systems through the red teaming approach (W. Dorn, Skype interview, June 12, 2020).

No exact figures are available to suggest the budget allocation of DBH. However, it can be deduced that a very minimal amount is currently being spent on the initiative considering that the UN spends about 6-7 per cent of its budget on information technology (Scruggs, May 2018). Moreover, no details are available to suggest what possible linkages DBH might have with non-UN entities. Considering visible presence of various UN-related initiatives and programs across social media platforms, it is surprising to see that DBH has virtually no presence on social media. A Twitter handle of Digital Blue Helmets (@UN_DigitalBlue) was created in December 2015 (Digital Blue Helmets, 2015). However, the handle has not posted any relevant updates in nearly four and a half years.

Future Outlook and Way Forward

In the long run, the program aims to focus on eight measures: to build the UN's defences against external threats, enrich national cybersecurity defenses for member states, mitigate the effects of 'zero-day' vulnerabilities, establish additional cybersecurity ground rules, promote digital IDs and encourage the shift to biometrics, encourage more robust encryption, combat online trafficking and finally, to improve the ability of the UN to deliver on its mandates through secured ICT (Office of Information and Communications Technology, n.d.).

There is a need for enhanced usage of digital technologies in facilitating peacekeeping operations in future. In this regard, tracking technology could facilitate precision peacekeeping, which will allow for the deployment of most appropriate persons in most appropriate locations. In the near future, the DBH could employ cyber threat hunting and other feasible and ethical means like honey pots, clever decoys and white-hat hackers (Dorn, 2020).

The scope of the DBH program could be expanded in the future to cover an array of related issues of cybercrime and counterterrorism. In order to materialize such efforts, it is essential that additional expertise and resources are available and can be effectively put to use. The team can be complemented with the establishment of a Cyber Peace Corps, built from the Peace Corps and AmeriCorps, in which volunteer cybersecurity professionals would serve clients from all across the world whereas UN cyber peacekeepers would be able to focus on nation-state cyber conflicts. Coupled with Cyber Peace Corps, DBH will have a crucial role to play in managing cyber risks pertaining to SDGs and UN Global Compact's Principles. DBH is expected to focus on cybercrime and primarily cyber-underground marketplaces in the long run (Akatyev & James, 2017, p. 5).

By overlooking the cyber dimension, the UN has reduced the effectiveness of modern peacekeeping operations, which may require cyber intervention. There are several ways in which UN peacekeeping may incorporate cyber component by including protection of the critical information infrastructure of countries (cyber buffer zone); facilitate conflict parties in neutralizing malware; provide IT services to restore the telecommunications and financial system in the post-ceasefire environment; assisting post-conflict countries in transitioning towards stabilization by imparting IT support to local governments by establishing online legal information systems and online education systems (Almutawa, 2020).

Meanwhile, the DBH team could undertake a role that would help with the investigation of a future cyber-attack upon request. A potentially beneficial convergence of interests can be developed between DBH and UN Global Pulse program in terms of data collection and analysis tasks. This collaboration can be helpful in cyber threat detection, prevention and mitigation. However, no details are as yet available, which can imply that such collaboration is either under discussion or is going to materialize in the near future (Akatyev & James, 2017, p. 6). There is also a need for specific allocation within the UN's IT Budget for DBH so that the programme is able to implement its objectives.

The future team composition of the DBH team could include personnel assigned by cyber-contributing countries, cyber-contributing organizations, volunteer experts and UN cyber staff. This team coming from diverse backgrounds could engage in selected projects which are according to their expertise and impartiality. Although it could be challenging to find well-trained and specialized staff from countries and organizations, the UN has been able to overcome such challenges in the past when assembling peacekeeping operations, fact-finding missions and inspection bodies (Dorn & Webb, 2019, p. 22). For fulfilling its challenging mandates, the UN can bring along teams from think tanks and AI-focused institutes and forge a working partnership with DBH. In this way, these teams will be able to have access to the data and resources of the UN's 50-plus agencies and organizations and their domain experts (Smith, 2017).

Using case studies of other UN-related initiatives and programs, the DBH program also needs to work on its social media projection. Currently, the team almost lacks any virtual presence on social media platforms. Likewise, a dedicated website

for DBH program should be allocated, which can act as a one-stop reference for all activities related to the program. The website can also provide a tracker to help in understanding where the program stands in terms of materializing its objectives. This will help in bringing transparency in its operations.

Meanwhile, in order to fully operationalize cyber peacekeeping, it is vital to increase awareness about the concept among UN member states and all across the world. In this regard, more research and consultation will be needed regarding conceptualization, implementation and operationalization of such an initiative. A review of existing scholarship related to the terms 'cyber peacekeeping' and 'cyber peacekeeping' returned thin results; highlighting the dearth of literature. Countries will need to come to support the UN by providing their cyber experts on loan as they have been providing personnel for physical peacekeeping.

Conclusion

Despite the formation of DBH more than four years ago, the program remains in its infancy stage. Several factors appear to have acted as stumbling blocks in keeping the program from completely materializing its objectives. Primary among these blocks is the failure to have specialized onboard staff on a long-term basis for the program. This has had serious consequences regarding the functionality of the program on a prolonged and consistent basis. Secondly, limited budget allocation prevents DBH and other relatable IT projects to harness their full potentials. In addition to the aforementioned challenging factors, failure to adopt a comprehensive strategy regarding the areas that the program envisions to cover have resulted in the uncertain future of the program. Moreover, the uncertainty about its collaboration with non-UN entities prevents the program from achieving its goals with respect to SDGs. Negligible information about its day to day operations result in painting an unclear picture about its current functionality and how it will be able to evolve in future.

The aforementioned issues necessitate a much-needed introspection within DBH regarding whether it is on track to materialize its objectives or not. DBH should have evolved much faster than where it currently stands. It also needs to be more transparent in future (W. Dorn, Personal communication, June 12, 2020). This article can be considered as an exploratory study to look at how DBH has evolved since its formation. Future research studies, depending on availability of literature or access to DBH operations, can understand whether the program is turning out to be a success by formulating some sort of pre-defined criteria to gauge its successes and failures and further explore how the program can potentially play an important role in future.

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Bangladesh's Policy on Rohingya Refugees: Securitization or What?

Taufiq-e-Faruque[1]

Abstract

This article adopts Copenhagen School, and Paris School approaches belonging to the broader framework of securitization theory in explaining whether Bangladesh's policy on the 2017-18 Rohingya refugee influx from neighbouring Myanmar has been securitized. In doing so, it analyses how the political discourses and governmental actions in Bangladesh have transformed over time. The findings suggest that human security-focused discourse, which was sensitive to the refugees, prevailed in Bangladesh during the initial days of the refugee influx. However, the national security-focused discourse has started to dominate the country's refugee policy as Bangladesh's early repatriation-oriented refugee policy has failed to yield any development for more than two years. Moreover, the lack of sincere efforts from Myanmar to provide security assurance and necessary civil rights to the displaced Rohingyas has made them reluctant to go back. As a result, the refugee settlement in Bangladesh is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. In such a situation, newly imposed securitized actions taken by Bangladesh as restricting the refugees from movement, mobile communication, internet, and livelihood opportunity could be counterproductive. It recommends Bangladesh to develop a comprehensive policy on the refugee issue that will address the country's security concerns and facilitate sustainable repatriation of the Rohingyas to Myanmar.

Introduction

Previously, Bangladesh had hosted two major Myanmar-origin Rohingya refugee exoduses, first in 1978-79 and second in the early 1990s. The third and the most massive exodus of Rohingya refugees in recorder history started shortly-after 25 August 2017, when a Rohingya insurgent group named the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked several security check-pots in Myanmar's Rakhine state, the place of habitual residence of the Rohingyas. In retaliation, the Myanmar armed forces carried out a series of violent military offensives throughout the Rohingya villages in Rakhine state. Following the military crackdown, more than 742,000 Rohingya people took refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh's Teknaf-Ukhiya Peninsula region in Cox's Bazar district. Initially, Bangladesh was reluctant to allow

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the incoming refugees to take shelter inside its territory, but as the humanitarian situation deteriorated and global opinion intensified, the government decided to accept refugees (Oh, 2017). The local people came up with heavy hearts to provide much-needed emergency relief assistance to the Rohingyas fleeing persecution from the other side of the border. With the support of United Nations (UN) agencies, non-government organizations (NGOs), and donor countries, the Bangladesh government has led a massive humanitarian response to 'the world's fastest-growing refugee crisis' of that time (UN News, 2017). The international community has applauded Bangladesh for its contribution to the 'global public good' by providing shelter and assistance to these large number of Rohingyas (Sun & Haung, 2019).

Bangladesh is neither a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, nor has it any legal status for refugees in its Constitution. From the very onset of the Rohingya refugee crisis, Bangladeshi has followed a short-term approach to the crisis. The Bangladesh government did not acknowledge the newly arrived Rohingyas as 'refugees' and signed an immediate repatriation agreement with the Myanmar government on 23 November 2017. Following this agreement, Bangladesh and Myanmar have made two attempts to repatriate the refugees — first on 15 November 2018 and a second one on 22 August 2019. Both the attempts have failed primarily because the Rohingyas are reluctant to go back to the Rakhine state without securing citizenship and other fundamental rights which are being denied by the Myanmar government (Banka, 2019). Hence, it is very likely that the Rohingya displacement crisis will become a protracted one (Uddin, 2020). Therefore, the short-term approach of Bangladesh has already failed as the repatriating process has reached a deadlock (International Crisis Group, 2019). The Bangladeshi officials fear that acknowledging Rohingyas as 'refugees' would only attract more Rohingya to come to Bangladesh from the violence-prone Rakhine state (Sullivan, 2020). Moreover, the short-term approach has practical consequences for the humanitarian response as it restricts the aid agencies to initiate any medium or long-term facilities for the Rohingyas.

Following the second aborted repatriation attempt in late August 2019, Bangladeshi public opinion has significantly shifted against the Rohingyas (Bhuiyan, 2019). The locals in Cox's Bazar have started to blame the Rohingyas for various social problems and have become reluctant to host them anymore (Uddin, 2020). Growing increasingly tired of hosting refugees, the Bangladesh government has also toughened its policies towards the refugees to coerce them to go back to Myanmar (Chowdhury, 2019). Some of the newly taken measures include restrictions on movements, confiscation of mobile phones, ban of high-speed mobile internet, installation of barbed wire fences around the camps, increased surveillance, the expulsion of some NGOs from the humanitarian operation, and reports of increasing human rights violations of refugees by Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies (International Crisis Group, 2019). The Bangladesh government has justified these measures to ensure necessary 'security, law, and order' inside the refugee camps (Shahid, 2019).

What is the origin of those visible changes in Bangladeshi public opinion and the government's policy towards the Rohingya refugees? The theory of securitization might provide an essential explanation to this question. Securitization theory holds that the creation of a security issue is the result of an actor's effort to construct topics as representing a security threat through speech act (Buzan et al., 1998). It argues that a securitized issue is resolved through *extraordinary measures*, which are not justified under normal circumstances. In this article, the securitization

theory will be utilized to examine how different actors in Bangladesh have contributed to the creation of Rohingya refugees as a security threat, which allowed the government to implement the 'tougher' policies. Accordingly, the newly introduced restrictive policies inside the refugee camps are assumed as securitized measures in this article.

To pursue the research objectives as described above, the article explores how the Rohingya refugee crisis has been securitized in Bangladeshi political landscape following the second failed repatriation attempt in August 2019, leading to the implementation of restrictive policies inside the refugee camps.

Although different explanations and dynamics might contribute to this change in public perception of Rohingyas as a security threat, this article assumes a central role for political leaders in the social construction of this perception. Accordingly, the main goal of this research is to examine how this perception has been constructed in the political landscape following the second aborted attempt to initiate the repatriation process in August 2019. This study can contribute by highlighting the question if the Rohingyas need protection against conflict and prosecution in Myanmar or Bangladesh needs protection against the threats from the Rohingyas.

Based on the mentioned research question, this article consists of the following elements. The first section presents the theoretical framework of the research. In this section, securitization theory as a framework for analysis, as well as its two different approaches, Copenhagen School and Paris School, will be discussed. Afterwards, the methodology is explained. The third section traces Bangladesh's policies towards Rohingya refugees from a historical perspective. The fourth section constitutes the main empirical chapter of this article. This section explains how the political discourses and policy measures on the Rohingya refugee situation in Bangladesh developed and shifted over time. Based on the findings and analysis, the last section offers some policy recommendations.

Theoretical Framework: Securitization Theory

Traditionally, the notion of security was concentrated on the threat or actual use of force between political actors. The traditional approach primarily focused on military issues, where the states were both the subjects and objects of reference. Securitization theory was developed as a result of the 'widening and broadening' of security agenda after the end of the Cold War. Through this development, new security issues like the environment, public health, refugee, and migration got significant attention as security objects by both analysts and policymakers. Initially, the Copenhagen School expanded the literature on security issues, by introducing a new approach to security that is social constructivist and multi-sectorial. Inspired by Foucault's concept of biopolitics, another understanding of securitization has been developed, which is known as the Paris School approach. It focuses on the role of power relations, bureaucratic politics, and institutional interests in determining who or what issues are securitized and what sort of measures are promoted to resolve the threats.

The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School of security studies was primarily developed by Waever, Buzan, and De Wilde (1998). It argues that a security issue is socially constructed whether the security issue is actual or not. The approach makes a difference between non-politicized, politicized, and securitized issues. A particular issue becomes *politicized* when it enters the public debate. Afterwards, it becomes *securitized* if the

problem is considered as an urgent, existential threat. This process justifies for controversial measures that go beyond usual political actions (Buzan et al., 1998).

The core concepts introduced by the Copenhagen School are the referent object, the referent subject, the securitizing actor, and the audience. Firstly, the referent object is the entity that has a legitimate claim to its existence and survival (e.g., state security, national identity, culture). Secondly, the referent subject is the entity that is threatening-whether imagined or real. Thirdly, the securitizing actor is the one who declares the referent object being threatened. In general, the securitizing actor is the government representing the citizens, but it could also be different institutions, media, or other pressure groups. The only prerequisite is that the actor has the support from the audience to act on behalf of the referent object (Buzan et al., 1998).

The Copenhagen School focuses on public announcements and speeches of a securitizing actor as an initial step to initiate a securitization process. The speech act creates urgency by signalizing that "if we don't act now, it will be too late" (Buzan et al., 1998). The political elite in power always needs the legitimacy of their political actions. The speech act indicates the policy preferences of a government to the people. The securitization is considered as completed if the audience (e.g., public opinion) accepts the proposed extraordinary measures. As securitization is an intersubjective process, security is needed to be expressed and legitimized in the dialogue between the actor and audience. However, in the context of a democracy, if an elected government speaks for securitization, the Copenhagen School assumes that the audience (people) has already supported the speech act of the actor (the government) (Ibid). In the case of Bangladesh's policy on the Rohingya crisis, audience acceptance is possibly not a challenging step, as the government is democratically elected and, thus, officially regarded as legitimate actors for speaking on behalf of the people.

In the case of the securitization of migration, the government is the central securitizing actor. The head of state is considered as the primary representative of the state and its people, therefore the one who sends signals to migrants and the international community about the state's current policy (Buzan et al., 1998). McGahan (2009) argues that the Copenhagen School "offers a lens through which to highlight certain actors and processes in analyzing immigration policies, particularly how societal threats are constructed and defended". McGahan (2009) further mentioned that the political, economic, and social dynamics within the host country should be taken into consideration to analyze the securitization of refugees and migrants. According to Watson (2007), the identity construction of refugees by political elites and media actors has a direct impact on a country's refugee and asylum policy. He believes that when asylum seekers are presented as *genuine refugees*, the government tries to respect international refugee laws. However, when asylum seekers are perceived as a threat, restrictive policies are introduced that undermine international refugee laws (Watson, 2007).

The Paris School

The Paris School approach, also known as in-securitization, was initially introduced by Bigo (2000) and later extended on by Vuori (2008), Atland and Ven Bruusgaard (2009), and Balzacq (2010). This approach argues that a securitization process is not necessarily about speech acts. It states that securitization takes place by controlling populations through different bureaucratic procedures, surveillance, and risk management tools (Huysmans 2006). It believes that actual policies are not open to misinterpretation in the way words are as they are a solid and definite act. It puts

particular emphasis on the relevance of action in the process of securitization, which is multi-layered and context-specific. While the Copenhagen School emphasizes on speech acts to understand securitization, Paris School argues that an institution can create a sense of insecurity and unease just by specific actions.

The Parisian approach believes securitization processes help the established elites to strengthen and consolidate power over the risk populations (Huysmans 2006). According to Didier Bigo (2002), security "is often marked by the handing over of entire security fields to professionals of unease who are tasked with managing existing persistent threats and identifying new ones". These professionals of unease are empowered with in-depth information and claim the monopoly to identify threats and handle those threats with securitized actions. The approach also acknowledges that security discourses of fear and unease are employed to justify more intrusive and draconian government control measures (e.g., Hammerstadt, 2014).

The Copenhagen and Paris School approaches can be considered as complementary. Securitization of an issue is not only about justifying exceptional measures through speeches but also about the execution of specific actions. However, the two approaches have a difference in understanding the political debate. While the Copenhagen School explains how *speech acts,* legitimizing exceptional measures can bring about securitization, the Paris School shows how a particular issue can be securitized, avoiding any political debate. Thus, securitized *actions* are carried out without a precise construction of any threat. Therefore, both the approaches on securitization will be useful to analyze Bangladesh's policy on the Rohingya refugee crisis within both discourse and practice.

Methodology

At first, following the Copenhagen School approach, this research conducts a discourse analysis as a qualitative tool to analyze how the security discourse on the Rohingya refugees has developed and changed over time in Bangladesh. Discourse analysis highlights how dominant discourses create structures of meaning, which is closely related to the Copenhagen School's constructivist approach to security. The empirical material primarily focuses on the Bangladesh government's *speech acts* related to the Rohingyas coming from Myanmar. However, the research also takes the discourses constructed by Bangladeshi media into consideration, as they are also dominant agenda-setting actors within the political debate. Secondly, following the Paris School approach, the analysis will focus on the actual whether the *policy measures* by the government indicated securitization that will provide more substantial empirical support for the research. The research has relied on secondary data collected from (official) governmental statements, newspapers, books, relevant journals, reports published by various research organizations.

Historical Background of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh

The Rohingyas are a predominantly Muslim ethnic group from Myanmar's Rakhine state, previously known as Arakan. The Rakhine state is separated from Bangladesh by the two-kilometer wide Naf River and from the rest of Myanmar by the Yoma Mountain Range. The origin of the 'Rohingya' word is disputed in academia, and there are different historical narratives. However, At least one historical account by Francis Buchanan (1799) suggests that a group of people referring to themselves as 'Rooinga, or natives of Arakan' and subscribe to Islamic faith have been staying in the present-day Rakhine State since the late eighteenth century. However, the

Myanmar government denies the existence of Rohingyas as a distinct ethnic group and consider them as 'illegal migrants' from Bangladesh (Ferrie, 2013).

Right after the independence of Myanmar in 1948, tensions between the government and the Rohingyas gradually increased as some of the Rohingya leaders previously lobbied to merge two Rohingya populated townships of Arakan with East Pakistan, now Bangladesh (Sarkar, 2018). From February to July 1978, the Myanmar military carried out *Operation Dragon King* in the northern Arakan region. The official statement of its purpose was to register citizens in the region and expel 'foreigners' before a national census. As a result of this military operation, more than 200,000 Rohingyas crossed the Naf River to take refuge in Bangladesh, which created in the 'first major wave' of refugees in Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar region (Ullah, 2011). Bangladesh set up makeshift refugee camps and accepted aid and assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The then Bangladesh government tried to resolve it through diplomatic engagement. A bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar resulted in s mass refoulement of the refugees by the end of 1979 (Rashid, 2019). However, several studies have confirmed that poor conditions in the refugee camps, reduction of relief assistance, and abuses by Bangladeshi officials forced the refugees to return to Myanmar (Akins, 2018). Later, UNHCR also acknowledged that up to 10,000 Rohingyas had died of malnutrition and epidemics in refugee camps in Cox's Bazar (Crisp, 2018). Therefore, Bangladesh's handling of the 1978-79 Rohingya refugee crisis was a matter of controversy.

In 1982, a new citizenship law was introduced in Myanmar, which did not recognize the Rohingya as one of the 135 'national races.' As a result, the Rohingyas became stateless overnight (Constantine, 2012). Between 1991 and 1992, the Myanmar armed forces launched Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation in northern Rakhine state involving killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of villages and mosques. It resulted in 'the second major wave' of an estimated 250,000 of the Rohingyas to Bangladesh (Piper, 1993). Bangladesh officially recognized the people as 'refugees' and delivered emergency shelter and relief. UNHCR started to provide relief and protection assistance in March 1992 in the 20 registered refugee camp in Cox's Bazar (Kiragu et al., 2011). Bangladesh was again able to reach an agreement with Myanmar to repatriate the Rohingyas on 28 April 1992. All but around 20,000 of the refugees went back to Myanmar between 1992 and 2001 (Rashid, 2019). Similar to the situation in the late 1970s, the Bangladeshi authorities failed to ensure the 'safe and voluntary' nature of the repatriation of refugees (Crisp, 2018). The majority of the repatriated refugees were reluctant to go back and had insufficient information about the security situation inside the Rakhine state (Abrar, 1995).

After hosting a significantly large number of refugees in 1991-92, Bangladesh's policy towards the Rohingyas significantly shifted as the exodus become 'a regular phenomenon' (Rashid, 2019). A smaller influx of Rohingya refugees took place in 1997. The Bangladeshi armed forces tried to halt the influx by force, but some Rohingyas were able to enter inside Bangladeshi territory illegally (ACAPS, 2007). From June 2012 to June 2015, a series of anti-Rohingya communal violence took place in the Rakhine state. Although the Bangladeshi authorities tried to deny any new entry, more than 300,000 Rohingyas took shelter among the host communities in Cox's Bazar (Rashid, 2019). In October 2016, following a low-scale insurgent attack, a military crackdown was carried out in the Rohingyas villages along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. As a result, over 87,000 Rohingyas people crossed into Bangladesh despite restrictive measures by the Bangladeshi security

forces. This time the new arrivals settled in the new Balukhali makeshift settlement in Ukhiya sub-districts. The new arrivals were perceived as illegal migrants instead of refugees, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided limited humanitarian aid to them (ACAPS, 2017).

The 'third major wave' of Rohingyas to Bangladesh started from 25 August 2017. As of 30 April 2020, Bangladesh was hosting 860,175 Rohingyas in registered refugee camps located in different parts of Cox's Bazar district (UNHCR, 2020). However, the actual number of Rohingyas currently staying in Bangladesh is roughly 1.3 million, according to several observers (Uddin, 2020).

Significant similarities can be drawn between Bangladesh's responses to the Rohingya crisis during 1978–79, 1991–1992, and 2017–2018. Right after the refugee influx in August 2017, Bangladesh allowed the refugees to enter on 'humanitarian grounds' and started preparation for an early repatriation process. Although Bangladesh and Myanmar have agreed to resolve the 2017-18 Rohingya influx through repatriation, the durable solution of the crisis is almost unachievable without restoring necessary civil and political rights of the Rohingyas in Myanmar (Rashid, 2019). Since the 1970s, successive governments in Bangladesh have been addressing the Rohingya refugee influxes as temporary crises. The short-term policy response from the Bangladeshi authorities has repeatedly failed to yield any durable solution to this displacement crisis. Moreover, the 'forced repatriation' of Rohingyas during the two previous cases raises an essential question on the 'voluntariness' of any potential repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar (Rashid, 2019). With this background, the next section will analyze the implementation of refugee securitization within Bangladesh's political landscape.

Findings and Discussion

The Bangladeshi political narrative on the 2017-18 refugee crisis can be divided into two different timeframes. The first timeframe encompasses the period from 25 August 2017, the day on which the 'third major wave' of the Rohingyas broke out, to 22 August 2019, the day on which the Rohingya refugees turned down a Bangladesh-Myanmar joint repatriation initiative for the second time. This failed repatriation attempt indicated a significant discursive shift in the political discourse of Bangladesh. Therefore, the second timeframe covers the developments that started to unfold from 26 August 2019 onwards.

Timeframe I: Human Security Discourse

Right after the Rohingya exodus in late August 2017, much of the discourse in the Bangladeshi political landscape was sincere to the human security needs of the refugees. The government presented the crisis into broader political narratives of national generosity and religious piety. At the same time, public opinion primarily emphasized religious solidarity, the rights of refugees, and the moral obligation to shelter the refugees fleeing life-threatening situations from the Rakhine state (Lewis, 2019).

Discourse Constructions

On 11 September 2017, while delivering relief to the newly arrived refugees in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said (Dhaka Tribune, 2017a):

> We can feed 160 million people of Bangladesh, and we
> have enough food security to feed the 700,000 refugees
> […]. We have let the Rohingya in on humanitarian

> grounds, and I ask the people of this country to help ease their suffering in whatever way they can. Bangladesh wants to maintain peace and good relations with its neighboring countries, but it cannot accept unjust acts of the Myanmar government. We will do all we can to ease the suffering of the Rohingya refugees.

In the speech, the target audience was the people of Bangladesh, who were asked to help the refugees in 'whatever way' they could. The prime minister portrayed the Rohingyas as the referent object who were 'in need of security,' whereas the referent subject was the Myanmar government, which violated the security of the Rohingyas. On 21 September 2017, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina addressed the 72nd session of the UNGA. In her speech, the prime minister went on to describe the atrocities committed against the Rohingyas as ethnic cleansing (Hasina, 2017):

> I have come here with a heavy heart. I have come here just after seeing the hungry, distressed and hopeless Rohingyas from Myanmar who took shelter in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. This forcibly displaced people of Manner are fleeing an 'ethnic cleansing' in their own country where they have been living for centuries.

A few days later, while attending a meeting in Washington, DC, Sheikh Hasina reaffirmed strong commitment to uphold the values of humanitarianism by saying (Dhaka Tribune, 2017b):

> If necessary, we (the people of Bangladesh) will eat one meal a day and share another meal with these distressed people (refugees). After all, we are human beings, and we stand for humanity. We are not that rich, but we have the heart. They are human beings, and we cannot throw them out into the Bay of Bengal.

Roughly one year later, on the 73rd Session of the UNGA, the prime minister continued to mention Bangladesh's commencement to ensure security needs of the refugees by saying (Hasina, 2018):

> The 1.1 million Rohingyas hosted in Bangladesh are living in an uncertain situation. To the best of our ability, we have made arrangements for their food, clothing, healthcare, child-care and security. So long, the Rohingya are not able to return home, they should, as a temporary arrangement, be able to live in a good and healthy condition.

The speeches mentioned above by the Sheikh Hasina highlights the government's sensitivity to the humanitarian situation. The speeches also signalled that Bangladesh was eager to make the necessary sacrifices to ensure the security needs of the refugees. Thus, the narrative constructed by the government emphasized on ensuring the security and safety of the refugees, not the security national security of Bangladesh.

The Bangladeshi media also echoed a pro-refugee narrative while reporting on the situation (Isti'anah, 2018). Right after the refugee exodus, mainstream media outlets regularly have published reports, articles, and opinion pieces that were dominated by the narratives of suffering and victimhood of the Rohingyas. For instance, an editorial piece of The Daily Star, the most circulated English daily in Bangladesh, titled 'Starving Refugees from Myanmar: Get Coordinated Relief Efforts Going.' The article welcomed the government's decision to set up new camps for the refugees. It called for coordinated efforts with international agencies to ensure food security and other basic needs for the refugees.

Most of the people in Bangladesh responded to their government's call to help the refugees (Joehnk. 2017). Right after the exodus, local people in Cox's Bazar started to respond by distributing food, clothing and giving money. Individuals, civil society organizations, and religious groups from different parts of the country soon arrived in the region to provide food, medicine, and other relief materials. Massive rallies and donation collection campaigns for the Rohingyas were also held in several cities in Bangladesh (Lewis, 2019). While reporting for *Al Jazeera* on the humanitarian emergency in Cox's Bazar, Katie Arnold (2017) wrote:

> Moved by their suffering, citizens of Bangladesh have rallied together to deliver much-needed assistance to the new arrivals. Most distribute their goods from large trucks that now clog the rural road between Cox's Bazar and Teknaf.

The Rohingya refugee situation of 2017-18 dominated the political debate of Bangladesh. The refugee-friendly narrative of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina significantly increased her domestic position and international credibility as a champion of humanitarianism (Chowdhury, 2017). Large political banners were raised in major public squares proclaiming Sheikh Hasina as 'mother of humanity' and the 'champion for human rights' (Lewis, 2017). Moreover, calls were made inside the country demanding the Nobel Peace Prize for Sheikh Hasina (Rahman, 2017). The discussion enables us to understand that the governmental discourse on the initial situation did not articulate a national security threat for Bangladesh. The criteria of threat construction are thus not met, and there was no securitization of refugees through *speech acts*.

Policy Measures

Although the initial response to the refugee influx was very local and disorganized, soon, the Bangladesh government took total control of the situation and asked the international humanitarian organizations to initiate a well-coordinated humanitarian response (Lewis, 2019). The government quickly contributed USD 4.37 million from its funds to the humanitarian response plan, which was developed for the first six months of this humanitarian emergency (Khatun, 2018). Moreover, around 6,340 acres of hills and reserve forest land in Teknaf and Ukhiya sub-districts of Cox's Bazar was allocated to set-up temporary shelter, relief storage, and medical facilities for the refugees and humanitarian agencies (Aziz, 2018).

The government mobilized 'the entire state machinery' to deal with the complex humanitarian emergency in Cox's Bazar (Wake and Bryant, 2018). At the national level, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) became the central decision-making authority. A National Task Force (NTF), chaired by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and having representatives from 29 ministries and agencies, started oversight

and strategic guidance to the overall response. The Office of Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) was set-up as the governing body responsible for the provision and coordination of humanitarian assistance at Cox's Bazar level. Around 40 government officials were deployed as Camp-in-Charge (CiC) to look after the administration inside the refugee camps. The Office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC), the primary public administrative mechanism of Cox's Bazar district, started to lead a District Task Force (DTF) for executing government policies and operational coordination of the humanitarian response. This multilayered bureaucratic coordination structure developed by the government ensured a timely and well-disciplined response that saved many lives and reduced the suffering of the refugees (Sullivan, 2020). Therefore, the policy measures taken by the government indicate that ensuring the basic needs of the Rohingyas was the primary priority during the initial period of the refugee situation.

Timeframe II: National Security Discourse
The second timeframe started in late August 2019 as the Rohingyas turned down a highly publicized repatriation initiative on 22 August. Initially, Myanmar handed over a list of 3,450 Rohingyas to Bangladesh, who were cleared for repatriation. On 22 August 2019, the Bangladeshi officials prepared a large motorcade to send the Rohingyas, and a Myanmar delegation was waiting to receive them on the other side of the border. However, the listed Rohingyas refused to go back primarily due to the lack of security guarantee from the Myanmar government (Rahman, 2019). The Rohingyas have demanded a list of prerequisites that include citizenship rights, ethnic recognition, freedom of religion, and movement inside Myanmar before any repatriation (International Crisis Group, 2019). Although a previous repatriation attempt in November 2018 failed similarly, this second aborted made the Bangladesh government seriously frustrated as they became 'tired of hosting' the refugees (Chowdhury, 2019). Moreover, public opinion in Bangladesh also started to shift dramatically against the refugees, and a popular narrative of Rohingya as a security risk started to develop (Sullivan, 2020). As a result, a discursive change in Bangladesh's governmental discourse and implementation of securitized measures can be noticed.

Discourse Constructions
On his initial reaction to the failed repatriation attempt, Bangladesh Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen said;

> We (Bangladesh) cannot be taken hostage to their (Rohingyas') demands. They have to realize their demands after returning to their own country (Myanmar) […]. The comfort will not be there in the future because those who are helping now (aid agencies) will not do so in the future […] We (Bangladesh) have spent Tk 2,500 crore to Tk 3,000 crore from our own fund. This money will also not be available in the future. The Rohingyas who do not want to return should go back for the sake of their future (Bhuiyan, 2019).

In the statement, the foreign minister indicated to Bangladesh as the *referent object,* which became a 'hostage' to the refugee situation. He presented the Rohingyas refugees as the *referent subject,* whose presence became a threat to Bangladesh.

Moreover, Mr Momen also signalled that the government would not fund any long-term refugee settlement inside the country.

On 25 August, three days after the failed repatriation attempt, around 200,000 Rohingya attended a rally inside the refuge settlement to commemorate 'Rohingya Genocide Day,' the anniversary of the outbreak of violence in northern Rakhine State in 2017. Although the rally appeared peaceful, this huge political gathering by the Rohingyas raised some serious security concerns among the government officials. Moreover, most of the media outlets covered the event in a way that fed public anxiety. For instance, a front-page report of a well-circulated Bengali newspaper titled 'The Rohingya showdown: conspiracy to destabilize the country' (Ahsan, 2019). Several news reports like this raised security concerns over the mass mobilization ability of the refugees and questioned the event's connection with the failed repatriation attempts (Sullivan, 2020). Against the backdrop of a failed repatriation bid, the rally increased domestic pressure on the government to take a 'tougher line against the Rohingya' (International Crisis Group, 2019).

On 4 September 2019, Bangladesh's Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense recommended installing fences around the refugee camps as an *extraordinary measure* to resolve the increased security concern over the massive 25 August rally. Muhammad Faruk Khan, a member of the parliamentary committee, said;

> We have been observing the Rohingyas are freely moving around the camps and outside. Therefore, to ensure security, we recommended taking measures so that no one can come out of the camps and no one can enter inside the camps (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

On 11 September 2019, while giving an interview to *Anadolu Agency* on the impact of failed repatriation and the 25 August rally, Bangladesh's State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shahriar Alam indicated that the government was preparing to be strict in addressing the refugee situation. The state minister said (Kamruzzaman, 2019);

> Bangladesh is an independent and sovereign country, but we have challenges in maintaining our own law and order. If we have any issues arising from them (Rohingya), we must take a tougher stance.

The above mention statement from the state minister suggests that the government had decided to implement some specific *extraordinary measures* to safeguard Bangladesh's security challenges from the refugees, the *referent subject.* While criticizing the international community for showing 'less interest' in helping Bangladesh to repatriate the refugees to Myanmar, Shahriar Alam also said;

> Until now, they (the international community) have failed to visit those villages in Rakhine state from where Rohingya people fled, but they are randomly working in Bangladesh without any interruption. Ignoring existing law and norms some, NGOs and aid agencies are infiltrating Rohingya to stay in Bangladesh. We must be harder against this (Kamruzzaman, 2019).

This statement constructed some NGOs and aid agencies as a *threat* as they were 'working against' Bangladesh's interest, the early repatriation of the refugees. Moreover, the state minister also suggested that the government would take necessary *extraordinary measures* against them. On 27 September 2019, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina addressed the 74th session of the UNGA, third time since the outbreak of the Rohingya exodus. This time, she referred the situation as 'crisis' and a 'security' threat for the first time by saying;

> The crisis is now entering its third year…. The crisis is now going beyond the camps; indeed, despite all our efforts to contain it, the crisis is now becoming a regional threat. Moreover, increasing congestion and environmental degradation is challenging the health and security of people in the host area. We are bearing the burden of a crisis that is of Myanmar's own making (Hasina, 2019).

On November 2019, while attending an international conference in Dhaka, the prime minister further referred the refugee situation as a 'threat,'

> I would like to say that more than 1.1 million Rohingya citizens of Myanmar fled to Bangladesh in the face of persecution and they are a threat to the security not only for Bangladesh but also for the region (CNN-News18, 2019).

In the statements mentioned above, the prime minister was indicating the refugees as the *referent subject,* whose presence is a 'security' concern. The security of Bangladesh and its people are articulated as something to protect, thus representing the primary *referent object*. Moreover, Sheikh Hasina also referred that the security of the entire South Asian region is under threat for the refugee situation in Bangladesh. Thus, this time the narrative constructed by the government started to emphasize on ensuring the regional security of South Asia in general and the national security Bangladesh in particular, not the security needs of the refugees.

Echoing the official narrative, mainstream Bangladeshi media outlets started to publish stories on socio-economic impacts of hosting refugees as 'threats' to political stability and national security of Bangladesh. The media presented a securitized discourse in a way that can be considered as a 'coordinated campaign' (Ahsan, 2019). For instance, on 6 September, 2019, a report by of The New Nation, a widely circulated English daily in Bangladesh, titled 'Crime on Rise amid Uncertainty over Repatriation: Security, Vigilance Beefed up at Rohingya Camps'. The report presented a close linkage between 'crime gangs' and 'anti-repatriation elements' inside the refugee camps. It also welcomed increased presence and surveillance by law enforcement agencies to reduce 'subversive' activities by the refugees. The public opinion on the Rohingya refugees also started to shift significantly since August-2019. Following the second aborted repatriation, the host community in Bangladesh concluded that they might have to live with the refugees for the foreseeable future. This realization further frustrated the people as they have been facing problems like environmental damage, price hike, and change in the demographic balance (Sullivan, 2020). Now, the most dominant narrative among the host community is that the

refugees are reluctant to go back to Myanmar as they are 'living a comfortable life in Bangladesh', while some of them even demand that the Rohingyas should be repatriated them back forcibly (Bhuiyan, 2019).

From the above mention discussions, we can say that the governmental discourse on the refugee situation started to construct a national security threat for Bangladesh since August 2019. The criteria of threat construction are visible, and thus refugees were securitized through *speech acts*. In other words, a national security discourse started to dominate at the expense of human security discourse. Thus, the discourse analysis suggests the relevance of the Copenhagen School's securitization approach in the context of Bangladesh's current refugee situation.

Policy Measures

In August 2019, the refugee situation entered into the third year, and reports on criminal activities like murders, drug smuggling, and human trafficking were on the rise near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. (International Crisis Group, 2019). The deteriorating law and order situation in Cox's Bazar, coupled with the failure to make any breakthrough in the repatriation process, made the Bangladeshi officials anxious and frustrated (Chowdhury, 2019). As a result, the Bangladesh government has taken a series of *securitized actions* that appear to address the national security concerns but significantly restrain the security needs of the refugees.

The first and most immediate *securitized measures* were bureaucratic shuffling and tightening of administrative control inside the refugee camos. Right after the second failed repatriation attempt, the government replaced Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner Mohammad Abul Kalam and several other administrative officers as they were known to be 'sympathetic to refugees' and 'highly regarded' by humanitarian agencies (International Crisis Group, 2019). From the first week of September 2019, the government took control of all administrative duties inside the refugee camps. Previously, the government outsourced recruitment and site management activities through UNHCR and IOM. The government deployed more personnel to 'directly control' the site management and coordination responsibilities (Hasan, 2019).

The second *securitized action* by the government was strict restrictions on freedom of movement of the refugees. Following the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense, the government assigned the Bangladesh army to erect barbed-wire fences around refugee camps on 'security grounds.' This move was made primarily to impose travel restrictions on refugees beyond the highly congested area allocated for their temporary settlement. Recently, the government installed watchtower and CCTV cameras to 'strengthen the surveillance' on the refugee camps (Sakib, 2020).

The third *securitized action* and perhaps the most drastic one taken by the government was the imposition of communication ban on the refugees. On 02 September 2019, Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) banned sales of SIM cards inside the refugee camps in the 'interest of state security and for preserving law and order' (Irani, 2019). Following this executive order, Bangladeshi officials inside the camp reportedly launched a campaign of confiscating SIM cards and mobile phone from the Rohingyas inside the refugee camps (International Crisis, Group, 2019) A few days later, the authorities shut down 3G and 4G networks in an attempt to the 'further clampdown on communications' among the refugees by depriving them access to high-speed internet (UNB, 2019). The restrictions on mobile communication and the internet were primarily aimed at

preventing the refugees from organizing any political event in the future. However, this decision has made it difficult for the Rohingya to contact their relatives inside the Rakhine state and the Rohingya diaspora. Moreover, these ban on mobile and internet also created obstacles to disseminate emergency information on situations like monsoons, cyclones, and pandemics (Sullivan, 2020).

The fourth *securitized action* taken by the government was against NGOs and aid agencies operating in Cox's Bazar. The government had barred 41 NGOs from working inside the refugee camps and imposed a complete ban on two international NGOs in Cox's Bazar over their allegedly sabotaging the refugee repatriation process (Aziz, 2019). Several other humanitarian agencies reported that their activities in Cox's Bazar became very problematic due to increasingly strict bureaucratic obstacles and scrutiny. These newly imposed restrictions had directly interrupted the humanitarian response as the aid agencies became unable to operate efficiently under such conditions (International Crisis Group, 2019).

Apart from restrictive policies imposed in the refugee camps, the reports of alleged human rights violations of the refugees by Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies are also significantly increasing. As of 02 March 2020, at least 50 Rohingyas died in 'gunfights' with law enforcement agencies over their alleged involvement in 'crimes' like drug trafficking, robbery, and human trafficking (Alif and Aziz, 2020). Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other rights groups have accused the Bangladeshi security agencies of 'extrajudicial executions' and demanded independent investigations. However, the government has repeatedly denied such allegations raised against its security personnel, and no initiative has been made to investigate any of those incidents (Kamruzzaman, 2019).

Therefore, after the second aborted repatriation attempt, the government's *actions* started to address Bangladesh's national security by marginalizing some basic security needs of the refugees. In other words, Bangladesh's current *actions* are increasingly focused on protecting its security against the *threats* refugees, not on protecting the refugees against the prosecutions in Myanmar. Thus, the post-August 2019 *actions* taken by the Bangladeshi authorities suggest the relevance of Paris School's securitization approach to the Rohingya refugees.

Policy Implications

On 16 September 2019, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM) published its report on the security and human rights situation inside Myanmar. According to the report, roughly 600,000 Rohingya remaining inside the Rakhine state were subject to 'systematic persecution' and living 'under the threat of genocide' (OHCHR, 2019). In such a situation, any premature repatriation of the Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Myanmar may not bring any sustainable solution to the decades-long displacement crisis. Therefore, the Bangladesh government needs to continue its diplomatic activities to mobilize international pressure on the Myanmar government to ensure security in Rakhine state and restore the legitimate civil, and political rights demanded the Rohingyas. According to a report by the *Refugees International*, poor coordination in information sharing and last-minute notification campaigns were the two primary reasons for the failed repatriation attempts. Therefore, to make a breakthrough in the much-anticipated repatriation initiative, Bangladesh needs active consultancy with the refugee community inside the camps.

There are some real security threats for Bangladesh, like increased drug-related crimes, human trafficking, and militancy in Cox's Bazar (Sullivan, 2020).

However, the newly imposed restrictions on movement and communication can be counterproductive for Bangladesh. These securitized policies have the potential to instigate more criminal activities and militancy, which would add more pressing security challenges in southern Bangladesh, a crime-prone and underdeveloped region (International Crisis Group, 2019).

Any rapid repatriation of the Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar is highly unlikely (Rashid, 2019). Hence, most of the refugees will stay in Cox's Bazar in the upcoming years (Uddin, 2020). In such a context, at least a medium-term humanitarian response strategy is needed for Bangladesh ((Sun and Haung, 2019). Recently, the government has allowed the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and its partner agencies to provide institutional education to the Rohingya children inside the camps. The rights groups and humanitarian activists have welcomed this decision as a 'positive step' (Al Jazeera, 2020). Similarly, the refugees need skill development and livelihood opportunities to empower themselves for a better future after any future repatriation to Myanmar. Therefore, Bangladesh should mobilize more financial and material resources from the international community to develop safer living conditions for the refugees and the host community members in Cox's Bazar.

Conclusion

This article assessed whether the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar had been constructed as a security issue within the political landscape in Bangladesh. Theoretically, it has shown that the combination of two approaches of securitization — introduced by the Copenhagen School and the Paris School — helps to explain the securitization of a refugee situation in a comprehensive way. The Copenhagen School shows how *speech acts* contribute to make refugees a security issue and legitimize *extraordinary measures*. On the other hand, the Paris School shows how an issue transforms into a threat by some specific *actions*. Hence, it helps to explain the securitization of refugees in Bangladesh by focusing on the policy measures taken by the concerned government agencies.

The empirical findings of this article suggest that a human security discourse dominated Bangladesh's policy response during the initial days of the refugee influx. However, following several failed repatriation attempts, the governmental discourse has started to focus on the country's national security concerns. As a result, narratives and policy responses from Bangladesh have been increasingly shifting towards a securitized trajectory. Thus, the government has started to impose restrictive policies inside the refugee camps on security grounds that violate certain rights and security needs of the refugees. Bangladesh has been facing the Rohingya refugee influx from Myanmar since the late 1970s. Therefore, the political leadership in Bangladesh should come up with a comprehensive policy to resolve the refugee crisis in a way that ensures the country's security concerns and welfare of the Rohingyas.

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SWOT Analysis of Pakistan's Space Program

Noor-ul-Huda Atif[1]

Abstract

Outer space in Pakistan is a trivial notion, and the idea has become less concerning for the authorities let alone the general masses. For decades, this field has been void of any particularly outstanding and significant development in the country with only a handful of satellites launched in outer space. Where the world has progressed in space technology utilizing it for exploring, exploiting, and now even racing to dominate the global common, that is the outer space, Pakistan's space program has been lagging and misses the opportunities that a robust outer space program provides, all the while ignoring the threats that arise from a weak space program. The significance of outer space has increased over the years in both civilian and military domains, where militarization outer space is now being transformed into a weaponization phenomenon. The space race that began in the Asian region with the Soviet Union inspired periphery states such as Pakistan to join space faring. Pakistan was the third country in Asia to establish its space agency; however, over time, it has lost its acclaimed position. Over time, it has grown weak with minimal research and development (R&D) in the field. Pakistan's space program lacks a place in the literature, and academic discussions and this study aims at filling that gap by analyzing the strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities for the space program of Pakistan.

Keywords
Pakistan, India, security, outer space, SWOT analysis, SUPARCO

Introduction
Outer space is gaining strategic significance for competition with time among not only the world powers but regional powers as well. In recent times, this global common has increasingly gained popularity among the developing states pertaining to its multidimensional significance in academics, science and technology, and security aspect. Access to space has become relatively easy in terms of technology; however, it is still an expensive venture to achieve, which requires an amalgamation of both sound technology and a robust and stable economy. In order to obtain maximum benefit from outer space, it is essential to devise strategies and policies that may strengthen the space program. Space programs are formulated to help explore the outer space and develop the technology required to carry out these programs. Among South Asian states, Pakistan was the first country to formulate its space program;

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however, it has had relatively slow-paced progress, which has put it behind by many folds in the regional and global space race. Space race has enhanced the global importance of the domain. In a short time, the world's approach towards outer space has changed altogether. The exploration has shifted to the paradigm of exploitation of outer space and its resources. This exploitation has rendered the global security vulnerable, with states like India and Pakistan becoming space-faring states as both poses a hostile nature towards each other, which jeopardizes their mutual relations and has adverse impacts on the regional peace and stability. The fast-track advancement of space technology in the military domain by India has already created an imbalance in the capabilities of both countries. Owing to the assessment of the looming threats for false flag operations within these circumstances, the security of outer space in the future must be sought after. The regional security dynamics of South Asia have more potential for facing direct threats in this scenario. Subsequently, India's ambitions to militarize and weaponize outer space threaten the national security of Pakistan.

This paper will review the progress of Pakistan's space program. The foreground is set on the phases of the space program that cover different eras in the R&D of Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). The paper is based on the primary data collected through semi-structured interviews from national experts, academics, and practitioners associated with outer space in Pakistan. It overviews the space program of Pakistan, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the program. The paper explores the threats and opportunities offered by the space program to Pakistan, via the SWOT analysis. The paper highlights the strengths and weaknesses in terms of an academic basis, lack of technology, and financial resources. The paper will assess the threats faced by Pakistan. It will also explore the opportunities to strengthen Pakistan's space program further through indigenous developments and the feasibility of international collaborations.

Pakistan's Space Program

Dr Abdus Salam, a world-renowned physicist and Pakistan's first noble laureate, was the pioneer of Pakistan's space program (Mehdi & Su, 2019). He conceived the idea of an institution that can cater to the strategic and modern scientific needs of the state. Dr Salam was determined to strengthen the strategic basis of the country and established the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1956 (History). He understood the strategic and scientific importance of outer space as well and initiated the space program under the umbrella of PAEC in 1961. Under the brilliance of his faculties, Pakistan became the third country in Asia to launch an ambitious space program. Space and Upper Atmosphere Committee was established under the auspices of PAEC as its parent organization, which was later recognized as an autonomous body in 1964 (Kingwell, 2014). However, SUPARCO became the successor institute of this committee that dealt with the research and development in the field of outer space (Ibid).

Owing to the strategic significance of outer space, the status of this commission was once again changed from the autonomous body and was placed under the direct command of the Strategic Planning Division (SPD) (Ali & Khan, 2019). Since Pakistan has lagged in the indigenous capabilities of space technology, the United States assisted in initiating the space program. US-supported in the launch of sounding rockets such as Rehbar- I and Rehbar-II in 1962 (Mehmud, 1989). In 1961, when Pakistan perceived the idea of exploring the outer space, US President John F. Kennedy announced his ambition of landing on the moon (Mehdi & Su,

2019). This mission required knowledge and information of the upper atmosphere exceeding the stratosphere and the Indian Ocean provided a suitable environment to collect this data. Pakistan seized this opportunity and offered to join the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with their data collection (Mehdi & Su, 2019). With the US and NASA's support of rocket launching, Pakistan's scientists mastered the launching capability, which began with sending sounding rockets in the 1970s (Amhed Bilal, 2019).

Trajectory of SUPARCO

The history of SUPARCO is sinusoidal and had its complications. The history of Pakistan's Space Program is categorized in three phases, where Phase I is almost thirty years, 1961-1990, Phase II is from 1991-1999 and finally, the period of 2000-2012 is Phase III (SUPARCO).

During this era, SUPARCO focused on understanding the working of space and space assets, R&D of sounding rockets and satellites. In this period, Pakistan set up the space commission, mastered the engineering of sounding rockets, and launched its first indigenous satellite Badr-A, also known as Badr-I (Amhed Bilal, 2019). During this phase, SUPARCO set up research labs and ground stations at Lahore and Islamabad. The Satellite Ground Station (SGS) and Satellite Research and Development Centre for Communication Satellite (SRDC) were established at Islamabad and Lahore, respectively (SUPARCO).

The second phase of the ten years (1990-1999) began with the R&D of the second satellite of Badr program, named Badr-B. However, there was a hiatus in the R&D during this time in the field of outer space was decreased for a very long time. The second phase mainly incorporates research of Remote Sensing Technology, which had begun in 1973, and only one satellite was launched during this era, with borrowed satellite imagery technology. (Mehmud, 1989; Amhed Bilal, 2019).

The third phase, in 2000, began the revival of the dormant status of Pakistan's space agency. The authorities recognized the need to increase expertise in the field and that SUPARCO must be brought at power with the leading space agencies. The third phase of the space program focused on the launch of Badr-B and Paksat-1, which led to Design and Development (D&D) and the launch of Paksat-1R in 2011. Along with the development and launching of satellites, the authorities directed their attention towards the capacity building and facility enhancement at the SGS (SUPARCO).

Pakistan launched two satellites through the Chinese Jiuquan satellite launch centre in 2018 according to the space vision. PRSS-1 is Pakistan's first Remote Sensing Satellite that will mainly serve the purpose of monitoring of CPEC projects. The other satellite launched was PakTES-1A that is an indigenously developed satellite by the SUPARCO (Mehdi & Su, 2019).

Figure 1: Trajectory of SUPARCO's Progress

Satellites by Pakistan

Pakistan has managed to launch six satellites; however, the gap between the first launch of rockets and the launch of satellites is very alarming. Pakistan launched the first satellite Badr-1 in 1990, after a daunting gap of thirty years (Mehmud, 1989). The indigenously made satellite was launched from the Chinese Long March-2E launcher. It was an artificial satellite launched for experimental purposes, with a lifetime of fifteen years. The second satellite again took a decade to launch. Badr-B/Badr-2 launched 2001, was a Russian Zenith-2 Rocket with only two years of shelf life. It was more sophisticated than the Badr-1 and had a (Charged Coupled Device) CCD camera, which took pictures of the Earth (BADR-B). The system allowed ground stations to change the direction of satellite in space. In the same year, the PAKSAT-1 was launched (Mehdi & Su, 2019). The Turkish satellite, which was earlier used by Indonesia as well, was a communication satellite leased to Pakistan. This satellite was launched to retain the slot provided to Pakistan by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

It took yet another decade for Pakistan to launch PAKSAT-1R, which was launched in 2011, into the geostationary orbit (Ali & Khan, 2019). Pakistan used Chinese launcher CZ-3B to launch PAKSAT-1R, which replaced PAKSAT-1 that was launched earlier. However, it took another eight years for Pakistan to launch more satellites. In July 2018, Pakistan launched PRSS-1 and PakTES-1A, where PakTES-1A is an indigenous effort of Pakistan (Amhed Bilal, 2019). Apart from these satellites, Pakistan also owns an iCube satellite that was a project of the Institute of Space Technology (IST) (SUPARCO). IST is an educational institution affiliated with the SUAPRCO. These satellites are very less in terms of quantity and quality as compared to the other states in the region that started many years after Pakistan's space program.

National Space Policy and Regulatory Framework

The space program of Pakistan lacks direction despite a national space policy, a national regulatory framework on outer space activities, and a space vision. The national space policy highlights a direction for space activities under a statutory framework, which is currently missing, as Pakistan has not formulated any national legislation for space activities (Din & Butt, 2020). The incoherence among the three main documents has disrupted achieving sustainable goals in outer space. Pakistan's national policy addressing the outer space activities focuses on the authoritative body that will overlook the design, manufacturing, and the procurement of satellite technology in Pakistan (Khan, 2014). The regulatory body will also be responsible for issuing the license to operate satellites and maintaining the national registry of space objects. It will manage the regional and global cooperation of Pakistan regarding the outer space. The regulatory authority will devise a framework for the space sector, focusing on the peaceful utility of outer space assets. According to the policy, the development of space assets for civil use of space technology and applications will be in collaboration with the civil space sector. The national framework currently focuses its attention on an understanding of space laws, policy, and regulatory issues at the national and international levels.

Table 1: Pakistan's satellites launched in outer space

No.	Satellite	Launch Date	Function carried out by Satellite
1	Badr-1	16 July, 1990	Experimental and Educational Purpose
2	Badr-B	10 December, 2001	Experimental Purpose
3	PakSat-1	December, 2001	Communication satellite used for tele-medicine and tele-education
4	PakSat-1R	11 August, 2011	Geosynchronous and Communication satellite that replaced the PakSat-1 satellite
5	PRSS-1	9 July, 2018	Dual purpose remote sensing satellite used for earth observation and optical satellite
6	PakTES-1A	9 July, 2018	Technology Evaluation Satellite-remote sensing

Pakistan's Space Vision

The outer space has become significant to the global players in the modern world due to the technical advancement of the command, control, and communication. It broadens the horizon of capabilities for any state in the world with the dual-purpose utility, including civilian and military use. Pakistan is all set to advance as an ambitious space-faring state with its space vision. Space vision was initially named Pakistan's Space Program (PSP) -2040, which was approved by the then Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. However, it was later renamed to Space Vision (Official, 2019). The main aim of the space vision is that the people of Pakistan must benefit from space technology. This can be done by utilizing outer space capabilities for socio-economic and defence purposes. Currently, Pakistan uses space technology

for socio-economic purposes, including agriculture, communication, meteorology, and aeronautics.

The 'space vision' focuses on the functions of the operational framework (Shah, 2012). According to the vision, Pakistan will develop and launch five Geostationary satellites and six Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites (Shah, 2012). The details of the space vision have been kept confidential as Pakistan treats its space program as a national security concern with the growing strategic significance of outer space. This space vision will prove to be a guide for Pakistan to regain its outer space autonomy and counter the threats it faces from the adversaries with a unidirectional approach.

SWOT Analysis of Pakistan's Space Program

The space program has gained strategic significance in Pakistan over the years, given the military ambitions of its adversary. The growing strategic significance of the outer space has prompted Pakistan to resurrect its vulnerable space program. A secure space program and investment in space technology is a need of the hour for the country. To achieve this ambition, a strategy build-up must be initiated at the grassroot level starting from the strengthening academic foundations as a part of space technology, and space policy as the space vision of Pakistan's space program provides an institutional framework for the future.

Establishing a reliable and effective space program for Pakistan has become a necessity as the international and regional outer space activities have gained momentum over the last few years. The analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats provide a definitive outline for more sustainable strategies for the advancement and reinforcement of the space program. It is crucial to identify these characteristics for the space program to incorporate them into the space policy. With regards to the strengths, education has the foremost significance in the growth of any research and development institution. It plays an essential role in the strengthening of the space program. Education provides for the technical and non-technical pool of experts and specialists. It will help in formulating a robust Human Resource (HR) and contributing to capacity building.

Furthermore, there are two ways to enhance the capacity; to increase the commercial use of space capabilities and to employ outer space assets for military purposes as well, with the dual-purpose technology. The latest development of PRSS-1 serves the interest of commercial and strategic users for high-resolution imagery (Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite).

As far as weaknesses are concerned, Pakistan lacks the coherence of institutions that are required to strengthen the space program. There are separate public and private institutions that exist in their segregated capacity (Amhed Bilal, 2019). The collaboration among these institutes is challenging to achieve in the absence of national space legislation, weakening the progress of the space program. The gap in collaboration also widens due to weak economic and technical foundation, as outer space experimentation remains an expensive venture requiring high-end technology.

In view of the above, it is essential to acknowledge that the strategic aspect of warfare has shifted from kinetic to non-kinetic and unconventional methods, amidst of which outer space has emerged as a new security challenge for the international community. The significance of this domain in South Asia has increased in the last few years. South Asian states are using outer space like other states in any other region for militarization (Riaz, 2019). India heavily militarizes the region in

every aspect, which is now reaching outer space as well. It has emerged as a space power with the Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test, and it should be taken into account that as an adversary with hostile relations, India's ambitions will always be directed towards Pakistan. The development of an effective space program, with defensive counter capabilities, has become a national security emergency for Pakistan.

Pakistan is on the path of reviving its space program, which allows it to engage domestic and international institutes for various collaborations. The educational institutions-industry synergy is one of many options that provide opportunities to enhance the capacity of space programs. It is from this synergy that new and innovative ideas will emerge and small, testing satellites like the iCube satellite can be designed, developed, and launched indigenously or through international collaborations.

Strengths and Opportunities

The space program offers multiple opportunities for Pakistan, domestically, and internationally. The private-public partnership at national and international level is an opportunity to encompass the strengths at different levels.

Strong Academic Foundation

The higher studies in Pakistan offer many subjects that collectively contribute to space technology and the development of satellites (Riaz, 2019). The engineering universities across the country are offering specialization in Material Sciences and Engineering, Nano-technology, Electronics, Avionics, Aerospace, Data-Imaging, and Signal Processing, which contribute to the satellite and space assets development. However, only a few dedicated higher education institutions offer academic expertise in space sciences and technology. In Pakistan, only three universities offer the subject of Space sciences and only two of them offer specializations in space sciences that too as non-engineering courses. Whereas, the social research related to space militarization and strategic significance of outer space is only taught in the one university of Pakistan, Air University Islamabad at the department of Aerospace Science and Strategic Studies.

The departments of space sciences in Pakistan are educating hundreds of students that are graduating with expertise in the space sciences and technology; they are employed in the different organizations, domestically and internationally (Dr. Javed Iqbal, 2019). These educational intuitions have industry linkages that yield better-equipped scientists and engineers who have firsthand experience of the latest technology that is employed worldwide. These students are not only working as interns and fellows at the government institutions such as SUPARCO but in international organizations like UAS-global, which is Pakistan's first and only authorized UAV provider for civil and military purposes. These private organizations provide experience and exposure to the students in aviation but not in satellite technology and outer space dynamics.

Table 2: Subject of Space Sciences offered in Pakistan

Sr. No.	Field of Study	Institute
1	BS Space Sciences	Institute of Space Technology, Islamabad
2	BS Space Sciences	Punjab University, Lahore
3	M.Sc. Space Sciences	Punjab University, Lahore
4	MPhil. Space Sciences	Punjab University, Lahore
5	PGD Space Sciences	Punjab University, Lahore
6	B.Sc. (Hons.) Space Sciences	Karachi University, Karachi
7	MSc. Space Sciences	Karachi University, Karachi
8	MS Space Sciences	Karachi University, Karachi
9	PhD Space Sciences	Karachi University, Karachi

Capacity Building

The military utilization of outer space is inevitable. Pakistan must realize the severity of the changing dynamics of this domain. He is of the view that Pakistan should develop a program that is capable of incorporating dual-use capability- civilian and military. It will not only strengthen the country's defence but will also contribute to the state's economy. However, the country faces a lapse of technical expertise. Pakistan launched its first Remote Sensing satellite in 2018 despite SUPARCO initiating a dedicated division for Remote Sensing Research in 1973 (Mehmud, 1989). It evidently manifests the slow-paced progress of Pakistan's Space Program that took almost forty years to develop its technical research into a final product.

Development of Dual-use Satellites

The space vision of Pakistan has provided a framework for developing geo-stationary satellites that will be beneficial in the socio-economic domain. As military utilization of outer space and its assets is inevitable in the modern age, Pakistan should invest in the development of dual-purpose satellites. Currently, Pakistan employs its PRSS satellite for dual purposes. Space technology used for imagery and communication must be indigenous and developed to address the security threat in the short term. In the meanwhile, the peaceful purposes of the space technology, in the long run, will be beneficial for the state to progress. Pakistan must have strong defensive space policy and technology to counter the threat that looms in the region. The dual-purpose satellites will provide new avenues for the progress of the space program and the SUPARCO. The commercial use of satellites will generate revenue that will help achieve a rather expensive goal.

International Collaborations

Pakistan has become the closest ally of China in its latest strategy of emerging as a soft power with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It has placed various national and regionally significant projects under the umbrella of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Space vision and the renewed space policy of Pakistan are also noted as a part of this mega multi-billion investment project that helped Pakistan to launch two satellites. However, China cannot be Pakistan's only option for

international cooperation. Previously, Pakistan has launched satellites in collaboration with Turkey, which is an option that can always be explored. Nevertheless, these are not the only available choices, and Pakistan must consider alternative collaborations to enhance its horizon. The states that have successfully launched their space programs like France and Japan can become potential collaborative partners (Official, 2019). Pakistan is also moving towards improved strategic relations with Russia and given the increased military cooperation in mutual relations as well as the regional-Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) - it must incorporate the development of space program (Official, 2019).

Threats and Weaknesses

Regionally, the outer space dynamics revolve around two states of China and India, where India is regionally competing with China yet pursuing Pakistan as a soft target. This competition has had adverse effects on Pakistan's national security. Considering the arms race in outer space as a national and regional security threat, the paper moves on to discuss the regional and national security threats that emerge due to the militarization of outer space. The imbalance of outer space capabilities in this age can be challenging for a state like Pakistan. Pakistan has to not only secure its territory but also maintain the deterrence for its own peace to prevail.

Lack of Facilities and Defense Strategies

Pakistan's vulnerable defences against the state of the art space assets of the adversary integrated with C4ISR capabilities empowering it with the Space Situation Awareness (SSA) increases Pakistan's defenselessness in outer space (Mansoor, 2018). The lack of counter strategies and the security tactics of the ground assets highlight the weaknesses of the space program. The development of defensive strategies to secure space assets, ground facilities, and monitor the space activities of the adversary must be the mission statement of the space program that is mainly providing defensive capabilities. The lack of facilities and space labs has caused a gap in the research, design, and development of launching facilities, ground, and space assets as exploring the outer space requires space assets supported by ground facilities.

The national awareness about the significance of the growing space militarization is the need of the hour. Pakistan's adversary, India, is capable of monitoring the activities even in the darkest of nights and given the circumstances, the priority of safeguarding strategic assets must be treated as an urgent matter and a national concern (Mujadid, 2019). India has developed the geo-stationary satellites that are used for monitoring and are capable of providing inter and intra-communication continually. Over years, there have been additions to the reconnaissance satellite series of RISAT, Cartosat and GSAT military dedicated satellites (Zahid & Qaiser, 2019). The Cartosat-2E satellite and the RISAT-2BR1 have been termed as the 'eye-in-the-sky' and 'spy-satellite', respectively (India Today, 2019). The increase in reconnaissance satellites that are capable of providing real-time data and information weakens the defences.

Regional Security Threat

Addressing outer space development as a national security emergency requires addressing the threat along with the military lines. Regional security is currently at stake due to the two technically most advanced states of China and India are competing for an arms race in outer space. The relationship equation of Pakistan, India, and China has created complex regional security, with China and India being

the prominent players of outer space and Pakistan being a significant regional power. The offensive-defensive power nexus among these states transforms the security trilemma in outer space (Khan & Khan, 2019). India has openly admitted to its military ambitions in outer space ever since China acquires ASAT capability (Arif & Qaiser, 2017). Since the Kargil war of 1999, India has realized the importance of space technology and openly admitted to employing it for military purposes (Defence M. o., 2017).

India tested its Anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in March 2019 (Times of India.com, 2019). India has always centred its acquisition of military stockpile towards out-growing Chinese military ambitions (Rajagopalan, 2011). However, historically their military aggression has always directed towards Pakistan. After China tested its ASAT capability, India maintained a contradicting approach towards the militarization of outer space (Rajagopalan, 2011). On the one hand, the political leadership and civil bureaucracy maintained the stance of the peaceful utility of outer space while the military hierarchy stressed the importance of a countermeasure. Within three years, their ambitions on the militarization of outer space became visible.

In 2010, the integrated Defence Staff of HQ stated in a policy document, "India will develop anti-satellite weapons 'for electronic and physical destruction of satellites in both LEO and GEO-synchronous orbits'. On another occasion, the chief of DRDO and the scientific advisor to the defence minister, V.K. Sarawat, commented, "India has begun the development of ASAT capability". In February 2011, at the press conference after the test of Agni-III, Sarawat referred to the test as India's anti-satellite capability. He validates the simulation of anti-satellite technology on the ground at the same occasion. Similarly, the president of India, APJ Abdul Kalam has also boosted the anti-satellite technology of India on the Golden Jubilee celebration of DRDO stating that it has the capability of intercepting and destroying any spatial object within the radius of 200 km (Rajagopalan, 2011). After projecting its ambitions to the world, India realized its ambitions of militarizing outer space after nine years and conducted a successful ASAT test on 27, March 2019.

National Security Threat
The significance of outer space in South Asia has increased in the last few years. South Asian states are using outer space like other states in any other region for militarization. The achievements that India has made in this domain have shifted the geostrategic paradigm of the region. India holds close collaborations with the United States and Israel for technical assistance and acquiring upgraded assets (Sarosh, 2019). It has realized the significance of outer space and employing all the capacities to closely monitoring its adversary.

The development of ASAT capability by India will have global and regional impacts on multiple fronts. It claims to be competing with China to counter it in outer space, but this progress can have a devastating effect on Pakistan in the future. Pakistan should be able to foresee the threats that this aggressive advancement can have on the country and develop a multi-fold program (Riaz, 2019). Military utility and militarization of outer space are inevitable. A space program must be capable of incorporating the dual-purpose utility of space assets and ground facilities, as military and commercial purposes are beneficial for each other (Riaz, 2019). India has attained a dual-use capability of space assets as for them; it is a matter of prestige rather than national security (Official, 2019). This ASAT test has made India capable of challenging China, but it will have a tertiary impact on Pakistan.

Conclusion

Conclusively, the paper has provided an overview of the phases of Pakistan's Space Program and a SWOT analysis. The SWOT analysis played a vital role in identifying the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats associated with the space program of Pakistan. The paper highlighted that the strength of space programs for Pakistan lies in the increase of training and education of the space sciences graduates in the professional environment. It can be made possible with the synergies of educational and professional institutions. The students must be motivated to perform R&D within the resources available at the educational institutions in order to increase the feasibility of the indigenous development of space assets. These opportunities can be provided with the private-public collaboration, which will further enhance the capacity building in the field of space sciences, where the introduction of a student satellite program in educational institutions, launched by SUPARCO, is a step forward in this direction. The international partnerships also offer alternatives and opportunities for technology and development collaborations as highlighted.

The paper also highlighted the weaknesses in the lack of indigenous development, limited focus on the subjects of space sciences and engineering, lack of defensive strategies for outer space, and inadequate attention towards the international collaboration for transfer of technology and the research and development in the field of outer space. The lag of R&D has weakened the progress of the space program, which led to the emergence of national and regional threats vis-à-vis outer space in South Asia. The lack of C4ISR and SSA capabilities possessed by Pakistan's adversary makes the tactical and strategic ground assets vulnerable. Pakistan lacks counter strategies for outer space that may provide safety and security in case of an unfortunate event. Along with the strategy is the absence of space assets and relevant ground facilities that further weaken the space program and threaten the national security of the country. Moreover, a vulnerable space program of Pakistan and the absence of deterrence in outer space further threatens the fragile strategic stability of the South Asian region.

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Protracted Social Conflict in the Globalized World: The Case of Newly Merged Tribal Districts (NMTDs) in Pakistan

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Abstract

The 'Newly Merged Tribal Districts' (NMTDs) of Pakistan have been a historic conflict zone. The area was dragged into protracted social conflict (PSC) once again after Pakistan joined the US in the global war on terror (GWOT). Successful military operations and border fencing between Pakistan and Afghanistan have significantly restricted activities of militancy and terrorism in the region; however, a significant problem in conflict management is foreign intervention and lack of development in the social sector in the region. The present study aims to explore the nexus between economy and governance, and its contribution to PSC, in the case of the NMTDs. It attempts to build a cross-sectional theoretical construct of structural realism, capitalism, globalization, and PSC by Edward Azar. The concept of PSC emphasizes that lack of governance and international linkages are predominating factors in PSC. The study identifies the absence of central power in the international system allowing foreign intervention in the region while using tools of globalization; thereby, in the context of NMTDs, beneficiaries of conflict generated the war economy. It further argues that the lack of development in the social sector and slow rehabilitation process in the region can undermine sustainable peace.

Keywords

Introduction

Erstwhile FATA has been recently merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan to bring the people of the region into mainstream. On 31 May 2018, the President of Pakistan assented FATA merger with KP based on the 25th Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan (e.g., Waseem, 2018). The region was subsequently named 'Newly Merged Tribal Districts' (NMTDs). Although the Government authorities have officially announced the merger, the complete (re)settlement of provincial government functionaries are likely to take place in a few years (owing to limited resources, inadequate infrastructure, and the ongoing post-conflict

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rehabilitation and reconstruction processes). Historically, the NMTDs, along with the Afghanistan region, has been a battlefield for outside 'invaders' fighting against the local inhabitants. However, none of these invaders could sustain their rule due to massive clashes with local tribes, and therefore, the region came to be popularly known as the 'graveyard for empires' (Bearden, 2001). The recent wave of terrorism in Afghanistan and NMTDs is also primarily an outcome of US intervention in the region, against the backdrop of 9/11 (Morgan & Woosley, 2009). Since 2001, both Afghanistan and the NMTDs became conflict zones with sporadic attacks by security forces and the Taliban alike. This thrust the region into PSC. With regards, several studies have elucidated the structural determinants of the violent conflict in the region, along with other regional dynamics. However, there is still a need to explore the link between the psychological and socio-economic factors that continuously nurture conflict in the region. This research explores these various facets of the PSC in the NMTDs, in the light of the connection between Structural realism, capitalism and globalization. It commences with an inquiry of the casual relationship between capitalism and conflict, and extends this understanding to the role played by these in the context of the NMTDs. Following this, the research explores a similar link between globalization and conflict. This causal relation is also extended to the context of the NMTDs. The causal link between Structural realism and conflict is similarly explored in the context of NMTDs. The study then brings together these three concepts to elucidate their complementary roles in the generation and protraction of conflict in the NMTDs in Pakistan. It links this conflict to the several domestic and international factors and concludes with recommendations in the light of theoretical considerations and primary findings.

Relationship between Capitalism and Conflict

The causal link between capitalism and conflict can be traced back to the evolution of the various ideologies that have governed the global market system. The Classical school of thought argues that all human beings have self-interests that generate economic competition. Such competition fosters proficiency, and thus brings economic prosperity to society (Smith, 1776, p. 96). In view of this, capitalism and structural realism generated debate over its negative outcome of classes of 'rich and poor' and 'societies and states'. The outcome is well feared by the Marxist approaches, which tend to explicate that the capitalist/bourgeoisie and proletariat, are in a state of clash over productive forces. Similarly, the Communist manifesto highlights capitalism as "a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx & Engles, 1848, p.15). It stresses that this economic system of capitalism is not consistent and hence would get replaced by Communism through social revolution (Ibid, p. 46).

The theory of capitalism and the free-market has benefited the developed world immensely. Business organizations (especially from the first world), use this ideology as a rationale to expand their businesses in other countries, thereby affecting local markets. The contemporary dominance of capitalism came about as a result of the failure of the post-WWI environment, which fostered mercantilism and military expansion (Frieden, 2012). The rapid expansionism led to a state of global insecurity, eventually leading to the Second World War the victors of the war, the USA and her allies, reasserted the foundation of the sustainable liberal international economy, which extended to the broader socio-economic and political domains. The followers of such liberal policies argue that the economic interdependence promoted by the free

market system has led to the minimization of the possibilities of conflict between states (Keohane & Nye, 1973).

However, evidence suggests that such liberal policies have given rise to a new form of conflict. While liberal organizations do favor business opportunities, they produce significant inequalities (e.g., Stein, 1979; Buckman, 2004). With regards, scholars have well identified the relationship between such ideologies and underdevelopment, inequalities and violent conflict (see, e.g., Deneen, 2019). In addition to private businesses, other international financial institutes (such as the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank) have been repeatedly criticized for their policies. These policies compromise the sovereignty of host states, under the guise of free-market economy (e.g., Azar, 1990).

The Link between Capitalism and Conflict in the NMTDs

The NMTDs have remained deprived in terms of socio-economic development and socio-spatial/political inclusion. This exclusion can be attributed to the imposition of the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR). The draconian of Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR), authoritative powers of a Political Agent (PA), and local *Malak* system significantly contributed towards maintaining the centralized power in the tribal region. (Mumtaz, 2016). Consequently, the broader public was excluded from any political participation in the real sense, considering the electoral system in NMTDs was not as per the rest of the country. It is also essential to understand that the (social) justice system was exclusively practiced through the indigenous *Jirga*. Although the Jirga system has widely been acknowledged as an effective indigenous mechanism of local dispute resolution, nevertheless there are significant power dynamics attached to the practice itself (Mehmood & Mir, 2019) which eventually contributed to PSC. These dynamics need to be explored in more detail. In this regard, the events surrounding 9/11 offer one point of departure.

The conflict emerged after the 9/11 terrorist incident and the USA's call for Pakistan to join the war against terror. This included clearing the NMTDs from the Taliban (Musharraf, 2006). The local population was generally involved in extra-legal economic activities, and only a few had stable jobs. Since it was an under-developed and less governed region, the militants were successful in mobilizing the locals to join militancy. The militants' success was also due to the state's has neglect of the NMTDSs since 1947; it had let the locals live according to their customs and traditions (KP Planning Department, 2019).

The economy of the areas has been similarly overlooked. Geological surveys have identified reserves of economically valuable minerals like copper, coal, limestone, chromite, lead, barite, soapstone, gypsum, marble, dolomite, emerald, and manganese in many parts of NMTDs. These sources of useful minerals have not been adequately explored, in part because of the government's disregard of the region and in part because of ongoing violence and militancy. These natural resources can be exploited for the betterment of the region and its people (Ali, 2018). Health care has also remained limited to major community centers. Therefore, people had to travel long distances to reach out to health facilities. As per one survey, there is only one doctor for every 7800 people, and only one health care facility for every 4200 people (Butt,2015; Mehmood & Mir, 2019). Primary school enrolment for children is 52.1% as compared to 65% for the rest of Pakistan. Similarly, women are at an alarming disadvantage in terms of literacy rate (7.8%) as compared to men (45%) in the NMTDs (Bureau Report, 2016; KP Planning Department, 2019). The judicial system is also lacking. The FCR denies people of NMTDs, the right to defend against arrest,

detention, the prohibition of torture for extracting evidence, citizenship equality, and protection of property rights (Ali, 2018).

The lack of access to necessary facilities, unemployment and lack of education, health facilities, communication infrastructure, government services and limited source of income in the community, all compounded the deprivation in the region. It allowed the transition of the peaceful community into violent social mobilization, because they had nothing at stake and were already used to war-fighting owing to the previous Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Khalid Afridi, personal Commanders to extract maximum monetary benefits by using local youth in armed fighting against security forces.

The Taliban Commanders, associates, and supporters in the chain availed monetary benefits through extortion, kidnapping for ransom, donations in the name of *Jihad*, and hence continued militancy in the region (Fawad Orakzi, personal communication, May 24, 2020). Since the youth of the NMTDs had limited access and exposure to the rest of the world, it was conveniently subverted in the name of religion, martyrdom, and going to heaven upon suicide. The foregoing, capitalism attracted the beneficiaries of the conflict who were keen on maintaining and expanding conflict in the NMTDs.

Globalization and Conflict

Capitalism, technological development, and hegemonic aspirations contributed significantly to globalizing the world. There is, however, no single definition of Globalization. Giddens (2013) explains "Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (The Globalizing of Modernity, para 2). Similarly, "globalization represents the triumph of a capitalist world economy tied together by a global division of labor" (Holten, 2011, p. 21). Both pro and anti-globalization arguments are convincing. Hence both views are still under the social sciences debate. While globalization has indeed shrunk the world, it is not without demerits.

The dark side of globalization has been utilized by the powerful states' machinery and international organizations alike. The absence of a central authority at the international level has allowed the expansion of hegemonic governance, propagation of ideologies serving vested interest, and accumulation of resources, which allows father leverage for powerful states like the US. Unjustified intervention under the guise of the elimination of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the elimination of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are clear examples of the misfortunes of globalization. Additionally, the foremost outcome of globalization is the increasing gap between rich and poor. As per UNDP, the economic wealth ratio between rich and poor countries was 3:1 in 1820, and in 1992, it reached 72:1 (Buckman, 2004). All of these factors contribute to PSC.

The cons of globalization result in hate, extremism, anger, and even terrorism. The anti-Islamic cartoon crises erupted in most of the Muslim world soon after it was published on 30 September 2005 in Danish Jutland Newspaper (Anderson & Luchau, 2011). Globalization has also created a certain loophole in the global legal framework. One example is the establishment of Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq where US soldiers tortured and sexually abused the suspects in the name of restoring the rule of law, democracy, and freedom to the people of Iraq (Gordon, 2006). Beside global terror, the disappearance of politics, division of classes, creation of insecurity, uncertainty, security dilemma, and structural realism is the dark side of globalization.

While Neo-liberal arguments may argue otherwise[3], international organizations such as the United Nations responsible for ensuring peace in the world could not deliver effectively and rationally due to the dominance of big powers in the decision-making process of the UN in their favor. Air bombing, drone attacks, and occupation of ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, after the September 11 attacks by NATO allies and US faced no resistance from the UN to cease collateral damage and resolve the issue through peaceful means. The issue with globalization, therefore, is that big powers take all the benefits and weaken the social fabric of weaker states in the global world.

Globalization and Conflict in NMTDs

Underdeveloped countries consider themselves deprived due to all advantages of globalization and free-market moving uni-directionally towards rich countries. The conspiracies regarding the hegemonic design of the West especially the USA, interventionism through direct or indirect means, extraction of natural resources, and enforcement of westernization or Americanization over globalization leads to mistrust, unrest, anti-American and anti-western sentiments. While the 9/11 attacks were considered an act of terrorism by Al-Qaeda network, the communities with radicalized views tend to organize violent social movements (such as Al Qaeda) with the logic of war against foreign intervention. The majority of the society of NMTDs openly supported anti Americanization drive and waged war against the USA and those who were thought to be supporting the USA in GWOT. The profiteers and beneficiaries jumped into the conflict by siding with the conflicting parties according to their vested interest.

> It was a stiff threat from the then US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage joins the GWOT, the then President Musharraf decided to join the USA in the interest of the state however faced tough resistance in the NMTDs region as people with radicalized mindset had already decided to wage war against the USA and Pakistan in GWOT (Musharraf, 2006, p.222).

Foreign fighters (such as Uzbeks) also joined the Taliban in the NMTDs region to fight against security forces. The Taliban in the funding, subversion, training, directing, and maximization of terrorism used the tools of globalization (Binnie & Wright, 2009). The same globalization enabled the swift intervention of the US and allied forces in Afghanistan. Similarly, Pakistan siding with the US in GWOT deployed security forces in the NMTDs region. Hence, all sides engaged in the conflict harnessed the tools of globalization in one way or another. The near to real-time footages of bombing and casualties were spread through tools of information technology to the global world (Putra, 2016, pp. 2-4). The Al-Qaeda and like-minded militants of other organizations took advantage of tools of globalization by swiftly connecting through their associates in most parts of the world, successfully developing anti Americanization narratives, and attracting individuals from other countries to join militancy in Afghanistan and NMTDs region. Hence, the NMTDs region was directly affected due to the US-allied countries' intervention in

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[3] See for e.g. Harvey. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism.*

Afghanistan, the Indian intervention in NMTDs, and the existence of safe havens of foreign militants resulted in PSC in NMTDs, all within the prism of globalization.

Structural Realism and Conflict

Classic realism elucidates international politics as based on human nature, therefore subject to emotions and ego of international leaders. However, Structural or Neo-Realism deviates from Classic realism and posits that emotions and ego do not determine behavior. It instead proposes structural limitations as the primary source of the behavior of states in international relations. The world operates without a centralized authority, therefore, in the international system, every state is sovereign and takes decisions rationally in its own interest (Mearsheimer & Alterman, 2001) The absence of centralized authority has led to anarchy in the international system, and thus causes conflict. Such an international system is continuously affected by the change.

> Within a system changes take place all the time, some important, some not. Big changes in the means of communication and warfighting, for example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. Such changes occur at the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps in all history, the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure in the international political system (Waltz, 2000, p. 5).

Structural realism, therefore, posits a security dilemma in the international system (Wunderlich, 2007, p. 18). The sovereign states acquire defensive mechanisms to safeguard against international intervention. However, their behavior comes across as an offensive mechanism, since this leads to an increase in their power relative to other states. This off-sets the offensive military capability of foreign interventions. It is due to this reason that states are never sure about the intentions of other states. This results in a lack of trust and the possibility of losing relative power that threatens the survival of the weaker state. The insecurity due to structural realism, thus leads to the expansion of military capability from defensive to offensive capability for interventionism, causing international security dilemmas. This suggests that "the international political system is anarchy, which is to say that its principal defining characteristics are the absence of overarching government" (Buzan, 2008, p. 128).

The defining feature of states is their sovereignty, or their refusal to acknowledge any political authority higher than themselves. Thus, the essential character of states defines the nature of the international political system, and the essential character of the political system reflects the nature of the states. If the units are sovereign, their system of association is anarchy, and if the system is anarchic, its members must reject the overarching government (Buzan, 2008). The security dilemma, therefore, causes an increase in military spending by encouraging large armies and high technological arsenals around the world. For example, because Pakistan fears a security threat from India, and has fought three wars in the past (besides limited conflict and skirmishes at the line of control), it keeps a minimum deterrence level to thwart against aggression. On the Indian side, the state feels threatened by China and raises its military budget to defend against any aggression

from China, and counter any threat from Pakistan as well. China is wary of a threat from the USA and keeps the army large enough to retaliate in case of any offensive. Similarly, the USA continues to expand its foothold all over the world by holding military bases and gaining a qualitative and quantitative edge over others so that no country in the world can come to challenge its military capability. Due to such international anarchy, the big powers intervene in other countries' affairs directly or indirectly to maximize their own defensive and offensive capability. Hence, the spiral of insecurity continues to get complex resulting in PSC.

Correspondingly, the behavior of the state is also greatly influenced by its pattern of linkages within the international system. In the world of globalization, two important international factors influence the behavior of states domestically. First is the level of economic dependency of the state on the international economic system. The level of dependency affects the level of the sovereignty of the state. Economic dependency and development affect the security needs within the state. The alteration in economic patterns due to the international economic system results in the realignment of a coalition of international capital and distorts economic policies within the state. The second linkage is political and military considerations in the international system. PSC occurs when communities are deprived of the satisfaction of their essential needs based on their communal identity. This deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of internal linkages.

In explaining such military and security considerations in the international system, Pape (2003) has deviated from the term international linkages and derived the term *foreign intervention*. Addressing the problem of suicide terrorism, he holds that the level of foreign intervention, the difference of religion between the foreign state intervening and the local state, the level of nationalism within that community, and mass support to martyrdom leads to suicide terrorism. Pape (2003) suggests that offshore balancing should be the best strategy for the USA, considering that despite being a superpower, it has its limitations.

Structural Realism and Conflict in NMTDs
The social fabric of NMTDs was greatly affected by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 as most populations conceived as a threat to their sovereignty, and thus decided to join hands with the people of Afghanistan in violent resistance against Soviet forces (Hegghammer, 2010). This also resulted in an influx of millions of Afghan refugees into the NMTDs, and the rest of Pakistan. Afghan fighters, along with volunteers of NMTDs and foreign support, forced the withdrawal of Soviet forces. However, this gave birth to Mujahideen and the ideology of *Jihad* for socially violent mobilization against foreign invaders. The Mujahideen commanders propagated religious fundamentalism and severely affected the culture and traditions of NMTDs. On the Pakistani side, it was predominantly the issue of foreign policy, and Pakistan's joining of hands with the USA on the global war on terror, which resulted in PSC in the region.

Until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the people of NMTDs lived the way they wanted. However, the joining of locals as Mujahideen to fight against Soviet forces resulted in the rise of Talibanization. The Taliban later took over from traditional *Malaks* and started administering the region along religious lines as per their understanding. However, the Pakistani authorities later resisted Talibanization and took control of the region with rehabilitation programs for the community. The US presence in Afghanistan is based on the existence of terrorism in the region. This

also helps TTP elements to strengthen their narrative of the war against invaders (the US in Afghanistan) and her allies supporting GWOT (Pakistan) (Ali Shinwari, personal communication, May 22, 2020).

On the other hand, India is exploiting the situation and supports militancy in NMTDs to settle the score with her rival Pakistan. At present, Pakistan is engaged on the western border with the US (based in Afghanistan) and on the eastern border with India. The USA is in a state of chaos in Afghanistan and cannot manage the conflict. The use of force (operations) and peace processes are going on side by side (Landay et al.,2020) Pakistan is blamed time and again for its (US and allied forces) failure in Afghanistan and is asked to 'do more' (Yousaf, 2010, pp. 1-2). Whereas Pakistan has already paid a heavy price on GWOT that has severely impacted the economy, damaged infrastructure, suffered losses of human lives, and psychological trauma to the society as a whole. The FDI fell to $ 463 million during the first quarter as against $1.116 billion during the same period in the previous year (a decline of 58.5 percent). The frequent incidents of terrorism have brought a bad name to Pakistan in the world and international markets. Terrorism has damaged the economy, polity, and society of Pakistan, on multiple levels (Ali, 2010). The political rebuttal is continuing between both the governments on the war on terror; however, Pakistan has been able to control its side to a large extent and is now in the process of consolidation and rehabilitation (Saeed, 2017). Whereas the USA has initiated peace dialogue with the Taliban, though it is yet to take its course towards sustainable peace in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Indian consulates in Afghanistan are in rivalry with Pakistan, and Pakistani officials have stated openly Indian involvement in undermining Pakistan's security and stability[4]. DG ISPR has given official statements on Indian involvement in causing terrorism in Pakistan. He stated: "India has been busy in fomenting unrest through terrorism using Afghan soil (Global Village, 2018). There are rare cases of uncovering the participation of serving officers of intelligence agencies operating in other countries. Indian Naval serving Officer Commander Yadev was apprehended in Pakistan on conducting terrorist activities to destabilize Pakistan. His video confession stated that his activities have been anti-national or terrorist in nature that resulted in killing or maiming of a Pakistani citizen. Even the Prime Minister of India while his visit to Bangladesh in 2015 openly stated Indian active participation in 1971 causing separation of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan (Khetran, 2017, p. 112). MaleehaLodhi, (the erstwhile permanent) representative to UN, submitted a dossier to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres containing shreds of evidence of Indian terrorism in Pakistan (Ibid, p. 115).

Foreign intervention by a superpower in the present era has received a blowback effect in terms of anti-Americanization, especially in conflict zone countries or underdeveloped regions. Before US attacks in Afghanistan in 2001, there was a rare incident of terrorism or militancy against state authorities, however, due to international anarchy; the US intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan's support to the US in GWOT, the region was triggered with violence turning to PSC for almost last two decades.

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[4]A viral video on social media shows Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval stating that the best way to tackle Pakistan is through terrorism.

Situating PSC and Conflict in NMTDs

While structural realism, capitalism and globalization, all have a role in contributing to militancy in NMTDs, there is a need to analyze factors, which specifically contribute to PSC. Edward Azar identifies communal content, human need, the role of state and governance, and international linkages, as contributors to PSC. He states that disarticulation between the state and society is the core problem initiating PSC (Azar, 1990). The term identifies the violent relations between the communal groups based on historical, ethnic, religious and cultural hatred as the basis of conflict generation, in attempts to the protection of rights based on groups' communal identity. Following the colonial pattern and governance based on the FCR, the community of the NMTDs remained largely isolated from the rest of the country even after the country's independence in 1947. This resulted in the development of stronger bonds between the local communities, and the strengthening of local culture to safeguard against the threat to the communities from outside powers. The decision to support the US in GWOT, and the stationing of Pakistan security forces in NMTDs were threatening to the community of the region. It encouraged them towards resistance and violent mobilization, hence resulting in PSC. Additionally, the area continued to rely on the *Jirga system* (local dispute settlement mechanism as per own traditions and culture) and remained deprived of social development in education, health and the economic domain. (Amin-u-Haq Qadri, personal communication, June 22, 2020). The cleavages between state and community caused the deprivation of human need and increased the gap in development between settled areas of KP and NMTDs. As per Azar, international linkages are one of the major contributing factors in PSC. International linkages involve the "political–economic relations of economic dependency within the international economic system and the network of political-military linkages constituting regional and global patterns of clientage and cross-border interest" (Azar, 1990). The US foothold in Afghanistan and movement of Pakistan security forces to NMTDs resulted in the expansion of militancy in the region. Though successful military operations and limited social development have mitigated the PSC, however, the decades' deprived region needs a massive rehabilitation program to fulfill basic needs at par with settled areas of the country.

Concluding Remarks

The theoretical construct of capitalism, globalization and structural realism have contributed to the conflict in NMTDs while internal dynamics such as the state's neglect of society resulted in PSC in the region. The US intervention in Afghanistan, and Pakistan's support to the US-led forces in Afghanistan, has severely affected peace in the NMTDs region. Capitalism has attracted beneficiaries of the conflict and generated a war economy through conflict in the NMTDs region. The intrastate conflict is protracted due to tools of globalization as it has attracted both foreign state authorities and militants alike to escalate the conflict (by using tools of globalization). The militants used information technology to spread terror and develop an anti-American narrative, in addition to operating from Afghanistan to target the NMTDs region. Capitalism, globalization and structural realism have therefore worked together to create and protract conflict. However, the effective role of state and governance can mitigate the effects of PSC. Therefore, the Government of Pakistan needs to pay special attention to education, health, economy, and justice to rehabilitate society on a fast track.

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The Need for Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: A Psycho-social Approach towards Curbing Extremism in Pakistan

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Abstract

Violent extremism (VE) has emerged as one of the most serious subjects in the contemporary world. A significant issue concerning extremism is the psychological rehabilitation of both the victims and the witnesses of violent extremist acts. This study aims to elucidate the psychological state of the surviving victims and witnesses of violent extremism and their current psychosocial stressors in Pakistan. The objective of the study is to investigate if the cycle of extremism perpetuates through victimization due to lack of post-conflict rehabilitation. Methodologically, the paper is based on the quantitative psychometric evaluation according to the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scale scoring on the victims of VE. This method is widely used for clinical and research practices. This study was carried out in two phases; the pilot phase measured the alpha reliability of the BDI through SPSS, while the main study identified the psychosocial stressors, according to DSM IV, and through history taking. A group of 70 victims of VE in Pakistan, were drawn through convenience sampling. Secondary data comprised of the published literature on post-conflict rehabilitation in Pakistan. According to the findings obtained through BDI scoring of research, most of the VE victims suffer from severe depression and exhibit the tendencies of extreme anger and vengeful behaviour. Such tendencies have made them more prone to engaging in a future conflict. The psychosocial stressors following the acts of extremism further contributed to their depressive state and heightened aggression towards society. The study strongly suggests that there is a dire need for the allocation of resources by the government and relevant authorities, to build post-conflict rehabilitation frameworks in order to sabotage the perpetual cycle of the spread of extremism through victimization. Anti-extremism policy recommendations are also provided based on the findings of the study.

Introduction

Violent extremism has recently emerged as one of the most serious security issues in the contemporary world (Sen, 2007). In the case of Pakistan, violent extremism in the

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form of sectarianism and terrorism has effectively seeped into the social fabric of the country, resulting in the destabilization of the country's socio-political structure. This has led to the birth of new internal security challenges. While these new internal security threats have presented novel challenges, the required state response has remained lacking. The state has retained an uncertain focus between internal and external security issues. As a result, internal security threats have been inadequately addressed. (Nawaz, 2016; Eatwell, 2012).

Generally, it is a practice of the local governments to provide the post-conflict victims of extremism with short-term support, and the mental health rehabilitation which can be in the form of psychosocial assistance. However, once the victims recover from their physical injuries, the support is withdrawn, and the victims start to suffer in silence and isolation, which leads to mental health issues like depression, aggression and PTSD. It has also been observed that depending upon the type of injury that the victim suffered from, he may need substantial psychotherapy. However, due to lack of post-conflict psychological rehabilitation, he remains untreated in the long term for that a comprehensive government public policy is needed (United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, 2016).

Appropriate follow-up of treatment of the victims of violence has also remained absent from Pakistan's post-conflict rehabilitation efforts. Meanwhile, violent extremism has continued to rise, entrenching itself deeply within the psyche of the people. Direct and indirect exposure to such violent extremism and related behaviors has resulted in several mental health problems. Such mental health problems have been linked with various psychosocial stressors among both urban and rural populations. Mental health problems have also been found to be positively correlated to the unstable socio-economic conditions resulting from violent extremism (Khalily et al., 2011). There has been an especially high propensity of such psychological stressors and disorders among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Gadit, 2011; Hussain et al., 2012).

Such alarming tendencies in the Pakistani population, are reflective of the pervasive psychological impacts of violence and extremism in the country. The present study analyzes the impact of exposure to violence on different groups of people in the country. Some of the major psychological issues and the manifestation of exposure to violence observed in the victims of VE include depression, aggression, PTSD and over-generalizing. These manifestations are examined in relation to the various psychological stressors that result from acts of violence. The initial sections of the paper outline the links between violence and mental health problems. The following sections present a detailed review of the methodology, including the main procedures, participants and measures used in the research. This is followed by a presentation of the results and their detailed discussion. The paper concludes with policy recommendations in light of the research findings.

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a major mental disorder that people affected by extremist attacks suffer from. Studies indicate a discernible link between acts of violence and post-traumatic disorders. Various forms of political and religious-based violence result in altered behaviors and perceptions of the victims of such violence. Populations most at risk include the youth and other vulnerable segments of society.[2]

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[2] See e.g., Fayyaz, S. (2019). Impact of violent extremism on Pakistani youth. *South Asian Studies*, *34*(2), 441-450.

The survivors of violent assault are more likely to develop PTSD in comparison with those who survive natural disasters or other accidents. Such experiences can result in different forms of PTSD including acute (recovery within three months), chronic (symptoms lasting over months or years) and delayed (onset of symptoms after six months or more after actual experience), type of PTSD. Different individual and societal factors also determine the occurrence and type of PTSD experienced by survivors (Kaminer & Eagle, 2010). Nonetheless, social support remains a crucial factor in trauma treatment. Other treatments that are effective for PTSD include a combination of counselling and medication. Physical Medication and Rehabilitation therapies (PM&R) can also be utilized for the treatment of these individuals (Yehuda et al., 2015). If left untreated, continued stress can manifest in other forms of psychological disorders.

Over-Generalization

Exposure to traumatic experiences can cause other kinds of behavioral patterns in victims, such as over-generalization. Prolonged exposure to violence has been proven to induce over-generalizing behaviors in those affected, whereby victims generalize their traumatic experience in every other situation. Such over-generalization is induced by stress, anxiety and depression. The famous 'Little Albert' experiment carried out in the 1920s was one of the earliest researches to prove a case in point. Psychologists Watson and Rayner conditioned an infant to be fearful of rats. The infant eventually came to fear any furry thing that resembled a rat. (Beck et al., 2009). This experiment holds true in defining the core of PTSD, as in the cases of PTSD, fear that is related to the violent extremist act also extends to safe situations, (furry things), that resemble a distressing situation. If this remains untreated, it becomes a continuous source for anxiety, aggression and depression, inculcating suicidal thoughts and constant fear in the victims of extremist acts. In some cases, these untreated victims go on to become perpetrators of violence themselves (Greco & Liberzon, 2016).

Depression and Aggression

Depression and aggression are some of the related psychological manifestations of (prolonged or intense) exposure to violence. Although the perpetrators strategically plan the acts of violent extremism, such as terrorism, these acts are always an unexpected occurrence for the victims. This element of surprise and lack of any control over the situation exacerbates the psychological consequences of many folds (Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004). In addition to traumatic stress, distress responses and behavioural change, it can lead to severe and prolonged depression. Certain studies have employed various mechanisms to chart the link between acts of violence, resource loss and depression. A structural equation path model revealed that such symptoms were positively correlated with exposure to terrorism and related loss of psychological and other resources (Hobfoll, 1991; Hobfoll et al., 2006). Exposure to such kinds of events increases the possibility of physical and mental health problems in children, adolescents and adults alike (Comer & Kendall, 2007). Although different in many ways from other life events such as abuse or disaster, terrorism has also been identified as a traumatic life event (Shahar et al., 2009). It carries a significant impact on the victim's life in the form of traumatic stress that has been identified as a

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See also Durodié, B., & Wainwright, D. (2019). Terrorism and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Historical Review.

significant cause of depression. Such exposure makes them vulnerable to experience anxiety, worries, depression and anger. This feeling of depression results in behavioral change among survivors (Hussain et al., 2012). Contrastingly, certain standardized clinical classifications, such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification Disease (ICD) have postulated that trauma exposure may not always lead to significant depression. (Vitriol et al., 2014).

Nevertheless, as evident from the literature above, prolonged or intense exposure to violence, particularly terrorism can produce adverse psychological effects. This is especially true in the absence of appropriate public mental health systems. Such evidence points towards the pressing need for coordinated state response to address the psychological dimensions of violent extremism. An adequate response to violent extremism must take account of the victims' psychological issues and emotional rehabilitation. The present study analyzes the various psychosocial effects of exposure to violent extremism. It makes a case for addressing the psychological dimension of post-conflict rehabilitation in Pakistan in order to improve the overall effectiveness of rehabilitation efforts.

Methodology

Procedures
This research is retrospective in nature and includes a psychometrical quantitative analysis. The research process was initiated by seeking permission to conduct psychological tests. Relevant authorities, at the various locations of research, were contacted for access to participants and data collection. The authorities were informed about the purpose of the study. Due to the volatile security situation, it was also mentioned that the names would be kept confidential, and information will be used only for the research purpose. The research was carried in two steps, i.e. pilot testing of the questionnaire and main study. The first step consisted of the pilot study which was carried out to assess the psychometric characteristics of Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), a psychological test for measuring depression among the victims of extremism and the psychosocial stressors as categorized in DSM IV. The alpha reliability of the Beck Depression Inventory was 0.94. Cronbach's Alpha reliability is most generally used for the research that has multiple Likert questions in a survey/ questionnaire that forms a scale. Also, it helps to determine if the scale is reliable. This is often used in the psychometric quantitative research tool that also helps to determine the results from the scale. Cronbach's also helps to identify if the diverse sets of test items would give the same measurement outcomes. Cronbach's above 0.90 is considered the best (Taber, 2018). For example, the Cronbach alpha reliability of Beck Depression Inventory scale used in this research is 0.94 (see table below).

Cronbach's Alpha	No. of items
0.94	21

Participants
The sample size comprised of 70 victims of violent extremism from NWFP, FATA, Wah-Cantt, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi (a few of them were Afghan refugees as well). This sample was acquired through convenient sampling. The BDI and questionnaire of psychosocial stressors, according to DSM IV, was administered on

70 victims of extremist acts along with their history taking. After getting their consent, Beck Depression Inventory and Psychosocial stressor, according to DSM IV, were administered on VE victims. The obtained data was analyzed psychologically through BDI scale scoring, and the alpha reliability of BDI was taken through SPSS.

Sources

This research was essentially deductive and inferential in nature. The deductions were compared with those available in independent western sources. Tertiary source information released by the family of people who conducted extremist acts was also analyzed. Books written by the renowned authors in the field of Psychoanalysis concerning terrorism and political science were another tertiary source. Help from the published papers of various think tanks available in the country and abroad was also sought. The primary source was the interviews and the responses of the victims of violent extremism which was collected through questionnaires, namely Beck Depression Inventory and Psychosocial stressor DSM IV. Important information about their behavior was also noted down during their interviews.

The analysis was based on a psychological research method, "Beck Depression Inventory Scale Scoring", SPSS was used for the alpha reliability of the BDI scale and the psychosocial stressors were identified through history taking. Views and opinions expressed by local psychologists and foreign scholars towards the psychological impact of extremism were also gleaned. It was found that out of 70 participants, 44 victims were showing severe depression.

Measures

Psychosocial Stressors According to Diagnostic Statistical Manual IV

The main underlying reason to use psychosocial stressors from DSM IV in the questionnaire was to thoroughly understand the psychological state of the post-conflict victims because DSM IV provides the detailed psychosocial stressors. In this study, the psychosocial stressors that contributed to the aggressive and depressive state of the victims of VE were identified during their interviews. Psychosocial stressors (especially after any conflict or war) are the fuelling factors to increase psychological disturbances which can often result in extreme behaviour. Terrorist organizations often recruit young individuals who are dissatisfied from the psychosocial statuses and the young minds who are looking for some psychosocial opportunities for advancements (Taylor & Louis, 2004). Given below are the psychosocial stressors, according to DSM IV (American Psychological Association, 2000).

Table 1: Psychosocial Stressors according to DSM IV

Psychosocial Stressors related to Primary Support Group	The stressors related to the primary relations such as death or loss of a family member
Psychosocial Stressors related to Social environment	The stressors related to the inability to cope with the social environment or loss/death of a friend
Psychosocial Stressors related to Educational Problems	The psychosocial stressor associated with the educational problem such as inability to study due to traumatized mindset
Psychosocial Stressors related to Housing Problems	The psychosocial stressor associated with the neighbouring

Psychosocial Stressors related to Occupational Problems	The psychosocial stressor associated with the sustainability of Jobs.
Psychosocial Stressors related to Health Care	The psychosocial stressor associated with the provision of adequate physical or psychological health after any traumatic incident
Legal system/ Crime	The psychosocial stressors that involve the legally charged for any crime
Economic problems	The psychosocial stressors related to the financial issues after any traumatic incident
Other Psychosocial stressors	Other psychosocial stressors, according to DSM IV means any other psychological and social stressors related other than the above mentioned.

Beck Depression Inventory Scale (BDI) II and Scoring

BDI is a 21-item psychological scale that is used to measure the psychological/clinical depression by psychologists. This questionnaire was initially designed to be administered by the practising psychologist/trained interviewers. However, it can be self-scored as well, but in the presence of a trained psychologist/mental health professional (Beck et al., 1996). Furthermore, the BDI II contains the 21 items on a 4-point scale from 0-3 (0, 1, 2, 3) — 0 (the absence of depressive symptoms) and 3 (severe depressive symptoms). The cognitive decline (lack of emotional control, impulsivity, and aggression), emotional disturbances and asexual symptoms are also covered in it reflecting the DSM IV- criteria for major depressive scoring. The scoring is achieved by adding the marked number (0-3) by the research subjects. The minimum score of depression which indicates the minimal depression category is 0, and the highest depression score is 63: higher the score, higher the range of depression. In Non-clinical populations such as post-war victims, post-conflict victims; scores above 20 indicate the presence of depression (Kendall et al., 1987).

In subjects diagnosed with depression, 0-13 represents minimal depression. Score from 14-19 indicates mild depression, whereas score from 20-28 represents moderate depression and scores between 29-63 represent the severity of depression (Beck et al., 1996).

Results

Through psychometric evaluation under the Beck depression inventory scoring, the following were the findings of this research. The total number of victims of violent extremism in the study were 70. Out of 70, 44 victims of extremism (such as suicide bombing and drone attacks) were observed to be severely depressed and had aggressive tendencies towards the society.

This research paper focuses on severely depressed victims of violent extremism as they showed a higher level of aggression and dissatisfaction towards society, which led them to have violent behaviour. The severely depressed victims of VE desired to be engaged in violent activities because the post-traumatic and psychological effects of violent extremism were not addressed or treated adequately by the authorities and by the health care departments. Thus, the cycle of extremism and victimization continued to perpetuate. Figure 1 highlights the psychosocial

stressors in ascending order as reported by the victims of violent extremism during their interviews.

Table 2: Level of Depression among Victims of Violent Extremism (N=70)

| *Post Extremism Psychological Effect Variable (Depression)*	*Victims of Violent Extremism (N=70)*
Severe Depression	44
Minimal Depression	6
Moderate Depression	15
Mild Depression	5
Grand Total	*70*

Figure 1: Stressors in Their Increasing Order as Reported by the Victims of VE


Figure 2: The Psychosocial Stressors of Severely Depressed Victims of Extremism as reported by the Victims of VE (N=44)

The Effects of Various Psychosocial Stressors Leading to Severe Depression and Violent Aggression

After reviewing and critically analyzing the results as presented in Figure 2, it can be inferred that the victims of extremism mostly suffer from four main categories of psychosocial stressors: economic problems, occupational problems, primary support group and healthcare problems. Victims of these extremist attacks suffer tremendous economic burden even before being victims of these attacks due to their socio-economic status. For example, they may rely on construction jobs or odd jobs to get by as a daily wage worker. This requires their health to be excellent. Therefore, when these individuals have their worlds turned upside down as a consequence of violent acts, their psychological state and physical state does not allow them to perform their routine businesses adequately. Some of these individuals may have suffered a physical injury which renders them useless in their respective workforce as a daily wage worker and they are resultantly forced to re-live their traumatic experiences.

Furthermore, the lack of a primary support group where family members can compensate for the economic hardship for the individual does not exist. It is due to this fact that they are also victims of the same attacks and are in the same socio-economic group. These four leading psychosocial stressors are very much interconnected and create a domino effect where the presence of one stressor leads to the emergence of next.

These stressors emphatically have a long-lasting detrimental effect on the psychology of the post violent extremism victims if not adequately treated. Majority of the surviving victims of violent extremism (treated as a sample for this study) were suffering from severe depression after the attack, and most of them had health problems in the family. About 35 out of 44 severely depressed victims of Violent Extremism (VE) reported that they suffered from economic problems due to a physical and psychological disability and others reported that they lost a family member to violent extremist acts such as suicide bombings. Consequently, the whole family or a few members of the family became victims to it by proxy. A linear relationship was observed among the permanent physical/psychological disability and intensity of depression and aggression towards the society. For example, one of the victims was found suffering from severe depression and reported sexual abuse after the incident.

Thus, it can be deduced that there is a remarkable rise in psychosocial stress, which leads to severe depression and violent behaviour due to a lack of coping mechanism. During their research interviews and BDI administration, aggression was also analyzed, and the simple deduction was that higher the depression, higher the level and patterns of aggression. These victims reported that they witnessed the death or a loss of a friend during violent extremist attacks, and they reported inadequate social support after an act of violent extremism took place.

A few of the victims reported that the death or loss of a friend or loved one increased their depression and aggression because they had seen them dying in front of their eyes, yet the post-conflict psychological rehabilitation was not given to them. This depression led them to the poor coping ability with society, and they sought to project their aggression towards it. This Depressive illness remains untreated due to the lack of post-conflict psychological rehabilitation, which can result in violent thoughts and violent behaviours. Such as, in the sample of the study, it was observed that the emotional rage in the victims of VE became severe. Consequently, there was a tremendous rise of aggression or vengeful behaviour because of non-availability of the post-conflict or post extremism psychological rehabilitation. A few of them

reported that they displaced their aggression to the common public, such as mass shootings or target killing. One of the victims of suicide bombing stated, "If I am not happy, why them? If I suffered, why not them?"

The phenomenon of 'Displacement' is a common psychological phenomenon of displacing anger on the innocent. It refers to satisfying one's desire for revenge (Freud, 1937). Such as in the case of suicide bombings, or terrorist attacks. The most unaddressed area in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) is understanding the underlying causes of violent behaviour. It is observed that if the victims of a terrorist attack or an extremist attack remain psychologically untreated, they may join hands with any extremist organization to displace their anger for the sake of revenge. Mostly, the common public becomes the target in this process of their anger displacement.


Figure 3: The Response of the victims of Extremism towards Violence Engaging Acts

As it is shown in the above Figure 3, the rise in depression among the victims of extremism led them towards behavioural hostility. Another significant finding of the study is that the severely depressed victims of extremism showed a linear relationship with the violent engaging behaviour (as shown in Figure 3). This finding helps us to understand that if the victims of extremism are left without post-conflict psychological rehabilitation, their chances to engage in violence significantly increases. The more psychologically untreated victims of extremism a country has, the more extremism can flourish there. However, previous research state that depression can seldom be the cause of violence. Extremism is a psychopathological illness. In order to manage or resolve conflict, it is essential to understand the underlying cause and nature of it. Anti-extremism policies cannot reach their designated goals unless peace psychology is taken under account. One of the most important but the least focused consequences of such violent acts is the psychological effects of extremist acts on the victims and witnesses and their potentially harmful long-term effects. Many researchers have confirmed this observation (e.g., Almog, 2004). Unfortunately, underlying factors such as psychological effects and psychological nature of the conflict has been the most neglected area of research in the field of Peace and Conflict studies. However, this research addresses the primary and essential study of conflict management and peace studies.

Figure 4: The Cycle of Extremism through Victimization

Discussion

The occurrence of extremist acts like suicide bombings, drone attacks and other acts of extremism have increased drastically over the past few years. During the interviews conducted, it was noticed that victims of violent extremism such as drone attacks and suicide bombings were more threatened of the extremist acts. The primary cause of worry for the victims was the unpreparedness of the government and system to deal with extremism and to build an effective post-conflict rehabilitation program. Most of the victims thought that acts of extremism are also psychological in nature because they cause psychological suffering. They create more anger, fear, stress and depression than any other natural disaster. The interviews and the results of the psychological tests showed that victims were not satisfied with the psychological rehabilitation offered in their respective conflict-ridden areas due to non-availability of any socially integrated policy for such victims.

The study conclusively shows that almost all of the victims suffered from depression in the immediate aftermath. Alarmingly, victims remained depressed even after a long time had passed. According to the Beck Depression Inventory, most of the victims unexpectedly fell in the range of severe depression due to the increased psychosocial stressors and their poor psychological capability to cope up with them. A strong linear relationship was noted between depression and psychosocial stressors among the victims of violent extremism in Pakistan. These victims, especially those who suffered from the severity of depression (if left without post-conflict rehabilitation) could potentially be motivated to conduct violent acts and harm the society further, which has the potential of creating more victims and the cycle might eventually perpetuate. The survivors of any conflict who faced psychological disturbance and increased psychosocial stressor were more vulnerable to get involved in violent activities, conflict or even suicide bomb attacks (Cardenas et al., 2003).

Acts of violent extremism significantly affected the mental and psychological capability of individuals which caused stress, depression, anxiety and fear in them that ultimately affected their behaviour (Borum, 2014). People who were victims of violent extremist acts like terrorist attacks and drone strikes were found to be emotionally upset, threatened, nervous, stressed-out and sad most of the time. Frequent occurrences of extremist acts like suicide bombings and terrorist attacks made them more worried about their own and their family's security. These victims experienced a high degree of severe depression and related altered perception of reality.

Appropriate and timely identification and amelioration of such stressors and their related symptoms are imperative in the context of post-conflict rehabilitation. Mental health professionals can play a crucial role in this regard. For instance, providing advice and guidelines to medical and surgical staff regarding post-traumatic reactions and helping in identifying the symptoms that could be due to psychological reaction to any stress. Similarly, prioritizing victims for the specialist psychiatric care can prove helpful in advising the authorities on the management of anxious, aggressive and distressed behaviors of the victims of any traumatic incident (Weine et al., 2017).

While previous researches have measured depression using only one of the psychosocial stressors (Coid et al., 2016), this research has analyzed all of the psychosocial stressors with the categories of depression according to BDI scoring such as minimal depression, moderate depression, mild depression and severe depression. The data collected in this study can be used to prioritize the victims according to their needs by keeping in view the ascending level of psychosocial stressors. It prioritizes the psychosocial stressors to know which one is playing a pivotal role in elevating the depressive illness and aggression through the psychometric evaluation as given in BDI scoring. This study strongly emphasizes on the fact that in conflict zones there is a severe lack of mental health care facilities and the government and relevant authorities need to take the initiative for the provision of this facility to victims of extremist acts in specific and all the population in general. The government needs to allocate proper funding for this cause. There is a need to offer an empathetic, non-judgmental, collaborative approach to help these ailing individuals to achieve a better level of adjustment by the government or authorities (Bhui et al., 2014).

The Dilemma: Post-conflict Rehabilitation in Pakistan

Pakistan is severely deprived of mental health rehabilitation that is linked to the violence in Pakistan and the disruption of its social infrastructure. Hence, the cycle of extremism can only perpetuate further (Mumford et al., 2000). Psychological rehabilitation of both victims and witnesses of violent extremist acts is an absolute necessity. The practice of psychological rehabilitation has been formally accepted since the 20th century and has been a part of the treatment of post-war and trauma victims.

Most of the victims and witnesses of extremist acts go through a post-trauma period in which they continuously re-experience the moment of suffering, and that leads to several mental disorders including, severe depression and aggression. Apart from medicine, they also need post-conflict mental rehabilitation approaches to bring them back to their healthy life (Ginges et al., 2011). So, that they can assimilate back into society and again be a productive part of the community.

Mental health services for the victims of extremism has been a serious issue in Pakistan as the mental health workers are under-resourced and under-trained, especially in the areas like erstwhile FATA and Swat (Saeed, 2001). There are very few mental professionals (psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers) in Pakistan (Khalily, 2010). Most of the victims of violent extremism live in urban centres. Available facilities are not adequately utilized due to the social stigmas attached with mental health rehabilitation where most of the community has the misperception about mental illness as the possession of *evil spirit (jinn), magic* (Somasundaram, 2004). Mental health rehabilitation in Pakistan demands persistent attention from

policymakers, professional bodies, academics and mental health professionals working in the mental health field (Khalily, 2010).

Conclusion and Recommendation

The current study was conducted to understand the need for post-conflict rehabilitation. The results showed that most of the victims of violent extremism in Pakistan, including Afghan refugees, are more prone to the severity of depression and violent aggression due to non-availability of Post-conflict rehabilitation services. Moreover, the significant finding of this research supported the fact that the victims of violent extremism suffered from depression in the immediate aftermath, however, over time the severity of depression and aggression was noted according to beck depression inventory scale scoring. This emotional rage and psychological decline among the VE victims were seen due to the increased psychosocial stressors and their poor psychological capability to cope with them. During the research interview and psychometrical evaluation, a strong linear response was observed between depression and psychosocial stressors among the victims of extremism. It can be inferred that people who were once the victims of extremism could end up in being extremists themselves if the post-conflict rehabilitation services are not provided to them. The study strongly suggests that there is a need for provision for post-conflict rehabilitation and mental health care to the victims of extremism, and emphasizes on the fact that there is a dire need for allocation of resources by the government and relevant authorities in order to obtain psychological well-being and to minimize issues like extremism in society. The current study has also provided a blanket recommendation of anti-extremism policy for the victims of violent extremism based on the findings of the study.

Policy Recommendations

There should be a provision of a platform mainly for the underdeveloped and developing countries to encourage them in active participation at an international forum to highlight the psychological effects of violent extremism (suicide bombings, terrorist attacks and drone strikes) on the national and regional stability. Providing access to Global Mental Health Facility through training and workshops shall prove beneficial as well. Also, the provision of funds for mental health rehabilitation in conflict-prone areas to provide the victims with a socially integrated approach could be beneficial in terms of effectively managing post-conflict rehabilitation.

There should be an immediate action for the awareness of mental health rehabilitation through different workshops and social campaigns at the national public level to highlight the threats of the untreated psychological condition of the victims of extremism/terrorism. Practical implementation of public policy by provincial and local governments is also required to address the threatening psychological effects of suicide bombings, particularly in the poor targeted communities who are unaware of rehabilitation services and/or cannot afford expensive rehabilitation services. Since most of the victims of violent extremism are more prone to engaging in further violent activities, there is a need for the conflict resolution through a more socially integrated psychological approach to reduce the fear of their personal and family security. This can help us to achieve a better, socially integrated society.

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Afghan Peace Deal 2020: Possible Scenarios and Outcomes

Farhan Zahid[1]

Introduction

After much deliberations and delays, the US-Taliban peace deal was finally inked on February 29th, 2020 (Asia, 2020). The long-awaited peace deal though officially considered as the end of the longest war in US history but does not seem likely to last long. The peace deal focuses on much-debated vital areas such as withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in phases (in 14 months); Taliban not to allow any Al-Qaeda presence or not to provide safe havens to Islamist terrorist groups in Afghanistan; talks between Taliban and Afghan government to begin soon; and, lifting of economic sanctions on the Taliban (US State Department, 2020).

Scholars and researchers on the subject matter issues such as counter-terrorism, Afghanistan conflict, and peace negotiations are divided on the eventual outcome of this deal. Nonetheless, there are high hopes considering the success of this deal. The country has been facing the menace of terrorism and consecutive political violence since 1979, making it one of the oldest ongoing conflicts. Probably, the Afghans have suffered more than any other nation during civil wars, coups/revolutions, foreign invasions, Islamist extremist movements and insurgencies.

Talking about long-awaited peace in Afghanistan sounds like honey to ears, but the question is how to achieve sustainable peace in Afghanistan, which has never been the case at least in the last 40 years. Having a bird's eye view of previous peace deal starting from Geneva Peace talks in 1989, to Peshawar Agreement signed with the aegis of the Pakistani government in 1992, and the subsequent Mecca Accord signed after the mediation of Saudi government; none had yielded the desired results. The survival of this peace deal remains a subject of much consideration. This essay endeavours to analyze possible scenarios in which the peace deal could work or could not work. One could always hope for the best interest of peace but making impractical hopes far from ground realities is never a sound examination of the situation.

Scenarios when peace is achievable

Modern history has witnessed scores of political conflict lasting over the years, and at times decades and even in the grimmest of situations, peace is achieved. Finally, the bloodiest of the political violence ended after negotiations with or without mediations of influencing state and supra-state actors. Though difficult, the case of Afghanistan is no different as far as the resolution of the conflict is concerned. There is a troika of state and non-state actors involved in it like other previous and ongoing conflicts such

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as the Vietnam War, Yugoslav Wars of Succession, Kosovo crisis, the civil war in Rwanda and others.

The US government is, of course, the primary state actor, involved in the conflict since October 2001 after the commencement of Global War on Terror (GWOT); whereas Afghan government was established after the ouster of Afghan Taliban regime in 2002 and the third actor which used to be a state actor and now a violent non-state actor is Afghan Taliban. Ideally, the consensus among the three has to be there for a viable peace in Afghanistan. In reality, this is hard to achieve but not impossible. We can hypothesize these scenarios based on realities and possibilities sans idealism. There are, in fact, possibilities of varied ranges that could bring the stakeholders to some level of consensus and may pave the way for peace and tranquillity in Afghanistan.

Successful intra-Afghan peace deal
One possible and likely scenario is the beginning of intra-Afghan peace talks. The US government may be an essential peace broker, but eventually, the US will have to leave, and then only the remaining two would have to sit and deliberate about peace. This is one situation that suits Afghan people who are sick and tired of a never-ending war. The possibility of intra-Afghan peace talks, eventually leading to a conclusion could not be ruled out. Even though the Afghan Taliban adhere to ultraorthodox Deobandi sect of Islam and considers the Afghan government as a 'US puppet', they may come to terms to start a dialogue with them. After all the Taliban have made peace with the US, their arch enemy and the one who invaded and removed their regime from Kabul and has been fighting the Taliban since 2001 killing, injuring and arresting thousands of the Taliban foot soldiers and commanders; not to mention killing one of their Emir-ul-Muslimeem, i.e., Mullah Mansoor in a drone strike in 2016 in Pakistan (Al Jazeera, 2016). Albeit this, the Taliban, time and again, held talks and meetings with the Americans and finally made a peace deal with them. Amid this situation, one could project an intra-Afghan peace deal in upcoming years, which would bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Both sides already seem to be drawn towards dialogue while displaying vanity in their statements and dates of prisoner releases from both sides is in the coming days. There may be delays and contradictory statements from both sides in the initial stage, but this would not stop the process to begin.

De facto division of Afghanistan on communal lines
In case a dialogue does not result in any positive development for peace in Afghanistan, there is a possibility that Afghanistan may be divided (de facto) in terms of communal lines. Afghan Taliban is primarily a Pashtun movement and Pashtuns form a majority in 11 of 34 provinces of Afghanistan[2]. There are no official figures, but according to estimates, the Pashtun ethnic group constitutes around 42% of total Afghanistan's population, whereas ethnic Tajiks are at 27%, with Hazaras 8% and Uzbeks at 9% (Sawe, 2019). During the last 40 years of warfare, Pashtuns remained at the forefront of fighting with foreigners, local governments and non-state actors. The Pashtuns are considerably weakened and have sustained more losses than other ethnic groups.

Furthermore, millions of Afghan refugees who left the country during the last 40 years of warfare are also Pashtuns, and they have relocated to western countries, Pakistan, Iran and other parts of the world. This movement out of

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[2] Author's assessment is based on the discussions with various scholars and researchers on South Asia

Afghanistan has further shrunk the strength of Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Despite this, the Taliban would likely to create havoc in Pashtun dominated provinces of southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. If fighting to retake Kabul is not possible for the ragtag Taliban forces and completely decimating the Afghan Taliban is not possible for the Afghan government then there are ways to settle the situation in light of other case studies of weak and fragile states such as Somalia, Mali, Yemen and others. In Somalia, the central government at Mogadishu is unlikely to wrest control of areas falling under the Al-Shabab's control. Hence, the Somali government is managing territories under their control and strengthening their writ rather than launching unsuccessful ground offensives to wipe out Al-Shabab Islamist group, which is a practical way out. The government of Somalia is actually in no position to defeat an estimated 7000-9000 strong Al-Shabab (BBC News, 2017).

Same is the situation in Afghanistan where the Afghan government does not appear to be in a position to defeat the Afghan Taliban. However, it could concede some territories for the sake of peace in a tacit manner. Afghan Taliban may also know this reality that with their guerrilla force of an estimated strength of 60,000 fulltime fighters (Stone, 2019) they could not defeat a weak but still 350,000 strong Afghan National Security Forces and make their way to Kabul. If such a situation arrives at some point of time in near future, then there is a strong possibility that the world community would also accept it for the sake of peace, as this would not be happening first time anywhere in the world. There are several other cases such as The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Colombian government where a tacit understanding has been reached between the state and non-state actors in recent past.

Intra-Afghan prolonged and protracted dialogue without results
Another possibility for peace is the continuation of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. This is possible in case the two sides decide to have a ceasefire and then continue holding peace talks for an extended time with specific parameters in mind. This situation is challenging to arrive at but not completely unlikely or unreachable. The Afghan Taliban has a sense of arrogance but as time passes on they may come to realize that defeating a state (though weak and fragile) with a standing army and police and other security apparatus is somewhat very unlikely to happen and this may drain Taliban resources and manpower. They may also have this idea that the US government would continue to bankroll the Afghan government. Amid this situation and realities Pakistan and Iran, the two neighbouring states of Afghanistan are also experiencing severe economic meltdowns, and they would also want Afghan Taliban to reach a settlement with the Afghan government in the near future. Keeping in view of this situation, there is a glimpse of hope that Taliban and Afghan government may come to terms without reaching to conclude a peace deal, but even if that happens, it will allow Afghans a breathing space or at least a temporary peace in the country that may linger on as a permanent feature.

Military solution
Another prospect of peace in Afghanistan after the US-Taliban peace deal is the military solution of the Taliban problem. There is always a military solution with its own costs and ends. Here the military solution does not mean that the US forces defeating Taliban militants but somehow Afghan military developing into a force that would crush the Taliban movement. This seems highly unlikely, but since the peace talks started between Afghan Taliban and the US government the Afghan security forces are engaged in multiple operations against the Taliban militants across the

country, and there clearly appears to be a surge in the military activities of Afghan forces. It is also evident that despite the end of US military operations after the peace deal in February 2020 the Afghan Taliban has not been able to capture any city or urban centre of a rural district not to talk about taking over a province. The Afghan military has ramped up their operations against the Taliban across the country. During the last 19 years, more than 3400 US soldiers and allied soldiers alongside 38,000 Afghan civilians have lost their lives in the conflict (Gramer, 2020). More than 45000 Afghan security forces also killed during the ongoing war (BBC News, 2019). Besides that, more than 42,100 Taliban militants have reportedly been killed, and another 19,000 received injures (Crawford, 2016).

The Taliban may launch furious attacks in most of the Afghan provinces but their capacities to launch conventional attacks remain limited and keeping in view of modern warfare it would be difficult for them to defeat Afghan forces without conventional prowess. The US-trained Afghan army and air force are somewhat weak, but it is still a potent military force with complete air superiority over the Taliban. If Afghan military forces continue to hold ground and keep deflecting the Taliban guerrilla strikes, it is quite likely that the Taliban would lose momentum, finally come to terms, and start talking to the Afghan government. The current re-election of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his designated vice president Amarullah Salah is indicative of the fact that the Afghan government would not surrender to Afghan Taliban wishes and continue to fight. The presence of hawks like Amarullah Salah and Defense Minister Asadullah Khalid under the wings of President Ghani displays a resolve of the Afghan government to fight to the last in the war against the Taliban. The current Afghan army under Khalid has started to prove its mettle by launching hundreds of military operations against Taliban hideouts and safe havens and inflicting severe damage to their rank and file especially in the last quarter of 2019 and first quarter of 2020. The present states of affairs show that the Afghan government is on an offensive rather than solidifying their defences. With losses being incurred at the current scale, the Afghan Taliban does not seem to have the potential to survive long enough as this time; it would be challenging to mobilize forces against fellow Afghans.

Scenarios when peace is unachievable

There are situations in which it appears that the Afghan peace deal may not last long. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has already said that if the Taliban does not abide by the peace deal, then it would be scrapped. On the other hand, the Afghan government acts as if they were not the party to the peace deal and are not obliged to follow its terms and conditions.

Taliban-Al-Qaeda nexus continues to grow and rigid ideologies

One most probable cause of the collapse of the Afghan Taliban-US peace deal would be the continuity of Taliban-Al-Qaeda nexus and their presence in Afghanistan. Hitherto, the Afghan Taliban Shura has not wholeheartedly taken this issue very seriously. The presence of Haqqani Network within Taliban ranks is another major problem that may soon surface. The Haqqani Network is enlisted as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in the list maintained by the US State Department. The Haqqani-Al-Qaeda closeness is no secret, and Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani have remained open supporters and provider of safe havens to Al-Qaeda and other foreign Islamist militants in areas under their control. Neither Taliban nor Haqqanis have condemned Al-Qaeda and terrorist attacks masterminded by Al-Qaeda

Central and other affiliates operating all-over the world. There are reports of Al-Qaeda's South Asia chapter militants (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) fighting alongside Afghan Taliban and many Taliban offensives against the Afghan security forces. The Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Emir Asim Umar was killed in a joint US-Afghan Special Forces strike in Helmand province in October 2019 (Al Jazeera, 2019). There are also other incidents where Al-Qaeda militants were reportedly killed while fighting alongside Afghan Taliban insurgents. The AQIS's official magazine "Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad" acts like an Afghan Taliban mouthpiece. The Taliban has never official distanced Al-Qaeda from them. In fact, Al-Qaeda Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri pledged allegiance to Afghan Taliban's then supreme leader Mullah Omar and later renewed his pledge of allegiance with Mullah Mansoor in 2015 and later after Mansoor's death in 2016, he once again renewed it with Mullah Haibatullah, the new Emir of Afghan Taliban. It would be pertinent to mention here that it was Osama bin Laden who first pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar in 1999, practically making Al-Qaeda part of broader Afghan Taliban movement.

In his op-ed at New York Times in March, Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin did not mention or said a word regarding condemning Al-Qaeda and Islamist jihadists, even though having known ties with Afghan Taliban. Sirajuddin has also ranked number two in the Afghan Taliban hierarchy, and his father remained the Minister of Border Regions during Taliban ruled Afghanistan (1996-2001). During this whole episode of Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan since the US invasion in October 2001, the Haqqanis remained the most potent force to tackle within eastern Afghanistan. A peace deal without their inclusion would raise many eyebrows as their pivotal role in harbouring foreign Islamist terrorists, fighting against the US and allied forces; and perpetrating hundreds of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan which are of primary importance. From the outset, it appears that Haqqanis would not change their ways and if they continue to harbour Al-Qaeda and other foreign Islamist terrorists who remain operational against Afghan and US forces, then the deal is likely to be off.

Taliban continues to keep fighting the Afghan government, and the US halts withdrawal

Another possible turn off which is most likely is the US revoking the deal after Taliban refuse ceasefire amid continued attacks. Keeping in view the Trump administration's unpredictable behaviour vis-à-vis Afghanistan (which is at the moment hell-bent on withdrawing troops from Afghanistan) there is an unlikelihood, but things may change if violence does not stop. The Trump administration may not like to lose what the US has invested in Afghanistan over the years since the beginning of GWOT. There is only a slight possibility that the US policy makers would allow Afghanistan to fall back into the hands of the Taliban. This would turn out to be a Vietnam déjà vu which neither the US nor the other free world countries would readily accept. This would be the end of the peace deal.

Afghan government refuses to hold talks

There are possibilities that hawks in the Afghan government would convince the president and his kitchen cabinet not to hold any talks with Taliban Shura. Amid this scenario, the peace agreement between the US and Taliban would not yield any positive outcomes. The Afghan government may have their own assessments of the situation based upon certain ground facts. Realities such as how to integrate the Afghan Taliban Shura members into an already in placed Afghan political system, the Afghan constitution, rights of women and minorities, and most importantly what role

Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada, the supreme leader of Afghan Taliban, is going to be in the next set up. The Taliban are Islamist fundamentalists, and their rigid ultraorthodox Deobandi ideology may not allow them to give concessions to the current Afghan government and the system. Peace talks between the two sides may be held in order to discuss prisoner release and other issues but developing broader peace framework seems like a bridge too far.

Taliban's apparent victory

Apart from their rigidity, the Afghan Taliban have this sense of victory and arrogance that they have managed to defeat the US and allies as for them the US signing the peace accord in Doha after much deliberations are the defeat of US. Considering their emotions and understanding of the situation, they may have a feeling of an apparent victory in upcoming years against the Afghan government with the capture of Kabul. Amid this bent of mind, the Taliban may not like to go further in talks with Kabul.

Conclusion

It is apparent with the US-Taliban peace agreement that the US government wants to withdraw and roll back from Afghanistan. This does not mean that the US would allow the Afghan Taliban to take over and defeat the incumbent Afghan government. Having the advantage of superior firepower, the US may resolve the Afghan issue by military means as it could have done the same in Vietnam, but the US government opted to act otherwise. The same is happening again. There is always a military solution with costs attached to it, but the problem is that the US government is not ready to bear those costs. This may come to the advantage of the Afghan Taliban and high time for the Afghan government as it may find at the crossroad in order to survive any further. The fact of the reason is that in the modern era, no military could remain at forefronts in a foreign land for very long. Neither did the Soviets nor the US in Afghanistan or India during the Sri Lankan conflict. Costs of surviving in a foreign environment are high and countering asymmetric warfare even higher. Hence, the Taliban had a fair idea that eventually, the US would withdraw; in fact, it was highly predictable from the start. On the other hand, the US also knew about it, but they just do not want to lose whatever they have gained in Afghanistan during the last 19 years.

The Afghan problem is indeed a cagey difficult one to resolve. The need is to bring all relevant stakeholders on board, whether regional or global. Only the involvement of these stakeholders would help bring peace to Afghanistan. The recent Afghan peace deal was more of a truce between the US and the Taliban and could not be termed as a peace accord in true spirit. This is not in the best interest of the US government to abandon all of their gains in Afghanistan; there is a need to strengthen the Afghan government's resolve to stay put and hold dialogue with Afghan Taliban with dignity. The Taliban needs to be realized that they may be able to get their share reasonably and exceedingly high demands and ambitions may not be allowed to get materialized.

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The Afghan Peace Agreement: Repercussions for South Asia

Alina Malik[1]

A historic peace deal was reached between the Afghan Taliban and the U.S. government in the hope of ending the decades-old war in Afghanistan. America's protracted war in Afghanistan is expected to come to an end with the life loss of millions of civilians, thousands of American troops, and billions of dollars. This peace deal is significant in a way that never in history, has a sitting government negotiated with a violent non-state actor, let alone reaching a peace deal with them. This would act as a precedent for such agreements in the future with other non-state actors to restore peace and stability around the globe. However, whether this deal is good enough to sustain peace will be apparent in the future. How the Afghan peace deal will play out in the future is yet to be seen, but the fact that two conflicting parties made it work after years of negotiations is an effort that needs to be acknowledged. The legitimacy of this deal would be derived from the indigenous support from domestic stakeholders and regional powers. The people of Afghanistan have suffered the most in a tug of war between the Taliban and the U.S. government. They deserve a homeland where they can live and work freely without any fear. Thousands of Afghans have been displaced as a result of this war, and this new deal will provide opportunities for the rehabilitation of Afghan refugees. It is high time that Afghanistan closes its woeful war-stricken chapter and embarks upon a road towards development. The Afghan peace deal has the potential to provide stability to an already turbulent South Asian region. With one less threat to deal with, the countries in the region can focus on mitigating other prospective threats to peace and security in South Asia.

Introduction

The United States has signed a deal with the Afghan Taliban to put an end to two decades of war in Afghanistan, which gained momentum after the 9/11 attacks. After more than a year of setbacks to negotiation efforts between the two parties, both sides have finally concluded an agreement which would set the stage for America's withdrawal from Afghanistan (Qazi, 2020). The U.S. government has long been finding ways for a safe exit of their troops as the security situation in Afghanistan continued to exacerbate with the rise of the Taliban. The U.S. has always overlooked the might of Taliban in the country but has now come to terms with the fact that they remain an integral part of Afghanistan's power dynamics. However, the peace agreement does not come without problems. An essential loophole in the deal is the exclusion of the Afghan government who are a major stakeholder in this conflict. Due to the deep-seated grievances between the Taliban and the regime in Kabul, the

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government of Afghanistan was not made part of the negotiations (Samad, 2020). The absence of Afghan government makes the deal unstable as they have a major part to play in the implementation of this agreement. This has eventually allowed the Taliban to gain a concession from the U.S at the expense of the Afghan government, in return for a safe withdrawal of American troops from the country. The deal lacks a mechanism for overseeing its implementation in the future and gives the Taliban the leverage to use this deal as they please.

The prolonged war in Afghanistan has had spillover effects in South Asia and has led to the spread of terrorism across the region. In the peace agreement, the Afghan Taliban have agreed to prevent Al Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and other terrorists' organizations from using the Afghan territory for attacks (Walena & Dwyer, 2020). It is hoped that this would suppress terrorists' activities in the region. To what extent the Taliban's enforce this clause will shape the security dynamics in South Asia. Therefore, the application phase of this agreement is crucial in shaping the strategic and security dynamics in the region. It is yet to be seen how this deal plays out for other states in the region and the impact it will have on the rehabilitation of Afghan refugees from neighbouring countries.

Deep Rooted Divisions in Afghanistan

The intra-Afghan dialogue is the most crucial aspect of the Afghan peace deal. This dialogue has the potential to make or break Afghanistan's future in the upcoming time. As the initial negotiations between the U.S government and the Taliban did not include the Afghan government, it is unlikely that the intra-Afghan dialogue will be a success. The Taliban and the Afghan government have not had any direct talks in recent years, which make it difficult for the two parties to negotiate and agree over a solution. The U.S. government has made several decisions without taking into consideration the concerns of the Afghan government. Therefore, the leadership in Kabul is having a hard time accepting the conditions of the deal and implementing them (Willner-Reid, 2020). The Taliban got away with a deal they wanted, giving them an upper hand in the negotiations. Hence, it is going to be a challenging task for the fragile and a divided Afghan government to cooperate with the Taliban during the dialogue process.

There are certain impediments in the execution of the peace plan which can linger the implementation process. First, there are divisions within the leadership in Afghanistan. The government is divided between two potential candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah who are both rooting for the presidency. They have pronounced themselves winners of the September 2019 election and have staged separate swearing-in ceremonies in Kabul. This entrenched rift between the leaders is likely to offset the peace plan before its application begins. This antagonism in the government is delaying the intra-Afghan dialogue, as they are unable to come up with a concrete plan for discourse. This lack of solidarity is likely to be exploited by the Taliban, who are unwilling to start negotiation before their demands as per the peace agreement are met (Jami, 2020).

The differences within the government have started to affect the dialogue process adversely. To begin the intra-Afghan dialogue, it was mutually agreed by the Taliban and the U.S. government that a prisoner swap should take place. As this decision was made without taking the Afghan government into confidence, President Ashraf Ghani was hesitant to comply with it. Even then, Ghani has feebly agreed to release 1500 prisoners in one phase and the remaining 3500 in another phase while citing security concerns and demanding time to study the security situation in the

country. The Taliban have rejected this proposal and demanded the release of all 5000 prisoners before the dialogue process begins with the government (Hirsh, 2020). Such discrepancies between the two sides are bound to influence the peace plan and delay the process negatively. Afghan Taliban views themselves from a position of superiority and are unlikely to cooperate with their government. The U.S. government is hesitant in pressing the Taliban to oblige, and neither do they want themselves to get further involved in the peace process. Hence, the triumph of the peace plan now depends on the relationship between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Implications for South Asia

The region of South Asia has become a hotbed for terrorism since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. The region has seen import and export of terrorism, especially in the last ten years where the Afghan territory has been used to carry out attacks. The continuous war in Afghanistan had led to the spread of the terrorist networks in neighbouring states, making it difficult to deter this threat (Chakma, 2014). Terrorism remains a crucial source of concern for states in South Asia, particularly for India and Pakistan, who have suffered the most at the hands of these groups. The Afghan Taliban have vowed under this new agreement not to allow their territory to be used for terror attacks by other terrorist organizations. However, it is uncertain how true this will be. However, if the Taliban comply with the peace deal, it will be a first step towards eradicating terrorism from the region.

Nevertheless, terrorism is not the only security concern that overshadows peace in South Asia. Furthermore, there is a lack of friendly bilateral or trilateral relationships between states which have added to the ongoing instability in the region. Issues such as Kashmir and Water dispute between India and Pakistan are also hurdles in regional integration (Lamb, Hameed, & Halterman, 2014). The hostile relations among states has further contributed to the limited regional economic activity and made it difficult for a regional security structure to be set up. The lack of regional connectivity and mistrust in relations will hardly allow the Afghan peace agreement to make a positive impact in the region. Nevertheless, stability in Afghanistan can be the beginning of long-term peace in the region.

To analyze the implications of this peace deal in South Asia, it is essential to look at the relationship between different actors in the region. Firstly, Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban has opened doors for negotiation with the U.S. government, which have resulted in a peace agreement after facing several deadlocks. However, this relationship has also cost Pakistan thousands of lives during its war against terrorism and damaged their relationship with the Afghan government. Besides, it has tarnished the image of Pakistan on international forums, where it is characterized as a terrorist nation or a rouge state (Bohr & Price, 2015). Nevertheless, Pakistan's motives in Afghanistan can be understood by examining the deteriorating security conditions in the country. Thus, Islamabad needed to play a constructive role in the Afghan Peace deal negotiations as stability in the neighbourhood would translate into stability in the country (Mazzetti & Khan, 2020).

Moreover, Pakistan has played a significant role in the negotiations and has facilitated the agreement by continually pushing the two sides to talk. Pakistan can help facilitate the intra-Afghan dialogue as it enjoys a good relationship with the Taliban leaders. Islamabad's relations with the Taliban have proved to be detrimental for this deal whose impact is yet to be seen. While these efforts to bring peace are

hailed as a triumph by Pakistan, it is not viewed in the same manner by India who foresees its influence declining in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the two nuclear neighbours need to set aside their differences and focus on peace in Afghanistan, as it is critical for stability in South Asia.

Secondly, India's friendly relations with Afghanistan have added a new stakeholder to a conflict influenced by Pakistan in the past. New Delhi has employed soft power tactics by investing in infrastructure and development to win the hearts of Afghan. This includes India's investment of around $2 billion in Afghanistan over the last decade. Through these ventures, India has yearned for stability in the war-torn country as it happens to serve their interests in Kashmir. India firmly believes that the Afghan soil has been used as a launching pad by the Taliban's to train insurgents and infiltrate them into Kashmir (Akhter & Malik, 2009). Through monetary investments in Afghanistan, India hoped to gain influence over the Afghan government to benefit their interests. Therefore, peace in Afghanistan can be a positive sign for India, given its Kashmir policy. However, on the other hand, the Taliban's rise to power can sabotage Indian activities in Afghanistan which will further impair relations between India and Pakistan.

The Afghan peace deal is also expected to have a significant bearing on the Afghan refugees residing in the South Asian states. Pakistan currently hosts more than 1.4 million Afghans, making it the largest country with Afghan refugee. Some of them also reside in Iran and India. In the past four decades, thousands of Afghans have fled their country to find a safe place. They have tried to return home but were either displaced in their own country or became refugees again. The ongoing transition to peace in Afghanistan has become a sign of hope for these refugees who yearn to return home (Greenfield, 2020). Accordingly, if all the states in the region push for this peace deal to remain intact, it can help them overcome the refugee crisis in the future. The Afghan government also needs to take constructive measures to ensure rehabilitation of internally displaced people and refugees across the border.

Conclusion

The Afghan Peace Deal is set to bring an end to United States longest war in history but with various obstacles remaining to be surmounted. The agreement reached between the U.S. government and Taliban leaders lacks an enforcement mechanism giving rise to concerns about the future of this deal. Under this deal, the Taliban have been obligated to insignificant measures, for example, not colluding with terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda which are hard to assess. As America plans to withdraw troops if the Taliban uphold their end of the bargain is a highly doubted question. The U.S. and NATO forces have begun to withdraw their troops which have allowed the Taliban to operate as they like (Sanger et al., 2020). The only thing that interests America is the safe withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. However, a complete retreat of forces is unlikely to happen if the deal falls apart during the intra-Afghan dialogue process. Therefore, America needs to realize that without stability in Afghanistan, it would be improbable to retreat without chaos. There is also growing skepticism among western scholars who believe that the Taliban would not honor this agreement. As president of The Brookings Institute John Allen said:

> The Taliban are untrustworthy; their doctrine is irreconcilable with modernity and the rights of women; and in practice, they're incapable of summoning the necessary

> internal controls and organizational discipline needed to
> implement a far-flung agreement like this. The so-called
> "Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan" will not
> only not be honored by the Taliban, but it will also not bring
> peace (Allen, 2020).

These views are substantiated from the fact that the Taliban have continued to carry out attacks on Afghan forces even after the peace agreement was signed. However, a ceasefire was not agreed upon. Nonetheless, on a bright side, the deal could remain intact if all stakeholders play their part, including the U.S. and Pakistan's government. At present, there are heated tensions between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo arrived in Kabul on March 23, 2020 to resuscitate the waning peace deal. Pompeo is expected to help bring an end to the impasse, which has stalled progress on the deal (Faiez & Ganno, 2020). While America pushes the Afghan government, Pakistan can play its part by speaking with the Taliban and persuading them to negotiate with the Afghan government. The intra-Afghan peace talks are a crucial next step in the deal to ensure Afghanistan's transition to peace.

The smooth functioning of this deal is necessary for peace and stability in South Asia. If this deal blows over, there will be unforeseen repercussions for all the states in the region. It could lead to another refugee crisis resultantly disturbing the security balance in South Asia. The failure of this deal would provide the Taliban with the opportunity to join forces with Al-Qaeda and ISIS and expand its network in the region. Such a scenario would result in a debacle, and South Asia would again be eclipsed by terrorism. Therefore, the regional powers need to step up their efforts to ensure the deal remains intact. Similarly, the U.S. government needs to restructure its strategies to deal with this ongoing conflict if they want a safe exit from Afghanistan.

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Power in Peacekeeping
by Lise Morjé Howard.

Natasha Khan[1]

Howard is an experienced scholar in the fields of international relations, civil wars, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. She has authored several works on peacekeeping such as *Learning to Keep the Peace? United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (2001)*, and *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (2007)*. Her recent work, *Power in Peacekeeping,* takes a novel approach to explore UN Peacekeeping Operations. This book makes a case for looking at the dynamics of power in peacekeeping missions and exploring how peacekeepers wield their authority in peacekeeping missions. The author suggests that while most studies on peacekeeping document empirical accounts of the successes and failures of PKO's, it can prove beneficial to understand what kind of powers peacekeepers wield on the ground. These powers are grouped into three major categories: financial and institutional inducement, verbal persuasion, and coercion. The author further categorizes these into, persuasion in Namibia, financial inducement in southern Lebanon and coercion in the Central African Republic. Acting as part of a journalist team, the author has first-hand experience in the areas explored in the book and offers detailed accounts backed by existing research in the field of peacekeeping.

The book has been divided into five chapters, where the first chapter explains the methodology undertaken during the research, which is mainly based on a combination of interviews and ethnography. It further analyzes the role of the UN in the contemporary world and its increasing monopoly over the use of force. However, the author contends that the UN peacekeepers function as 'soldiers of peace' which profoundly complicates an understanding of their actual role. In order to provide an understanding of the role of the UN despite such complicated notions attached with its role, the author draws upon a typology of the three primary forms of power exercised by the UN by drawing upon three different cases of UN peacekeeping. The author takes a *modern constructivist* approach in exploring the notion of power in peacekeeping, and states that peacekeepers and peace kept are both social constructs where the former is dependent on the latter for existence. The book, therefore, attempts to establish cause and effect relationship and bring together ideational and material aspects of power relations.

The second chapter outlines the case of Namibia, where the United Nations Transition Group (UNTAG) 1989, accomplished its mission through persuasion. Persuasion is seen as ideational and non-material power which manifests in the daily actions of the peacekeepers. These different forms of persuasion, namely shaming, civilian outreach, symbolic displays etc., are seen to have worked together in Namibia to achieve mission success. The third chapter outlines the case of Lebanon where the

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United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) deployed in 1948, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed in 1978, are amongst the UN's most extended-standing missions till date. While the author traces various transformations of mandates throughout the missions' long history in the area, it is argued that these missions continue to operate through inducement, which comprises of material and institutional incentives to change behaviour. Although conflict resolution remains a distant goal, the UNTSO and UNIFIL, through the mechanism of mostly soft power have been effective at conflict management, especially in southern Lebanon.

Chapter four builds upon the case of UN involvement in the Central African Republic following the operation by the French Sangaris. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA) 2014, concentrated on development, the mitigation of lawlessness, and state-building. It was able to achieve some of these goals through the defense, surveillance and arrest as part of its strategy of coercion. While such measures were effective for a specific time period, the absence of an overarching compellent force led to a collapse in UN authority and effectiveness. Amidst this, the UN mission also compromised its legitimacy following reports of misconduct in 2015. The fifth and concluding chapter presents a summary of the findings.

Throughout the book, the author compares the examples of similar types of powers exercised in other UN missions and builds a convincing argument. The ethnographic approach undertaken in the research lends it credibility in providing an alternative form of analysis for peacekeeping missions. While most other research on UNPKO's focuses on the overall success and failure of the mandates, this research takes a different approach to study how the UN currently operates and may increase success in the future. Problems incurred in peacekeeping are highlighted alongside the various reforms aimed at addressing them. The comprehensive research makes a case for taking a more *peacekeeper* centric approach as opposed to a generic, *mandate* centric approach. It accounts for how the peacekeepers perform in relation to the peacekeeping. It offers a worthwhile read on the host of complexities and dynamics of power, which can influence a mission in such diverse settings in which UNPKO's operate.

The Age of Nuclear Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times *by Mohamed ElBaradei*

Hajra Mazhar Raja[1]

Mohammad ElBaradei, an Egyptian born Lawyer, has been the Director-General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 1997 to 2009. A Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and longest-serving Director General, who got the honour of becoming Director General Emeritus of the agency towards the end of his service. His failed bid to become the president of Egypt after Hosni Mubarak brought him back in the news during the Arab Spring of 2011.

His tenure as a Director-General was one of the most happening times of world nuclear era. Cold War had ended, and the risks of proliferation had grown considerably. Revelations about multiple nations ambitious to lay their hands on nuclear energy, both for peaceful as well as weapon purposes were increasing rapidly. The book is a compelling account of chronological events and challenges faced by IAEA during his tenure.

Arguments in his book revolve around the three underlying principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These important facets of the treaty include the pledge by the (non–nuclear) members to not to try and obtain or develop nuclear weapons, a sincere effort on the part of all members to lead the world towards complete disarmament and thirdly to facilitate the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all member countries with particular consideration for the needs of developing countries. Linking these issues to nuclear have and have-nots, his narrative seems almost to condone the aspirations of contenders. ElBaradei has drawn some serious censure for his book as well as his work at IAEA. Anyone rising to this level in public service in international organizations is bound to be subject to such criticism by the global north or the south, by a particular religion or a nation and he was no exception.

A significant portion of the book covers Iran's nuclear program and the diplomacy involved in bringing Iran and the west to negotiating terms. His tenure ended before anything substantial could be achieved between Iran and the west, especially the USA. However, the list of his efforts is very descriptive and is spread over more than three chapters. The gulf between his understanding of Iran's nuclear program and that of the west is vast and expands all over the book. While ElBaradei saw and treated Iran's nuclear issue as their right, west looked at Iran as a mocking exploiter of diplomacy, which according to them, has been proven by multiple lies and noncompliance, spread over many years. This laxity on the part of ElBaradei leveraged Iran to continue enriching even after he found out that Iran had deliberately been telling lies to IAEA about their reactor at Natanz. Over the years, Iran's initial stockpile of 1500 Kilograms of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU, less than 5%

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enrichment) swelled to more than 2500 Kilograms, with the increased capability of almost 20% enrichment.

IAEA has numerous operational limitations under the NPT; for example; it can only inspect the declared sites of the member states. Going beyond that, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has to exert pressure on countries to cooperate with IAEA. ElBaradei repeatedly mentions this limitation and his desire to seek more cooperation from the member states on matters related to intelligence sharing, satellite imageries and diplomacy. While talking about nuclear hypocrisy, he explains the Israeli attack on Syria's suspected nuclear facility at Dair Alzour in 2007. After the attack, the agency wanted to inspect the site of which Syria denied the permission. Furthermore, the matter was further escalated by a lack of cooperation by Israel and the USA to share any information that provided a reason for this attack by Israel. He repeatedly blames Israel for being a favoured state on issues related to nuclear weapons.

His criticism of Israel as the sole possessor of nuclear weapons and the non-NPT member is blunt, which drew him serious criticism in American media. At one point John Bolton, a senior US State Department official even lobbied for his ouster as the Director-General. Bolton had been a critique against ElBaradei. Bolton writes, "was my ideological opposite, a champion of 'us-versus-them' foreign policy; he opposed multilateral diplomacy and consistently worked behind the scenes to discredit the IAEA [...] He strove to undermine everything I stood for" (p. 165). The author has also been accused by some to overstep his mandate and get involved in politics by thinking and moving "outside the box". He brushes this criticism by saying, "I told them I had "no box," that I felt it as a part of my responsibility to speak out on matters that had a direct impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, a responsibility that, as a Nobel laureate, I felt even more keenly" (p.216).

The author has explained the Iraqi nuclear program that was enshrined in decades of deception and was marred by defiant cooperation with IAEA. He admits that throughout the 1990s, Iraq deceived IAEA about the nuclear ambitions. ElBaradei became one of the most vocal opponents of US invasion of Iraq in 2003. He was right about Iraq's non-possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and asserts that given a choice, he would have wanted to let the inspection process by the IAEA inspectors conclude and then the decision for further action would have been initiated. Americans had already made up their minds to go to war on the evidence that they possessed WMDs and also believed it to be true. He shows his dismay in the book when he says, "For a war to be fought over unsubstantiated WMD charges — and for the IAEA's nuclear diplomacy role to be pushed to the side, serving as merely a fig leaf of due process — was for me a grotesque distortion of everything we stood for. It went against nearly half a century of painstaking labour by committed scientists, lawyers, inspectors, and public servants from every continent. I was aghast at what I was witnessing" (p. 8). He has gone one step ahead to suggest that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in collaboration with UNO must ascertain the "legality of Iraq War" (p. 84). The author also proposes for countries to arrest and implicate the individuals who are responsible for starting this war and compensate Iraqis who became war victims.

Political and diplomatic wrangling is spread all over the book while west makes promises to bring the suspect nations to negotiating tables and then fails to deliver the promised reactors or other assistance. The North Korean nuclear weapons program exemplifies the delicacy of issues that IAEA has to handle. It took ElBaradei years and multiple visits to North Korea to build a working relationship. The

inspections revealed many discrepancies and North Koreans were pressurized to cooperate. Referring to the possibility of bilateral dialogue between the USA and North Korea, ElBaradei makes a logical argument against US refusal to do the same in the case of Iran. His arguments and choice of word for drafting statements from opposing parties show his refined understanding of diplomacy and the vital role of sustained diplomacy in resolving some very contentious issues.

ElBaradei came to be known as someone who could stand up to the bullying and face the USA and the west head-on. He does not shy out from apportioning the blame of each case of a failed diplomatic or a negotiated agreement on the parties responsible. For example, he talks about North Korea walking out of NPT and says, "Framework was ultimately undermined when the United States failed to live up to its commitments with North Korea, most notably by not delivering the promised power reactors" (p. 47). Similarly, he sharply criticizes France for budging to US pressure and refusing to supply Iran with the promised reactor causing a breakdown in negotiations and resumption of enrichment by Iran. During his tenure, he has been labelled as being too soft on Iran by the western media. However, these remarks do not seem to alter his choice for a preference of diplomacy over war.

His account of tireless work to give diplomacy one final chance every time gives the reader an impression of the difficulty and delicacy of negotiated efforts to settle some serious problems facing humanity today. During an interview with the *New York Times,* he called himself a "secular pope" with a mission to ensure that, "we do not end up killing each other". For his diligent work and elevation of agency's role from a group of technicians, scientists, and lawyers to a vigilant and assertive organization won him and the agency a Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.

Divided over twelve chapters, the book traces the history of nuclear proliferation down to the last source, especially in the case of Iran and Libya. He has dedicated one chapter uncovering the involvement of A. Q. Khan in nuclear proliferation. Calling it a virtual Nuclear Wal-Mart he says, "In the coming years, as our monitoring and reporting intensified, our database would come to hold more than 1,300 cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials" (p.153). In the same context, it is essential to note that he has blamed Western intelligence agencies for not cooperating fully with the IAEA and lack of provision of timely information to the agency. He accuses them of sidelining the agency and his role as the Director-General, especially when he learned about disarming Libya. Libyan Prime Minister for Science and Technology told ElBaradei that while Libya was bound by the NPT and all along wanted to inform IAEA, "they won't allow it" (p. 139). Towards the end of the book, he has again emphasized the need for cooperation between the intelligence agencies of all members and the IAEA.

American exceptionalism to the rules has been highlighted by the author in almost every case of proliferation. Israeli possession of nuclear weapons creating a serious strategic imbalance in the Middle East is one stark example of such favouritism. Israeli asymmetry in the nuclear arsenal is one of the most serious detriments to peace in the Middle East. Similarly, while talking about the discovery of South Korean efforts to separate small amounts of Plutonium, he calls them "American Allies" and "Good Guys" (p. 196). The author himself can be branded in similar words due to his endorsement of the American — Indian nuclear deal of 2006. While he was fully aware that the deal would undermine NPT, he still takes sides with the USA and offers no plausible explanation for his endorsement other than his wish that India, Pakistan and Israel could join NPT.

Probably one of his most admirable achievements has been chalking out a work plan that eventually ironed out IAEA — Iran differences. This plan helped in sorting out all six of the contentious issues that were the real cause of referring Iran's Case to Security Council regarding sanctions. It is a sad irony that ElBaradei had to resign office on completion of his third tenure in office in 2009, and it would take the international community and Iran almost six more years to reach a deal.

His bold and direct style grabs the attention of the reader and inspires devotion to appreciate the events staged at the international level as well as down to his personal life. For example, his disappointment on account of his daughter's marriage to a non – Egyptian or the way he and his wife heard the news of Nobel Peace Prize announcement, with "tears streaming down our faces" (p.168). However, at times the reader gets an impression of ElBaradei being the head of a "Princely State" who would not appreciate anything lesser than a deluxe treatment, especially when he talks down about the food being fundamental with "few choices: noodles, meat, and kimchee; no fruit or salad" (p. 38), or chilly hotel rooms in North Korea, etc. This kind of thinking makes it harder for masses to relate to him, and possibly this could have been one of the reasons for his non – election as president of Egypt after Hosni Mubarak.

The book is excellent reading for foreign policy, diplomacy and nuclear experts besides leaving some thoughtful lessons for the students of 21st Century. His writing would certainly resonate more with the developing countries than the developed ones, since he criticizes the global structural imbalance and inequalities, leaning more in favour of north than the south and the widening divide between have and have–nots. Graph of his tenure at IAEA fluctuates between has failures and successes in negotiating diverging interests and intractable conflicts on nuclear-related issues. He culminates the book by asserting that quest for human security cannot be selective. Nations, he avows, must come together to formulate a framework whereby the security aspirations of the west and energy needs of the rest are fulfilled in simultaneity. If those in prized possession of nuclear assets keep threatening the have–nots, through their nuclear asymmetry, the chances of a peaceful world free of proliferation can simply be ruled out.

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