



# NUST JOURNAL OF

## INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY (NJIPS)

ISSN: 2616-4434 (Online)

ISSN: 2616-4426 (Print)

[njips.nust.edu.pk](http://njips.nust.edu.pk)

Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ January 2020

### Articles

**Yosuke Nagai**

United Nations, Peacekeeping Operations, and Peacebuilding Framework: A Critical Analysis of 'Security-Development' Nexus

**Bakare Najimdeen**

UN Peacekeeping Operations and Successful Military Diplomacy: A Case Study of Pakistan

**Shaheed Babajide**

Beyond Proscription: Rethinking Government Response to Yan Shilla Gang Violence in Yola Metropolis of Adamawa State, Nigeria

**Ajmal Khan & Azmat Khan**

From Burhan Wani to Abhi Nandan: A Comparative Analysis of India and Pakistan's Newspaper coverage of Kashmir Conflict

**Asifa Jahangir & Furqan Khan**

US Strategic Propensity towards India in Perspective of Nuclear Bonding: Security Apprehensions for South Asian Region and Pakistan

**Tanzeela Khalil**

India-Pakistan Relationship: A Case of Perpetual Instability

### Book Reviews

**Ayesha Masood**

The United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century by *Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, and Alynna J. Lyon*

**Mudasser Javaid**

Civil War and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia by *David Harris*

# NUST JOURNAL OF

## INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY (NIIPS)

### **CHAIRMAN**

Professor Tughral Yamin

### **EDITORIAL DIRECTOR**

(Department of Peacekeeping)  
Brigadier Imran Rashid (Retd)

### **EDITOR IN CHIEF**

Dr Muhammad Makki

### **ASSOCIATE EDITORS**

*Aizah Azam*, Research Associate, Peacekeeping and Training (PKT) Department

*Masooma Jafri*, Peace and Conflict Studies, National University of Sciences and Technology

*Waseem Iftikhar*, Peace and Conflict Studies, National University of Sciences and Technology

### **ASSISTANT ASSOCIATE EDITOR**

*Muhammad Abdul Wassay*, Peace and Conflict Studies, National University of Sciences and Technology

Edited at the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)

---

### **EDITORIAL COMMITTEE**

*Dr Andrzej Stelanch*, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland

*Dr Arshi Saleem Hashmi*, National Defence University, Pakistan

*Dr Chris Kwaja*, University of Jos, Nigeria

*Dr Corey Williams*, Leiden University, Netherlands

*Dr Gerardo Castillo*, Pontifica Universidad Catholic Peru

*Dr Hussain Shaheed Soherwardi*, University of Peshawar, Pakistan

*Dr Isabel B. Franco*, United Nations University, Japan

*Dr Martin Sökefeld*, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

*Dr Mirza Sadaqat Huda*, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

*Dr Osiewicz Przemyslaw*, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland

*Dr Saira Yamin*, Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies Honolulu, Hawaii

*Dr Shabana Fayyaz*, Quaid.e.Azam University, Pakistan

# NUST JOURNAL OF

## INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY (NIIPS)

The NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability (NJIPS) is a peer-reviewed, bi-annual academic journal. NJIPS welcomes interdisciplinary manuscripts focusing on issues related to peacekeeping, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, human rights issues, terrorism, violent extremism, social movements, security, etc. At the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), the Department of UN Peacekeeping and Training (PKT) and the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) have been collaborating for their mission of global peace and stability. NJIPS is one of the milestones in this regard, which aims to provide research-based knowledge through the scholarly papers written by national and international authors. To ensure and uphold the quality of scholastic discourse and circulation, the articles in NJIPS are peer-reviewed and edited rigorously. NJIPS is committed to publishing original and timely research from around the world.



NUST Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (NIPCONS)  
Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS)  
National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)  
Editor Email: [editor@njips.nust.edu.pk](mailto:editor@njips.nust.edu.pk)  
Phone: +92-51-90856781; Fax: +92-51-90856702  
Website: [njips.nust.edu.pk](http://njips.nust.edu.pk)

## Contents

### Articles

- **United Nations, Peacekeeping Operations, and Peacebuilding Framework: A Critical Analysis of 'Security-Development' Nexus**  
*Yosuke Nagai*
- UN Peacekeeping Operations and Successful Military Diplomacy: A Case Study of Pakistan  
*Bakare Najimdeen*
- Beyond Proscription: Rethinking Government Response to Yan Shilla Gang Violence in Yola Metropolis of Adamawa State, Nigeria  
*Shaheed Babajide*
- From Burhan Wani to Abhi Nandan: A Comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's Newspapers' coverage of Kashmir Conflict  
*Ajmal Khan & Azmat Khan*
- US Strategic Propensity towards India in Perspective of Nuclear Bonding: Security Concerns/ Apprehensions for South Asian Region and Pakistan  
*Asifa Jahangir & Furqan Khan*
- India-Pakistan Relationship: A Case of Perpetual Instability  
*Tanzeela Khalil*

### Essays

- The **Al-Qaeda** Revival in Pakistan: Prospects and Challenges  
*Farhan Zahid*
- **Civil-Military** Cooperation and Post Conflict Development: **A** Case of North Waziristan  
*Maria Spsychala Kij*

### Book Reviews

- The United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century *by* Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, and Alynna J. Lyon  
*Ayesha Masood*
- Civil War and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia *by* David Harris  
*Mudasser Javaid*

### Disclaimer

The views and opinions presented in the research articles and essays in this journal are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the policy and/or stance of the NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability (NJIPS).



NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability by NJIPS is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial 4.0 International Licence.

# United Nations, Peacekeeping Operations, and Peacebuilding Framework: A Critical Analysis of ‘Security-Development’ Nexus

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 1-12  
njips.nust.edu.pk

Yosuke Nagai<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

The security-development nexus has become one of the most important agendas especially in the field of peacebuilding in response to urgent needs in complex humanitarian assistance in war-torn areas. With the changing dynamics of conflict since the end of the Cold War, recent peacebuilding efforts have employed a combination of security and development paradigm to ameliorate severe human rights situations in different contexts. In particular, the functionality of security-development nexus has been well observed in post-conflict scenarios where broader state-building, institutional, security, and governance-related reforms were implemented to ensure sustainable peace processes. In addition, it has been criticized in terms of the imposed liberal values. This article critically analyzes the security-development nexus and attempts to examine *how* and *why* the nexus has become essential to the post-Cold War peacebuilding framework. It further elucidates the role of the United Nations (UN) as the leading actor in peacebuilding operations, especially in the form of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) which have played a significant role in establishing and consolidating peace in various conflict-ridden societies.

## Keywords

Security-Development Nexus, peacebuilding, post-Cold War, post-conflict development, post-conflict reconstruction, United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

## Introduction

Undoubtedly, the concept of the security-development nexus has become one of the most important agendas with regards to peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Consequently, the concept became an important conceptual theme to be explored by various scholars, practitioners, and international organizations (Stern, 2010). The attention toward the concept was primarily driven by the need to understand the complexities of the inherited multifaceted challenges associated with the peacebuilding processes.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Yosuke Nagai* is CEO of ‘Accept International’ and also serves as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) mentor of United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Urban Economy and Finance Branch Youth Unit. He holds MSc in Conflict Studies from London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).  
E-mail: yosuke.nagai@accept-int.org

Since the announcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, violations of human rights have been regarded as among the most pressing matters in various contexts. In accordance with such flow, activities to deal with violations of human rights have also been developing especially in cases of severe conflicts, particularly after the Cold War era. Therefore, the ‘contemporary’ peacebuilding has a tendency to employ a combination of security and development works in order to overcome difficulties in conventional peacebuilding and to ameliorate severe human rights situations in conflict and post-conflict scenarios.

In view of the above discussion, the main objective of this paper is to elucidate and examine *how* the security-development nexus has become essential to the post-Cold War peacebuilding framework, and more importantly what kind of challenges it has created in case of foreign-based interventions (such as the United Nations). After a brief definition of the key terms, this study explains in detail, firstly, the convergence between ‘security’ and ‘development’, and secondly, why the nexus needed to appear in the post-Cold War peacebuilding framework. This discussion will be followed by a consideration of the effects that are generated by peacebuilding efforts based on security-development nexus. This paper argues that the nexus has become inextricably linked to each other in the context of peacebuilding in order to tackle complex situations on the ground, however, also contains the various problematic issue.

### **Defining ‘Security-Development’ Nexus**

According to Stern (2010), there are different narratives associated components around the convergence between ‘security’ and ‘development’. This argument illustrates the complexities around the developed nexus. This research considers both the elements — ‘security’ and ‘development’ — as mutually reinforcing each other in the broader context of the peacebuilding process. Also, ‘security’ in this paper refers not only to military power but also towards the institutionalization or reconstruction of the security sector along with the associated sectors, often termed as Security Sector Reform (SSR).

Regarding post-Cold War peacebuilding, this paper recognizes that the ‘new’ idea of ‘peacebuilding’ (as a concept) kicked off by ‘An Agenda for Peace’ in 1992. Although the concept was first introduced by Johan Galtung (Galtung, 1976), it was the United Nations (UN) that ‘formalized’ and ‘institutionalized’ the peacebuilding as a practice and process. In addition, especially since the 1990s, the number of actors in peacebuilding has dramatically increased within the broader context of conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction & development. Considering the change in the scale and nature of ‘new’ conflicts, the peacebuilding aspect necessitated the involvement and responsibility of the international community and organizations (Tschirgi, 2004). In this vein, this paper focuses on the role of the UN as the leading actor in peacebuilding operations (Dodson, 2006), especially UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) which have played a vital role in the establishment and consolidation of peace in various conflict-ridden societies.

### **Pathway of the Security-Development Nexus**

After the ending of the Soviet Union, the international community was challenged with a new form of chaotic situation(s). In response, a paper titled 'An Agenda for Peace' was published by then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992. This report opened a pathway of post-Cold War peacebuilding approaches. In the very document, the UN understood peacebuilding as a comprehensive framework that includes various concepts such as the rule of law, democratization, and respect for human rights. In order to accomplish such comprehensive peacebuilding, various actors, particularly international NGOs were considered as important actors in **the** peacebuilding framework (Duffield, 2010). As Boutros-Ghali (1992) described, such a framework is steered towards 'state-building' rather merely 'building peace', particularly during the (conflict) transition phase. Therefore, it can be said that the new approach towards peacebuilding is to promote pre-conditions which are important to ensure sustainable peace.

Moreover, the international community framed the peacebuilding plan as based on 'the need for a more systematic and intrusive approach' (Helman, 1992, p.7). In doing so, many scholars have illustrated how transitional governments supported by international actors served as one of the more effective solutions. Given the nature of peacebuilding processes, it is important to ensure the re-construction of security framework (i.e., SSR) which in turn supplements the post-conflict development-related agendas.

In view of the above discussion, it can be well observed that the 'security' aspect in the peacebuilding process has expanded itself into a broader domain; that is to say, the change from a conventional understanding of security to a broader institutional and governance-related domain (Newman, 2010). Furthermore, the broader governance-related reforms in post-conflict or transition societies and SSR supplement each other. As such, Security Sector Reform (SSR) encompasses many structural processes such as police and military reforms, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), judicial reforms, etc. Owing to these broader considerations, the security-development nexus became integral to the post-Cold War peacebuilding framework.

The functionality of security-development nexus can be observed in the UN's PKO operations (e.g., the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC] and the UN Operation in Mozambique [ONUMOZ]). According to the UNTAC's official web page, the authority had around 15991 military and 3359 civilian-police components from 43 countries, along with 1149 international civilian staffs and 465 UN Volunteers.

This extended resource was concerned with various sectors: a civil administration, civilian police, repatriation, and rehabilitation components. ONUMOZ also had a similar structure that was composed of 6576 military components and 1087 police observers with 355 international staff and had diverse expertise related to DDR, election support, etc. Furthermore, in order to implement such a comprehensive peacebuilding approach in conflict-ridden societies, the UN



strengthened the conventional security aspect in the PKO's operations. For example, the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), supported by Security Council Resolution 794, was endowed with the authority to implement all means to improve the security situation on-ground for humanitarian assistance and effective peacebuilding.

Although the peacebuilding framework had included various security-related components combined with developmental agenda, nevertheless, the UN missions in Somalia and Yugoslavia were not successful. After that, the concept of human security was introduced in 1994 supplemented by Boutros Boutros Ghali's released 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace' in 1995 (Bosold, 2010). These new developments in the context of the post-Cold War era fostered the unification of security and development in peacebuilding while also providing a stable conceptual foundation for a sustainable approach. Moreover, the Brahimi Report in 2000 showed further necessity to improve PKO works. The report argued that the simultaneous implementation of peace-keeping and peacebuilding is necessary for terms of dealing with civil war. However, these commendable developments created practical challenges for the 'security-development' nexus itself (Duffield, 2010). Kofi Annan in 2004 further emphasized that 'development and security are inextricably linked' (Stern, 2010, p.5). Such an understanding led to a new PKO, which is usually called a robust or integrated PKO, and thus strengthened the combination of the nexus. Additionally, as many researchers described, in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MUNUSMA), the UN attempted to set an intervention brigade in PKO for peace enforcement. Hence, in comparison with the 1990s, nowadays, the peacebuilding framework which the UN has been leading defines the security aspect as an essential factor of peacebuilding.

With regard to the security and development nexus, various practitioners and scholars have also explored the gender dynamics; especially the rights of women and related human rights violations, such as observed in the case of Yugoslavia around 1992 (Cockburn, 1999). In order to deal with such human-rights issues, in 1993, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women was adopted by the UN General Assembly. That was followed by the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 and the Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, which pointed out the necessity of 'protecting' women, improving gender equality, and women's broader involvement decision-making processes (Carpenter, 2006; Väyrynen, 2004). Such a gender-based approach further strengthened the security-development in the broader context of peacebuilding framework(s).

As mentioned above, in a post-Cold War situation, there was a need to employ security in order to fulfill the 'needs' of peacebuilding framework. Hence, the relationship between security and development became indispensable in the peacebuilding agendas.

### **Motivations behind 'Security-Development' Nexus**

Although 'An Agenda for Peace' was based on a reflection of the past, the situation after the Cold War became much more complicated. As various scholars and

practitioners have described, the 'new' conflicts became more internal (intrastate) in nature, and more importantly, exposed the identity-based cleavages (ethno-religious, cultural or political) within various societies (e.g., Dodson, 2006). Kaldor (2007) termed these altered nature of conflicts as 'new' wars.

According to Kaldor (2013), 'new wars' have features such as the privatization of violence which targets civilians. At the same time, such wars transcended the national borders, thus expanded its influence, impact, and space. With regards, Duffield (2005) also argued that the border between international and national disputes disappeared which can be considered as negative globalisation. Such circumstances led the international community to reconsider the concept of governance while linking it with a western understanding of globalisation (Stern, 2010). According to Hettne (2010), the concept of global governance subsequently generated the concept of global regimes that regarded the developing places as of global concerns. Later, underdevelopment and horizontal inequalities started to be regarded as one of the main factors behind the manifestations of violent conflicts (Duffield, 2010; Stern, 2010). Moreover, the background assumption, that poverty creates a lack of security and a lack of security creates underdevelopment, supported such comprehension. Therefore, the international community, led by the UN, decided upon a more positive, systematic and intrusive approach towards addressing the issue of poverty and underdevelopment. As a 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace' mentioned, a 'feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos' (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.5) and 'It means that international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government' (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.5). Such an approach can be seen as solid and dynamic state-building or reconstruction to create a democratic state which can maintain peace and prevent conflict recurrence. Such state-building projects need a well-structured development and security approach to supplement the agenda of sustainable peace and stability. In this respect, development theoretically has no choice but to build itself on security. In this manner, the security and the development aspects perform simultaneously in peacebuilding.

Within the broader discussion of security-development nexus, the concept of security expanded its domain, thus encompassed 'human security' as its main objective (Krause, 2005, p. 457). Indeed, this expansion had positive impacts over the broader developmental and governance-related agendas; however, it burdened it with tasks, such as SSR, DDR, and small arms control (Krause, 2005). Del Castillo (2008) described it as extremely important to complement socio-economic development. As such, contributions of security acquired an important position in peacebuilding and became a necessary component in a peacebuilding framework after the end of the Cold War.

As indicated above, Holt (2009) identifies some failures in PKO in Sierra Leone which produced many lessons learnt, thus led to a refined PKO robust and integrated approach. The improved approach fostered the nexus between security and

development. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, usually known as Brahimi Report 2000, argued that ‘History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work’ (Brahimi Report, 2000, p. 5). That report reconfirmed the value of security in the peacebuilding framework and recognised that security works are vital in deciding a result of peacebuilding. Moreover, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 played a decisive role in advancing cooperation between security and development (Tschirgi, 2004; Youngs, 2008).

It should be noted that the above-described motivations behind the nexus of security-development are based on an approach known as *liberalism*. In fact, in post-Cold War societies, tenets of liberalism, such as human rights and democracy, have become major international norms. As such, almost all peacebuilding projects have been implemented by such a liberal viewpoint (Jones, 2006; Baranyi et al., 2011). In addition, one of the significant factors which made a huge influence on the post-Cold War peacebuilding framework is an economic perspective. Since the end of the Cold War, the prominence of the political economy and a ‘greed’ analysis in various fields has been noticeable. These political-economic dimensions of violent conflicts have been well explored and theorized by Keen (2009) and Collier (2000).

### **Security-Development Nexus and Peacebuilding: Understanding the Impact**

As this paper illustrated, it is important to establish a comprehensive approach around the nexus of security and development. Such an approach needs to be implemented in order to address the conditions which are in fact the root causes of violent conflicts. It further establishes itself as a long-term approach that can possibly ensure the prevention of violent conflicts along with the violations of human rights. We have observed various success stories where such comprehensive approaches/frameworks have addressed the complex underlying issues in post-conflict settings. For instance, the case of Sierra Leone is a classic example, which had capacity-based issues however when offered assistance, the country successfully recovered itself. Nevertheless, we have to consider the detrimental impacts of security-development based approach in the post-conflict environments, as mentioned previously.

Mac Ginty (2011) and Belloni (2012) commented on the ‘hybrid peace’ which seeks coexistence with *liberal* and *non-liberal* values. The coexistence is fundamentally based on incorporating the indigenous traditions or social capital rather than imposing liberal schemes on developing countries or post-conflict societies. In this vein, a significant literature has been produced which criticizes the de-contextualized ‘mainstreaming’ of peacebuilding framework driven by liberal standards. Such literature has thoroughly examined various components of *liberal* peacebuilding (such as SSR, DDR, and reconciliation) led by international actors (e.g., Heathershaw, 2008). In other words, one can argue that the post-Cold War peacebuilding approach has adopted liberal state-building (as a binding force), which

aims at developing economic policy based on a free market and building a rule of law to protect individual rights through institutional reform and election (Newman, 2009). Paris (2002) also pointed out that such liberal peacebuilding has functioned to spread the liberal sovereign state model to the world, and argued that 'Peacebuilders promote this model in the domestic affairs of war-shattered states as the prevailing 'standard of civilization' that states must accept in order to gain full rights and recognition in the international community' (p. 650). Additionally, in terms of human security, which has fostered further relations with development, yet has been criticized for re-adjusting or re-defining itself to fit with a liberal peacebuilding approach in a globalised world (Stern, 2010).

Moreover, there is a tendency in liberal peacebuilding to intervene in a particular context through kinetic force or military power. As many scholars have observed, since the end of the Cold War, many peace agreements (a *precondition* for peacebuilding peace processes have tended to be created by powerful international intervention. This trend can be seen in various states such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya; however, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be the best example.

The Bosnian War was one of the bloodiest conflicts in the 1990s and took a heavy toll on human lives. The UN dispatched PKO operation called the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to protect people and refugees on the ground. However, it was concerning to observe that the international community was not able to prevent the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. Later, NATO did decide to intervene in Serbia with unilateral aerial bombings without the consensus in the UN Security Council. In fact, it can be said that that strong intervention led the *Dayton Agreement* followed by an exhaustive peacebuilding process in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bose, 2002). However, in terms of the provisions of that agreement, there was great dissatisfaction on the ground, particularly among the Muslim dominated areas (McMahon, 2009; Caplan, 2010). In order to deal with such dissatisfaction, the UN and other international actors deployed a large-scale military force to keep the structure of peacebuilding. Moreover, regarding the state-building process, which the UN has planned to strengthen the central government to build a legitimate and democratic sovereign state, the Serbian faction bitterly disagreed with such a policy (Bose, 2002). According to Friedman (2019), over 20 years have passed after the Dayton Agreement was signed, there are still foreign military forces stationed there to deal with unforeseen events caused by the dissatisfaction on the ground. It means that the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly shows that military humanitarian intervention based on the liberal peacebuilding framework led to the development of other serious problems, such as increasing concerns over nationalism, ethnic divisions, etc.

It is evident from the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina that a liberal peacebuilding framework (embedded within the security and development nexus) has a high possibility to create a wide range of challenges on the ground, as well as undermines local ownership because of its de-contextualized approach (Donais, 2009). In addition, Paris (2004) noted that peacebuilding and state-building processes could never be effective until there is mutual trust between different stakeholders and

institutions. Additionally, the post-Cold War peacebuilding approach tends not to present *victory* or *defeat*, thus there is a possibility that such an attitude leaves a question mark over the neutrality or legitimacy of foreign intervention in the conflict setting or conflict-induced crisis situation(s). Consequently, any withdrawal of external forces increases the risks of conflict reoccurrence and intensification (Berdal, 2017). In addition, according to Krause (2005), a liberal peacebuilding approach which is developed and supported by the concept of human security is not really proven to be effective (see also Kuperman, 2015; McCants, 2015). The reflections of the mentioned challenges can be found in the discussion triggered by the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P). For instance, interventions in Libya and Syria were conducted with reference to R2P, however, later the international actors found themselves in a much-complicated environment (Morris, 2013).

Another point is the increasing trend of the mortality rate of aid workers active in the peacebuilding processes (Duffield, 2010). This issue has been critically discussed in the debate concerning the operationalisation of humanitarianism in complex emergency or conflict-induced crises (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2018). In general, humanitarian workers usually put a priority on humanitarian principles (i.e., humanity, neutrality, and impartiality) as sanctioned by the UN General Assembly. Here, the objective is to mobilize humanitarian assistance at full scale in order to respond to critical situations or disasters. The specified role under the mandate of the UN also distinguishes the humanitarian actors or organization from the military component of the broader peacebuilding framework. Nevertheless, emerging literature has well pointed towards the consequence of security-development nexus within which the humanitarian actors have to perform. The literature refers to the concept of 'securitization' of development. These issues can be well observed in countries like Somalia (Trachslor, 2008). While considering these complexities, one may argue that the 'security' component in the peacebuilding framework has a significant intention and tendency to encroach the development related agenda.

Duffield (2010) claimed that 'While forming part of liberalism's external sovereign frontier, they also signal the deepening institutionalization of the development-underdevelopment divide' (Duffield, 2010, p.71); thus, leaving the liberal peacebuilding framework for intense criticism. Duffield's opinion implies that the liberal peacebuilding, supported by the security and development nexus, is expanding the gap between many aspects of global north and south; nevertheless, the international community has made an endeavour to minimize the mentioned gulf. In this respect, Stern (2010) understands that the security-development nexus is facing an impasse, and further noted that the nexus generates enormous problems and consumes significant human, monetary and institutional resources (Stern, 2010, p.19).

Besides, contrary to the political and economic rationalities which have supported the very idea of liberal peacebuilding, Junne (2005) and Krause (2005) argued that mere economic development is not enough to establish the states which have the capability to prevent violent conflicts or wars. Paris (2004) further pointed out that tendencies of peacebuilding to bring stability through security sector

reconstruction and democratization have not proven to be effective. In such situations, there is a need to have a greater focus on institutional building or reforms prior to commencing a democratization process (Eide, 2013).

The final point is the length or span of the peacebuilding process or initiatives. In general, it is necessary to pursue the peacebuilding process, which is long-term in nature (e.g., Keen, 2009). Dodson (2006) argued that ‘the fact that the short-term effect of marketization is often an increase in want and suffering among the poor’ (Dodson, 2006, p.247). Collier (2011) claimed that post-conflict peacebuilding needs international assistance for at least ten years. However, Collier (2008) noted that most international peacebuilding endeavours have been based on short-term approaches, hence led to undesirable results, such as destabilization, fragmented state-citizen relationship, poor governance, etc. (Anderson, 1999).

In view of the above-detailed discussion, it appears that the nexus between ‘security-development’ has been well theorized (within the broader peacebuilding framework), yet it has led to various contradictions. Considering the complexities involved in the peacebuilding processes, it is, therefore, an issue of contextually-driven and sensed priorities, in the conflict settings. Similarly, the issue calls attention to challenging the liberal-based idea in the peacebuilding processes; it needs to adopt contextualized approaches.

## **Conclusion**

This paper has outlined an overall evolution and involved complex dynamics surrounding the nexus between ‘security’ and ‘development’ within the broader peacebuilding framework. This paper has illustrated that, given severe situations and urgent needs on the ground, the peacebuilding framework has become highly integrated. It has developed its relationship with security-development nexus, in order to deal with the complex issues in the (post-)conflict or fragile states. Nevertheless, this article has demonstrated the embedded contradictions within the nexus; thus it has led to undermining the peacebuilding process in various cases. The article has further argued that the peacebuilding approach has been primarily steered by the liberal principles, thus reflected itself as a liberal project (legitimization of western democratic ‘values’) rather developing a more contextualized approach in its operational and state-building agendas (Szeftel, 1998; Carbone, 2015).

## **References**

- Anderson, M. B. (1999). *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War*. London. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Baranyi, S., Beaudet, P., & Locher, U. (2011). *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389>
- Belloni, R. (2012). Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Significance. *Global Governance*, 18 (1), 21-38.
- Berdal, M. (2017). *Building Peace after War*. London. Routledge.

- Bose, S. (2002). *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. London. Oxford University Press on Demand.
- Bosold, D. (2010). Development of the Human Security Field: A Critical Examination. In *Critical Perspectives on Human Security* (36-50). London. Routledge.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An Agenda for Peace, Volume no. 11*. New York. Retrieved from [https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/A\\_47\\_277.pdf](https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/A_47_277.pdf)
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1995). *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/168325?ln=en>
- Brahimi, L. (2000). *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. Retrieved from [https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Brahimi\\_Report\\_Exec\\_Summary.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Brahimi_Report_Exec_Summary.pdf)
- Caplan, R. (2000). Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 11(2), 213-232.
- Carbone, G. (2015). Democratisation as a State-building Mechanism: A Preliminary Discussion of an Understudied Relationship. *Political Studies Review*, 13(1), 11-21.
- Carpenter, R. C. (2006). Recognizing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations. *Security Dialogue*, 37(1), 83-103.
- Collier, P. (2002). Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective. In Berdal, M. Malone, D. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. London. Lynne Rienner. 101.
- Collier, P. (2011). *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York. Random House.
- Cockburn, C. (1999). Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence. *The World Bank*. Washington DC. Retrieved from <https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1093/wber/lht032>
- Collier, P. (2008). Post-conflict Economic Policy. *Building States to Build Peace*. Retrieved from [https://www.undp.org/content/dam/turkey/docs/Publications/PovRed/Post\\_Conflict\\_Economic\\_Recovery\\_Report.pdf](https://www.undp.org/content/dam/turkey/docs/Publications/PovRed/Post_Conflict_Economic_Recovery_Report.pdf)
- Del Castillo, G. (2008). *Rebuilding War-torn States: The Challenge of Post-conflict Economic Reconstruction*. London. Oxford University Press.
- Dodson, M. (2006). Post-Conflict Development and Peace Building: Recent Research. *Peace & Change*, 31(2), 244-252.
- Donais, T. (2009). Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes. *Peace & Change*, 34 (1), 3-26.
- Diamond, L. J. (1994). Toward Democratic Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3), 4-17.

- Duffield, M. (2010). The Liberal Way of Development and the Development—Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide. *Security Dialogue*, 41(1), 53-76.
- Eide, E. B., & Holm, T. T. (2013). *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*. London. Routledge.
- Friedman, F. (2019). Re-Inventing Yugoslavia: Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Globalization and Regime Change: Lessons from the New Russia and the New Europe*, 227.
- Galtung, J. (1976). 3 Realistic Approaches to Peace—Peacekeeping, Peace-making, Peacebuilding. *Impact of Science on Society*, 26 (1-2), 103-115.
- Heathershaw, J. (2008). Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging Of Peacebuilding Discourses. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 36(3), 597-621.
- Helman, G. B., & Ratner, S. R. (1992). Saving Failed States. *Foreign Policy*, 89, 3-20.
- Hettne, B. (2010). Development and Security: Origins and Future. *Security Dialogue*, 41(1), 31-52.
- Holt, V. K., Taylor, G., & Kelly, M. (2009). *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*. Retrieved from <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Protecting%20Civilians%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20Operations.pdf>
- Jones, G. A., & Rodgers, D. (2011). The World Bank's World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development: A Critique through Five Vignettes. *Journal of International Development*, 23(7), 980-995.
- Junne, G., & Verkoren, W. (Eds.). (2005). *Post-conflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*. London. Lynne Rienner.
- Kaldor, M. (2007). *New and Old Wars*. New York. Stanford University Press.
- Keen, D. (2009). Economic Initiatives to Tackle Conflict: Bringing Politics Back in. *In Crisis States Occasional Papers*, No. 9 Retrieved from <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/101218/OP9.Keen.pdf>
- Krause, K., & Jütersonke, O. (2005). Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments. *Security Dialogue*, 36 (4), 447-462.
- Kuperman, A. J. (2015). Obama's Libya Debacle: How A Well-Meaning Intervention Ended In Failure. *Foreign Affairs*, 94(2), 66-77.
- McCants, W. (2015). *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State*. New York. St. Martin's Press.
- Mac Ginty, R. (2011). *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. The United Kingdom. Palgrave Macmillan.
- McMahon, P. C., & Western, J. (2009). The Death of Dayton—How to Stop Bosnia from Falling Apart. *Foreign Affairs*, 88, 69.
- Morris, J. (2013). Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum. *International Affairs*, 89 (5), 1265-1283.



- Newman, E. (2010). Peacebuilding as Security in 'Failing' and Conflict-Prone States. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 4 (3), 305-322.
- Paris, R. (2002). International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'. *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), 637-656.
- Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. United Kingdom. Cambridge University Press.
- Pattison, J. (2014). *The Morality of Private War: The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies*. New York. Oxford University Press.
- Stern, M., & Öjendal, J. (2010). Mapping the Security—Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence? *Security Dialogue*, 41(1), 5-29.
- Szeftel, M. (1998). Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption & the Governance Agenda. *Review of African Political Economy*, 25 (76), 221-240.
- Trachler, D. (2008). Security and Development: Convergence or Competition? *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, 3, 1-3.
- Tschirgi, N. (2004). *Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, and Challenges*. New York: International Peace Academy.
- Youngs, R. (2008). Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-platitude? *European Integration*, 30(3), 419-437.
- Väyrynen, T. (2004). Gender and UN Peace Operations: The Confines of Modernity. *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), 125-142.
- UN Operation- ONUMOZ. *Fact and Figures*. Retrieved from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozF.html>
- UN Operation - UNOSOM II. *Background*. Retrieved from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom2facts.html>
- UN Operation – UNTAC. *Fact and Figures*. Retrieved from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untacfacts.html>
- UN Operation – UNTAC. *Background*. Retrieved from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untacbackgr2.html>

# UN Peacekeeping Operations and Successful Military Diplomacy: A Case Study of Pakistan

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 13-25  
njips.nust.edu.pk

Bakare Najimdeen <sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

Few years following its creation, the United Nations (UN) with the blessing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to establish the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), as a multilateral mechanism geared at fulfilling the Chapter VII of the UN Charter which empowered the Security Council to enforce measurement to maintain or restore international peace and security. Since its creation, the multilateral mechanism has recorded several successes and failures to its credit. While it is essentially not like traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping operations have evolved over the years and have emerged as a new form of diplomacy. Besides, theoretically underscoring the differences between diplomacy and foreign policy, which often appear as conflated, the paper demonstrates how diplomacy is an expression of foreign policy. Meanwhile, putting in context the change and transformation in global politics, particularly global conflict, the paper argues that traditional diplomacy has ceased to be the preoccupation and exclusive business of the foreign ministry and career diplomats, it now involves foot soldiers who are not necessarily diplomats but act as diplomats in terms of peacekeeping, negotiating between warring parties, carrying their countries' emblems and representing the latter in resolving global conflict, and increasingly becoming the representation of their countries' foreign policy objective, hence peacekeeping military diplomacy. The paper uses decades of Pakistan's peacekeeping missions as a reference point to establish how a nation's peacekeeping efforts represent and qualifies as military diplomacy. It also presented the lessons and good practices Pakistan can sell to the rest of the world *vis-à-vis* peacekeeping and lastly how well Pakistan can consolidate its peacekeeping diplomacy.

## Keywords

Military diplomacy, UN peacekeeping operation, diplomacy, Pakistan's peacekeeping, foreign policy

## Introduction

One of the first lessons of International Relations lies in the introduction of realism as the traditional theoretical underpinning which explains and also shapes nation-state's behavior. Through the optics of realism, the state's survival is not merely fundamental, but a defining principle of inter-state relations and foreign policy

---

<sup>1</sup> Bakare Najimdeen is currently the Head of Department (HoD) at Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS), the National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad.  
E-mail: olaayo@gmail.com

formulation. Within the changing anarchic global system, the survival and prestige of a state are construed, understood, analyzed and connected with the success and failure of its diplomacy. In an evolving global system, the act of diplomacy is not spared from the evolution and hence, the reason why today's diplomacy transcends the preoccupation of a few selected diplomats. Part of the evolution is the changing nature of war and conflict, the type which traditional diplomats cannot practically put an end to.

Traditional or public diplomacy is an art by which the state employs and deploys all resources available at its disposal to convincing, persuading and coercing other states to take particular actions, which they might necessarily be indisposed to doing (Aron, 1966). In the traditional sense of the term, 'diplomacy' functions up to a certain degree between allies, but hardly any longer among enemies, or even between the blocs and the neutral nations' (Aron, 1966). Yet it is the conduct of international relations through negotiation, between states and other entities – through peaceful means by official agents, adroit to 'making policy understood and if possible, accepted by other nations. Interests aims and concepts of foreign policy may change, while in diplomacy what usually changes are only the methods of implementation and the repertoire of persuasion' (Bull, 1977, pp.: 162-163, Sofer, 1988, Jönsson, 2011, p.:188). For Watson (1982), diplomacy is not just about negotiation, but it entails a process of dialogue within a given system, through which states pursue their purposes (national interest) by means short of war (Watson, 1982, p.:11). Traditionally, what is incontestable is that the practice of diplomacy enjoins the state to ensure the fulfilment of national interest through a form of foreign policy that is peaceful.

The fact that diplomacy is not foreign policy, but only one of the elements through which the objective(s) of foreign policy are accomplished, remains indisputable. Hence, it is a tool in the hand of the state, geared at achieving sets of national objectives – in both the short and long term. Invariably, the traditional construct of diplomacy is not simply tailored at strengthening the position of a state; it is equally a calibrated and well-calculated measure – the process of making an impression on another state. If the impressionist argument of diplomacy, should be considered tenable, thus, diplomatic norms typically embodied by professional diplomats (Wiseman, 2011) adroit in creating an impression and maximizing the state's advantages without the risk and expense.

Even though the conduct of diplomacy has a long history, as far back as the creation of empires and state-system and owing to the transnational and transcontinental intercourse, yet most scholars of diplomacy seem to believe that the present structure and institutionalized diplomatic practices are the products of the modern world system. Since the birth of the Westphalian state system, the conduct of diplomacy has primarily remained state-centric and hence Martin Wright's delineation of the diplomatic system as the 'master-institution' of international relations and the 'communication system of the international society' (Jönsson, 2011). From both systemic and structuralist standpoints, diplomatic culture (Bull 2002) amongst states is by itself a form of international socialization, ritualistic and institutionalized process (Bjola & Kornprobst, 2018, Jönsson & Hall, 2005, p. 39, Watson, 1984). And from a postcolonial and realist point of view, such socialization might be intrinsically and characteristically coercive, embedded in power relations –

weak states are co-opted forcefully and otherwise into the global system (Mitzen, 2103, Jentleson, 2006, Wiseman, 2011, p. 701).

Back in 1969, the American Society of International Law invited Ambassador Carl Schurmann to its annual meeting in Washington. During the academic summit, Ambassador Schurmann offered an insightful analysis of diplomacy. From his lens,

[...] diplomats are no more overwhelmingly controlling the art of diplomacy, the growing dynamics of today's world has significantly changed the complexion of diplomacy (Schurmann, 1969).

Schurmann's assertion is as true today, as it was in 1969. Contemporarily, diplomacy is far beyond the preoccupation of the designated or professional diplomats, particularly in an ever-changing world and global affairs; if the world is susceptible to change, diplomacy cannot be insulated and therefore must also adapt itself to the growing change (Bjola & Kornprobst, 2018).

### **Conceptualizing Diplomacy and Peacekeeping**

Like traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping operations involve the use of carrots and sticks to dealing with the unknown enemy (Hocking, 2008, p.63). While peacekeepers are technically mandated to create, a transitory environment – from conflict to a post-conflict situation, doing so would be rationally plausible through both soft and hard measures.

To conceptualize peacekeeping as a form of diplomacy, it is important to establish the intersection of diplomacy and foreign policy as two distinct ideas. The said distinction can be drawn using Brian Hocking's differentiation conception of the two ideas. Unlike foreign policy which focuses on actors, diplomacy explores the interactions between actors (Hocking, 2016, p. 67). This explains the true essence of peacekeeping missions, directed not at the actors in the conflict, but at the interactions between them.

Similar to traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping carries the element of negotiation and/or mediation among the main protagonists in the conflict. Aside from being a country representative, professional diplomats also act as agents of conflict containment. In the same token, peacekeeping is not confined to conflict containment, but also includes preventive peacekeeping, war limitation, constraining fighting geography, mitigation and eventual alleviation of conflict intensity and post-ceasefire peacekeeping (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.14).

Secondly, arbitration in the shape of third party intervention is an integral part of diplomacy, which becomes necessarily important in the event of two parties reacting to each other's actions which sometimes culminates into hostility. Like diplomacy, peacekeeping efforts are no less than a third party intervention tailored at dampening hostility. Yet, it is safe to say that unlike the traditional nature of diplomacy which could be bilateral or multilateral (i.e., between two more states), peacekeeping does not involve the compromise and give and take which shapes traditional diplomacy. Nonetheless, a peacekeeping mission is akin to the customary mediation and third-party involvement within the art of diplomacy. However, in contrast to the traditional diplomatic processes, peacekeeping as a form of diplomacy

differs in methods of implementation and the repertoire of persuasion (Sofer, 1988). While traditional diplomacy can be characteristically non-coercive, the methods and implementation of peacekeeping can be otherwise coercive. Figure 1 and Table 1 demonstrate the said variation.

Thirdly, while peacekeeping does not qualify as traditional diplomacy between or among states, it nevertheless bears a certain degree of semblance of what traditional diplomacy is. The UN peacekeeping soldiers have over the years demonstrated their capacity to act as buffer force meant to keep the peace between two warring parties and to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Being a buffer and mediator between two consenting warring parties epitomises diplomacy (Coulon et al., 1988). Buttressing the notion of ‘consent diplomacy’, the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, asserted that peacekeeping is not just a technique to preserve peace in fragile and conflicted regions, but a mechanism which involves ‘the consent of all parties concerned’; an important and uncompromising element of diplomacy. Prior to venturing into the complicated and muddy processes of conflict resolution, the mandate of any UN peacekeeping mission is directly dependent on the consent of the hostile parties – particularly the state actor.

Fourthly, peacekeeping missions are dubbed as ‘preventive diplomacy,’ - a pre-emptive measure to mitigate against conflict escalation and a way of exercising good offices and mediation between two or more conflicting parties from resuming fighting and ensuring ceasefire agreement and more importantly, confidence and consensus-building process between the parties. As a ‘preventive diplomacy’ peacekeeping should be in a position to transform from waiting for the conflict to break out before sending peacekeepers, the later (and senior UN mediators) can always be deployed as countermeasures and mitigation strategy against possible conflict escalation. Besides, such preventive measures open the doors for mediation, negotiation and third party role play that can re-channel conflict energy towards the direction of peace. Beardsley and colleagues (2016) demonstrate how the nexus of diplomacy and peacekeeping can effectively achieve the objective of diplomatic venture that includes, acting as the third party; arbitrating, resolution of conflict, incentivising conflicting parties and the facilitation and settlement of conflict on systematic bases and thus reducing huge death tolls and battlefield fatalities and preventing conflict escalation.




Figure 1: Process of Negotiation

Fifthly, peacekeeping missions over the years have acted with the intent of conducting diplomacy between warring parties. Besides being ‘a small protective force essentially different from an attacking force’ (Lie, 1969), they have shown the proclivity of ‘overseeing the implementation of agreements on the borders and assisting UN troops stationed in the region’, and subsequently reinforcing the liberal paradigmatic view by which ‘dialogue replaces confrontation’ (Masuda, 2011). This is true for the Dayton agreement, Rwanda, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and other UN peacekeeping mandates such as:

- UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999 was a sign of new policy development;
- UN Transition Assistance Group for Namibia (UNTAG);
- UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH);
- UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL);
- UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC);
- The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); in charge of the civilian sector;
- Kosovo Force (KFOR) in charge of the military sector was established based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, (Yugoslavia)

<b>Diplomacy</b>	
<b>Coercive</b>	<b>Non-coercive</b>
<b>Enforcement</b>	<b>Pure mediation</b>
<b>Non- forcible coercion</b>	<b>Conciliation/ problem solving</b>
<b>Mediation with muscle</b>	<b>Good offices</b>

Table 1: Understanding the Contours of Diplomacy (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.2)

Today's formula and structure of peacekeeping force is the product of evolving circumstances, primarily the careful initiative of Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General anticipates the presence of peacekeeping forces as the fulfilment of Article 33-Chapter 6 of the UN charter. The fact that warring parties might either be less willing or incapacitated to seek a peaceful resolution to a dispute could eventually necessitate the diplomatic role of the peacekeeping force, which is not merely a neutral party, but charged to work towards ceasing the conflict. Peacekeeping diplomacy does not necessarily have to be the sole responsibility of men in boots, who might or not necessarily be skilled in the language of the mission area. Hence for some practical and cogent reasons, elements of diplomacy which require negotiations and mediation and understanding of the language of the conflicting parties evidently requires the indulgence of a seasoned UN-diplomat, whose linguistic proficiency will play an instrumental role in achieving the set goals and elements of diplomacy (Druckman & Stern, 1997).

Making an argument for the potential success of peacekeeping as a diplomatic effort, the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen during the 45<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly, September 1990, opined that peacekeeping is certain to be a failed diplomatic project, unless 'normalization of international relations can only be realized by universally respecting the five principles: mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence' (Masuda, 2011). However, Ling (2007) argues that if peacekeeping tends to embrace diplomatic posture, it might turn out to be detrimental as the missions will be selective and encouraged only when 'payoffs to national interests, hence the huge impact on collective interest and international security that peacekeeping operations are mainly meant to serve'.

### **Case of Pakistan**

Being one of the largest and oldest troop-contributing countries gives Pakistan a unique niche within the community of peacekeepers. Besides, being an important constituent, Pakistan is a major contributor to both boots and brains on the ground (Moon, 2013). Such a display of commitment towards international peace and security invariably carries the potential of improving and adding to the international image and status of Pakistan. In the past 70 years of UN peacekeeping, Pakistan has participated in a total of 46 UN peacekeeping missions, deployed troops in 28 countries and in total contributed over 200,000 soldiers in different capacities and conflict zones. This is not to mention, 156 brave men who sacrificed their lives for global peace and security. Presently, Pakistan ranks as the 6<sup>th</sup> largest troop-contributing country to the UN.<sup>2</sup>

If diplomacy is how a country conducts its international relations and makes a positive image of itself within the comity of nations; Pakistan's peacekeeping ventures should no less be considered as a form of diplomacy. For almost six decades of indelible contribution, Pakistan has been able to mark a niche in peacekeeping and

---

<sup>2</sup> Based on the data gathered from the Department of Peacekeeping Training, the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad.

particularly made an impression to an extent that the UN has come to reciprocate with a gesture of trust in the capability of Pakistani military and non-military officers (who had served the UN in different capacities and aspects of peacekeeping). The visit of the **Under-Secretary-General**, UNDPKO, Jean Pierre Lacroix to Pakistan in recent past and most especially his visit to the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) at the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, a citadel that offers peacekeeping training to local and international potential peacekeepers, uproariously underscores the aforementioned recognition (The Nations, 2018).

The appreciation of her years of active participation and sacrifice in UN peacekeeping missions is also a common knowledge within the peacekeeping countries. While several countries are now using peacekeeping participation to advance their foreign and economic policy (Armstrong 2010), Pakistan should be no exemption in promoting her diplomatic and foreign policy agenda through peacekeeping. Interestingly, China, having a long-standing non-interference foreign policy has joined the bandwagon of peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, where pundits argue that Beijing must protect her increasing economic interests (Ukeje & Tariku, 2018, p. 301). Thus, for China, peacekeeping transcends ensuring peace in a foreign land but is of cardinal importance to the growing expansionist Chinese economic agenda and project. **Even** if Pakistan considers her years of peacekeeping engagement as an act of diplomacy and an integral part of her foreign policy instrument, the question arises, how well this instrument has yielded dividends, in both short and long terms and how successful has it been. Answer(s) to such pertinent questions might not necessarily require hard logic, yet it is a puzzle that demands some degree of conceptual dissection.

The notion of success and failure might be debatable, yet conventional wisdom will agree that the relativity of success and failure does not hinder objective analysis of marking what implicit success and failure are. To evade such contentious waters, it is imperative to set a benchmark for success and failure, if both cannot be quantified, thus a nation like Pakistan needs a qualitative instrument to gauge the overall success and failure of its peacekeeping missions. Hence, policymakers should be able to proffer answers to these questions, what favourable policy outcomes have been accrued over the years, vis-à-vis peacekeeping. Does mere demonstration to the UN that Pakistan can offer and send troops anywhere in the world to quench uprising and conflict, constitute success? Or does maintain short term prestige or building a strategic socio-political and economic diplomatic relations with the concerned country qualify as a representation of success? Policymakers in Pakistan critically need to discern, where the country stands.

Druckman and Stern (1997) in their research debate on the success of international peacekeeping operations, focusing on the implication(s) of peacekeeping missions on conflict situation and environment, but the question that remains unanswered is that does the same foreign policy instrument roll back any significant diplomatic advantage, strengthen relations between the troop-contributing country and the affected country?

If peacekeeping diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy, it behoves every contributing state to carefully understand its level of success and failure (Baldwin, 2000). Foreign policy should not and is not a mere policy formulation



process, but a process that culminates by the output that stems from the input and throughput. The success and failure of a policy are arguably associated with the output in both the short and long term and hence a conscious and pragmatic policymaker should be cognizant of the fact that policy output is as important as the level of policy input. Addressing this Lacuna, Cohen and Scott (1975) argued that policymakers often muster great strength to making policy, but they often fall short to defining and ascertaining its output. In addition to ascertaining the success and failure of a particular foreign policy, policymakers should not simply be concerned about the output but the feedbacks generated by the policy. It is most plausible to measure success and failure through the nature of feedback, a state received upon the implementation of any policy. In the backdrop of the above, arise fundamental questions such as;

- i) As a peacekeeping nation, what output (success or failure) has Pakistan derived from years of numerous missions?
- ii) Do the missions translate into good relations with the conflict-affected countries?
- iii) As an instrument of foreign policy, has peacekeeping diplomacy actually translated into national prestige, or an avenue to generate enormous diplomatic dividends for Pakistan? And finally,
- iv) How well and deep has peacekeeping goodwill managed to outlive the peacekeeping missions?

To place the preceding questions and discussion in perspective, the following discussion explores three different but important peacekeeping missions as a tool to explicate and generate a perspective as to how peacekeeping diplomacy can either become scorn or prestige for the participating country. There is no denying that UN peacekeeping missions are always a multilateral collection of nations, hence it is uneasy to bestow all the goodwill of maintaining and keeping peace on a single country. Yet, what remains important is how participating and contributing countries conduct themselves with the local population during and following the conflict. Hence, peacekeeping diplomacy is not a one- way traffic, but a continuous process and based on such continuity, contributing countries can ascertain whether or not its contribution is a success or failure or if it has accrued prestige or scorn from the concerned country. In addition to representing the UN, peacekeepers are also the bearers of their countries' flags, emblem, and dignity and in the event of any mishap or unforeseen circumstances or display of bravery; the soldiers bearing a particular country's emblem will be either directly or otherwise held responsible.

### ***Case One: The Rwanda Genocide***

While the post-genocide report was highly critical of the conduct of the UN and two principal UNSC members (the U.S and Britain) over their lackadaisical and nonchalant responses to the prescient warning of a looming genocide is a glaring case in point. The inaction of the Belgian soldiers to salvage thousands of Tutsis from the genocide will/might ever remain an indelible stain on both the conscience of the

commanding officer and his troops. According to Colonel Luc Marchal - the Belgian commanding officer in Rwanda, the instruction of the UN to desert the country, but to save the white UN workers was an act of cowardice. 'We were perfectly aware of what was about to happen. Our mission was a tragic failure. Everyone considered it a form of desertion. Pulling out under such circumstances was an act of total cowardice,' admitted Colonel Luc Marchal in the times that followed (Guardian, 1999).

### ***Case Two: The Srebrenica Genocide***

Another important case is the Srebrenica genocide. Their mandate as UN peacekeeping force was to keep and maintain peace amongst the warring parties in Bosnia, but the action of the Dutch soldiers underpinned their complicity in the Srebrenica genocide. Since 1995, the memory of wearing the Dutch military badge and allowing the Bosnian Serbs led by Ratko Mladic to slaughter Muslim men and boys will remain an undeletable stigma for the Dutch military. Of recent, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) affirmed that the Dutch soldiers were 10% liable for the massacre of hundreds of Muslim men in Srebrenica – Bosnia perpetrated by the Serbian soldiers in 1995 (Khan, 2019).

### ***Case Three: Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia***

Following her ill-fated civil war and the consequent international intervention, Somalia became yet another politically unstable nation that sought help to return to the path of political civility. The mishandling of the Somalian conflict, the failure of the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) under the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751, informed the 1992 US humanitarian campaign in Somalia. The campaign was considered a political goal-scoring mission for President George H.W Bush amidst election year (Yamin, 2019, p. 54). The humanitarian campaign under US troops in Somalia turned into a nightmare for the US Marine and the infamous black hawk down the incident. Like Afghanistan, Somalia turned out to be a dead hole for the foreign troops, but not solely true for Pakistani peacekeepers, whose help was formally solicited by Washington (Yamin, 2019, p. 61).

Even as it lost 24 brave soldiers, the Pakistani peacekeepers demonstrated unwavering gallantry, whilst bravely saving the Americans from their nemesis, stabilising the country for other foreign troops (French and Belgian to mention a few) and equally boosting the position of UNOSOM. Sadly on one hand, while the like of Belgian and Canadian soldiers were found wanting in the violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Yamin, 2019, pp. 80-81) on the other hand, the action(s) of Pakistani soldiers reflected an epitome of professionalism, fulfilment of the UN mandate accorded to them and simultaneously a representation and implementation of Pakistan's peacekeeping foreign policy in a foreign land. Interestingly, there was momentary positive feedback for Pakistan over its professional conduct and bravery during the UNOSOM. The entire episode translated into the success of military diplomacy for Pakistan; it made many Somalis consider Pakistan as a country worthy of extending a hand for help. At the peak of war during the 1990s, Pakistan hosted thousands of Somali refugees. Though the Somali conflict has matured and entered a new phase, the question remains; Is Pakistan still revered for its heyday gallantry in that country and why Islamabad could not sustain the ovation for much too long?

In all three cases cited above, while the two other countries' (Belgian and The Netherlands) troops have stains on their national emblems - failing to save lives and eventually causing the unforgettable genocidal events, the disposition of Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia is a plausible representation of successful peacekeeping diplomacy. Though Pakistan suffered a considerable casualty, the output of the mission underscored Pakistan's renewed emphasis on UN peacekeeping. As Yamin (2019) rightly puts it, the Somali mission was a calculated foreign policy, carefully tailored to provide Islamabad a chance to regain its niche in global politics, which indeed was actualized. Diplomatically, the Somali mission added both credibility and capability to Pakistan's peacekeeping pedigree, showcasing the courage and professionalism of Pakistani soldiers, saving the fallen black hawk, an effort that paid off and earned appreciation from Washington and hence the renewal of Pakistan-US relations, following post-Cold War disparagement.

### **Consolidation of Peacekeeping Diplomacy**

Pakistan's foreign ministry and the military establishment responsible for the management and coordination of peacekeeping missions must be cognizant of appraising peacekeeping beyond the mandate of the UN, not to violate or undermine the mandate, but to re-construct and ensure how Pakistan can turn its peacekeeping adventures into a pragmatic diplomatic tool through which state's national interest and foreign policy objective(s) gets actualized. Diplomatically, peacekeeping should be consolidated through professional, structural and infrastructural engagement with the war-affected area.

Without being incognizant of Pakistan's socio-political and economic worries, it is less prudent to ask the country to bite off more than it can chew, such doing, would resultantly produce less promising success, though asking the country not to try is never an insinuation to curb its ability to progress. Nevertheless, it is always prudent that states wisely engage in formulating rational yet plausible policies capable of producing pragmatic outcomes. Over ambitiousness might result in foreign policy disasters. The fact that China or other nations are engaged in Africa other than peacekeeping does suggest that Pakistan too can do the same. The success and failure of any foreign policy are shaped and determined by the capability of the state itself.

To achieve success through the peacekeeping foreign policy, Pakistan foreign policymakers should be goal-oriented to the extent of being particular as to what is expected from each peacekeeping mission sent abroad. In addition to ensuring the UN mandate and keeping its neutrality, Pakistan's foreign policymakers should be specifically focused on the role of its troops in the conflicted area. In addition, the relevant stakeholders close to the policymaking circles in the country need to consider the following when crafting a viable and simultaneously productive peacekeeping policy;

- i) What areas of development and infrastructural manoeuvring, can Pakistan be instrumental in?
- ii) What aspect of the country's economy can Pakistan invest in?
- iii) What areas of the people's life, can Pakistan be helpful with?

- iv) Should Pakistan's presence in conflict areas be closed upon the culmination of the peacekeeping mission?

### **Areas where Pakistan can improve its Military Diplomacy**

Like every form of achievement, the civil-military institution in charge of peacekeeping should not merely celebrate but must also promote Pakistan's peacekeeping achievements in terms of boots contribution and brain development. The performance of Pakistani peacekeepers on the ground must be carefully and strategically promoted. In the world of commoditization of everything, the act of diplomatic peacekeeping should be seen by Pakistani policymakers as a worthy commodity that must be well packaged, branded and considered as worthy of being advertised. Following are a set of workable recommendations which Pakistan can play to its strengths and benefits whilst shedding light on its role in carrying out military diplomacy;

1. promoting achievements in terms of boot contribution and brain development;
2. through peacekeeping and opening market and resources opportunity through development of formal and informal relationships (hence peacekeeping for diplomatic and national interest purpose should not end and when boots are off from the conflict zone);
3. international exchange in international peacekeeping operations in order to share Pakistan's experience and learn from the experiences of the armies of other countries to enhance cooperation in international peacekeeping operations;
4. holding 'seminars' or 'symposiums' (individual and in collaboration with other peacekeeping nations) under the theme of international peacekeeping operations by hosting Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense);
5. enhancing military exchange through robust coordination, engagement, and interaction amongst the major countries and countries in the region;
6. crisscrossing intellectual and practical military exercise (the synergy of theoretical and practical studies);
7. peacekeeping training should accelerate its effort to enticing more participation in her peacekeeping durational courses;
8. Pakistani peacekeeping forces should bolster their level of transparency and accountability not as professional peacekeepers representing the UN, but figuratively representing Islam.

### **Conclusion**

In an evolving global system, the act of diplomacy is not spared from the altering contextualities. Hence, today's diplomacy transcends the preoccupation of a few selected rather cherry-picked diplomats. Part of the evolution is the changing nature of war and conflict, the type of which traditional diplomats cannot practically put an end to. U In the backdrop of the aforesaid evolution, peacekeeping too became an institutionalized process under the UNSC, which accords capable and willing states to

demonstrate their determination and commitment for international peace and order. Like diplomacy, peacekeeping mission is always geared at mediating between warring parties and a process aimed at ending the conflict.

Since its first peacekeeping venture in 1960, Pakistan has marked a niche and become a household name amongst the troop-contributing countries. It has maintained the credibility of contributing and participating diligently in UN peacekeeping missions. While peacekeeping has become an integral element of Pakistan's foreign policy, it is important for Islamabad to capitalize on how well her peacekeeping diplomacy can outlive the timed tenure of the peacekeeping mission. Islamabad must seek to actualize national prestige and interest through peacekeeping diplomacy. Pakistan might not be financially potent to influence the global decision and thought, but its peacekeeping diplomacy should be instrumentalized and considered as an essential foreign policy tool within the foreign policy toolkit.

## References

- Armstrong, M. (2010). U.N. Peacekeeping as Public Diplomacy. *World Politics Review*. Retrieved from <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5561/u-n-peacekeeping-as-public-diplomacy>
- Aron, R. (1966). *Peace and War*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Baldwin, D. A. (2000). Success and Failure in Foreign Policy. *Annual Reviews of Political Science*, 3, 167-182.
- Beardsley, K. Cunningham D. E. & White, P. B. (2016). *Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and the Severity of Civil War*. Retrieved from [http://www.davidcunninghampolisci.com/uploads/4/2/9/7/42974855/bcw\\_un\\_sc\\_conflict\\_v\\_iolence.pdf](http://www.davidcunninghampolisci.com/uploads/4/2/9/7/42974855/bcw_un_sc_conflict_v_iolence.pdf)
- Beker, A. (2014). UN Peacekeeping Forces: Preventive Diplomacy and its Limitations.6 (2), 1-17.
- Bjola, C & Kornprobst, M. (2018). *Understanding International Diplomacy: Theory, Practice and Ethics*. London: Routledge.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peacekeeping. *International Relations*, 11(3), 201-218.
- Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Springer.
- Cohen, B. C. & Scott, H. (1975). Foreign Policy. In F. I. Greenstein & N. Polsby (Eds.), *Handbook of Political Science Policies and Policymaking*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Coulon, J, Aronoff, P. & Scott, H. (1998). *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Druckman, D. & Stern, P. C. (1997). Evaluating Peacekeeping Mission. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1), 151-165.
- Hocking, B. (2008). Operationalizing Public Diplomacy. In N. Snow & P. M. Taylor (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (63-72). New York: Routledge.

- Hocking, B. (2016). Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. In C. M. Constantinou, P. Kerr & P. Sharp (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy* (67-88). London: Sage.
- Jentleson Bruce. (2006). Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World. *The Stanley Foundation* Retrieved from <https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/pab06CoerDip.pdf>
- Jönsson, C & Hall, M. (2005). *Essence of Diplomacy*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jönsson, C. (2011). Diplomacy. In K. Dowding (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Power* (188-190). London: Sage Publications.
- Khan, M. (2019, July 19). Dutch Troops Held Partly Responsible for Srebrenica Massacre. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/d77418e6-aa15-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04>
- Lie, T. (1969). 1946-1953. In A. W. Cordiers and V. Foote (Eds.), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ling, B. (2007). China's Peacekeeping Diplomacy. *China Rights Forum*, 1, 47-51. Retrieved from [https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.1.2007/CRF-2007-1\\_Peacekeeping.pdf](https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.1.2007/CRF-2007-1_Peacekeeping.pdf)
- Masuda, M. (2011). China's Peacekeeping Diplomacy and Troop Dispatch: A New Avenue for Engagement with the International Community. *NIDS's Journal of Defense and Security*, 0-12. Retrieved from [http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2011/bulletin\\_e2011\\_2.pdf](http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2011/bulletin_e2011_2.pdf)
- Mitzen, J. (2013). *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance* Chicago. United States. IL University of Chicago Press.
- Moon, K. B. (2013). Secretary-General's Remarks at Exhibit Celebrating 52 Years of Pakistan's Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping [as prepared for delivery] Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-01-21/secretary-generals-remarks-exhibit-celebrating-52-years-pakistans>.
- Murray, S., Sharp, P., Wiseman, G., Crikemans, D., & Melissen, J. (2011). The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies. *International Studies Review*, 13 (4), 709-728.
- Ramsbotham, O. Woodhouse, T. & Hugh, M. (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Schurmann, C. (1969). Two Kinds of Diplomacy. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969), 63, 245-251.
- Sofer, S. (1988). Old And New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited. *Review of International Studies*, 14 (3), 195-211.
- Ukeje, C. & Tariku, Y. (2018). Beyond Symbolism: China and the African Union. In C. Alden, A. Alao, Z. Chun, & L. Barber (Eds.), *China and Africa: Building Peace And Security Cooperation on the Continent* (299-332). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- UN Lauds Pak Troops Contribution to Global Peace. (2018,). *The Nations*. Retrieved from <https://nation.com.pk/04-Jul-2018/un-lauds-pak-troops-contribution-to-global-peace>
- Watson, A. (1982). *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. London: Eyre Methuen.
- When The Massacres Started, UN Troops Saved White People. (1999). *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/dec/19/theobserver3>
- Yamin, T. (2019). *UN Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, 1992-1995: A Pakistani Perspective*. Islamabad: Paramount Books.

# **Beyond Proscription: Rethinking Government Response to ‘Yan Shilla’ Gang Violence in Yola Metropolis of Adamawa State, Nigeria**

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 26-40  
njips.nust.edu.pk

**Saheed Babajide Owonikoko<sup>1</sup>**  
**Jude. A. Momodu<sup>2</sup>**

## **Abstract**

Adamawa State in North-Eastern Nigeria has been battling with the Boko Haram crisis for over a decade. While the group is yet to be significantly decimated, a new gang known as *Yan Shilla* has emerged and continues to wreak serious havoc among the inhabitants of the state. Within a month of the emergence of a new political administration in the state in May 2019, the group was banned. This paper critically examines the implications of the proscription of the group, and general peace and security of the state. Using the theory of securitization, the paper argues that, although proscription of the group has heralded attention of security agents to the threat of the group, it does not constitute sustainable management of gang violence in the state. The root of the crises such as widespread poverty, decadence in education, and increase in school drop-out rates have fuelled the emergence of the criminal gangs in the state. Consequently, the paper recommends that the Nigerian government and the state in question should consider addressing the root causes of its myriad of security challenges by addressing widespread poverty, education, and unemployment among the youths. Similarly, the government should prioritize education through funding and also criminalize political patronage of these gangs by the politicians. Finally, it is also recommended that good governance should be entrenched in the political administration of the state.

## **Keywords**

Proscription, *Yan Shilla*, gang violence, Adamawa State, Nigeria, security education, good governance

---

<sup>1</sup> *Shaheed Babajide Owonikoko* is a Lecturer and Researcher at the Centre for Peace and Security Studies of the Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola. He holds a doctorate degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS), University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

Email: owonikoko.babajide@mautech.edu.ng

<sup>2</sup> *Jude A. Momodu* is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Security Studies of the Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola. He is also the Post-Graduate Programme Coordinator of Centre. He holds doctorate degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS), University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

Email: judemomodu4@gmail.com



## Introduction

Global security is plummeting because of the activities of armed groups that continue to constitute an internal security threat to the modern state. Nigeria is one of the numerous countries with multiple security challenges. These challenges range from banditry to cattle rustling, kidnapping, armed robbery, terrorism, and militancy among others, and are orchestrated by organized criminal gangs. The North-eastern region is now tagged as one of the most dangerous in the country, and this is due to the activities of Boko Haram. Adamawa State is one of the three states most affected by Boko Haram terrorism. While the threat of Boko Haram insurgency is yet to be completely vanquished in the whole of the North East and Adamawa State. In particular, the threat of a dreaded gang called the *Yan Shilla* has emerged and continued to spread in the state. For a state that is already embroiled in intense security fragility, the need for a response to a security threat is very important. The new government of Adamawa State, which unseated an incumbent in the 2019 elections, came in with a strong policy against the group by proscribing such groups. The question to ask is *how* strategic and apt is this policy approach to the threat of *Yan Shilla* in Adamawa State? This paper aims to critically examine the proscription of the *Yan Shilla* gang in Yola metropolis of Adamawa State, Nigeria. It explicates the origin and development of *Yan Shilla*. Further, it enquires into the threat posed by the 'Shilla Boys' gang in Yola metropolis of Adamawa State. The paper also evaluates the engagement approach previously used by the government including the recent proscription of the group by the new regime of the state. It also analyses the effects of the proscription policy on the activities of the groups and the general atmosphere of short- and long-term peace and security. The study is carried out against the background of securitization theory.

## Method of Data Collection and Analysis

Primary and secondary data were sourced and utilized for the paper. Primary data collected for the paper were qualitative in nature. They were collected through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). Twelve in-depth interviews were conducted held with journalists, government officials (including police officers from Adamawa State), and inhabitants of Yola metropolis and the arrested members of the *Yan Shilla* gang in the custody of the police using random and purposive sampling. FGD sessions were held with several inhabitants of Yola metropolis. A combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques was used to select participants in the FGD sessions. Inhabitants who had encounters with members of the *Yan Shilla* gang were initially purposively selected, snowballing the process for further participants. A total of two FGD sessions were held; one with the male group and another with the female group. Each of the FGD sessions had 10 persons in attendance. Data collected from the interviews and FGD sessions were triangulated with the secondary data collected from textual materials.

## Understanding Securitisation Theory

This study is anchored on securitization theory. The theory of securitization was developed by the Copenhagen School to provide the spectrum along which issues can be plotted. The tenet of securitization theory is that a concern can be framed as a security issue and moved from the ordinary level to the level where it will be given a

serious concern by articulating it as an existential threat, or a question of survival. It holds that issues are classified as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently when they have been labelled as ‘dangerous’, ‘menacing’, ‘threatening’, ‘alarming’ and so on, by a securitizing actor who has the authority and power to move such issue beyond politics to a level that it would be seen and treated as threatening security (Eroukhmanoff, 2018). Therefore, security issues are not simply out there but rather must be articulated as problems by securitizing actors, which may be government, political elites or even civil society. Thus, when such an issue is securitized, urgent action is taken to address it and its existential threat for safety or survival of the referent object. The theory advances that national security policy is not naturally given, but carefully designated by politicians and decision-makers through speech act. Therefore, the security threat is not only constructed, but it is also prescribed, which means that if it emanates from a political agent with certain political motives, insensitive and non-security issues can be securitized, all because there are power and authority embedded in where the speech comes from.

A number of criticisms have been levelled against securitization. Part of the criticisms is the possibility of manipulation and abuse by the government, politicians, political elites or any other securitizing agent (Emmers, 2007). Beyond this, there are two other striking demerits of securitization. First, declaring an issue, actor, group or object a security threat that deserves special attention usually warrants the coercive approach of the state, which may involve the use of the state’s instrument of coercion. This may warrant a concentration of resources that would have been used for human capital development into dealing with the threat of such a group or actor. Second, in securitization, the securitizing object will be given excessive security attention and in doing that, it may aggravate its threat beyond the limit that the state can deal with. This stems from the view that securitizing the object, state, government or any other securitizing actor may use excessive power that may radicalize or increase the level of radicalization of the securitizing object. This essentially played out in the management of Boko Haram. It started as a religious sect but the securitization of the threat of the group by the government and deployment of excessive coercion led to the serial mismanagement of the group by the security agents and this contributed to the transformation of the group from mere religious sect to a terrorist group (Mohammed, 2014). Thus, in securitizing a threat of a group, it is important to know that using coercive or hard-power approach alone cannot clear away the threat. Owonikoko and Danjibo (2019) have observed that there is a need to apply rather a subtle approach that addresses the root causes of the threat posed by a group.

### **Understanding Gang as Violent Non-State Armed Group**

The gang is one of the typologies of violent non-state armed groups in the Post-Cold War era. It is one of the most noticeable groups threatening peace and security in the contemporary world. They constitute a ‘significant worldwide phenomenon with millions of members’ (Hagedorn, 2005:153). Despite the security threats posed by gang groups in the contemporary world, defining the term has been fraught with ‘long and rancorous’ debates among scholars in criminology and security studies (Hagedorn, 1998). Sometimes it is difficult to differentiate the group from other forms of violent non-state armed groups such as terrorists, insurgents, rebels, militia, militant, ‘Sobel’ and criminal network groups in terms of strategic deployment of violence (Barrow and Huff, 2009). Scholars such as Thrasher (2013), Moore (2010),

Klein (1995) and Hagedorn (2005) have defined gangs in different ways. While there are marked differences in their definitions, they seem to agree in some ways on what gang groups are. From all these definitions, some characteristics of gangs can be deduced such as:

1. Gangs are predominantly made up of youth between the ages of 12-30. This is why some scholars prefer to refer to them as youth gangs.
2. They are a predominantly urban phenomenon in modern large cities.
3. They are usually made up of people who are marginalized socially and economically in society.
4. They are usually loosely organized and moderately cohesive groups.
5. They are involved in criminal activities.

The last characteristic of gangs has been one of the most debated in the study of gang groups. For many scholars such as Spergel (1990), Klein (1995) and Miller (2001) criminal acts are intrinsic behaviours of gangs. On the other hand, scholars such as Short (1990), tend to disagree. However, most scholars of criminology and security studies agree that gangs are composed of youths on the wild side of the continuum and are prone to orchestrating the violence.

Although, virtually all the countries of the world have gangs (Esbensen, Brick, Melde, Tusinsk and Taylor, 2008), in Africa, globalization and widespread urbanization have created a fertile ground for the growth of criminal gangs. There is virtually no country in the region that does not contend with gang violence in their domains. For instance, in South African *skollies* were a well-known gang during the 20th Century (Pinnock, 1984), *number gang* in South African prisons (Shurink, 1986), and *Rarry boys* in Sierra Leone (Abdullah, 2002) have made their marks on the society. All these groups have been directly or indirectly involved in the security challenges that confront African states in the contemporary world. Usually, they transform into rather dangerous violent groups in the end and threaten the stability of a state. Therefore, there is and need for the states to take this threat more seriously.

### **Proscription as Armed Group Engagement Approach**

Proscription, forbidding or banning something from operating, is one of the engagement approaches for the management of dangerous and violent non-state groups. It may come through an executive order or an act of parliament depending on the nature of the government (Owonikoko, 2016). The declaration is normally followed by military or police action to enforce it. The essence of the policy is to isolate, stigmatize or delegitimize the armed group constituting security threat (Muller, 2008), and it normally follows from the securitization of the existential threat posed by such groups.

### **Origin and Development of Yan Shilla Gang in Adamawa State**

Nigeria has been described as the hub of Africa's organized crimes because of the prevalence of various gangs in the country (Lunde, 2006). Most of these dangerous gangs include *Kauraye* in Kaduna and Katsina States, *Yan Daba* and *Yan Dauka Amarya* in Kano State, *Yan Sara Suka* in Bauchi State, *Yan Kalare* in Gombe State,

among others. *Yan Shilla* is a relatively new gang based in Yola metropolis of Adamawa State.

There are many contestations on the evolution of the *Yan Shilla* gang in Adamawa State. As a result, there are at least four versions of the origin of the group. One version traced the origin of the group to the flushing away of the *Yan Kalare* gang in the neighboring Gombe State<sup>1</sup>. This version of their origin states that when the *Yan Kalare* group was displaced from Gombe State, they first settled in Ngurore, a suburb town near Yola. There, they started regrouping and then moved to Yola. Later, the group was hijacked by politicians and started using them as political thugs, especially during the 2015 general elections but after that, the politicians abandoned the group. The group, therefore, took to criminal activities as a means of livelihood in Yola to survive (Mr. Vandi Joshua/Journalist/Male/35). According to this version of the story, the *Yan Shilla* gang group is the fallout of the *Yan Kalare*, and the only difference is in the name. The second version of the origin of the group says the group is a transformation of the *Shinco Boys*, who operated in the state (Mr. Inuwa Abdullahi/Journalist/Male/50). *Shinco Boys* is a gang named after an area in Yola metropolis and was believed to be funded by a prominent political figure from the town. The third version of the origin of the group says a prominent politician in Yola for political reasons created the group in 2015. From the period of the creation of the group until 2017, it was relatively peaceful but started criminal activities during 2017, and became a serious security risk during 2018 (Personal interview, Umar, resident of Jambutu). The fourth version says the group evolved over time and was manipulated by the political elites during the 2015 elections. The fourth version of the origin of the groups is relatively more popular among security agencies. A Nigerian police officer in charge of the group in Adamawa State explained during an interview that:

[...] *Shilla Boys* has been in existence for long but it was not as pronounced as is it today. By 2016, we started receiving reports of their activities. By that time, they were not many, they were hiding. By 2017, the group became known and became large...by 2018, the group started operating openly – a very important factor in the evolution of this group, to be factual is politics and election [...] (Personal interview, Abdullahi, police officer at the Adamawa State Headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force, June 15, 2019).

Although these versions of the origin of *Yan Shilla* gang group in Adamawa State may be different, there is a link between them — political exploitations. The political use of gang groups in Nigeria is not new. It has a rich history that is dated to colonial and immediate post-colonial eras in Nigeria when independence was approaching, and the colonial administration began to give way to the new ruling class and the rich aristocrats, the emirs and elites to begin to align themselves into political parties. In his study titled '*Yan Daba*', '*Yan Banga*' and '*Yan Daukar Amarya*': *A Study of Criminal Gangs in Northern Nigeria*, Emmanuel Dawha traced the origin of '*Yan Daba*' in Kano metropolis to the opening of political space and the formation of political parties prior to Nigeria's independence in 1960. In his explanation, '*Yan Daba*', a criminal gang that still exist in Kano, was created by Northern Elements Progress Union (NEPU), an opposition party in the first republic, to serve as special kind of bodyguards for the stalwarts of NEPU against the oppression of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) that used the security

apparatuses of the state and traditional council especially the *dogarai*<sup>2</sup> to wear-out opponents.

Unfortunately, the First Republic did not last long as Nigeria's democracy in the First Republic (1963-1966) was truncated by the military takeover on January 15, 1966. The long years of military involvement in politics (1966-1979 and 1983-1999) resulted in a ban on political activities and made politicians and their protégés redundant and jobless. Added to this was the harsh economic situation of the country during the military era. Thus, the political thugs protected by the politicians had to look for means of livelihood elsewhere. Having been used to violence, they formed gangs to carry out various forms of criminal activities. Nigeria returned to democracy on May 29, 1999, and the country is currently enjoying the long spell of democratic practice spanning over two decades (1999-2019). This period has witnessed the unbridled use of criminal gangs by political elites as thugs to carry out assassinations, intimidation of opponents, ballot snatching, etc. (Kushee, 2008). They are usually contracted and armed for the duration of elections, armed and organized, but are abandoned after that. These weapons are subsequently used against the masses to make living. This has been the trend since 1999, and the case of the *Yan Shilla* gang may not be too different from this.

### **The Threat of *Yan Shilla* Gang Group in Adamawa State**

The criminal activities of the group can better be understood from the meaning of the name of the group. The group's name known to the people is *Yan Shilla*, a Hausa phrase which means 'little hawks'. ('Yan' means 'children' while 'Shilla' is Hausa name for hawk bird<sup>3</sup>). Apparently, the people, having noticed the manner in which they carry out their operations, might have given the name to them. It is common in Nigeria to give dangerous groups names reflecting their activities or ideological standpoint. For Instance, the people because of their aversion for western civilization (including western education) popularly call *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad Boko Haram*. Thus, while members of the group refer to themselves as *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, the people call them *Boko Haram* to reflect their activities (Danjibo, 2010; Onuoha, 2014). This is also the case with *Yan Shilla*.

Hawk is known to be a prey bird with keen eyes and very efficient in hunting with its magnetic claws. The similarity in mode of operation of members of the group with the preying tactics of hawk may have warranted the naming of the group as *Yan Shilla* by members of the public. Interview with a journalist who has been covering activities of the group for over two years in Yola metropolis contended:

The people have noticed the ways and manner they carry out their operations given the name 'Yan Shilla' to the group. They operate using tricycle that is locally called *keke napep*. The tricycle normally contains the driver and one or two persons masquerading as passengers. They drive to secluded areas where there are very few people, study unsuspected pedestrians especially women with bags or phones or any other valuables, snatch them and zoom off their tricycle. This is why the group is called 'Yan Shilla' but their activities are not limited to snatching (Personal interview, Mr. Vandi Joshua, interviewed, July 15, 2019 at Yola, Adamawa State).

Members of the group are involved in phone theft, bag snatching, and money stealing. They are also involved in armed robbery, burglary, raping, drug and substance abuse, kidnapping and forceful defilement of minors (FGD with the female respondents). At the emergence of the group, their criminal activities were confined to a deep forest called 'small Sambisa', named after the dreaded Boko Haram hideout in Borno State. Sooner than later, they started invading the city with various kinds of criminal activities. The group has grown into a notorious monster engaging in broad daylight robbery using knives, cutlers, daggers, scissors and many other objects. Members of the group also disguise as commercial tricycle riders with one or two of its members as passengers, picking other unsuspecting passengers, driving them to an area where there is less concentration of people in order to rob them of their belonging, dropping them there or even forcefully pushing them out of the moving tricycle before zooming off. They also use guns at night for house-to-house robbery (FGD with the male respondents).

### **Previous Government Response to the Threat of 'Yan Shilla'**

One of the responsibilities of the state is to provide security for the lives and properties of the people. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 13, Sub-section 2b states that 'the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.' Unfortunately, the various levels of government in Nigeria have lived below the expectation of the people in the provision of security. Governments at the various states in Nigeria have set aside a large budget for the provision of security; however, the issue has not been taken seriously. There is no denying the fact that the *Shilla* group in Yola was actually underrated and was treated non-seriously by the government and security agencies. This gave the group the opportunity to evolve and expand in the state. As the violence of the group increased, the government launched a special security operation known as Operation Tsaro (Tsaro in the Hausa language means security). The primary essence of the formation of the security group was to curtail the excesses of the gang in the state and address other sundry security issues. Therefore, between July 2016 and October 2017, Nigeria Police Force (NPF), State Security Service (SSS) and other security services, in separate or combined operations, arrested over a hundred members by raiding deep forest hideouts' (Personal interview, Abdullahi, police officer). One of the major challenges of the security operation was that it was much more defensive rather than been offensive in nature. The personnel of the security operation would always wait for members of the gang to carry out their activities before they would take action (Personal interview, Jumai Abubakar, Resident of Jambutu). Another major challenge of the security operation was low funding (Personal interview, Abdullahi, police officer). Consequently, the response of the security operation to the activities of *Yan Shilla* diminished. This gave the group further impetus to commit more violence against society. Hardly does a day pass without a report of '*Shilla Boys*' attack in Yola metropolis. The group's activities are so terrible, that people could hardly sleep with their two eyes closed in the capital city (Adamu Maiyaki, Commissioner for Police, Adamawa State, Press Briefing held with journalists on July 15, 2019). This made the new regime of Governor Ahmadu Umaru Fintiri to declare a prohibition policy on the group in June 2019.

### **Prospects of the Proscription of *Yan Shilla* Gang**

On the assumption of office as the new government in Adamawa State, Governor Ahmadu Umaru Fintiri proscribed the group (Ochetenwu, 2019). The proscription has significantly securitized the group as an existential security threat and this has increasingly drawn the attention of security agencies towards the group. Resultantly, there has been an increase in security surveillance in the state. Several checkpoints have been established, and a highly offensive security operation called Operation *Farauta* (*Farauta* in the Hausa language means hunt) has been launched. This has led to the arrest and killing of over 500 members of the group across the state (Audu Madaki, Commissioner for Police, Adamawa State, Press Briefing held with journalists on July 15, 2019). Furthermore, the government has also put in place policy to regulate ownership and operation of tricycles in the city to curb the use of tricycles for operations by the group.

However, proscribing violent groups like the *Yan Shilla* has never proven to be effective in Nigeria. Sequel to the outbreak of ‘Bakassi Boys’ in southeast Nigeria in 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared the proscription of the group and issued a shoot-at-sight order to the military against any member of the group (Johannes, 2003). The same was also declared against the members of the O’dua People Congress (OPC) in South West Nigeria (Ikelegbe, 2001). In these two cases, the groups were simply driven underground with the proscription policy while they continued and even increased their violence against the state. Dudouet (2011) explains that armed groups usually perceive proscription policy as a ‘badge of honor’ which encourages them to increase their violence. Thus, ‘proscription tends to encourage state repression of armed dissidents and usually fuel radicalism’ (Dudouet, 2011:1). During the various FGD sessions with inhabitants of the Jambutu area in Yola metropolis, all the participants claimed that the proscription policy of the state has failed to stop the activities of the group. Rather, members of the group have only moved their operations away from city centers or opened places to secluded areas where victims can easily be attacked. The implication is that there may be a temporary pause in the activities of the group because many have been arrested, and others are at large, but this may not indicate the end of their violence. Although the commissioner for police has promised that members of the group ‘will be charged for armed robbery so that they can go to jail and Adamawa State will be free’ (Audu Madaki, Commissioner for Police, Adamawa State, Press briefing held with journalists on July 15, 2019), this does not mean sustainable peace. However, having members of the group easily convicted in the court has been seriously doubted.

There are at least two reasons for this doubt. First is because most of the members of the group are juvenile whose ages are less than 18 years. Therefore, the problem may arise as to whether they can be tried in the court of law when they have not reached the statutory age. Second is the question around prosecutorial capacity and diligence of the officers of the NPF. They have been criticized nationally for lack of evidence handling and mismanaged prosecution strategies. The officer in charge of *Shilla* Group, during interview with the authors also said: ‘in the next one week, the *Shilla* boys will be taken to court for prosecution but I can tell you, they will be released’ (Personal interview, Abdullahi, police officer at the Adamawa State Headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force, June 15, 2019). Obviously, he has accused the court system in Nigeria of corruption but part of the problem is lack of prosecutorial diligence by the police officers because a court will give its judgment

based on the evidence provided by the prosecutors, as the burden of proof is with the prosecution. Unfortunately, their conviction and imprisonment lead to a further radicalization inside the prison. The absence of correction and reformation centers further hardens their criminal skills and they become a threat to the state (Owonikoko and Ashindorbe, 2019).

In conclusion, proscription cannot be an effective long-term approach to the crisis of gang violence in Adamawa State. It only suppresses group activities temporarily. As explained above, some inhabitants of Yola metropolis believe that *Yan Shinco*, a previously existing group transformed into a *Shilla* gang. With the proscription of the *Shilla* gang by the government of Adamawa State and serious security crackdown, the inhabitants of the metropolis believe that activities of the members of the group have been reduced but not completely halted. They expressed that a new group that uses machetes as a robbing weapon has now emerged in the state. This new gang group is called *Gar da Gar* gang (*Gar da Gar* is Hausa statement which can be translated to mean 'face to face') (Personal interview, Abdullahi, police officer at the Adamawa State Headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force, June 15, 2019). This kind of transformation of the criminal groups into a more deadly group is not new in Nigeria. The evolution of Boko Haram can be linked to 'ECOMOG', a criminal group patronized by notable politicians in Borno State (Albert and Danjibo, 2004; Onuoha, 2014).

### **Towards A Sustainable Management of Yan Shilla Gang Violence**

Addressing *Yan Shilla* gang violence and other sundry security challenges in the state need a robust strategic approach beyond the usual kinetic approach of the state. Some stakeholders have suggested an amnesty for members of the group to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate them back into society. The granting of amnesty to criminal groups constituting security threats to the Nigerian state is not new. In fact, it has become a popular approach for armed insurrections and widespread criminality in Nigeria since 1999 and it is being abused. Because of the manner in which it is always applied in Nigeria, it usually looks like state appeasement to threaten groups or an indirect way of rewarding criminality in the guise of engendering peace (Owonikoko, 2018). Consequently, the abuse of the approach is one of the reasons for continuing crime in Nigeria. Similarly, granting amnesty to members of the group is not robust enough because it does not address the root causes of gang violence in the state as a long-term approach. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the root causes of gang violence in Adamawa State.

The tree model problem is very apt at illustrating the security problem posed by the *Yan Shilla* gang. Essentially, a tree has three parts- the root, the stem, and the branches. The root supplies all the nutrients needed for the tree to blossom. These nutrients are supplied through the stem to the branches, which are the final consumers. Cutting the branches of a tree or its stem does not essentially lead to the elimination of the tree. The root has to be located and removed. In Africa, especially in Nigeria, the general tendency to address conflicts, crises, crimes, and insecurity constitutes focusing on surface issues. This is also the case in the engagement of Adamawa State with the gang violence of *Yan Shilla* in the state. *Yan Shilla* gang violence in Adamawa state is a manifestation of structural imbalance within Adamawa State that requires attention; one of which is widespread poverty.



With a maximum crude oil production capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day, Nigeria is ranked as Africa’s largest crude oil producer and the **sixth-largest** in the world (Nigeria National Petroleum Commission, nd). Unfortunately, this has not transformed into a better life for the citizens of the country. Out of the total population of 198,825, 421, almost 94,787,664 are living in poverty<sup>3</sup>. This makes Nigeria the country with the largest number of poor in the world. Among the 36 states in the Federation of Nigeria, Adamawa State is the third poorest state after Sokoto State and Katsina State (Ikenwa, 2019). Although Boko Haram insurgency and other criminal activities are usually pointed out as the reason for the widespread poverty of the state, the role played by continuous bad governance and political leadership of the state is to be blamed. Many political leaders in the state, including a former governor, have been tried and found guilty of corruption (Sahara Reporter, 2014). Resultantly, the state inhabitants have been deprived of democracy, good governance and basic amenities of life. The demographic group most affected by widespread poverty in the state is the youth. Over 70 percent of the youth population of the state who are willing and able to work cannot find reasonable employment in the state (Ahmad Sajoh/Former Commissioner for Information and Strategy/52). Lack of employment opportunities for this demographic group increasingly drives them into criminal activities including gang violence.

Apart from this, other socio-political problems such as decadence in education and an increase in school dropouts are significant factors in gang violence in the state. Decadence in education is quite profound in Adamawa State. It is driven largely by a lack of interest in education by the political leadership of the state that has resulted in low funding to the sector in the annual budget of the state. One of the outcomes of poor funding of education in the state is the lack of infrastructures like schools and classrooms. Another major problem that contributed to decadence in education in the state is the politicization of employment of teachers, and this cronyism has resulted in the employment of incompetent teachers. In most cases, job slots for teaching in the post-primary sector are sold to job-seeking, but incompetent and disinterested teachers (Personal interview, Mr. Augustine Vulapa, teacher). Another significant issue in the prevalence of gang violence in Adamawa State is the large and increasing number of out-of-school children. According to the United Nations, five countries in the world are with the highest number of out-of-school children and Nigeria has the highest among them with 13.2 million children.

S.No.	Country	Population (Approx.)	No. of Out-of-School Children
1	Nigeria	201.3 million	13.2 million
2	Pakistan	204.9 million	5.6 million
3	India	1.3 billion	2.9 million
4	Ethiopia	110.3 million	2.1 million
5	Sudan	42.5 million	2.7 million

**Table 1:** Five Countries with the Highest Number of Out-of-School Children in the World  
 Source: TVC News Programme, March 19th, 2019.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>The approximate population of the countries is based on the record of [www.worldometer.info/world-population/](http://www.worldometer.info/world-population/)

Over 60 percent of the incidents of out-of-school children are in Northern Nigeria and Adamawa State has one of the highest (TVC New, April 16, 2019). There are two problems resulting from the increasing number of out of schoolchildren in the state that contributed to gang violence in the state. One is the phenomenon of child-breadwinning, or hawking for food during school hours. This started in Nigeria in the 1990s after the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Jega, 2000) but has increased in intensity. This practice has partly been encouraged because the Child Rights Act has not been applicable in the state. Child Rights Act was passed to serve as a legal document for the protection of the rights of children. Nigeria adopted this act in 2003 but it is yet to be implemented in most of the states in northern Nigeria. For instance, out of the seven states in the Northwest region, only Kaduna State has enacted this law. Similarly, out of the six states in the Northeast region, only Taraba State has enacted the law. Adamawa State and the remaining four states in the region are yet to implement this act. The second aspect is the adoption of Quranic education as an alternative to costly and unaffordable western education by many children, popularly known in local parlance as *Almajiri* (Hannah, 2012).

*Almajiri* is a corrupt spelling of the Arabic word *Al-Muhajirin*. This is a situation where young boys between the ages of five (5) to fifteen (15) or so are sent far from home to study the Quran, Hadith and other branches of Islamic knowledge in an informal setting without financial support from their wards or parents. The schoolteachers (Muallams), teaching hundreds of children, are expected to take care of these children, and may send these children to streets for begging due to lack of funding. The role *almajiri* plays in gang violence, terrorism, and insurgency in northern Nigeria is not trivial and has been well documented in the literature (Dawha, 1991; Awofeso, Richie and Degeling, 2003; Danjibo, 2010). Their role in widespread violence in northern Nigeria is a major reason for the government's decision to ban such practices. According to National Security Adviser to the President, 'they (*almajiri*) are a huge problem to the society. Many of them end up becoming criminals, drug addicts and willing tools in the hand of those who have very dangerous intentions' (Cable News, 1991; Nasir, 2019). Most of them are from polygamous families with a large number of siblings and poor parentage (Ya'u, 2000; Dan-Asabe, 1991; Dawha, 1996; Abeeb, 2011; Hannah, 2012). As the theory of relative deprivation tells us, where there is a wide discrepancy in the communities where the poor and the rich live in close proximity to one another, a general feeling of anger, hostility and social injustice on the part of inner-city youths may occur. This may be so because of the experience of frustration due to poverty while also seeing the opulence of their neighbors but are deprived of benefiting from it. Thus, they may resort to crime, to attain success like their neighbors (Michael and Gary, 2007). All participants in the interview and FGD sessions express the belief that some ex-*Almajiri* graduates exist in the regular members of the criminal gang. An effort to robustly and sustainably address gang violence and sundry security issues in the state must address all these root causes.

## Conclusion

The threat of the *Shilla* gang in Adamawa State is real and with the proscription of the group by the new government of Adamawa State, one might not expect to see the end to the criminal violence of the gang in the state. Also, there is the fear that a new threat group that is more brutal than *Yan Shilla* may have arisen in the state. To

sustainably address gang violence in the state, there is a need to address the structural imbalances within the state that provide ground to increasing gang violence and criminality. First, the government of the day must address widespread poverty and youth unemployment in the state by improving the skills and training of the youths and assisting them to be self-reliant. Governor Muritala Nyako's administration (2007-2014) created many skills acquisition centers around the state, where the youths could be trained but those facilities have been abandoned.

The state should also address pervasive decadence in education through increased funding. More so, a deliberate policy that makes education, at least, up to secondary level free and compulsory should be introduced. Already, the new governor has assured the indigenes of the state that the state would pay for the West African Examination Council (WAEC) and National Examination Council (NECO) for all Senior Secondary School Students in the state as a way of improving school enrolment in the state (Lawal, 2019). However, this may not be adequate because the problem for most parents and guardians has always been how to financially support their children until they get to senior secondary school. The state should also criminalize child labor by domesticating and enforcing the Child Rights Act. Once this is done, child breadwinning activities will be curtailed. Additionally, the demand for accountability and transparency from the government of Adamawa State is very important. This will promote good governance that is currently lacking in the state. Lastly, the government of the state must criminalize patronage of gangs by politicians and ban *almajiri* system. These have a direct impact on gang violence in the state. Unless these measures are taken, criminal activities of gang groups will continue to haunt the state.

**Endnotes**

1. Gombe State is a neighboring state to Adamawa State. Its capital is Gombe, one of the most beautiful capital cities in the North East, is less than 200 kilometers away from Yola. Yan Kalara gang tormented the capital city. This group carried out political and non-political violent crimes especially between 2003 and 2011 before the ex-governor of the state outlawed the group. See Human Rights Watch (2007). *Criminal Politics: Violence, 'Godfathers' and Corruption in Nigeria*. Vol. 19, No. 16(a). Available at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/nigeria1007web.pdf>.
2. *Dogarai* is the plural of *Dogari*. They are traditional security personnel of the emirs.
3. During interaction with students of Peace and Conflict Studies in Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola, a new nuance was brought to the name of the group. It was revealed that the word *Shilla* in the Hausa language, which is the widely spoken language in the area, could also mean infant, teenage or underage. This, however, is debatable.
4. The secondary school teacher interviewed informed one of the authors that the first batch of students goes to school between 7 AM and 12 noon, while the second batch attends the school between 12 noon and 5:30 PM.

**References**

Abdullah, I. (2002). Youth Culture and Rebellion: Understanding Sierra Leone's Wasted Decade. *Critical Arts*, 16 (2), 19-37.

Albert, I.O. and Danjibo, D.N., Borno (2004). Fitting the Designs of the Political Elite. In A.V. Isumonah (Ed.) *Participatory Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria*. Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan: Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies.

- Awofeso, N., Ritchie, J., & Degeling, P. (2003). The Almajiri Heritage and the Threat of Non-state Terrorism in Northern Nigeria – Lessons from central Asia and Pakistan. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26, 311–325.
- Barrows, J., & Huff, C. R. (2009). Gangs and Public Policy: Constructing and Deconstructing Gang Databases. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 8 (4), 675-703.
- Basra, R., & Neumann, P. R. (2016). Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10 (6).
- Dan-Asabe, A. (2009). ‘Yan Daba: The ‘terrorists’ of Kano Metropolitan? Kano Studies, Special Issue: *Youth & Health in Kano Today*, 3, 85–112,
- Danjibo, D. N. (2010). Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The ‘Maitatsine’ and ‘Boko Haram’ Crises in Northern Nigeria. Text of Paper Presented at IFRA Conference.
- Dawha, E. M. (1996). *‘Yan Daba,’ ‘Yan Banga And’yan Daukar Amarya: A Study of Criminal Gangs in Northern Nigeria*. 9. IFRA.
- Dudouet, V. (2011). Anti-terrorism Legislation: Impediments to Conflict Transformation. Retrieved from <http://www.konfliktbearbeitung.net/en/content/anti-terrorism-legislation-impediments-to-conflict-transformation>
- Emmers, R. (2007). Securitization. *Contemporary Security Studies*, 109-125.
- Eroukhmanoff, C. (2018). Securitisation Theory: An Introduction. In Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walter and Christian Scheinpflug (Eds.) *International Relations Theory- A Foundation Beginner’s Textbook*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Esbensen, F. A., Brick, B. T., Melde, C., Tusinski, K., & Taylor, T. J. (2008). The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Gang Membership. In F. Van Gemert, D. Peterson & I. L. Lien (Eds.), *Street Gangs, Migration and Ethnicity* (117–139). Devon: Willan.
- Federal Government of Nigeria. (1999). *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with Amendments 2011*.
- Hagedorn, J. M. (1998). Gang Violence in the Postindustrial Era. *Crime and Justice*, 24, 365-419.
- Hagedorn, J. M. (2005). The Global Impact of Gangs. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 21(2), 153-169.
- Harnischfeger, J. (2003). The Bakassi Boys: Fighting Crime in Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(1), 23-49.
- Hoechner, H. (2012). Striving for Knowledge and Dignity: Young Qur’anic Students in Kano, Nigeria. In *African Childhoods* (157-170). New York. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ikelegbe, A. (2001). The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39 (1), 1-24.
- Ikenwa, C. (2019). *Top 10 Poorest States in Nigeria*. Retrieved from <https://nigerianinfopedia.com.ng/poorest-states-in-nigeria/>
- Jega, A. (Eds.). (2000). *Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*. Nordic Africa Institute.
- Klein, M. W. (1971). *Street Gangs and Street Workers*. Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall.

- Klein, M. W. (1997). *The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control*. Oxford University Press.
- Kushee, J. D. (2008). Political Thuggery in the North East and North West Geopolitical Zones of Nigeria: Implications for Electoral Democracy. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 7 (4), 199-212.
- Lawal, S. (2019). Adamawa Government to Pay Fee for WAEC and NECO Exams, *Vanguard*. Retrieved from [www.vanguardngr.com/2019/12/adamawa-govt-to-pay-fees-for-waec-neco-exams/amp](http://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/12/adamawa-govt-to-pay-fees-for-waec-neco-exams/amp).
- Lyman, M. D., & Potter, G. W. (2007). *Organized Crime*. 426-27. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Matusitz, J. & Repass, M., Gangs in Nigeria: An Updated Examination. *Crime, Law, and Social Change*, 52, 495-51.
- Miller, W. B. (2001). *The Growth of Youth Gang Problems in the United States, 1970-98: Report*. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Mohammed, K. (2014). The Message and Methods of Boko Haram. *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, 9-32.
- Moore, J. (2010). *Going Down to the Barrio: Homeboys and Homegirls in Change*. Chicago. Temple University Press.
- Muller, M. (2008). Terrorism, Proscription and the Right to Resist in the Age of Conflict. *Denning LJ*, 20, 111.
- Nasir, J. (2019). If We Don't End Almajiri Now, It Will Come Back to Bite Us. *The Cable News*. Retrieved from [www.thecable.ng/nsa-if-we-dont-end-almajiri-now-it-will-com-back-to-bite-us/amp](http://www.thecable.ng/nsa-if-we-dont-end-almajiri-now-it-will-com-back-to-bite-us/amp).
- Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation, Oil Production. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Upstream-Ventures/Pages/Oil-Production.aspx>.
- Ochelle, O. F. (2015). The 10 Poorest States in Nigeria. *Ventures Africa*. Retrieved from <http://venturesafrica.com/the-10-poorest-states-in-nigeria/>
- Ochetenwu, J. (2019). Gov Finitiri warns Shilla Boys, Vow to Make Adamawa Best-Governed State in the World. *Daily Post*. Retrieved from <https://dailypost.ng/2019/05/29/inauguration-gov-fintiri-warns-shilla-boys-vows-make-adamawa-best-governed-state-world/>.
- Onuoha, F. (2014). Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria. *Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, 158.
- Owonikoko, B. S. & Ashindorbe. K. (2019). Nigeria Prisons Service and Internal Security Management in Nigeria. In Oshita Oshita, Mike Ikenna Alumona and Freedom C. Onuoha (eds) Oshita, O. O., Alumona, I. M., & Onuoha, F. C. *Internal Security Management in Nigeria* (Chapter 22). London. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Owonikoko, B. S. (2016). *An Assessment of Government Engagement with Armed Groups in the Niger Delta Region*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Owonikoko, B. S. (2018). *Amnesty for Boko Haram Members: Lessons from the Niger Delta Amnesty Program*. Paper Presented at the Lake Chad Regional Workshop for Experience Sharing on the Management of Disengaged People from Boko Haram.

- Pinnock, D. (1984). *The brotherhoods: Street gangs and state control in Cape Town*. Philip.
- Sahara Reporter. (2014). Governor Nyako of Adamawa State Impeached. Retrieved from <http://saharareporters.com/2014/15/governor-murtala-nyako-adamawa-state-impeached>.
- Saheed, O. B., & Danjibo, N. D. (2019). Buying Peace or Building Peace: Rethinking Non-Coercive Approach to the Management of Non-State Armed Groups involved in Mass Atrocity. *Full Issue*, 116.
- Salaam, A. O. (2011). Yandaba on the Streets of Kano: Social Conditions and Criminality. *Vulnerable Children and Youth Studies*, 6 (1), 68-77.
- Schurink, W. J. (1986). *Number Gangs in South African Prisons: An Organizational Perspective*. Association for Sociology in Southern Africa.
- Short, J. F. (1990). New Wine in Old Bottles? Change and Continuity in American Gangs. *Gangs in America*, 223-239.
- Spergel, I. A. (1990). Youth Gangs: Continuity and Change. *Crime and Justice*, 12, 171-275.
- The Cable News. (n.d.). We will ban almajiri system of education, Says FG. Retrieved from <http://www.Thecable.ng/well-ban-almajiri-system-of-education-says-fg/amp>.
- Thrasher, F. M. (2013). *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago*. University of Chicago Press.
- Ward, N. (2004). *Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World's Most Successful Industry*.
- Ya'u, Y. Z. (2000). The Youth, Economic Crisis and Identity Transformation: The Case of the Yandaba in Kano. *Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*, 161-80.

**From Burhan Wani to Abhi Nandan: A Comparative Analysis of India and Pakistan's Newspaper Coverage of Kashmir Conflict**

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 41-58  
njips.nust.edu.pk

Ajmal Khan<sup>1</sup>  
Azmat Khan<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract**

This paper compares the coverage of Kashmir Conflict in four English language dailies: two from Pakistan; DAWN and The Nation, and two from India; 'The HINDU' and 'Times of India' by employing Galtung's Model of Peace Journalism (Galtung, 1986; 1998) and Lynch & McGoldrick's (2005) Two-Sided Conflict Model. The study pursues two research questions; is the coverage of these newspaper war or peace-oriented, and do they report Kashmir Conflict through Two-Party (Pak-India) or Multi-Party lenses. For data sources, seven major recent events; Burhan Wani's killing (2016), Uri Attack, Indian Surgical Strikes, Pulwama Attack, Balakot Airstrike, and Abhi Nandan's Capture and Release (2019) were chosen. A total of 56 stories, one lead story and one editorial from each newspaper about every event, were collected. Each story was evaluated according to Galtung's 19 indicators; nine War, nine Peace and one Neutral, and accordingly categorized. The analysis revealed that DAWN had the highest (46.15%) peace-oriented coverage while The HINDU was second with only 23% peace content. In the war category, The Nation scored the highest (100%) while the Times of India was found second (92.85%). No story could qualify for the neutral category. Overall, the coverage of these newspapers was found grossly (81.13%) war-oriented. Moreover, in the coverage of the Kashmir Conflict, the media succumb to the Two-Sided Model, projecting Pakistani and Indian states as the only legitimate parties while Kashmiris are portrayed as mere passive victims. These newspapers also focus only on visible effects and heavily rely on elite positions. The purpose of this study was to examine how much Peace Journalism—being reasonably advocated throughout the last decade in the Subcontinent—has changed the attitude of our media towards peace reporting.

**Key Words**

Kashmir conflict, peace journalism, India, Pakistan, print media, Burhan Wani

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ajmal Khan* holds a Master degree in International Journalism from the Communication University of China (CUC), Beijing. Currently, he is working with The Daily Mail as a Reporter in Islamabad.  
Email: khanaj965@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> *Azmat Khan* is currently a graduate student, majoring in 'Cross Cultural Communication' at (CUC), Beijing. E-mail: azmat991@cuc.edu.cn

## Introduction

### *Relationship between Mass Media and Conflicts*

We make sense of ‘the world by taking messages and images—including those served up by the news—and slotting them into codes we develop through our lives’ (Lynch & Fischer, 2014), and carry in our heads. Mass media have been shown to be playing a determining role in manufacturing for us these images and messages and cultivating our mental codes/frames (Durga, 2004; Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1974; 1986; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Besides many other factors that cause conflicts, breakdown in communication between the warring parties is also one of the leading reasons why conflicts are born and persist. According to Peleg (2006), ‘communication produces information which affects each side’s decision, whether to hash out the differences or shun them’ [...] ‘Thus, communication becomes a crucial determinant in conflict and conflict resolution: it creates consciousness of, and attentiveness to, the Other’ (p. 2).

A closer inspection of the timeline of the world conflicts reveals that ‘media has played a dominating role in conflicts in Palestine, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now in the Middle East’ (Siraj, 2008). Siraj (2008) further argues that studies on War and Peace Journalism suggest that the discursive construction of conflicts by mass media has always been a serious concern of combatants, academics, media professionals as well as common people. ‘Media coverage shapes the course of events in war and peace’ (Siraj, 2008). Geelen contends, ‘Media has the power to reach a large number of audiences’ (as cited in Ijaz, 2015), particularly in poor countries that are host to most of the conflicts in the world. ‘During conflict situations, media can play an important role in easing tensions amongst people as well as between governments’ (Ijaz, 2015). However, like almost all other technologies, mass media is also a double-edged sword: should they benefit or disserve humanity depends on who is wielding them. Therefore, media can be a frightful weapon of violence when they propagate messages of intolerance or misinformation that manipulate public sentiment (Ijaz, 2015), or can be an effective instrument for bolstering peace and mutual understating. However, Zaheer complains, ‘research has found the media tilted towards aggression, violence, and disagreements during conflict coverage’ (Zaheer, 2016). Moreover, ‘[p]ower of the media’s coverage may prove stronger than the will of people and government, consequently, making the media and press as an actor which might complicate the attempts to resolve the conflict’ (Riaz, Ahmad, & Shah, 2018). Particularly, Riaz and colleagues claim that South Asian media’s coverage of Kashmir Conflict is based on different agenda settings that are void of objective representation of the Conflict.

### *Media and Kashmir Conflict*

‘According to UN records, Kashmir is the oldest conflict inscribed in the body of UN resolutions and one of the most serious’ (Burki, 2007), and hence the longest-standing conflicts of the World. In the last seven decades, it has burst in several violent and semi-violent phases, resulting in three full-scale wars (1948, 1965 and 1999) between the two countries. This Conflict still triggers border skirmishes, frequent threats of war with massive troops mobilization alongside borders (Gadda, 2014), and drives the two nuclear-armed countries to the brink of mutually assured destruction. Why is this conflict so hard to be resolved? Besides many other explanations, in her book



'*Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors*', author Tavleen Singh (cited by Gadda, 2014), designates National media as one of the major players protracting the Kashmir Conflict.

Similarly, Riaz and colleagues (2018) have also studied the relationship of media and Kashmir Conflict and adduced that Indians and Pakistanis tend to structure their pattern of thinking about each other through the narrative endorsed by media and press. 'Most importantly, media reports of both countries on Kashmir Conflict significantly shape the perception of common people in both countries' (Riaz, Ahmad, & Shah, 2018). Indeed, mass media are not only the chief source of information for the Pakistani and Indian populations, they—specifically the four esteemed newspapers which this study has selected—are also major sources of information for the officials of foreign office, bureaucracy and military of both states (Zaheer, 2016; Ijaz, 2015; Khalid, 2014).

However, various studies have shown that the coverage of Kashmir Conflict by both countries' media overblow war and violence. They moreover reveal that Kashmiris, the actual party and victims, are ignored, elite positions of India and Pakistan are over-projected, only physical aspects of the conflict are reported, similarities are overlooked and finally, violent means are valued at the cost of peaceful alternatives. This might have had a bearing over the persisting hostile environment in which several peace talks have so far failed. If media change their approach of covering conflict, it is likely that the political and public debate also follows which may foster an atmosphere conducive for dialogue. Since media coverage significantly influences public policy and cultivates peoples' attitudes, therefore it becomes pertinent that the contents of media be subjected to penetrating academic scrutiny. Both Pakistan and India have dynamic media systems—particularly print—and hold a very essential place in people's daily lives.

This paper critically examines and compares the coverage of Kashmir Conflict in four respected elite English language dailies: two from Pakistan; the DAWN and The Nation and two from India; The HINDU and Times of India (ToI). The Galtung's Model of Peace Journalism (Galtung, 1986; 1998) is the overarching theoretical framework while Lynch & McGoldrick's (2005) Two-Sided Conflict Model also informs the analysis. The principal goal of this paper is to find the value-bias of these newspapers towards peace and/or violence and war. This paper investigates two main questions. The first question draws on Galtung's Model of Peace Journalism (Galtung, 1986; 1998) and the second on Lynch & McGoldrick's (2005) Two-Sided Conflict Model: (1) Whether War or Peace Journalism dominates the coverage of India and Pakistan's newspapers? (Taking two newspapers from each side), and (2) Do these newspapers consider the Kashmir Conflict to be only between Pakistan and India or Kashmiri people/leaders are allocated legitimate space/role?

As was mentioned earlier, the Kashmir Conflict which keeps both India and Pakistan in a constant state of enmity has deterred peace in the sub-continent for the last 70 years and if not resolved, the future of this region's billions of inhabitants seems bleak. Since both these countries have vibrant media systems and keeping in view the failure of the two governments to negotiate peace within this region, Peace Journalism seems to be one of the remedies that can guarantee a peaceful future. This paper explores the prospects and promises that peace-oriented journalism can bring to the subcontinent. The finding of this study can be of immense importance to foreign

and domestic policymakers, journalists, students of media and conflict studies and people at large.

### **Literature Review**

In the following paragraphs, the latest studies on media coverage of conflicts specifically that of Kashmir Conflict, and War and Peace Journalism have been cited with an aim of identifying a research gap which this study must fill by contributing fresh insights to the existing literature.

Gadi Wolfsfeld, a renowned scholar of Media and Conflict Studies maintains that the nature of media by default is to cover disputes, conflicts, violence and tension (Wolfsfeld, 2004). In the same vein, Shinar (2004) also upholds this view saying that to create sensation and get high ratings, 'media mostly prefer to use war frames even when there are peace negotiations between the opposing groups' (Shinar, 2004). Similarly, Fawcett in his content analysis (2002) found that for the Irish media, war frames were more attractive than the peace frames. Finally, Lee and Maslog (2005) were forced by the glaring findings of their study to announce that the media coverage of almost all Asian conflicts is dominated by war frames.

The coverage of Kashmir Conflict in Indian and Pakistani, as well as international media, has been widely studied. Gadda (2014) has compared Kashmir's local newspaper with Indian national newspapers using 'Partial Journalism' as his analytical tool. The author argues that to favor the Indian state narrative, the national media ignore the dissenting voices from Kashmir Valley. 'Truth became the first causality as media content was engineered from the power corridors to suit a particular ideology' (Gadda, 2014). He claims that the national media which is the only source of information about Kashmir for the people outside Kashmir are status-quo. 'National media has reported the situation in Kashmir with a partial approach, narrating only what fits the official policy, and ignoring anything, howsoever closer to reality, that hurts the interests of India as a nation or is in breach of the official policy'. Hence he concludes that the true story of the Kashmir has largely been kept untold (ibid).

Similarly, Jan and Khan in their article '*Peace Journalism and Conflict Reporting: A Case study of Pakistani Media*' (2011), examines the Pakistani media's coverage of conflicts from the perspective of Peace Journalism. They argue that media have the power to alter public opinions and can bring public attention to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, Jan & Khan (2011) have expressed pessimism as their study affirms that media have turned away from productive discussion on the peace initiatives which are essential for promoting peace in the region. Furthermore, they have also highlighted the danger of media's distortion of the news contents which has the potential to deteriorate conflicts and conceal resolution of disputes.

Moreover, Hafsa Khalid (2014) in her article the '*Role of Peace Journalism in Indo-Pak Relation: A case study of Aman Ki Aasha*', maintains that the instability in this region, resulting from the inflexible conflict position of the two states, has created a horrifying atmosphere of looming nuclear war with the warmongering media adding fuel to the fire. She refers to the failure of both countries and their respective media to develop a peaceful environment in the region and suggests that Peace Journalism is the only way out of the fear of impending war and instability. Khalid (2014) asserts that only objective, unbiased and peace-oriented media can help

redeem the tense political relationship into the forgotten history of Hindu-Muslim unity and can fill the political and communication gaps, which would allow the people of the two nations to hear each other's cry for peace. Her paper also suggests that the media should adopt Peace Journalism to improve the image of the subcontinent in the world because this conflict has painted its image as an insecure and dangerous zone.

Examining international media, Durga (2004) studied the coverage of the Kashmir Conflict and the parties caught up in it in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* from 1989 to 2003. She found out that all these newspapers, throughout their coverage, reported only war and violence and ignored peace-inspiring aspects of the conflict. Moreover, Durga also establishes that only officials from Pakistan and India are given space while Kashmiri people and local leadership are ignored.

In a fresh study, Lubna Zaheer (2016) examines the media coverage of Burhan Wani's killing. For her study, she selected four Pakistani newspapers; two of English and two Urdu language. She employed the Peace Journalism Model (Galtung, 1986) and Framing Theory (Entman, 1993) as her theoretical models. Her findings show that Pakistani media are 'highly war-oriented and war Frames continue to dominate the coverage as compared to peace Frames' (Zaheer, 2016). Additionally, she found that 'Urdu press uses more war Frames as compared to the English language dailies' (Zaheer, 2016). She concludes that the reason for more war slanted reporting could be credited to the historical background and state policy towards the Kashmir issue. 'Due to the human rights violations and the violence itself in Kashmir might also be the reasons why Pakistani media cannot avoid War Journalism' (Zaheer, 2016). However, these are the very excuses and professional pitfalls which the 'Peace Journalism Model' (Galtung, 1986), has challenged.

Galtung's Model of Peace Journalism (Galtung, 1998; 1986) proposes a solution-oriented coverage of conflicts by giving voice to all parties that are involved/caught up in the conflict. Similarly, Lynch & McGoldrick state that the idea of Peace Journalism brings a unique style of news gathering, processing and presentation which minimizes the conflict between the parties involved, 'simply by not repeating such facts that may demonize one group and further escalate the conflict' (2005). 'Peace Journalism aims at focusing on the structural and cultural causes of violence, rather than on an oversimplified dichotomous account of conflict' (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) further state that Peace Journalism explains violence; frames conflict as involving many parties who pursue many goals; and finally, makes audible and visible the subjugated aspects of reality.

In contrast to Peace Journalism, Hanitzsch (2004) argues that in War Journalism, the center of attention is violence and destruction. He further explains that War Journalism is mostly biased, highlights the visible effects of war and is zero-sum oriented. Hanitzsch (2004) adds that War Journalism presents direct violence, visible consequences and it is also elite oriented in nature. Similarly, Siraj (2008) posits that to boost their TRP and paper circulation, media further dramatize War Reporting by using graphics and post-production effects. Moreover, Lee, et al. observe, 'war journalism is characterized by military triumphalist language, an action-oriented focus, and a superficial narrative with little context, background or historical perspective' (cited by Siraj, 2008).

Only a few studies were found which have comparatively examined the media of both India and Pakistan. Hussain (2015) in his comparative study concludes that the Indian print media use hate language and high level of war frames when reporting Kashmir Conflict, whereas the print media of Pakistan [he has only studied DAWN] use peace Frames and avoid hate language. Another notable co-authored comparative study ‘*A case study of Kashmir dispute* by Zia & Hajrah’ (2015), has examined the print media’s role in escalating or de-escalating the conflict and media’s potential for the peacebuilding process. Zia and Hajrah (2015) concluded that the Kashmir issue was negatively framed and media consistently focused on violence.

However, these studies have compared only one newspaper from both countries and their time span is also short. This study, on the other hand, compares two newspapers from each country and focuses on those major events from 2016 onwards to 2019 which have mostly dominated the intervening media coverage. Moreover, newspapers were selected according to their ideological leanings. DAWN is an elite leftist daily, while The Nation is a conservative newspaper, both promoting two distinct world views. Similarly, The HINDU and The Times of India represent two opposing ideological camps, the former is considered leftist while the latter is center-right. Therefore, the analysis of these newspapers can yield a reasonably fair picture of the two societies’ socio-political standing on the Kashmir issue. Moreover, they are read by the policymaking elite and analysts who influence the agenda of the public discourse. So this study takes into account many essential considerations that the earlier studies have overlooked.

### **Research Methodology**

This paper has adopted Comparative Content Analysis (Krippendorff, 2004) as its research methodology. The analysis takes into account both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the data, with more emphasis on the latter. Mazrui argues that ‘Qualitative Content Analysis provides an important layer of analysis in a way that it helps to note what stories, stakeholders and frames are included and excluded and to what extent’ (Mazrui, 1996).

### ***Selection of time period and events as Data Sources***

Bigger events are likely to create more news. Seven such major events that happened between 2016 and 2019 in Kashmir and with huge ramifications to both India and Pakistan were selected. These include; Burhan Wani’s Killing (2016), Uri Attack, Surgical Strike, Pulwama Attack, Balakot Airstrike, and Abhi Nandan’s Capture and Release (2019). The events were massively covered by media and dominated the public discourse in both countries. Therefore, the researchers decided to select these seven events for data collection. To distinguish their prominence and immediacy, the events are discussed below in detail.

### **A Timeline of the Events**

The recent unrest in Kashmir began when ‘Burhan Wani, a popular separatist militant commander was shot dead by the Indian forces in a village in South Kashmir on July 8’ (Bukhari, 2016). According to a BBC report (Bukhari, 2016), ‘born to a highly-educated upper-class Kashmiri family, Wani was driven to militancy at the age of 15 after his brother and he was beaten up by police for no reason.’ The report further states that after that incident, Wani swore to avenge his insult and joined local fighter

group Hizbul Mujahedeen (Bukhari, 2016). BBC also claims that unlike militants in the past, Wani was highly active on social media and did not hide his identity behind a mask. Similarly, Gabol (2016) notes that Wani had become a hero, an iconic face of Kashmir militancy, spearheading the current wave of agitations. 'He regularly posted video messages online dressed in military fatigues, becoming an instant hit in Kashmiri youth and invited young men to join the movement against Indian rule' (Gabol, 2016). His killing caused massive protests in the valley and thousands attended his funeral (Meenakshi, 2016). To control the situation, the Indian state had enacted a curfew for 99 continuous days (Press Trust of India, 2016).

Next, on September 18, 2016, only two days before the Premier of Pakistan and the foreign minister of India were to speak to the UN General Assembly, an attack happened on Uri Army base, located in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK), in which 19 soldiers were killed. India claimed 'the attack was carried out by Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) militants, crossing the border from Pakistan' (Praveen Swami & Shubhjit Roy, 2016). Pakistan, however, rejected the claims (Perry, 2016).

Less than two weeks later, on September 29, 2016, India claimed that it has executed surgical strikes along Line of Control (LoC)<sup>3</sup> in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, taking out seventeen launch pads or temporary shelters, that militants were preparing to use to cross over into the country, and inflicting significant casualties (Hindustan Times, 2016). Pakistan denied any such strikes ever to have happened (Press Trust of India, 2019).

'On February 14, 2019, a convoy of vehicles carrying security personnel was attacked by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber in Pulwama district of Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK), resulting in the deaths of 40 Indian Central Reserve Police Force' (Gurung, 2019). India again blamed it on Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Pakistan 'denied any connection to it' (Dawn.com, 2019). India threatened to attack the bases of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) located in Pakistan and soon launched an airstrike on the *Balakot* area inside Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on Feb 26. India claimed to have 'destroyed a militant base and inflicted heavy loss of life, killing up to 300 fighters belonging to Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)' (Slater & Constable, 2019). However, 'Pakistan denied the claim, saying that the Indian Air Force (IAF) warplanes were forced to drop their payload on an empty hillside when confronted by Pakistani interceptors' (Yousuaf, 2019). Islamabad also denied the existence of any militant camp in the area. The next day, 'Indian and Pakistani warplanes engaged in a dogfight over Kashmir and Pakistan downed an Indian plane and captured its pilot after he ejected in Pakistan's Administered Kashmir' (Slater & Constable, 2019; Gettleman, Hari Kumar, & Yasir, 2019). Hours later, video clips of the bloodied IAF pilot, Wing Commander Abhi Nandan Varthaman, 'appeared on social media, identifying himself to Pakistani interrogators' (Reuters, 2019).

It was the first time in history that two nuclear-armed states carried out airstrikes against each other which brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war. The situation was so volatile that it could have conceivably got out of hand and led to a nuclear apocalypse (Akhund, 2019). There were extreme tension and war hysteria on both sides. However Pakistan announced that the pilot will be released

---

<sup>3</sup>The Line of Control (LoC) refers to the de facto border between the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of the Jammu and Kashmir.

unconditionally as a peace gesture and the next day, he was handed over to Indian authorities at Wahga Border.

### **Data Collection**

For data collection, one editorial and one lead story about every event from each newspaper were collected. This was done because ‘editorial is the guiding element of any medium’s ideological bent...[r]evealing a level of tolerance, an editorial also exposes itself to taking sides’ (Jan & Ashraf, 2017). Similarly, the leading story of a newspaper also reveals the highest importance it places on an issue. Therefore, it can be argued that by examining the editorial and leading story of a newspaper, its overall editorial policy and ideological bent can be mapped, although generalization of the findings of such a study might have limitations. So a total of 56 stories i.e. 14 from each newspaper were to be collected but three editorials were not published. Thus 53 stories in actual could be collected ( $7 \times 2 \times 4 - 3 = 53$ ). It is also important to mention here that DAWN did not publish editorial on *Balakot* airstrike while The Nation and The HINDU both about Abhi Nandan’s capture. Instead, they only relied on lead stories.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The principal theoretical framework of this study is Galtung’s Model of Peace Journalism (Galtung, 1986; 1998) but Lynch & McGoldrick’s (2005) Two-Sided Conflict Model also informs the analysis. These two analytical approaches are briefly disused below.

#### ***i) Peace Journalism Model***

‘Johan Vincent Galtung (born 1930) is a Norwegian sociologist and the principal founder of the discipline of Peace & Conflict Studies’ (Brewer, 2010, p. 7). Peace Journalism Model, ‘which today is a source of practical options for journalists; a lead into media monitoring for peace activists and offers a firm basis for drawing distinctions in a content analysis by academic researchers was originally conceived by Galtung’ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Galtung (2003) defines Peace Journalism as people-oriented, focuses on victims, gives voice to the voiceless and seeks a solution. It is a ‘special mode of socially responsible journalism’ (Hanitzsch, 2004), and ‘responsible and conscientious media coverage of any conflict’ (Shinar, 2004). War Journalism, on the contrary, is propaganda-driven and obsessed with violence, elite position and victory (Galtung, 1998).

How Peace Journalism can help societies imagine peaceful alternatives? Lynch and Fischer (2014) explain, ‘through Peace Journalism, editors and reporters make choices – about what to report, and how to report it – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict’ (Lynch & Fischer, 2014). They also claim that Peace Journalism has an intrinsic ability to inspire and building non-confrontational communication which is indispensable for conflict transformation (ibid). They further contend that as a promoter of depolarization and de-escalation, Peace Journalism can accomplish a significant role by inspiring journalists to portray disputes in a different manner than that to which they usually ascribe (2014).

Behind every visible battle, there are always underlying structural inequalities that form the roots of political grievances and violence. The continuing ignorance of this context by the media turns conflicts into protracted ones because ‘if

no underlying causes are visible, there is nothing to 'fix' and we are left only with further violence as a possible response' (Azar quoted in Peleg, 2006). 'Peace Journalism, with its keen eye on causes and stimuli and with its commitment to a broader and fairer depiction of interests and motivations rather than positions' (Galtung, 1996; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), 'can and should bring such unattended human needs to the fore and alleviate intractable conflicts' (Peleg, 2006).

Moreover, Lynch (2014) has described the following characteristics of Peace Journalism:

1. It explores the backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation, presenting causes and options on every side (not just 'both sides');
2. Gives voice to the views of all rival parties, from all levels;
3. Offers creative ideas for conflict resolution, development, peace-making, and peacekeeping;
4. Exposes lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides, and reveals excesses committed by, and suffering inflicted on, peoples of all parties, and finally;
5. Pays attention to peace stories and post-war developments.

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) claim that in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, there were disease journalists who, in great detail, reported how epidemics spread and affected the people, but nothing was told about cures. 'Today we have health journalists who write about current research on new cures and healthy lifestyles that help prevent disease' (ibid). They propose that it is high time for peace journalists to not only report wars, but also investigate its root causes, possible prevention, and ways to sustain peace. 'But they need not invent solutions to conflicts themselves—in the same way as health journalists need not invent cures for diseases themselves; they ask specialists. Similarly, peace journalists can ask various peace organizations and mediators about their ideas for preventing or ending the violent conflict, and report about it' (ibid). The authors conclude, 'health pages in newspapers are very popular, and it can be anticipated that the same will be true for reporting about peace proposals: all we ask is give peace a page'.

### ***ii) Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) Two-Sided Conflict Model***

The Two-Sided Conflict Model has basically been derived from War Journalism (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Lynch and McGoldrick argue that War Journalism mostly favors official sources over voices from the grassroots; reports events instead of processes; and perceives a conflict only as a two-sided battle for supremacy. 'These preferences, indexing, and biases, [once] hardened into industry conventions, become a familiar journalistic habit of restricting the extent of debate to differences between government and official opposition (elite discord) and has the same effect of camouflaging choices as facts' (ibid). In simple words, the Two-Sided Conflict Model is an institutional apparatus and frame of mind through which journalists tend to see (or are forced to see) a conflict only through the eyes of the two combating parties and disregard all other actors. Thus journalism becomes a zero-sum game. The authors of this paper believe that Kashmir Conflict should not be viewed merely as a battle for territory between the two states of India and Pakistan but the people of Kashmir are the legitimate party/actors and not just statistics and hapless victims. So

this analytical concept (Two-Sided Conflict Model) was chosen to examine how the four newspaper scores on this specific category.

Viewing a conflict through a dichotomous lens creates the risks of oversimplifying the conflict and obscuring wider options. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) warn that anything that is not, unequivocally, winning, risks being reported as losing, hence it brings a readymade incentive to step up efforts for victory or escalate. Lynch and McGoldrick also warn about the fixation on official elites. They emphasize that governments have the coercive apparatus (the ‘legitimate’ use of military power) at their disposal which other groups lack. ‘For all these reasons, the primacy of official sources, coupled with the enduring national orientation of most media, is bound to skew the representation of conflicts in favor of a pronounced receptiveness to the advocacy of violence’ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Moreover, Lynch and Fischer argue, ‘stirrings of peace almost invariably begin at lower levels’. Therefore this paper also advocates that conflict should be seen through a multi-party lens and actors from the grassroots should also be given equal space.

**Coding Scheme**

This paper follows Galtung’s (1986; 1998) classification of War and Peace Journalism for the codification of the data.

Galtung Model (Classification of War, Peace and Neutral Indicators)		
War Indicators	Peace Indicators	Neutral Stories
<b>Visible effects of War</b>	<b>Invisible effects of war</b>	Stories that contain none of the indicators from these two categories are coded as neutral.
Statistics of casualties (dead and wounded)	Emotional trauma, damage to society, property or culture, long-term effects	
<b>Difference- oriented</b>	<b>Solution-oriented</b>	
Such reports lead to the escalation of the conflict	Suggestions/opinions for the solution of the conflict	
<b>Elite-oriented</b>	<b>People-oriented</b>	
Focus on political/military leaders and elites as actors and sources of information	Focus on common people as actors and sources of information	
<b>Here and now</b>	<b>Causes and consequences</b>	
Only reporting the current war situation/updates	Reporting the historical causes and future effects of the conflict	
<b>Dichotomy</b>	<b>Labeling</b>	
Good guys vs bad guys or heroes and villains	Avoid labeling of good and bad guys	
<b>Two-Party Orientation</b>	<b>Multi-party Orientation</b>	
One party winner, the other loser	Gives voice to all parties involved in a conflict	
<b>Partisan</b>	<b>Non-partisan</b>	
Being partial to one party in the conflict	(Neutral, not taking sides)	
<b>Zero-sum Orientation</b>	<b>Win-win Orientation</b>	
One goal: to win	Many goals and issues, solution-oriented	
<b>Use of Demonizing Language</b>	<b>Avoid demonizing language</b>	
Words such as brutal, barbaric, extremist, fundamentalist, etc.	Usage of more precise/inclusive descriptions, titles or names	

**Table 1:** Galtung’s Classification of War and Peace Indicators (Galtung, 1986)

Galtung has based the classification on four broader practices and, ‘linguistic orientations: peace/conflict, truth/propaganda, people/elites and solutions/differences’ (Galtung, 1998). ‘In contrast, war journalism is oriented towards war/violence,



propaganda, elites and victory’ (Lee et al. cited by Siraj, 2008). Galtung has further expanded these four categories into 19 indicators; nine peace, nine war and one neutral (Table 1).

Following this method, a single story was selected as the unit of analysis. The stories were then accordingly grouped into ‘Peace’, ‘War’ and ‘Neutral’ categories. A story that had more indicators, for instance from the war category as compared to the peace category, was sorted as a war story and vice versa. The following Table 1 explains these 19 indicators (Galtung, 1986).

**Findings of the Study**

No.	Newspapers	War Stories		Peace Stories	
		No. of stories	Percentage	No. of stories	Percentage
1.	<b>DAWN</b>	7	53.84%	6	46.15%
2.	<b>The Nation</b>	13	100%	-	-
3.	<b>The HINDU</b>	10	77%	3	23%
4.	<b>Times of India</b>	13	92.85%	1	7.14%

**Table 2: Result of Analysis: War vs Peace Journalism**

The above table reveals that The Nation’s coverage is 100% war-oriented. The Nation deploys only war frames/indicators while reporting the Kashmir Conflict. Although DAWN scores the lowest with 53.84% war coverage, we can infer that this tendency somehow can compensate for the war-ridden coverage of The Nation (in Pakistan). However, there is very little margin between Times of India with 92.85% war journalism and The HINDU with 77%. Similarly, in the category of Peace Indicators, the coverage of DAWN is the highest with 46.15% peace orientation. It shows the relative professionalism and sensitivity of DAWN towards Peace Journalism.

The HINDU’s 23% Peace Contents, followed by the Times of India with only 7.14% are abysmal, given their respected stature in India. Overall, DAWN has the highest number of stories covering peace and the lowest covering war. While the Nation had the highest stories covering war and zero stories about peace. Moreover, none of the stories could qualify as a neutral story on Galtung’s Indicators.

**Quantifying the Usage of Each Indicator**

Table 3 shows which dominant indicators/frames these newspapers use in their coverage. The indicator ‘Visible Effects’, for instance, means that this was the highest used indicator in the given news story which caused the whole story to be placed into the war category.

It is evident from the above analysis that the newspapers use War indicators more than the Peace frames. Partisan language, a heavy focus on visible destruction, here, and now, and inattention to context, such coverage, according to Galtung (1998), is detrimental to conflict transformation. Moreover, these newspapers only report elite positions and their entire coverage is zero-sum oriented. Both these

orientations, Galtung (1998) argues, obscure our understating of the deeper causes of conflicts and pushes the actors towards a win-lose battle.

Table 3 also shows that all these newspapers succumb to the Two-Sided Conflict Model (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). The newspapers report regarding the elite’s position and opinion from India and Pakistan but completely ignore the voices/positions of Kashmiris. They have not even considered taking the comments/opinions of common citizens from the two warring states. Similarly, their coverage is only restricted to Two-Party orientation rather than a Multi-party model. If the Conflict is framed in this Two-Sided template, Pakistani and Indian masses, as well as the world, cannot know the position and place of Kashmiri people and their political leaders. Instead, global opinion will continue to be shaped by Indian and Pakistani media which according to Gadda (2014) and Sulehria (2018) perpetuate status-quo because they portray positions instead of interests and are fixated on victory for their respective states. Thus the Conflict will continue to rot.

War Indicators	Pakistan Print Media		Indian Print Media		Peace Indicators	Pakistan Print Media		Indian Print Media	
	Dawn	The Nation	The Hindu	Times of India		Dawn	The Nation	The Hindu	Times of India
	No. (%)	No. (%)	No. (%)	No. (%)		No. (%)	No. (%)	No. (%)	No. (%)
Visible effects of war	2 (15.38%)	-	3 (23.07%)	2 (14.28%)	Invisible effects of war	-	-	-	-
Differences oriented	2 (15.38%)	2 (15.38%)	-	-	Solution oriented	3 (23.07%)	-	-	-
Elite-oriented	1 (7.69%)	1 (7.7%)	-	-	People Oriented	-	-	-	-
Here and now	1 (7.69%)	1 (7.7%)	2 (15.38%)	2 (14.28%)	Causes and consequences	2 (15.38%)	-	1 (7.69%)	-
Dichotomy i.e. Good, Bad	-	2 (15.38%)	-	2 (14.28%)	Avoid labelling	-	-	1 (7.69%)	-
Two-Party orientation	1 (7.69%)	4 (30.76%)	1 (7.69%)	2 (14.28%)	Multi-party orientation	-	-	-	-
Partisan/Biased	-	2 (15.38%)	3 (23.07%)	3 (21.42%)	Non-partisan: Un-Biased	1 (7.69%)	-	1 (7.69%)	-
Zero-sum Orientation	-	1 (7.7%)	1 (7.69%)	2 (14.28%)	Win-win orientation	-	-	-	-
Use of Demonizing Language	-	-	-	-	Avoid demonizing language	-	-	-	-
<b>Total War Frames</b>	7 (53.84%)	13 (100%)	10 (77%)	13 (92.85%)	<b>Total Peace Frames</b>	6 (46.15%)	-	3 (23%)	1 (7.14%)

**Overall Nature of the Coverage**

The following Table 4 shows the overall inclination of these newspapers towards war and peace.

Grand Total	Total Stories	War Stories	Peace Stories
	53	43 (81.13%)	10 (18.86%)

**Table 3:** Overall nature of the coverage

The above table reveals that the prominent English language newspapers of both countries, and with a cautious generalization, the media of the sub-continent as a whole are highly war-oriented. The findings revealed that the lion’s share (81.13%) coverage of Kashmir Conflict is war-oriented as compared to only 18.86% peace contents. Drawing on the literature of Peace Journalism, we can assert that Indian and Pakistani media’s gross neglect of the peace approach can be one of the main reasons why this Conflict has remained tenacious and unsolvable.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

This study compared the coverage of Kashmir Conflict in two Pakistani and two Indian elite English language Newspapers drawing on Galtung’s Model of Peace Journalism (Galtung, 1986; 1998) and Lynch & McGoldrick’s (2005) Two-Sided Conflict Model. Mostafiz (2017) has claimed that there exists a ‘conflict-media nexus’. This is likely to be true ‘because news reporting has traditionally been feeding on war, conflict, and violence, often offering propaganda for one of the conflicting parties, and without any apparent intention to promote peace’ (Lynch & Fischer, 2014). The findings of this paper also confirm that the reporting of these four highly esteemed newspaper is heavily (81.13%) war-oriented. Such war-obsessed coverage can upset the prospects of peacefully resolving the Kashmir Conflict.

Besides war and peace orientations, our second question was whether media from both countries give coverage to Kashmiri people and their indigenous leadership which is the genuine party to the conflict. The analysis revealed that none of the newspapers considers the Kashmiri people as equal/genuine actors/party, rather they are treated as only passive victims. So it can be inferred that all these newspapers give in to the Two-Sided Conflict Model identified by Lynch & McGoldrick’s (2005). They declare coverage to be Two-Sided when it only involves the two dominant parties/states and ignores any other actors. Since in the decolonized world, most of the states cannot be delineated as purely nation-states on the model of Europe because they comprise many ethnicities and nations, therefore, conflicts between post-colonial states should not be considered as merely between the two dominant states. There are always other actors as well, for instance, Kashmiris in this conflict. This is why Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) argue, ‘the journalistic habit of restricting the extent of debate to differences between government and official opposition – ‘elite discord’ – has the same effect of camouflaging choices as facts’ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Two-Sided depiction of conflicts also renders invisible the other parties and delegitimizes their aspirations. This is why we seldom see Kashmiris speaking for themselves but only Pakistani and Indian officials/journalists speaking ‘about’ them.

Moreover, it was found that all these newspapers do not provide any context to the conflict. Even if provided, it is restricted to the official narrative of Pakistan or India. How Kashmiris understand this Conflict and what sort of history they want to

construct is a blanket omission in the coverage. Danish Nabi Gadda, a researcher from 'Indian Held Kashmir', argues, 'The total loss of context is the greatest casualty in Indian and Pakistani media's portrayal of Kashmir Conflict' (Gadda, 2014). 'One of the reasons why these mistakes could be made with impunity is because the National press, out of misguided patriotism, has always chosen to tell the National public less than the whole truth about Kashmir' (ibid). He contends that this has made it possible for the government in Delhi to design dangerously myopic policies. 'Issues which perceived to have a bearing on national interest/security, particularly those relating to defense, foreign policy, insurgency, and human rights are usually portrayed from a state security perspective, relegating the priorities and concerns of the Kashmiri people to invisibility' (Joseph cited in Gadda, 2014).

Similarly, Farooq Sulehria, an academic from Pakistani 'administered' Kashmir states that in academic discourses on India and Pakistan as well as journalistic narratives – emerging out of Orient as well as Occident – Kashmir is usually delineated as the nuclear 'flashpoint' (2018). 'Kashmir as a disputed territory between these two states is a commonsensical understanding in and beyond South Asia' (Sulehria, 2018). This understanding, he continues, is reinforced by an unending war of words between New Delhi and Islamabad. He refers to Tashkent Accord (1966), Shimla Agreement (1972) and Lahore Declaration (1999) and concludes that India and Pakistan preferred a strategic 'status quo *ante bellum* on the question of Kashmir' (Sulehria, 2018). 'Neither India nor Pakistan, public and diplomatic narratives notwithstanding, wants to incorporate Jammu & Kashmir in its entirety' (Sulehria, 2018). So on one hand, if media do not provide context, it leads to the oversimplification of the issue and what Galtung defines as 'visible effects', but on the other hand, even if an issue is contextualized, it should be scrutinized as what kind of context/background is being provided. Locating the conflict in the officially sanctioned context by Pakistani and Indian media cannot challenge the status quo on Kashmir Conflict which, according to Sulehria, the two countries have agreed upon.

Besides this, providing context plays a significant role in broadening perspectives and choices of the actors caught up in a conflict and safeguard them from sliding into a dead end. Lynch & Fischer (2014) stress that Peace and War are not events but processes. As a decontextualized and mis-historicized conflict, Pakistan charges the violence in Kashmir on India as 'unprovoked border violations' while India does the same. Caught in the cross-fire, the value of the Kashmiri lives and sufferings has been reduced to 'unfortunate statistics' and 'collateral damage'. In Pakistan, as a result of the state propaganda, one can hear and read popular slogans such as 'Kashmir will become Pakistan' but no one thinks what Kashmiris, being a nation unto them, says about their own destiny. And the same is the case in India as 'Kashmir remains one of the world's most heavily militarized zones; the 700,000-plus Indian troops have been stationed there' (Ashraf, 2016). Akin to the approach of the two states to resolving a political problem with military means, the media coverage is also heavily militarized.

Moreover, from the analysis, we can see that both the media outlets impose their own partisan and reductionist labels on Kashmir, its people and their struggle. Metaphors and frames can distort the Worlds' understanding of the Kashmir issue. The Nation uses words like 'freedom fighters' while DAWN identifies them as 'militants'. Pakistani newspapers call the part of Kashmir that is controlled by Pakistan as 'Azad (Independent) Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)' while label the Indian

controlled part as Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK) or Indian Held Kashmir (IHK). Similarly, both Indian newspapers use the word Pakistan Occupied/held Kashmir (Po/hK) when referring to AJK. In addition, both these Indian newspapers claim that Pakistan deploys terrorism as state policy and use words like ‘Pak-based terrorists, Pak-backed militants, infiltrators, foreign militants, and Pakistan’s establishment-backed terrorists’. The use of these terminologies suggests that both the media outlets have presumed that the Kashmiri people, by default, subscribe to these labels. The choice of Kashmiris to represent themselves cannot be delineated from the coverage of these newspapers.

While Kashmir Conflict is an existential issue for Kashmiris, both India and Pakistan use it for their own domestic politics; to hide their corruption and win elections. The Kashmir issue is a handy invocation for diverting the attention of their respective populations from their poor political performances and drowning all social and economic problems in the war frenzy and patriotic whirlpool created in the name of ‘national security’. In this respect, both media seem to be serving their respective governments intentionally or otherwise.

From the analysis, it can be concluded that Indo-Pak Journalism is War Journalism as it focuses on events rather than on the processes of the conflict. The studied newspapers only reported visible violence and death statistics which according to Lynch & Fischer (2014) is a strategy of circumventing context and solution-oriented coverage. Lynch & Fischer claim that in War Journalism, reporters/editors avoid controversy by dwelling on the ‘details of death and destruction wrought by a bomb’ (2014). ‘What is automatically more controversial and hence Peace Journalism is to probe why the bombers did it, what was the process leading up to it, what were their grievances and motivations’ (Lynch & Fischer, 2014). They moreover argue, ‘with the enduring national orientation, most media are bound to skew the representation of conflicts in favor of a pronounced receptiveness to the advocacy of violence’ (Lynch & Fischer, 2014). Hence, Peace Journalism, they suggest, ‘is a remedial strategy and an attempt to supplement the news conventions to give peace a chance’. Lynch & Fischer (2014) conclude their article with the following lines;

The time has come for peace journalists to write not only about war, but also about its causes, prevention, and ways to restore peace. They need not invent solutions to conflicts themselves—in the same way as health journalists need not invent cures for diseases themselves; they ask specialists.

This paper adds to this and proposes that media of both Pakistan and India in their coverage must include Kashmiris as the legitimate party in the conflict and give more space to them as compared to the officials from the two claimant states. As Peleg has argued, ‘the notion of the media as a third party to a conflict, the facilitator of communication, the mediator or the arbitrator between the two rivalling sides, it is our contention that Peace Journalism as a third side can best enhance prospects for resolution and reconciliation by changing the norms and habits of reporting conflicts’ (Peleg, 2006). Peace Journalism is thus an inspiring theoretical and practical option for the media of both countries to follow which will lead to a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir Conflict.

## References

- Akhund, R. Z. (2019). Nuclear Apocalypse. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1470121/nuclear-apocalypse>
- Ashraf, A. (2016, July 21). 'Do you Need 700,000 Soldiers to Fight 150 Militants?': Kashmiri Rights Activist Khurram Parvez. *Scorollin*. Retrieved from <https://scroll.in/article/812010/do-you-need-700000-soldiers-to-fight-150-militants-kashmiri-rights-activist-khurram-parvez>
- Brewer, J. D. (2010). *Peace Processes: A Sociological Approach*. Polity Press.
- Bukhari, S. (2016). Why the Death of Militant Burhan Wani has Kashmiris Up in Arms. *BBC*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-36762043>
- Burki, S. J. (2007). *Kashmir: A Problem in Search of a Solution*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Durga, R. (2004). Frames in the US Print Media Coverage of the Kashmir Conflict. *Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations*. Retrieved from <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2215&context=etd>
- Entman, R. (1993). Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58.
- Fawcett, L. (2002). Why Peace Journalism Isn't News? *Journalism Studies*, 3(2), 213-223.
- Gabol, I. (2016). Cabinet Meeting Condemns Indian Govt for Calling Burhan Wani a Terrorist. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1271016>
- Gadda, D. N. (2014). 'Partial Journalism'—A Study of National Media of India and Kashmir. *Trends in Information Management*, 13(1), 13-23.
- Galtung, J. (1986). On the Role of the Media in Worldwide Security and Peace. *Universidad para La Paz*, 249-266.
- Galtung, J. (1998). High Road, Low Road: Charting the Course for Peace Journalism. *Trade Two* 7, 7-10.
- Gettleman, J., Hari Kumar, & Yasir, S. (2019). Deadly Shelling Erupts in Kashmir Between India and Pakistan After Pilot Is Freed. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/world/asia/kashmir-shelling-india-pakistan.html>
- Goffman, E. (1974; 1986). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston, Massachusetts: Northeastern University Press.
- Gurung, S. K. (2019). What Happened at Pulwama and History of Terror Attacks on Convoys. *Economic Times*. Retrieved from <https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/what-happened-at-pulwama-and-history-of-terror-attacks-on-convoys/articleshow/68019194.cms>
- Hanitzsch, T. (2004). Journalists as Peacekeeping Force? Peace Journalism and Mass Communication Theory. *Journalism Studies*, 5(4), 483-495.
- India's Surgical Strikes across Loc: Full Statement by DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh. (2017). *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-surgical-strikes-across-loc-full-statement-by-dgmo-lt-gen-ranbir-singh/story-Q5yrp0gjvxKPGazDzAnVsM.html>

- Ijaz, H. (2015). News Framing on Indo-Pak Conflicts in the News (Pakistan) and Times of India: War and Peace Journalism Perspective. *Mass Communication & Journalism*, 5(8).
- Jan, F., & Ashraf, S. I. (2017). Militarizing Malala: Global Media and Local Struggle. *The Dialogue*, XIII(4), 451-465.
- Jan, M., & Khan, M. R. (2011). Peace Journalism and Conflict Reporting: The Case of Pakistani Media. *South Asian Studies*, 26(2), 311-324.
- Khalid, H. (2014). Role of Peace Journalism in Indo-Pak Relation: A Case Study of Aman ki Asha. *NDU Journal*, 1-22. Retrieved from [https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra\\_pub/articles/ndu-journal/NDU-Journal-2014/01-Role-of-Peace-Journalism.pdf](https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/ndu-journal/NDU-Journal-2014/01-Role-of-Peace-Journalism.pdf)
- Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage.
- Lee, S. T., & Maslog, C. C. (2005). War or Peace Journalism? Asian Newspaper Coverage of Conflicts. *Journal of Communication*, 55(2), 311-329.
- Lynch, J., & Fischer, D. (2014). What is Peace Journalism?. *Transcend Media Service*. Retrieved from <https://www.transcend.org/tms/about-peace-journalism/1-what-is-peace-journalism/>
- Lynch, J., & McGoldrick, A. (2005). Peace Journalism in the Holy Land. *Media Development*, 52(1), 47-49.
- Mazrui, A. A. (1996). *East-West Dialogue*. USA: Armonk.
- McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (1972). The Agenda-setting Function of Mass Media. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36(2).
- Meenakshi, R. (2016, July 21). Kashmir on the Boil: A Timeline. Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.thehindu.com/news/national/kashmir-unrest-after-burhan-wanis-death/article14596369.ece/amp/>
- Mostafiz, M. (2017). Peace Journalism – A Global Debate. *Transcend Media Service*. Retrieved from <https://www.transcend.org/tms/2017/06/peace-journalism-a-global-debate-2>
- On Kashmir Attack, Shah Mahmood Qureshi Says 'Violence is Not the Govt's Policy'. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1464205>
- Peleg, S. (2006). Peace Journalism through the Lens of Conflict Theory: Analysis and Practice. *Conflict & Communication Online*, 5(2), 1-17.
- Perry, J. (2016). Pakistan Captures Indian Soldier Along Disputed Kashmir Border. *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/30/asia/kashmir-tensions-pakistan-capture-indian-soldier/index.html>
- Praveen Swami, & Shubhjit Roy. (2016). Uri attack: Jaish-e-Muhammad Suspects in Hand, Evidence shown to Envoy. *The Indian Express*. Retrieved from <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/uri-attack-jaish-suspects-in-hand-evidence-shown-to-envoy-3053717/>
- Press Trust of India. (2016). Wani's Killing: Curfew Lifted Across Kashmir After 99 Days of Unrest. *India Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/jammu-and-kashmir/story/kashmir-unrest-curfew-across-kashmir-lifted-burhan-wani-346696-2016-10-15>
- Press Trust of India. (2019). 2016 Surgical Strike A 'Figment Of Indian Imagination', There Was No Such Event: Pakistan. *Economic Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/amp/s/m.economictimes.com/news/defence/2016->

- surgical-strike-a-figment-of-indian-imagination-there-was-no-such-event-pakistan/amp\_articles/67376909.cms
- Reuters. (2019). How Pakistan, India pulled Back From Brink of War. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1470332/how-pakistan-india-pulled-back-from-brink-of-war>
- Riaz, S., Ahmad, S., & Shah, B. H. (2018). Kashmir Issue And Pak-Indian Press: Content Analysis of Leading Newspapers. *ISSRA Papers*, X(II), 53-68.
- Shinar, D. (2004). Media Peace Discourse: Constraints, Concepts and Building Blocks. *Conflict & Communication Online*, 3(1/2), 1-8.
- Siraj, S. A. (2008). War or Peace Journalism in Elite US Newspapers: Exploring News Framing in Pakistan-India Conflict. *ResearchGate*. Retrieved from [http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1303370133\\_44311323.pdf](http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1303370133_44311323.pdf)
- Slater, J., & Constable, P. (2019). Pakistan Captures Indian Pilot after Shooting Down Aircraft, Escalating Hostilities. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/pakistan-says-it-has-shot-down-two-indian-jets-in-its-air-space/2019/02/27/054461a2-3a5b-11e9-a2cd-307b06d0257b\\_story.html?arc404=true](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistan-says-it-has-shot-down-two-indian-jets-in-its-air-space/2019/02/27/054461a2-3a5b-11e9-a2cd-307b06d0257b_story.html?arc404=true)
- Sulehria, F. (2018). Kashmir as Unfinished Business of Partition. In A. Ranjan, *Partition of India*. Routledge India.
- Wolfsfeld, G. (2004). *Media and the Path to Peace*. Cambridge University Press.
- Yousaf, K. (2019). Pakistan Rejects India's Claim of Air Strikes, Casualties. *TRT World*. Retrieved from <https://www.trtworld.com/asia/pakistan-rejects-india-s-claim-of-air-strikes-casualties-24508>
- Zaheer, L. (2016). War or Peace Journalism: Comparative Analysis of Pakistan's English and Urdu Media Coverage of Kashmir Conflict. *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, 31(2), 713-722.
- Zia, A., & Hajrah, S. (2015). Use of Print Media for Conflict Escalation and Peace Building: A Case Study of Kashmir Dispute. *NDU University Journal*, 161-180.



**US Strategic Propensity towards  
India: Nuclear Bonding and  
Security Apprehensions for  
Regional Stability & Pakistan**

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 59-78  
njips.nust.edu.pk

**Asifa Jahangir**<sup>1</sup>  
**Furqan Khan**<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract**

The Indo-US strategic bonding is shifting the security dynamics of the South Asian balance-of-power in Indian favour. From the signing of 123 US-India Nuclear Deal to the facilitation in becoming a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the US has clearly designated India as an instrumental element in the American grand strategy of devising a 'new world order'. As a result, India has grabbed the opportunity of alleviating its status as a credible regional and global power. In this regard, the US tilt towards India is significantly paving grounds for a strategic imbalance in the South Asian region, thus creating challenges for Pakistan. Therefore, this paper argues that the growing bonhomie between the US and India is a destabilizing factor in the region which reinforces Pakistan's fast falling into the Chinese orbit; thereby cementing the old friendship into a new strategic partnership. This dynamic certainly gives China and Pakistan an incentive to work together so as to keep the value of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence alive. In an effort to expand the horizon on the subject, the paper is dedicated to critically examine the existing cooperation between India and the US while equally foreseeing the possible implications for the region in the face of such destabilizing cooperation. More importantly, based on qualitative data, this paper explores how Indo-US strategic partnership is directly impacting Pakistan and its strategic partnership with China; thereby explaining how the growing relationship between the US and India has undermined the traditional balance-of-power in the South Asian region?

**Keywords**

Indo-US strategic relationship, Pak-China, South Asia, balance-of-power, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

---

<sup>1</sup> *Dr Asifa Jahangir* holds a doctorate degree in South Asian Studies with expertise of International Relations from the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore. She is the Managing Editor to Journal of South Asian Studies published by ESci Journals Publishing.  
E-mail: ajcsas2327@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> *Furqan Khan* is currently a bachelor's student at the Department of International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad

## **Introduction**

The visit of the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defence Secretary James Mattis to New Delhi (in September 2018) achieved yet another milestone in the decade long strategic partnership between India and the US. The signing of the long-awaited agreement on the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) enables India to acquire the encrypted security equipment of the US. The agreement was a precondition for acquiring such sensitive equipment and 'security-focused' communication interoperability between the US and the Indian armed forces the agreements on sensitive military technologies and communications, understandably underpins the deep strategic ties between India and the US (Smith, 2008). The recent cooperation towards the Next Step for Strategic Partnership (NSSP) between the US and India was signed in 2004. The NSSP offers a general framework of cooperation in areas including civil nuclear and space activities and high-end trade with particular emphasis on missile defence which will increase commerce bonding and alleviate friendship to the next level of a strategic partnership between the two countries. More importantly, the NSSP has been linked with the stability in Asia (Statement on the Next Step, 2004, pp. 61-62). The close cooperation, however, has multi-faceted consequences for the regional security architecture or what Barry Buzan has termed as the 'Asian Super Complex' (see e.g., Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 109).

The Indo-US strategic partnership is a game of balance-of-power being played in the South Asian region. The US, being concerned with the growing influence of China, has demanded India to engage China in the Asiatic sphere to truncate it from challenging the hegemonic standing of the US. India on its part is trying to put up with the US; benefiting from the acquisition of advanced military hardware as well as perpetuating its dominance in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Having said that, India also tries to maintain its 'strategic autonomy' which is largely undermined in Washington and hence can disappoint her in using India as part of its Grand Strategy, that is to say, containing emerging China. Professor Ming Xia is optimistic about the US design and response to the concerns related to the emerging relationship between India and the US. According to him, the developments will certainly upset China and Pakistan, however with any potential confrontations. Furthermore, the two sides would be very careful not to create hostility, but to play the game of balance-of-power and realignment (personal communication, July 3, 2018). Similarly, India perceives China as an immediate threat not only because of its disputatious history but because of the latter's continuous assistance in building the conventional and nuclear capabilities of Pakistan.

Apart from the Sino-US controlled diplomatic confrontation, India views China as a key problem for its regional ascendancy. One of the opinions is that India is working to develop its military capabilities so as to bridle the ambitious Chinese aspirations in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. This is also because India believes in employing Indian exceptionalism, which is no less than inspiration from the American Exceptionalism; setting in motion the Indo-US strategic orientation in Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This, in large, also shows Indian reflection of Monroe Doctrine in South Asia; claiming South Asia as an exclusive sphere of influence. All this suggests India as a contender in the Asian 'superstructure' along with China pushing for attaining the global power status which can be described as a perfect archetypal of realpolitik in contemporary world politics. It is a matter of fact

that Sino-Indian competing aspirations are exploding to the global level, where the role of the US and its relationship with India are containing China.

The US' South Asian foreign policy, particularly for India and Pakistan, has always been oscillating right from the time of independence. Taking sides between the two does not necessarily suit the US in the long-run, though Washington often exploits the divide between New Delhi and Islamabad for her short-term benefit (Kux, 2001, pp. 34-36). Indian policymakers are aware of India as an inevitable instrument and potential power for the American Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific. India also considers her ever-increasing military power inevitable for the Americans to trust them for being a potential partner in controlling the South and East Asian politics, including China. However, the US chose a divided approach in maintaining relationships with Pakistan and India in view of the broad strategic interest in the region. Jahangir quotes a Pakistani professor, Syed Riffat Hussain while expressing his views about Chinese response to the growing Indo-US cooperation that 'the Chinese are very apprehensive that India would be a future rising military power. Therefore, China would like to keep Pakistan as a counterweight on its side to balance Indian power (2005, p. 116-117). The US, however, remained steady in riding both horses at the same time, i.e., its policy kept on oscillating between Pakistan and India where favouritism will scuttle the ship of the US aspirations in the region.

## **The Indo-US Strategic Partnership and Civil Nuclear Deal**

### ***Background of the US Realignment with Rising India***

As part of the US strategic understanding of the emerging trends in the 21st century, the recent wave of tariff barriers on Billions US dollars' worth Chinese products and its hard-pressing actions in the South China Sea counts for the tactical manoeuvring of US policy of containing China. This settles the stage for India becoming an area of interest as a strategic partner with a shared understanding of the vital strategic objectives in the region. This also ensures India's long-standing desire to becoming a regional hegemon with a due role in world politics. This, however, comes at the cost of the regional imbalance of the critical 'balance of power' which is already very fragile and is narrowed down to 'balance of threat' than a once balance of power in the region. Noting the fact that India has always enjoyed a conventional superiority *vis-a-vis* Pakistan, as the country acquired large-scale weapons and worked on military modernization programs. This shows the diverging nature of Indian objectives in the region and beyond in terms of extending its relations with the US against China in Asia. Owing to her approach towards the immediate and, more importantly, the extended neighbourhood, reflects at large the long-held Indian desire to become a regional and global power. India is effectively involved in manipulating the domestic politics of weaker regional states such as Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, and even Afghanistan. Moreover, being the largest democracy and geographically the largest country in the region, to have a check and balance in the region is largely viewed by the Indian policymakers as a legitimate right, thereby showing regional posture. Here, the US assist this change in power dynamics in South Asia in the purview of the 'American Exceptionalism' by establishing a special relationship with India and to assist her in acquiring the desired status in the region and the world *vis-à-vis* China (Chacka, 2013, pp. 332-333).

This also shows that Indian politicians and policy-makers have amalgamated the Nehruvian ‘peace diplomacy’ or bilateral partnerships approach of Indian foreign policy with the contemporary geopolitical understanding to alleviate her status as a Global power (Gupta, 2005, p. 14). The US envisages an ‘untapped’ potential in building a strategic partnership with her ‘natural partner’ in both strategic and economic spheres, partly because of the largest democracy and second-largest population (soon to be the first) in the world (Wilson, 2018). India owns the fourth position in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) with an annual growth rate of more than 7%. India is second to Saudi Arabia in the world ranking in terms of importing arms, which makes her a strategic bulwark as well as an economic market for the US (Jabeen, 2012, pp. 75-77). The US recognized India’s huge military, economic and diplomatic weight during the Clinton administration and hence incentivized India to bandwagon with the US, especially after 2001. The nuclear deal is part of this incentivization. The significance of India as an important market is described by Tellis as (2011, pp. 40-41):

India’s rise represents a net benefit for American interests; the growing challenges emerging in Asia will only bring the two countries closer than ever before. Keeping the focus on nurturing the relationship with India — which is the grand prize for maintaining a balance of power that favours the United States in Asia — will thus require committed attention on the part of American policymakers even when they might be otherwise distracted by the necessities of engaging other powers, including India’s competitors such as Pakistan and China.

Therefore, the US has developed strong ties with India as an ‘indispensable partner’ and as a counterweight to undo China’s fast-growing influence on the Asian and South Asia spectrum (Mohapatra, 2012, p. 4). Moreover, the US also expects Indian cooperation in dealing with challenges posed by terrorism, nation-building in Afghanistan, efforts of non-proliferation of nuclear and other WMDs with an emphasis on energy security (Ameer, 2019). This is important for India as they are dependent on the US presence for the security of billion dollars investment in Afghanistan. However, regional dynamics and orientation of the US are changing with the anticipated agreement in Doha peace talks and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

### **The Convergence of Interests — Indian and US Perspectives**

The Indo-US strategic partnership is dictated by a plethora of strategic, economic and political convergences. Colin L. Powell, the former US Secretary of State and former US Ambassador to India, Robert Black, have identified the immediate and longstanding common challenges faced by the US and India. These challenges have emerged as ‘common values and interests’ in this natural partnership. Such a set of complementary interests has steered the two countries to establish democratic societies endorsing tolerance, political freedom, representative government and a commitment to fight against terror (US Embassy in India, 2004). Strategically speaking, the natural partnership based on the similar democracy-led ideational

orientation between the two estranged democracies has evolved as a power partnership focussed on China as a mutual threat.

While representing the Obama administration, the former Assistant Secretary of State Asia, Nisha Desai Biswal, termed the Indo-US strategic convergence at the 'highest point' and equally emphasized on a need to continue bilateral engagement with a similar world view to understand the shared objective (Indo-US 'Strategic Convergence', 2017). Biswal's words reflected well in Trump's strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia when, after squeezing Pakistan for the 'do more', he termed India as the key economic and security partner of the US. While appreciating India's 'important contributions to the stability' in the region, the US President also urged India to 'do more' in nation-building in Afghanistan (Myer, 2017).

Though terming India's democracy coupled with the huge military and economic potential has advantages for the US, Nicholas Burns, who was the US Under-secretary of state for political affairs, has meticulously expressed that the rise of a 'democratic and increasingly powerful India' is a significant development for the broad range of interests of United States (Burns, 2007). Such a venture for achieving shared objectives is hardly generating any disarray, even in face of the democratically inconsistent practices such as the citizen act under the Modi government that is critical to the basic human rights of minorities in India.

Similarly, India perceives US policy, especially under Trump's administration, to be reflecting step towards its ambitious goals in the region vis-a-vis Pakistan. For instance, India's Former Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, while reacting to Trump's strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia states that 'Trump's call for Pakistan to discontinue the policy of supporting cross-border terrorism finds resonance with us' (India, US ask Pakistan to Act against Terror, 2018, n.d.). India expressed similar assent when the US withheld and conditioned the aid provided to Pakistan in the fight against terrorism what the Indians believe is being used against their interests.

### **The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal: Historical Background**

Until the late 1990s, the US was esteemed to propel the principles of the non-proliferation regimes and thus responded through sanctions when Pakistan conducted nuclear tests (in May 1998). However, As Ashon Carter argues that 'stance is never a policy' and the US, despite having embargoed India and Pakistan for their nuclear tests, deemed it necessary to change her behaviour towards emerging India. This can be attributed to the geopolitical change that has occurred across the Asian continent following the disintegration of the USSR in the late 1980s. The peaceful rise of China, nuclear explosions in the sub-continent and emerging India were some of the compelling factors that dragged the US to seek a strategic partnership in South Asia. India's democracy and huge economic potential attracted the US policy-makers and thus hinted for a strategic partnership between the countries. Following a series of strategic dialogue with India and the subsequent visits of (former) President Clinton, the US Joint Chief of Staff General Henry Shelton along with high-level officials from the Department of Defense (DoD) did much in easing nuclear-related sanctions

on India. The meetings of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), however, triggered a restart in defence cooperation between India and the US (Zhang, 2005, pp. 29-31).

The strategic partnership was re-enforced by the commitments made between the two countries during a visit of (former) President Bill Clinton in March 2001. Emphasizing on giving freedom and practicing democratic norms as the strongest basis for the shared destiny of peace and prosperity, President Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed that the shared ideals of the two major powers could transform our alliance into a natural partnership that will guide us towards achieving shared endeavours (US-India Relations, 2000). Such an overwhelming partnership was aimed to ensure long-term cooperation in shared socio-economic, political and strategic objectives. After transforming the status of China, from a 'constructive strategic partner' to a 'strategic competitor', the Bush administration sought to contain the Chinese ambitions in Asia and maritime activism in the Indian Ocean with a tier of bilateral and multilateral alliances around its periphery. This allowed the US to take India in countering the fast-breeding Chinese designs and growing influence on the South and South-East Asian spectrum. India seized the opportunity and reciprocated with unconditional support in the form of airbases and other logistics to the US military campaign in Afghanistan. She also hinted support for the Missile Defence Plan of the Bush administration, which was acknowledged by the US. In return, the Bush administration reciprocated by ending all nuclear-related sanctions over India which then emerged as her new 'strategic partner' (Mohapatra, 2012, p. 31). India was now embedded in the US foreign policy as a required tool to augment and translate a broad range of strategic objectives in the region and beyond.

In 2002, the US National Security Strategy Report was issued which concluded that the US interests require 'a relationship with India'. The report suggested, 'India's potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century' as the required basis for such a strategic alignment with the emerging South Asian power. Moreover, the US affirmed her commitment that she had strong intention to 'invest time and resources [into] building strong bilateral relations with India,' and 'work hard to transform our relationship accordingly' (George Bush, President of USA: The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America of 2002, 2002, p. 10). As part of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), the duration between 2002 and 2003 was marked with a number of high-level meetings with considerable cooperation ranging from the scientific and technical research to the joint military exercises. Moreover, the cooperation was aimed to alleviate the socio-economic development and to augment the law-enforcement capacity with a productive Track-II diplomacy (Zhang, 2005, pp. 30-31).

In 2004, the above-mentioned alignment was transformed into a robust strategic partnership following the initiative of the 'Next Steps in Strategic Partnership' (NSSP). This three-pronged strategic framework (Missile Defence was added as the fourth one) allowed India and the US to scale up their partnership in transfer of nuclear technology, technical assistance in civilian space programs, and trade in high-end military technology which should later include sophisticated missile defence systems (Tasleem, 2008, p. 25).

### Civil Nuclear Deal

With the NSSP sets course as a strategic framework of cooperation between India and the US, the two countries aspired to dramatize the nuclear cooperation and signed a comprehensive US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in June 2005 (Kerr, 2012: 2). The 10-year Defence Framework Agreement allowed India to escape the three-decades-long sanctions put in response to the 1974 nuclear tests (Interview — The Scholar as Secretary, September/October 2015). It expanded and entrenched this strategic alliance aimed at enlarging the Indian role in the Indian Ocean Region that results in a renewed balance of power politics in Asia with numerous players and competing interests. It unfolded a new era of an entrenched strategic partnership that re-enforced India's maritime activism in the farthest littorals of the Indian Ocean while also re-defined in parallel the traditional balance of power in South Asia with implications for Pakistan. This agreement as a watershed strategic framework materialized and was given legitimacy through the approval of the Congress on October 1, 2008 (Hosur, 2010, p. 437). Under the Civil Nuclear Deal, the following special arrangements were made for India;

- This provided the prospects for the recognition of India as a de facto nuclear weapon state by describing her 'responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states' (MoGoldrick, 2005, n.d.).
- India agreed to allow the inspection of her civil nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA). By March 2006, India pledged to put fourteen out of its total twenty-two nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA. She promised to sign an Additional Protocol (AP); thereby allowing a more intrusive inspection by the IAEA.
- During a visit to India, (former) President Bush acceded to an Indian plan which would seek to separate 'its civilian and military' nuclear facilities for inspection by the international watchdog, while India will show restraint in further nuclear tests and will help the US in implementing the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
- After taking necessary measures in the domestic laws of the US with Congress approval and that from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the agreement allows India to import sophisticated civil nuclear technology from the US. By the Hyde Act, Congress exempted India from doing nuclear commerce with the US, irrespective of the fact that India is non-signatory to the NPT and thus a non-declared nuclear weapon State. However, such nuclear commerce will comply with the legal obligations set by the IAEA such as the 'dual-use' of nuclear technology and fuel.
- The *123 Agreement* of July 2007 provided an operational basis for the commencement of nuclear trade between India and the US. This followed a series of negotiations between India and the IAEA that approved safeguards for the civilian nuclear facilities on a condition that India will utilize nuclear facilities and fuel for peaceful energy purposes and ensure non-proliferation on her part.
- Finally, after intense lobbying by the US, the agreement secured legitimacy from the NSG and granted an exceptional waiver to India with 'reasonable

conditions' of abiding by the export rule of nuclear material. After NSG exempting India from nuclear test ban followed by the Congress approval in September 2008, the agreement went into full force after the US President George W. Bush signed the final draft on October 10, 2008 (Akhtar, 2008/09, pp. 5-12). As part of the 'rebalance to Asia' strategy, President Obama tried to take the existing cooperation with India to new heights. The cooperation was enhanced in economic development, global politics, military hardware, leading to market integration, liberal democratic norms, capital investment and a new era of innovation in science and technology. Such a comprehensive engagement in the form of the strategic partnership was aimed to contain the Chinese ambitions in the South and South-East Asia.

### **Repercussions for Pakistan, South Asia Region, and the World**

The resulting thrust and repercussions of the Indo-US strategic partnership with special focus on the civil nuclear deal can be analyzed with respect to Pakistan's position, as it is the main victim with reference to the South Asian politics and power rivalries. In addition, it is also important to recognize the potential impacts of the afore-mentioned arguments on the Sino-Pakistan relations which are detailed in the subsequent sub-sections.

#### ***i) Repercussions for Pakistan***

A coherent analysis of the Indo-US nuclear deal indicates that Pakistan remains at the receiving end of and most affected country of the close Indo-US nuclear and military cooperation in the South Asian region ('Implications of Indo-US Nuclear Deal Discussed', 2008). Pakistan, having witnessed a continuous pattern of political instability, weak economic and financial conditions, has already been locked in a geostrategic competition with India. She has ensured over the past seven decades that India should not be allowed to become a regional hegemon, which in turn has forced the country to allocate a generous amount of its GDP to defense spending. Concurrently, the country is investing its resources in a long-term Global War on Terror (GWOt), a war that was imposed by the US which also remains the sole architect of India's hegemonic orientation in the region. Nevertheless, deal-raised Pakistan's fears took a high-up anticipating India's nuclear superiority after upgrading her nuclear facilities with modern technologies and sophisticated missile systems from the US

Consequently, the balance of power is gradually becoming irrelevant because of the discriminate nuclear cooperation between India and the US, which invariably accords the already advantageous in conventional terms Indian military superiority over Pakistan and by extension demonstrated US discrimination against Pakistan. This will put an end to the scope and practice of the deterrence stability in South Asian. This is because US support for India is matchless to the Chinese 'inferior' military and financial facilitation for Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan expressed her reservations over the following discriminatory and counter-productive developments of the nuclear deal.



***ii) Indian Separation Plan and Approval by Nuclear Supply Group***

As part of a series of developments between India and the US, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush announced the Indian Separation Plan on 20th March 2016. It was one of the controversial plans that ensured India's right to declare either a nuclear facility is civilian or military. This was significant because only the civilian nuclear facilities were to be offered for inspection by the IAEA. It means that not only it allowed India to place military facilities out of inspection but also to expand her nuclear program for strategic use as much as she deems it necessary for inspection. Soon after the announcement, India established multiple enrichment facilities with eight indigenous power reactors, Fast and Prototype Fast Breeder Test Reactors (FTBR), the three Heavy Water Plants and various strategic facilities of security significance such as a Prototype Naval reactor. Hence, the approval of the Indian Separation Plan from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) legitimized Indian freedom of choice to categorize her civilian and military nuclear facilities (Squassoni, 2007). Dr. Shaista Tabassum, Chairperson at the Department of International Relations in the University of Karachi has described three following nuclear benefits to India ('Implications of Indo-US Nuclear Deal discussed', 2008);

- First, irrespective of India's approval to allow IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities, the agreement allows India to designate which nuclear facility is civil and which is not.
- Second, the existing stockpiles of nuclear fuel and military facilities that were developed prior to the deal will be exempted from inspection.
- Third, the deal discusses only civil nuclear installations while leaves the ambitious and unlimited nuclear weapons programs with insufficient concern.

***iii) NSG Waiver to India for Dual Use of Nuclear Material and Technology***

The nuclear deal required a waiver from the Congress and the NSG. Congress granted legitimacy to the deal for the NSG, the US forwarded a draft in consultation with New Delhi to the NSG in August 2008. The draft sought a special exemption for India from the NSG's requirements of full-scope safeguards, without considering its non-signatory nature of the NPT. After an intense debate in the 45-member body, the draft was approved which dealt with India as a special case; thereby allowing her to use the nuclear for civilians as well as military purposes. The NSG statement, however, claimed that India acceded to a 'unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing' (Kerr, 2012). Such a waiver rendered suicidal repercussions for the regional security and balance of power in South Asia. Therefore, such a nuclear deal and the unprecedented waivers, with no condition to guarantee the non-diversion of nuclear fuel, were sufficient to encourage India for fissile material production and its use in making nuclear weapons (Mian et al., 2006, p. 119). Pakistan, fearing the collapse of her minimum credible deterrence (MCD) strategy, geared up her nuclear weapon program with respect to the 'evolving high-tech warfare structures including nuclear weapon development capacity, a delivery system in Indian defence arrangements' (Basrur, 2008, p. 6).

Hence, Pakistan was forced to take measures to ensure strategic balance with counter-measures to India's technological advancement, parallel to her defensive strategy of preserving the MCD. Professor Rasul Bakhsh Rais at the Department of

Humanities and Social Science in Lahore University of Management and Sciences justifies Pakistan's appropriate response and argues that "Pakistan must make the quality of its nuclear warhead or delivery system better rather than matching Indian nuclear strength" (Basrur, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, the waiver also signifies a transparent discriminatory approach towards Pakistan. Consequently, the waiver for the Dual Use of critical nuclear material allowed India to supersede Pakistan in both conventional and non-conventional power with dramatic consequences for the region.

#### ***iv) Boosting up Indian Military Might***

Besides the aforementioned superiority and relief, India was already enjoying a credible conventional military superiority over Pakistan. A report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ranks India as the top arms importer between 2013 and 2017; with Russia supplying 62% while the US and Israel 25% and 11% respectively (Wezeman et al., 2018, p. 8). Moreover, A. K. Antony, the then Indian Defence Minister, expressed in 2009 that '70% of India's military equipment was imported' (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2010, p. 168). The deal also encouraged India to try to implement her hostile designs in the region with resulting in aggression. During the last decade, India has consistently conveyed 'to prepare themselves for a nightmare scenario: a two-front war with nuclear-armed Pakistan and China' (Swami, 2012). Such hostile intentions have a flared-up arms race in the region because Indian military stock is mostly Chinese-oriented subsequent to Pakistan. This was also mentioned in the SIPRI Yearbook of 2010 that Indian military advancement is aimed to gain 'superiority over China and Pakistan' as to reduce 'China's threat which has always been a perennial notion of Indian defence and foreign policy circles and in the Indian media.'

Concurrently, India is expanding her military resources through procurement from the US, Russia, and Israel including fighter jets, missile technology, cruise missiles development, Various SAMs and Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System (ABMs). Indian strategic partnership with the US is to secure three objectives: 'the legalization of its nuclear status, a permanent seat on the SC, and international recognition of the Line of Control (LOC) as the border between India and Pakistan' (Gupta, 2005, pp. 28-29). However, Barack Obama as well as the subsequent Trump administration have categorically called for a bilateral solution of the Kashmir problem and did not side India in obvious terms ('President Trump Dismissive of Third-Part Role on Kashmir', 2018; Shaukat, 2010). However, the US did not side India but still insisted on dealing with Kashmir as a bilateral issue, contrasting Pakistan's perspective of Kashmir being an international dispute. Hence, the US adamant position on Kashmir and endorsement of India's cause for the permanent reservation in the UN Security Council renders intrusive implications on Pakistan's national interests. This is because India will have the opportunity to veto any development favoring Pakistan such as the resolutions on Kashmir while pushing for actions that will run counter to Pakistan's national security interests.

#### **Preserving India's Strategic Autonomy – Pakistani Perspective**

By signing this deal back in 2005, India attained an unprecedented position in the nuclear world. She did not only open a corridor to civil nuclear cooperation with the world but also managed to retain her principled stance on the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which the country is reluctant to become a signatory. India achieved this unprecedented status without giving too much in return; securing her arms open in developing nuclear weapons. This means that India was successful in securing its 'strategic autonomy'. The deal rendered India a de facto recognition as a nuclear-weapon state, irrespective of its non-signatory nature at NPT. This was the reason when China tried to condition any such recognition to similar treatment with Pakistan (Mian et al., 2006, p. 119).

***i.) Fake Indian Energy-Related Justifications***

One of the major justifications provided by the Indian and US officials about the need for the nuclear deal is that it will address the growing energy needs of the Indian economy. While facing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the deal, Secretary Rice argued that 'civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India will help meet its rising energy needs without increasing its reliance on unstable foreign sources of oil and gas, such as nearby Iran' (Muhammad, 2006, p. 12). However, currently, India is consuming 11% of energy sources such as gas, coal, oil, wind power and nuclear energy for power generation. Out of the total 11%, nuclear power contributes only 2-3%, which, according to the proponents of the above argument, will increase only up to 6.5% or 8% by 2025. It means the argument is not valid, as the deal will not bring any significant increase to the Indian power generation (ibid). Conversely, India has relied ambitiously on nuclear commerce to augment her weapons production capability as well as capacity. Recently, Pakistan's foreign ministry termed India's nuclear program as the fastest growing and claimed to have enough fuel to produce 2600 nuclear weapons ('India Capable of making 2,600 Nuclear Weapons', 2017).

Hence, the main prospect for the deal was to focus more on accelerating India's nuclear weapons program with little priority of power generation. Irrespective of the fact, that the US has kept 'the right of return if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement,' (Jaspal, 2008, n.d.). However, the IAEA safeguards will still not be able to stop India from using the advanced civil nuclear technology for critical use in weapons production. This was because the deal allowed technology provided for civil purposes to be transferred for military uses because as noticed that 'a significant proportion of India's nuclear complex to remain outside IAEA safeguards and continues to have a strategic function' (Mian et al., 2006, p. 125). Thus, 'nuclear testing by India might enable it to wield nuclear weapons and much larger explosive power than those currently it has and it might let India change its nuclear strategy against China or Pakistan' (Ferguson et al., 2006, p. 11).

***ii) Repercussion for South Asian Region and the World Destabilised Strategic Balance of South Asian leads to Arm Competition***

One of the anticipated consequences of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal was that 'if it implemented without checking India's potential to increase its fissile stocks and eliminating any possibility by India of improving its nuclear weapons could lead to arms competition in the region involving Pakistan, India, and China, thus destabilizing the entire region and making India a global, as well as a regional military power, seems primary aim of the US' (Muhammad, 2006, p. 119). This is evident by advancements made by both Pakistan and China in their respective nuclear

missile programs, in response to India's nuclear modernizations. Since 2008, Pakistan has conducted more than a dozen successful nuclear missile tests including Ra'ad, Babur, improved version of Ghauri and Abdali (Pakistan Missile Chronology, 2011) and Shaheen III as well as a MIRV capable Ababeel in January 2017 (Pakistan Conducts First Flight Test of Ababeel, 2017).

### ***iii) Source of Expanding Indian Role in Afghanistan***

The growing nuclear cooperation between the two countries took its assent on eve of the US invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing Global War on Terror (GWOt) in 2001. The drive for nuclear cooperation between India and the US started on the onset of the Global War on Terror and the US invasion of Afghanistan. America was not only seeking a huge market for nuclear technology but also sought an ally that could help her in dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, especially in the nation-building and post-war reconstruction. This is why, the deal brought the two strategic partners together, and it also allowed the US to give India a major role in the strategically important Afghanistan. India has gained a considerable presence in Afghanistan and is investing billions of dollars in expanding her influence through reconstruction and building the Afghan economy. Being in the immediate neighborhood and the associated strategic interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan has always objected to such an unnecessary role of India in the country. (Pakistan fears Indian influence in Afghanistan, 2017). President Trump's 'request' to India for a major role in Afghanistan while announcing his strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia underscores this ambitious design (Masood, August 22, 2017). Therefore, there are chances that the vacuum left with the exit of the US troops from Afghanistan will be filled by India that is growing concerned for its investment and security imperatives.

### **US Hybrid Role in the canvas of South Asian Politics**

The US has been playing a hybrid role in South Asia since 1947 that has ample implications for an unending arms build-up by both Pakistan and India. The United States relations with Pakistan are mostly transient and largely affected by the US' close cooperation with India and her pro-Indian stance. In the nuclear realm, the US voiced concerns and opposed Pakistan's nuclear program since it gained momentum in the 1980s. Despite having deep nuclear engagement with India, the US has deplored Chinese assistance in developing Pakistan's nuclear program. Conversely, the US has endorsed nuclear assistance to India and even lobbied for a waiver to her non-NPT status. Such discriminatory cooperation is aimed to give India an edge in developing her nuclear security apparatus against China (Tasleem, 2008). However, Pakistan continuously and appropriately responds to any nuclear development in South Asia as she believes Pakistan's nuclear posture is aimed to act as a credible deterrent in the South Asian balance of power. Such a scenario has forced Pakistan and China to believe that the increasing supply of advanced conventional and non-conventional arms to India will indiscriminately widen the already unequal military capabilities between Pakistan and India in addition to the economic and strategic misbalance. Another analyst says that 'the single superpower with very important stakes in South Asia, the US should pursue the procedures that should contain rather than support an arms competition in the region. The Indo-US deal is a clear sign that the US no longer will deal with India and Pakistan as an equal competitor in South

Asia and that it has at last recognized India as the leading power in the region' (Fani, 2009: 150). As a result of this deal and augmented US's cooperation, India has already been developing her sea power with an eye on attaining credible Second Strike Capability (SSC) which will wilfully endanger prospects for peaceful and strategically secure Indian Ocean region. India is thriving to augment her sea-based platforms equipped with nuclear missiles. She is seeking cooperation from Russia, the US, and other NSG member states to meet her 'security requirements' in the Indian Ocean with respect to China. Back in April 2012, India commissioned its first Nuclear Submarine, of Russian Origin, "INS Chakra-II" to her naval fleet in the Indian Ocean (Kashani, 2012).

More recently on 6th November 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that India has inducted INS Arihant nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and completed the "first deterrence patrol" in the Indian Ocean (Pandit, November 6, 2018). This is a dangerous development that can accelerate the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has voiced concerns over the deterrence patrol of the INS Arihant and cautioned against a 'renewed' arms race in the region (Bokhari, November 12, 2009).

Moreover, the US is increasing India's capacity by modernizing its arms and through technology transfer coupled with a series of military exercises with Indian military to secure sea-lanes of communications of South and Southeast Asia (Sutter, 2006, p. 48). The US and Indian navies carried out joint military drills at different positions near the Strait of Malacca, for instance in 2002 and in September 2007 in the Bay of Bengal while in October 2008 in the Arabian Sea known as the 'Malabar Exercises'. Moreover, a joint multilateral air exercise named as 'the Red Flag' has held in the US For countering insurgency, India is training US army troops since 2008 (Akhtar, 2008-09, pp. 24-25). The Malabar Naval War-Game was conducted between the Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defence Forces (JMSDF) and the US Navy in June 2018 in the waters of Guam and Philippine Sea (Gady, 2018). The dominating opinion exists in the analysts that the motive behind India's acquisition of the latest weapons and technology is to compete with China and are not merely to defend her as is justified by India. India and the United States are also concerned about China's billion dollars economic and strategic plans for Gwadar Sea-port in Baluchistan to enhance regional connectivity and can be used as a maritime chokepoint for checking Indo-US naval manoeuvring in the Indian Ocean (Shaukat, 2010).

Apart from having dreadful consequences for regional stability, the nuclear deal between the US and India and close strategic partnerships also render multifaceted consequences at the global level. Some of the major global level security concerns of Indo-US civil nuclear deal are listed as follows;

- The discriminatory nature of the deal rollbacks the decade long non-proliferation efforts under the NPT.
- This deal has politicized the humanely dangerous issue of proliferation.
- This deal allows India to utilize advance nuclear technology and access to an unlimited supply of nuclear energy without even being a signatory to the NPT which encourages the rest of the states to take the NPT status for granted and use nuclear fuel for dual

purposes. Countries like Iran and North Korea got a considerable justification for their nuclear weapons production program.

- This deal also questioned the credible nature of the so-called non-proliferation regimes such as the NSG and their non-proliferation efforts as the waiver by the NSG opened a new window for the legitimate proliferation of nuclear technology among the great powers.
- This deal encouraged other states of the world to allow the IAEA to inspect only the civil nuclear installations and keep the military installations of weapons production un-safeguarded.

### **Way Forward: Pakistan, a Key Player for Stability of India and South Asian Region**

Pakistan has become a critical 'peace player' for South Asia not only for the US regarding American-Taliban talks for the Afghanistan peace process but also for regional stability and security as a result of its proactive role for winning the diplomatic war following the recent Pulwama attack. The attack on the Indian forces in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir on February 14, 2019, provided yet another test for Pakistan to highlight its relevance in regional peace and stability in terms of proposed nuclear war in South Asia. The uproar in Indian government and media, accusing Pakistan of perpetrating the attack without even investigation, was tackled with due caution and responsibility by Imran Khan's government and Chief-of-Army Staff, Qamar Javaid Bajwa. Despite assurances by PM Imran Khan of acting on perpetrators, if found guilty based on solid evidence, encouraged by its military muscles and triggered by the domestic political compulsion, Modi's government resorted to aggression in the form of futile surgical strikes in Balakot (Bokhari, Frahan&Kazmin, Amy, February 26, 2019). The strikes were responded immediately the next day by Pakistan Air Force with two of the Indian jets shot down and a pilot taken in custody. The Prime Minister Imran Khan revitalized Pakistan's commitment to peace during his address to Pakistani parliament and handed the pilot over to India within 24 hours as a 'peaceful gesture' (Safi, Michael & Malik, Mehreen, March 1, 2019). These developments were important since both India and Pakistan were almost inching closer for a nuclear war with possible missile strikes in consideration (Nuclear-armed India & Pakistan, 2019). Adding to all this, the Indo-US nuclear cooperation challenges the nuclear parity in the region which starkly encourages the superior to strike the inferior with impunity. In March, following tensions between the two countries, US has signed an agreement with India for building 'six nuclear power plants' which raises questions over either the US is desirous to see a power balance in the region or not (the US to provide six Nuclear Powers Subs, 2019).

While analyzing the implications of the Indo-US close strategic partnership, the fact remains that the geostrategic position with considerable stakes in the region, Pakistan can never be ignored as irrelevant. Especially the US, largely engaged in a GWOt in Afghanistan, cannot side-line Pakistan and her role in the evolving geopolitical developments in South Asia and beyond. President Barak Obama, while responding to question during his 2010 visit to India; why Pakistan remains vital to the US so far it has not declared Pakistan as a terrorist state?, explained that 'Pakistan is an enormous country. It is a strategically important country not just for the United

States but for the world. I am absolutely convinced that the country that has the biggest stake in Pakistan's success in India. If Pakistan is stable and prosperous that's good because India is on the move and it absolutely is in its interests at the time when you succeed in incredible ways on the global economic stage. You want the distraction of your security and instability in the region. So my hope is to trust will develop between India and Pakistan' (Slap on Indian, 2010).

On the contrary, Donald Trump presented his South Asian strategy in August 2017, wherein, he tried to continue the policies of the previous administration, i.e. de-linking Pakistan and India, and demand of 'do more' for Pakistan in light of Af-Pak strategy. Three compulsions forced Trump to revisit its relationship with Pakistan (Kayani et al., 2018). (1) Trump has taken to u-turn in order to distance from Pakistan as a result of rising of an unknown entity to power — Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in Pakistan subsequent to the general election of July 2018. The PTI government took a firm stand of an equal and balanced relationship with the US along with providing supporting hand to America for its respectable exit from Afghanistan. However, not ready to sacrifice Pakistan's interests anymore for others' interests. (2) Pakistan's closeness with China due to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and (3) Pakistan's strategic proximity with Afghanistan which is a sole option for Afghan peace in the way of the US forces' withdrawal from Afghan land. Ultimately, Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, expressed that America wants good relations with Pakistan and expressed the desire to strengthen cooperation in multiple areas. (Khalilzad appreciates Pakistan's role, 2019). Additionally, Zalmay Khalilzad, United States Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation so appreciated Pakistani role in the on-going dialogue process for bringing peace and stability in the war-ravaged country of Afghanistan. As he stated 'What they [Pakistan] do on Afghanistan to facilitate peace and reconciliation, which has been a burden on the relationship, that will be removed. Pakistan is an important country with which we want to have better relations' (Khalilzad appreciates Pakistan's role, 2019).

Moreover, it has been argued that 'Pakistan's geostrategic location makes it a frontline state in the political, economic and military-strategic contexts of regional and international relations. It also offers challenges for Pakistan to architect its foreign policy in accordance with the quadrilateral China-Pakistan-India-US linkage' (Naz, 2011, p. 1). This, however, needs to be realized at a national level as well. It is up to Pakistan's policy-makers that how they evaluate the emerging geopolitical trends and policy transformations and respond to these geo-political realities in a way so as to maximize the potential benefits of the state in this highly complex anarchy of the international system. This is evident from the relevance of Pakistan in the possible peace settlement in Afghanistan which implies the crucial strategic importance of Pakistan in the realm of changing regional dynamics.

## **Conclusion**

The emerging geopolitical environment in South Asia and beyond has modified Pakistan's strategic outlook with a new dimension of the 'Look East' policy (Ansar, 2011). However, Pakistan is enjoying a multi-faceted warmer partnership and strategic alignment of interests with China. Both the 'Iron Brothers' have transformed their relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership over the past seven decades. Peaceful co-existence, mutual trust, alignment of interests with win-win ventures are the significant features of Pak-China friendship. Also, such an alignment

is independent of any regional or extra-regional relationship and exhibits a mutual ground on regional and global issues. Pakistan and China are firm to survive 'the winds of change with maturity and self-confidence and in keeping with the soul and spirit of their relationship' (Ahmad, 2006).

The Indo-US civil nuclear deal is consistent with and a 'mirror image' of both US' and India's antagonistic China-centric approach. As part of the psychological manipulation, the western world has long been dubbing Pakistan's nuclear bomb as the 'Islamic Bomb', the western world has long been associating Pakistan's nuclear bomb as "Islamic bomb", therefore, during 21st century, both are propagating that Pakistan's nuclear program is insecure while increasing Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in region and nuclear terrorism. Nevertheless, Pakistan and China have expanded their cooperation mainly as the result of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal that is based on energy purposes finalized since 2008 but actually a defense-oriented deal. Pakistan and China maintained 1986 agreement as a baseline for their nuclear energy cooperation by signing the civil nuclear deal of 2009 and aim of providing Chasma-3 and Chasma-4 power plant by which Pakistan would overcome its severe energy problem after the refusal of civil nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan on an equal basis as it has done to India.

Indian and US media have portrayed Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the civil nuclear sphere as a 'counter' to the Indo-US deal and equate both deals ('World's Double Standards on Pakistan-China Nuclear Deal', 2010). India and the US showed concerns by cross-questioning about China-Pakistan civil nuclear deal of 2009. However, both states criticized internationally when they raised the point and demanded 'clarification' after the Sino-Pakistan civil nuclear deal of 2009. As Pakistan's stance was that India has no right to raise objections and concerns on the agreement as India has signed a civil nuclear pact with the US, Canada is now also exploring the possibility of civil nuclear cooperation with Japan (Bokhari, 2009). Contrarily, the questions have been raised by China and Pakistan about the world's double standards to the international community especially to the US and India. Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistani former ambassador to the US and senior analyst argued that 'all the fuss' over providing Chinese nuclear power reactors to Pakistan may just be for 'an orchestrated campaign' against Sino-Pakistan strategic cooperation while all this was done under full international safeguards. She stated, 'Indian eighth civilian nuclear deal with Canada on the sidelines of last month's G20 meeting including France, Russia for the same kind of deals since the exemption it received from NSG in the wake of the Indo-US nuclear accord that entered into force in 2008' have exposed the world's double standards regarding non-nuclear proliferation strategy and especially Pakistan and China altogether (Lodhi, 2010).

In the coming scenario, it is expected that continuous Indo-US strategic engagement and using cards of the largest and most powerful democracies, their partnership would continue to be an important factor to push China and Pakistan together. Pakistan would help China balance its relationship with India. Pakistan would be an important ally for China in international organizations such as the UN. This is clearly evident by the continuous vetoing of UN resolutions backed by India and its allies, especially the US, calling for designating Masood Azhar as a global terrorist' (Pakistan's Masood Azhar, 2019). Yang Jiemian, president of SIIS argues that the Chinese want to bring a 'new strategic framework' wherein it could extend its strategic partnership with Pakistan independently. Moreover, another Chinese



analyst's view is that the continuing military competition among strategic triangle players may change soft balancing into a hard one. Besides due to the US policy of containing China and its competitors to US partners around the Chinese periphery, China's top priority is to 'maintain periphery stability and make neighbors partners' (Akhtar, 2008/09, p. 38). In this entire scenario, Pakistan seems the most reliable partner for China and China is very important for Pakistan as well. For Pakistan, no other country is willing to give nuclear weapons to Pakistan but Chinese have been giving. Both can continue to pursue a countervailing strategy of Indo-US nuclear collaboration in the future.

## References

- Ahmad, S. (2006). A Special Friend Comes Calling. *The Nation*.
- Akhtar, S. (2008-09). Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Implications for China. *Regional Studies*, XXVII (1), 5-12.
- Ameer, H. (2019). Pakistan Sensitive about Trump's Call for India's Role in Fighting Terrorism in Afghanistan. *India Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-trump-call-india-role-fighting-terrorism-afghanistan-1590673-2019-08-2>
- Ansar, A. (2011). Pakistan's 'Look East' Policy. *Pakistan Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/11/20/pakistan%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98look-east-policy%E2%80%99/>
- Basrur, R. M. (2008). Minimum Deterrence and Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy. *Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)*.
- Bokhari, F. (2009). China to Help Pakistan Builds 2 Nuke Plants. *CBS News (World)*. Retrieved from [http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202\\_162-4530697.html](http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-4530697.html)
- Bukhari, F. (2018). Indian Nuclear Submarine Provokes Pakistan to Renew Arms Race. *Nikkei Asian Review*. Retrieved from <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/India-s-nuclear-submarine-provokes-Pakistan-to-renew-arms-race>
- Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chacko, P. (2014). A New 'Special Relationship'? Power Transitions, Ontological Security, and India-US Relations. *International Studies Perspectives*, 15 (3), 329-346.
- D. (2001). *The United States and Pakistan 1947-200 Disenchanted Allies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fani, M. I. (2009). The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan. *Journal of Pakistan Vision*, 10, 150.
- Fazal-ur-Rahman. (2011). Pakistan-China Trade and Investment Relations. Pakistan-China Relations-2011: Year of Friendship. Islamabad: *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Pakistan*.
- Ferguson, M. A. (2006). US-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy of Moving Forward. *Council Special Report, Council on Foreign Relations*.
- Fred MoGoldrick, H. B. (2005). The US-India Nuclear Deal: Taking Stock. Retrieved from [armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org): <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1899>

- Gady, F.-S. (2018). India, US and Japan to Hold Malabar War-games this Week. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/india-us-and-japan-to-hold-malabar-naval-war-games-this-week/>
- George Bush, President of USA: The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America of 2002. (2002). Government Printing Office, *the White House*. Retrieved from <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf>
- Gupta, A. (2005). The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests? *Institute of Strategic Studies at US Army War College*.
- Hosur, P. (2010). The Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement: What's the Big Deal? *International Journal*, 435-448.
- Implications of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal Discussed. (2008). *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/787821>
- India Capable of making 2,600 Nuclear Weapons. FO. (2017). *The Nation*. Retrieved from <https://nation.com.pk/18-May-2017/india-capable-of-making-2-600-nuclear-weapons-fo-spokesperson>
- India, US ask Pakistan to Act against Terror Emanating from Its Soil. (2018). *NDTV*. Retrieved from <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-us-ask-pakistan-to-act-against-terror-emanating-from-its-soil-1912514>
- Indo-US "Strategic Convergence" at Highest Point: Obama Administration. (2017). *The Hindu*. Retrieved from <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/indo-us-%e2%80%98strategic-convergence%e2%80%99-at-highest-point-obama-administration/article17040357.ece>
- Interview: The Scholar as Secretary: a Conversation With Ashton Carter. (2015). *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2015-08-05/scholar-secretary>
- Jabeen, M. (2012). Indian Aspiration of Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council and American Stance. *Current Affairs*, 75-77.
- Jahangir, A. (2012). *China-Pakistan Strategic Partnership: Challenges and Prospects*. Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing.
- Jaspal, Z. N. (2008). Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Altering Global Nuclear Order'. *Strategic Studies*, 27(2-3), 18-38.
- Ji, Y. (2009). Obama's Asian Policy: Change and Continuity. *EAI Background Brief*, no. 425, 5-6.
- Kashani, S. (2012). Indian Navy inducts n-powered attack submarine INS Chakra. *India Strategic*. Retrieved from [http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1440\\_Indian\\_Navy\\_inducts\\_n-powered\\_submarine.htm](http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1440_Indian_Navy_inducts_n-powered_submarine.htm)
- Kayani, U., & Shah, S. (2018). Better The Alliance You Know: The Problem with Trump's Pakistan Strategy. *South Asian Voices*. Retrieved from <https://southasianvoices.org/better-the-alliance-you-know-trump-pakistan/>
- Kazmin, A., & Bokhari, F. (2019). India carries out a 'Pre-Emptive' Airstrike on Pakistan Terror Camp. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/7c158bbc-397a-11e9-b72b-2c7f526ca5d0>
- Kerr, P. K. (2012). US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress. *Congressional Research Service*. Retrieved from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.pdf>

- Khalilzad Appreciates Pakistan's Role in the Afghan Peace Process. (2019). *The Nation*. Retrieved from <https://nation.com.pk/09-Feb-2019/zalmay-khalilzad-lauds-pakistans-crucial-role-in-inter-afghan-dialogue>
- Kux, Lodhi, M. (2010). Nuclear Double Speak. *The Khaleej Times*.
- Masood, S. (2017). Trump's request for India's Help in Afghanistan Rattles Pakistan. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/asia/pakistan-trump-afghanistan-india.html>
- Mohapatra, B. (2012). India-US Strategic Partnership and the Challenges of Enhanced Cooperation. *India and US in the 21st Century: Building a New Partnership*. 4.
- Muhammad, A. S. (2006). Indo – US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Implications on South Asian Security Environment. *Henry L. Stimson Centre*. Retrieved from [www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research.../AdilSultan.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research.../AdilSultan.pdf)
- Myer, F. (2017). Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia. *The Whitehouse*. Retrieved from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/>
- Naz, N. (2011). Prospects for Pak-China Relations in 2011: Political, Militant and Public Views. *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 4 (1), 1.
- Nuclear-armed India & Pakistan Vowed Missile Strikes during Kashmir Standoff – Report. (2019). *Russian Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.rt.com/news/454043-india-pakistan-missile-strikes/>
- Pakistan Conducts First Flight Test of Ababeel Surface-to-Surface Missile. *Dawn*. (2017). Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1310452>
- Pakistan fears Indian Influence in Afghanistan, say US Spy Chiefs. *Dawn*. (2017). Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1335988>
- Pakistan's Masood Azhar: China Blocks Bid to Call a Militant Terrorist. (2019). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47565132>
- Pakistan Missile Chronology. *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. (2011). Retrieved from [https://media.nti.org/pdfs/pakistan\\_missile.pdf](https://media.nti.org/pdfs/pakistan_missile.pdf)
- Pandit, R. (2018). Nuclear Submarine INS Arihant Completes Patrol, Country's Nuclear Triad Operational. *Times of India*. Retrieved from <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/as-nuclear-sub-arihant-returns-after-first-deterrence-patrol-indias-nuclear-triad-complete/articleshow/66515624.cms>
- Pieter D. Wezeman et al. (2018). Trends in International Arms Transfer 2017. *SIPRI Fact Sheet*. Retrieved from [https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri\\_at2017\\_0.pdf](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf)
- President Trump Dismissive of Third-Part Role on Kashmir. (2018). *New Indian Express*.
- Safi, M. & Malik, M. (2019). Pakistan returns Indian Pilot shot down over Kashmir in 'Peace Gesture'. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/01/pakistan-hands-back-indian-pilot-shot-down-over-kashmir-in-peace-gesture>

- Sam Perlo-Freeman et al. (2011) Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. *SIPRI Yearbook 2011*. Retrieved from <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/files/SIPRIYB1104-04A-04B.pdf>
- Shaukat, S. (2010). Impact of Obama's Visit. *Pakistan Observer*.
- Siddique, J. (2013). Gwadar Port Control Goes to China Today. *Dawn*.
- Smith, J. (2008). COMCASA: Another Step Forward for the United States and India. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/comcasa-another-step-forward-for-the-united-states-and-india/>
- Squassoni, S. (n.d.). India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views. Congressional Research Service. *Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress*.
- Statement on the Next Step for Strategic Partnership with India. (2004). Retrieved from <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2004-01-19/pdf/WCPD-2004-01-19-Pg61-2.pdf>
- Sutter, R. G. (2006). China's Rise: Implications for US leadership in Asia. *Policy Studies, the East-West Centre Washington*.
- Swami, P. (2012). Inside India's Defence Acquisition Mess. *The Hindu*.
- Tasleem, S. (2008). Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation: Altering Strategic Positioning & Shifting Balance of Power in South Asia. *Policy Studies, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies*.
- Tellis, A. J. (2011). Ebb and Tide: Has the US-Indian strategic partnership bombed? *Force*, 40-41.
- Tkacik, J. J. (2011). The Enemy of Hegemony is My Friend: Pakistan's De facto Alliance with China. *Reassessing American Grand Strategy in South Asia*, 3.
- US Embassy in India. (2004). People, Progress and Partnership: the Transformation of US-India Relations. *New Delhi Embassy*. Retrieved from <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/wwwhppp.html>
- US-India Relations: A Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. (2000). *Joint US-India Statement, Fact Sheet, released by the Office of the Press Secretary*. Retrieved from [https://19972001.state.gov/global/human\\_rights/democracy/fs\\_000321\\_us\\_india.html](https://19972001.state.gov/global/human_rights/democracy/fs_000321_us_india.html)
- US to Build Six Nuclear Power Plants in India. (2019). *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/build-nuclear-power-plants-india-190314072408714.html>
- Wilson, J. (2018). The Importance of Advancing US-India Partnership. *The Hill*. Retrieved from <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/409195-the-importance-of-advancing-the-us-india-partnership>
- World's Double Standards on Pakistan-China Nuclear Deal. *Link Muslims*. (2010). Retrieved from <http://www.linkmuslims.com/worlds-double-standards-on-pakistan-china-nuclear-deal>
- Zaki, M. A. (n.d.). China of Today and Tomorrow: Dynamics of Relations with Pakistan. *Joint Conference of Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad & Pakistan Study Centre of Sichuan University, Chengdu-China*.
- Zhang, G. (2005). US-India Strategic Cooperation: Implications for China and Pakistan. *Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario. Area Study Centre at the University of Sindh*. 29-31.

## **India-Pakistan Relationship: A Case of Perpetual Instability**

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 79-93  
njips.nust.edu.pk

**Tanzeela Khalil<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract**

The study aims to dispassionately analyze what the future holds for Indo-Pak relations. The two sides have maintained strained relations since their independence from the British Colonial rule in 1947. It appears unlikely that India will change its course of action owing to the US support and resultant dismissiveness towards Pakistan's peace overtures. The current security situation between India and Pakistan is presumed to be unprecedented because of Prime Minister (PM) Modi's history of personal involvement in actions against Muslims and Pakistan. Therefore, the improvement in bilateral relations cannot be expected until the time some major compromises are made by the leadership on both sides. The lack of convergence in how each side views its security along with a long history of mistrust, are the root causes of this strained relationship. Although the broader dynamics of the Indo-Pak relationship cannot be analyzed in isolation from the very presence of nuclear weapons in the region; however, the occurrence or non-occurrence of crisis between India and Pakistan is not primarily subject to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. The actual causes of conflict remain the non-resolution of outstanding disputes. To this end, India lacks a demonstrable and consistent political will to resolve conflicts through a spirit of accommodation, compromise, and reconciliation.

### **Keywords**

India, Pakistan, nuclear weapons, border dynamics

### **Introduction**

Since independence, Pakistan and India have had a very uneasy relationship. The source of conflict largely rests in the territorial disputes amongst which the Kashmir issue has remained the central focus. In terms of resolution of outstanding disputes, Pakistan and India have failed to develop a comprehensive mechanism to address these issues and have rather adopted a security-driven approach leading to at least three wars (1948, 1965 and 1999), along with several crises that had the potential to escalate. This approach has not yielded any favorable outcomes.

Only a few episodes of temporary peace could be traced between India and Pakistan. Until recently, Pakistan was keen to resume the long-stalled peace process and for that, the Pakistani leadership went out of the way more than once.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Tanzeela Khalil* a Former Visiting Fellow South Asia Center at Atlantic Council, Washington DC and a graduate of National Defense University, Islamabad. Her areas of interest include doctrinal and missile developments in South Asia.

E-mail: tanzeela\_khalil@hotmail.com

Unfortunately, **all have** met with rebuffs and hostile statements. The hostility between the two has only aggravated in the past several years particularly after the BJP government's coming into power in the year 2014. PM Narendra Modi's pro-Hindu nationalist policies have increased the unfavorable views regarding Pakistan. There appears to be greater hostility towards Pakistan following PM Modi's re-election in 2019.

Unlike India, the resolution of outstanding disputes and resumption of bilateral dialogue with India are seen as common points in the election manifestoes of popular political parties, like Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN), in Pakistan. After taking charge as the 22<sup>nd</sup> PM of Pakistan, Imran Khan emphasized on normalizing relations with India as a top priority (Imran Khan's speech in full, 2018). He vowed to take two steps forward in return for India's one step (If India takes one step, we will take two: Imran Khan, 2018). Initially, the Indian side also manifested a similar desire and recognized the need to pacify the protracted hostility between the two states. However, the expectations were short-lived on both sides.

Once Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and PM Narendra Modi assumed power in Pakistan and India respectively, the two leaders initially shared pleasantries and it was expected that the relations will improve but the Pakistani efforts, later on, were met only with dismissal and hostility. The subsequent events in the later years exposed the differences in agendas that the two countries were pursuing. Similarly, one could suppose that the enthusiastic behavior of the newly formed governments on both sides was more related to formalities, offered lesser substance, and was short-lived.

If the Indian political parties continue to use Pakistan bashing as a recipe to encourage the voters, it will undermine the efforts of Prime Minister Imran Khan to improve the bilateral relations. There were expectations that after re-election, PM Modi led BJP Government would return to dialogue with Pakistan. Such hopes have only waned in the wake of Indian rescinding of Article 370 and 35A on 5 Aug 2019 (India abolishes occupied Kashmir special status with rushed decree, 2019) and the 14<sup>th</sup> February (44 Indian Security Personnel killed in held Kashmir Blast, 2019) crisis of the same year. These developments have led to Pakistan degrading its diplomatic relations with India and refused to engage in any dialogue with India (No point in talking to India, says Imran., 2019).

With this background of protracted hostility, unwillingness to resolve the outstanding disputes and the worsening security situation between the two countries, the study attempts to qualitatively analyse and explore what the future holds for Indo-Pak relations. The study starts with taking stock of recent developments that have shaped the current state of India-Pakistan relations. Later, the study explores divergent interests that Pakistan and India have over their relationship with the other. Following divergent interests, this study explores the role of nuclear weapons in the transformation of conflicts between India and Pakistan. The study also takes into account the role of the United States in India-Pakistan crises. Before concluding, the study assesses how this relationship can be normalized through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) leading to conflict resolution.

## Current Breakout of Events

### *i) Rescinding of the Articles 370 and 35A of Indian Constitution*

On 5 August 2019, through a Presidential order, India revoked Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution (India revokes occupied Kashmir's special autonomy through rushed presidential decree., 2019). The two articles provided a degree of autonomy to the disputed Kashmir region under Indian occupation (Kashmir special status explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A?, 2019). Introduced in 1949, article 370 allows the state to have its own constitution, a separate flag, and independence over all matters except foreign affairs, defence and communications (Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters., 2019).

Article 35A of the constitution, introduced in 1954, allows the legislature of Indian-administered Kashmir to define the state's 'permanent residents' and what distinguishes them. It applies to all of Indian-administered Kashmir. This article primarily prohibited non-Kashmiris from buying property and applying for government jobs in IOK (Article 35A: Why a special law on Kashmir is controversial., 2019).

It was indicated in BJP's manifesto 2019 (BJP Election Manifesto 2019) that once elected into power, the party will eliminate article 370 and 35A. This move of scrapping the articles should be seen in the broader context of BJP banking upon Hindu nationalism and delivering on the promises made during the election campaign.

The move met fierce opposition from Pakistan. While Pakistan did not appreciate the said laws, the illegal unilateral action by India constitutes a clear violation of UNSC resolutions, international law, and the Indian constitution. Unilateral abrogation of the articles deny Kashmiris the right for self-determination and staying an independent territory till resolution of this issue in the light of existing instruments of international law. India's unilateral abrogation of articles 370 and 35A is an attempt to escape from the just resolution of the Kashmir issue. The stance is taken on the 5<sup>th</sup> of August, however, runs contrary to its own long-standing stance of resolving the issues bilaterally.

### *ii) Pulwama Crisis*

The current security situation between India and Pakistan is hostile at its best in the aftermath of the Pulwama attack and the following LoC incursions by India and Pakistan. Since 1971, it was the first instance of the use of airpower between the two nuclear rivals that could have potentially pushed the two rivals close to war.

India is lowering the threshold of conflict by establishing *new normal* of launching the so-called surgical strikes in response to terrorist attacks inside India (India Claims Surgical Strikes Across Line of Control in Kashmir, 2016). The calculated response from the Pakistani side was warranted to deny India of creating this new normal. Pulwama has made the Indians believe that there does exist a space for conventional war between India and Pakistan. This very belief within India would prove to be detrimental to deterrence stability in South Asia.

South Asia is termed as a nuclear flashpoint by some experts and officials (Krepon, 2017) (Kashmir now a flashpoint, has potential of turning into nuclear war, 2019) primarily because of the lingering Kashmir dispute that has led India and Pakistan to wars and conflicts — often raising the possibility of an eventual nuclear exchange. In situations like Pulwama, India has always blamed Pakistan for such

attacks before conduct or completion of any impartial investigation of the incident. Such an approach helps India gain international sympathies and divert the attention of the domestic audience from atrocities that their government has continued in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK) for over half a century. This has been part of Indian statecraft for quite some time now. Similar incidents from the past provide insight into the Indian methodology of blaming Pakistan for any terrorist attack in India or on territories illegally occupied by it. Indian approach in the Pathankot attacks, Uri attacks, and expedient trial of Mumbai attacks are very telling.

Both Pathankot and Uri attacks paved way for Indian cancellation of Foreign Secretary-level talks and postponement of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. These developments in 2016, allowed the Modi government to use anti-Pakistan rhetoric to secure wins in Gujarat elections in the following year (Indian ruling party narrowly wins key state election, 2017). It is otherwise visible that anti-Pakistan card is still relevant in domestic Indian politics.

These episodes indicate a regular pattern in Indian behavior that whenever the environment is conducive for dialogue, BJP government uses such attacks to primarily achieve four objectives i.e. raise terrorism-related allegations against Pakistan to avoid dialogue that will eventually require India to deal with Pakistan as an equal and require resolution of outstanding disputes; delegitimize Kashmiri freedom struggle as terrorism; gaining international sympathies to pursue Pakistan's diplomatic isolation; and serve domestic political ends.

### *iii) War of Words*

The much-anticipated dialogues have been stalled either because of Indian hard-lined stance or because of Pakistan's unwillingness to compromise on its principled stance. The security-driven approach has turned out to be non-conducive even in the contemporary situation where both Pakistan and India have tried to conditionalize the dialogue process and have failed to coerce or persuade the other side to their terms.

After the meetings between the Pakistani and Indian PMs in December 2015, there was an indication of improvement in the bilateral relationship and it was anticipated that the two leaderships might find the way to move forward in a positive direction. However, the Pathankot airbase attacks in January 2016 seemed to hurt the aspirations of the two PMs in normalizing the bilateral relations. Since then the relationship has only become more hostile.

Despite the fact that the new government under PM Imran Khan vowed to take two-steps towards peace in return for India's one, Indian leadership appears to be interested in making short-term gains rather than durable peace and stability in the region. Before the new government could make any effort towards normalization of relations, the Pulwama attack and India's move of 5 Aug 2019 foreclosed any possibility of improving and making the relationship less hostile. This is evident from the statements coming from the leadership on both sides. Following the Pulwama Crisis in Feb 2019, the statements constituting nuclear signaling<sup>2</sup> have only increased manifold. PM Modi is visibly manifesting nuclear brinkmanship through statements like 'have we kept our nuclear weapons for Diwali?' (Report, 2019). This

---

<sup>2</sup> Nuclear signaling constitutes the communication part of nuclear deterrence whereby a nuclear weapon state intends to implicitly or explicitly deliver a message to adversary cautioning it from taking any undesired action.



brinkmanship from PM Modi and Indian defense minister Rajnath Singh is a source of concern. Unchecked and excessive nuclear signalling undermines the environment of confidence building, induces jingoism and carries repercussions for prospective restrained measures between the adversaries.

Pakistan's response to Indian nuclear brinkmanship has been of a responsible nuclear weapon state which has always proposed measures relating to nuclear restraint in South Asia and has eschewed measures that are offensive in nature (India's statement regarding 'no first use' policy on nuclear weapons is irresponsible, 2019). Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to peace and stability by putting forth the proposal for a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), which is premised on three interlocking elements of conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance (Pakistan Promotes "Strategic Restraint Regime", 2006).

The exchange of hostile statements has remained a regular feature of the Indo-Pak rivalry. The Pathankot attack was soon followed by Uri attacks in September 2016, inviting a lot of harsh statements from the Indian side mainly labelling Pakistan as a state that sponsors terrorism. The then Indian Army Chief Lieutenant General Dalbir Singh said that 'our men are ready to give a befitting response' (17 Indian soldiers killed in attack on Kashmir base, 2016), and after a few days claimed that 'India has conducted surgical strikes along the LoC to safeguard our nation' (India hits Pakistan terror launchpads in surgical strikes along LoC, 2016). The possible motivation behind the so-called Indian surgical strikes could be either compelling Pakistan or testing Pakistan's threshold. It is important that both India and Pakistan exercise caution. While war might not be an option; Pakistan and India must not take it for granted.

Following the approach of his predecessors, the sitting Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat in a move to support the government's decision to call off dialogue with Pakistan, asserted, 'There is a need for another surgical strike.' (There is no need for another surgical strike: Army Chief Bipin Rawat, 2018) This hard-lined stance against Pakistan came in aftermath of the cancellation of proposed talks between the Foreign Ministers on the sidelines of the 73<sup>rd</sup> session of the UNGA (India calls off foreign ministers' meeting with Pakistan, 2018), suggesting that the Indian military leadership is serving as a tool to further the political agenda of BJP. India has always adopted a dismissive behavior towards the peace initiatives offered by Pakistan. Pakistan in the past has referred to such Indian behavior as irresponsible and imprudent which vitiated the atmosphere and took both the countries further away from the goal of regional peace and stability.

Pakistan should base its relations with India purely on the principles of reciprocity. This particular principle of reciprocity while dealing with India appears to be on the agenda of the PTI government and is evident from the recent statement of Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi where he said, 'If India doesn't want dialogue, then Pakistan also won't be in a haste either. Pakistan extended the offer despite possessing evidence of Indian interference in Balochistan' (Modi govt calls off Pakistan-India foreign ministers' UNGA meet, 2018).

#### ***iv) 74<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)***

Pakistan's PM at the 74<sup>th</sup> session of the UNGA reminded it of its duty that 'two nuclear-armed nations almost went head to head in February. And this is why the UN has a responsibility. This is why you came into being in 1945' (Full Transcript of

Prime Minister Imran Khan's speech at the UNGA, 2019) It was further asserted at the UNGA forum that 'we both are nuclear-armed countries. If these tensions increase, the world could be in danger. Pakistan would never trigger a war.' (Full Transcript of Prime Minister Imran Khan's speech at the UNGA, 2019) Pakistan is actively pursuing all diplomatic channels at the international level and particularly the UN to keep the issue of Kashmir alive by highlighting brutal acts of Indian occupying forces. Pakistan's main objective should be to delegitimize Indian actions inside Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IOJ&K) and re-legitimize the Kashmiri freedom struggle. The closed meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on Kashmir after 50 years reflects the gravity of the situation. Despite Indian effort to seek veto at UNSC on the Kashmir meeting, UNSC declared Kashmir an international issue instead of India's internal matter (Pakistan Today, 2019). This reflects diplomatic win for Pakistan which will not settle well with India. India will now be looking for strong diplomatic manoeuvres to make sure that Pakistan is not able to gain much out of this and no such meetings on the Kashmir issue convene again. The international community appears to be unmoved by Indian human rights violations in IOJ&K. Although there have been debates in the US Congress, European Union, United Kingdom, Turkey, and OIC; however, it has not yielded any substantial outcome. Owing to their strategic and economic convergences with India, the international community is artificially trying to balance relations with India and Pakistan and is less likely to take any concrete step with regards to the Kashmir issue. Nonetheless, Pakistan should not lose its space in the international community and surrender its claims. This will help portray India's expansionist ambitions in the region.

Ever since Pakistan has continued to propose SRR in the region for the establishment of durable peace, avoidance of an arms race and enhancing stability. However, India has continued to reject these proposals while attempting to focus on the issue of terrorism alone without going into the root-causes of the phenomenon. Therefore, the lack of reciprocity and political will to engage in any arms control negotiations further widens the gap between the two states, and consequently compel them to follow the security-driven approach. In such an environment of mistrust, the prospects of any meaningful bilateral dialogue between the two states are further minimized.

Despite all the initiatives, Pakistan is still alleged for taking destabilizing actions, without taking into consideration its security concerns. India's dismissive behavior towards the proposed initiatives is one of the major reasons for a deadlock. While Pakistan considers the resolution of outstanding disputes (primarily Kashmir) as a prerequisite for durable peace with India, India, on the other hand, is more focused on addressing the symptoms of this uneasy relationship often manifested in the form of terrorism. Therefore, any attempt to understand the ongoing deadlock between India and Pakistan must consider respective approaches of two states towards entering into diplomatic negotiations.

#### ***v) LoC Violations and Terrorism-Related Allegations***

The Line of Control (LoC), which divides Indian and Pakistan controlled parts of Kashmir, is at its most volatile phase with intense cross-border firing. Even during the times of relative peace, this front continues to witness frequent skirmishes between the two forces along the LOC. Indian Border Security Force and Pakistan Rangers

began skirmishing in mid-July 2014 along the Line of Control (LOC) and the Working Boundary (WB). Since then the skirmishes have become intense re-establishing the old pattern of cross border violations and unprovoked firings along the LOC for many years. The events like Pathankot, Uri and Pulwama have only intensified the situation. Both sides have competing accounts and accuse the other of initiating the hostilities and violating the ceasefire. To foster a better environment between two states, it is also important to address continued and frequent violations of the ceasefire agreement that keeps on adding to the mutual hostilities.

The primary reason that successive political leaderships in India cite for not engaging in dialogue with Pakistan is the latter's alleged involvement in terrorist activities inside India. However, understanding terrorism as a root cause for non-engagement requires a holistic analysis of this phenomenon. The credit for introducing terrorism or sub-conventional warfare in South Asia goes to India which started training, arming and supporting Mukti Bahni in former East Pakistan during the 1960s (Indian forces fought along Mukti Bahini: Modi, 2015). The Indian political leadership expressed pride in helping the creation of Bangladesh (Modi admits India's role in Fall of Dhaka, 2016) through substantive material support for the insurgents. The recognition of the former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that India is financing terrorism inside Pakistan through Afghanistan (India financed problems for Pak in Afghanistan, says US defence secretary nominee Chuck Hagel, 2013), the arrest of Indian Intelligence Officer Kulbhushan Yadev, public statement, admission of TTP Commander Ehsanullah Ehsan (RAW, NDS funded TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar for terror attacks in Pakistan: Ehsanullah Ehsan, 2017) an acknowledgment of Indian strategists like Bharat Karnad (RAW supports Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, acknowledges Indian analyst in top daily, 2017) that India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has close ties with TTP prove that the employment of terrorism against its smaller neighbours has consistently remained the Indian policy.

The above-mentioned analysis of the events points out to a trend that whenever the two sides are moving towards a détente, Line of Control (LoC) and Working Boundary (WB) flare-up or there is a terrorist incident and the onus is swiftly shifted to Pakistan in a media trial. However, an environment that leads to tangible movement in conflict resolution suits Pakistan more than India, thus suggesting that Islamabad would have little interest in taking actions that undermine this objective.

The confrontation along LOC and WB may also be linked to domestic Indian politics. It is a trend that whenever an Indian government fails in delivering on election promises, it seeks to create a security situation that serves as a useful diversionary effort. In the current scenario, the Indian leadership seems to divert the attention of the domestic audience from Modi's unfulfilled promises of prosperity. In Pakistan's view, keeping the eastern border peaceful and relations with India manageable is more useful for the eradication of insurgency and terrorism from Pakistan's western border than responding to the repeated Indian provocations.

### **Elections in India**

It is difficult to look at Indo-Pak relations in a wholesome manner if we only consider the change in the Pakistani government to influence its relationship with India. As it takes two to tango, the other determining variable has to be the decision-makers on the other side. The two steps forward approach thus relies heavily on that one step

which India has to take. Hence it is important to look at differences in Pakistan's India policy and India's Pakistan policy.

The Pakistani approach towards India has been consistent despite changes in the ruling party including the military rule. Therefore, it can be argued that Pakistan's India policy is genuinely security-driven and not personality-driven.

In contrast, India's Pakistan policy has largely remained personality and party specific. Pakistan and India have fought 3 major wars during Congress rule in India. On the other hand, during BJP governments, Pakistan and India have seen serious crises like Kargil, 2001-02, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Uri, Pulwama and abrogation of article 370 and 35A. Therefore, the Modi factor has only exacerbated the existing tensions between India and Pakistan. However, this current situation is presumed to be unprecedented primarily because Hindutva ideology of aggressive expansionism is driving Indian strategic behavior coupled with PM Modi's fundamentalist approach and history of personal involvement in actions against Muslims and Pakistan.

History suggests that BJP has always used anti-Pakistan rhetoric to win popular support. This pattern also proved to be effective in winning the Gujarat polls in 2017. A similar kind of pattern could also be seen in the 2003 election where Modi managed to win with a clear majority because of the religious riots he crafted in Gujarat in 2002 (Ruling party wins Gujarat poll, 2002). A well-known expert on right-wing Hindu politics, Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, in an interview, said, 'Modi's entire political career is **built-in** 2002. If there were no riots in 2002, Modi would not have won the 2003 elections in Gujarat' (Ahmed, 2016). The whole Pulwama episode was used for political goal scoring by the BJP government to raise the anti-Pakistan rhetoric prior to the elections.

In the prevalent hostility, the governments in Pakistan and India are less likely to have a very positive impact on the nature of bilateral relations till the time some major compromises are made by the new leadership from both sides. Until and unless both the states see value in cooperating with each other and acknowledge each other's efforts no solution can be forthcoming.

### **Divergent Interests**

Despite a long history of engagements and a number of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan, the two states still stand at the opposite poles when it comes to the settlement and resolution of the outstanding disputes for the greater goal of achieving regional stability. India, being the stronger state as compared to Pakistan in the region, does not view its interests to be better served by resolving its conflicts with Pakistan and hence the dismissive approach *vis-à-vis* Pakistan's efforts towards conflict resolution. Normalizing relations with Pakistan is not in line with Indian hegemonic designs in the region where it seeks to establish its own dominance at the cost of interests of other states. On the prospects of normalization of relations between India and Pakistan, Stephen P. Cohen, argues that 'all unofficial dialogues, whether Track II or people-to-people talks are of marginal value if the governments are uninterested in addressing fundamentals.' (Cohen, 2013).

Each side presents its own view of the causes of failures in normalizing the relationship. Shiv Shankar Menon attempts to describe the difference in how India and Pakistan view each other as;

Indians see Pakistan as a failed state, or worse, as an integrated criminal enterprise, lacking an identity and increasingly Talibanized, perpetually seeking revenge for 1971. Pakistan sees India as hegemonist and expansionist, says the partition of the subcontinent is unfinished – that Jammu and Kashmir should belong to Pakistan as a Muslim-majority province – and believes that India has never reconciled itself to Pakistan's existence (Menon, 2016).

It is important to identify the actual objectives for normalizing Pakistan-India relations. If Pakistan's core national interests include human and economic development then it needs to be figured what role a normal relationship between India and Pakistan might play in that regard. Several analysts tend to draw a relationship between Pakistan's lack of economic growth and human development with the absence of normal ties with India (Kugelman & Hathaway, 2013). However, such connections need to be studied carefully. It is clear that though investment in Pakistan sees slight improvement once the ties between the two states improve. However, some might not be true for the Indian market. It also remains uncertain as to what might be the long term contribution of normal ties between these two states on Pakistan's economy. These improvements might at best be momentary and may have insignificant to zero impact in the long term. Since there exists unwillingness on the part of India for the resolution of outstanding disputes, Pakistan in the meantime should rather focus on improving its internal security, economy, education, energy, and soft cultural outlook. All of these areas are not dependent on Pakistan's improved relationship with India.

It is India that has been dictating the terms of this relationship throughout the course of history. If Pakistan continues to agree to Indian terms, India will continue to change the goalposts and Pakistan will be exhausted in accomplishing Indian demands to do more. Pakistan should rather focus on creating an environment that persuades Indian investors and producers of goods to influence their government to change policies toward Pakistan. For instance, the recent opening of Kartarpur Corridor gained Pakistan immense praise not just in India but also at the international level. Pakistan's poor economy, lack of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), energy crisis, minimal human development and so on are not an outcome of Pakistan's rivalry with India. On the other hand, it is evident that despite hostile relationships with their neighbouring states, countries like India and South Korea do not face any uncertainty in their economies.

### **The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Conflict Transformation**

The hegemonic ambitions of India – the largest South Asian state – and its preference for employing coercion, brinkmanship and escalation dominance towards its smaller neighbours, has frequently caused crises. India lacks a demonstrable and consistent political will to resolve conflicts through a spirit of accommodation, compromise, reconciliation.

The overt nuclearization of South Asia helped prevent wars in South Asia and has made war an unthinkable option. However, the recurrence of conflicts between India and Pakistan coupled with Indian aggressive approach vis-à-vis Pakistan has compelled the latter to increase its reliance on nuclear deterrence.

There are varying opinions in the literature regarding the role that nuclear weapons have played in exacerbating or limiting the hostilities between India and Pakistan. Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, in his seminal work on nuclear deterrence, concludes that the employment and signalling of the nuclear deterrent influenced the decision-makers on both Indian and Pakistani sides during the crisis time (Cheema, 2010). The 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis and the spring 1990 crisis over Kashmir are the two examples of workable nuclear deterrent even in the absence of declared nuclear weapons capabilities also known as the era of non-weaponized deterrence (Cheema, 2010). Furthermore, after the overt nuclearization, the employment and signalling of nuclear deterrence played an important role in preventing the Kargil conflict and the 2001-02 crisis from further escalation (Cheema, 2010).

India and Pakistan have a different interpretation of the linkage between nuclear weapons acquisition and conflict resolution. Raj Chengappa asserts that 'the rationale for developing nuclear weapons was not conflict resolution' (cited from Khan, 2009). This view is shared by several other scholars as well. Savita Pande states that 'nuclear weapons acquisition was not supposed to help in initiating negotiations between India and Pakistan (Khan, 2009).' These arguments further Pakistan's narrative that India has been exploring the space for limited war by keeping the conflict below Pakistan's perceived nuclear threshold. This belief is only further cemented by the outcomes of the February 2019 crisis where India believes that there is still space for conventional war between India and Pakistan. As discussed earlier, India is using sub-conventional means of warfare to instill crisis instability. This highlights India's dissatisfaction with a stable deterrence relation with Pakistan. The doctrines like Cold Start where India envisages a limited conventional war under a nuclear overhang further supports such Indian endeavors. In such pursuits, India appears to be risking regional stability as the inadvertent escalation of conflict from conventional to nuclear level seems likely. This is best explained in Michael Quinlan's words, 'Non-nuclear war is not just appalling in itself. It is also the likeliest route to nuclear war' (Quinlan, 2018).

The role of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region remains debatable because of the peculiar nature of the conflict/crises. The historical overview suggests that deterrence has played an effective role in preventing crises from escalation. However, the occurrence or non-occurrence of crises between India and Pakistan is not subject to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons only influences the decisions of the policymakers while figuring out the response options in the time of crises. The actual cause of conflict remains the non-resolution of outstanding disputes that pre-dates the acquisition of nuclear capability by both states and have shaped the hostile nature of bilateral relationship since partition. Weapons — be it conventional or nuclear — cannot and are not necessarily meant to ensure peace.

### **Role of the United States in India-Pakistan Crises**

The shadows of the US in the South Asian region are only getting darker with time. The US footprint in the sub-continent can be traced back to the Cold war. However, the nature of the US role kept on changing over time. In the prevalent security situation between India and Pakistan, the US has time and again urged both the states to resolve their outstanding disputes bilaterally, observe restraint during crises, and refrain from exchanging hostile statements.

The role of the US regarding conflict resolution is generally restricted only to issuing statements once the security situation between India and Pakistan worsens. For instance, following the Pulwama crisis, the US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, in a telephonic conversation with Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi appreciated Pakistan's efforts to de-escalate the crisis (FM Qureshi, US national security advisor discuss regional security post-Pulwama attack, 2019). On the other hand, while talking to his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval, John Bolton reportedly augmented US support for 'India's right to self-defense against cross-border terrorism' (We support India's right to self-defense': US NSA John Bolton to Ajit Doval on Pulwama attack, 2019). After the Uri attacks in 2016, the press secretary Josh Earnest stated, 'The United States has continued to encourage India and Pakistan to find a way to resolve their differences peacefully and through diplomacy. We continue to be hopeful and encouraging of both sides to try to find a way to resolve their differences and to reduce their tensions through diplomacy and without resorting to more violence' (Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 2016). The US role in conflict resolution between India and Pakistan does not go beyond such statements. The US policy appears to be closer to India's stance that all differences between India and Pakistan should be resolved bilaterally and the United States could only encourage them to talk. Despite exerting influence in the region through political and strategic engagements, the unwillingness at the part of the US to mediate the conflict may prove destabilizing.

The US role in the South Asian region is only likely to increase; however, not primarily to resolve the disputes between India and Pakistan. India is seen as a global player in larger US' objectives in the region - especially China's containment - hence the US tilt towards India. Whereas Pakistan is considered relevant only with regards to Afghanistan; a classic manifestation of US de-hyphenation of Pakistan and India. In pursuit of its objective of containing China, the US is building India both economically and militarily to watch China's rise in the region (Joshi, 2015). This discriminatory US approach in the region is only fuelling the asymmetries between India and Pakistan and eventually results in Indian dismissive behavior *vis-à-vis* Pakistan's genuine efforts and concerns. Vipin Narang, a leading Indian scholar, while arguing about this particular situation in the complex triangular relationship says, "this could only lower the likelihood of India participating in a dialogue on resolving territorial disputes on equal terms" (Narand, 2014).

### **Normalizing Relations through CBMs Leading to Conflict Resolution**

The introduction of nuclear weapons by India in 1974 and repeated in 1998, which was followed in a tit for tat reaction by Pakistan, stabilized the deterrence relationship between the two neighbors but strategic stability still eludes the Subcontinent because India is interested only in crisis management rather than conflict resolution. Much sought CBMs could play a sustainable role in dispute resolution but would remain ineffective if the roots of instability between the two remain unaddressed. Asma Shakir Khawaja in her recent work on CBMs observes that the chain of recurring conflicts has been one of the key spoilers to the prospects of peace between India and Pakistan (Khawaja, 2018). The inability to manage the spoilers presents even a bigger challenge to peace between the two.

In the past, India and Pakistan have concluded several bilateral agreements or arrangements to reduce the risk of conflict. However, the outcomes mostly

remained limited because of poor implementation. CBMs can only play an effective role in regional stability if both the States find value in cooperating with each other thereby reducing the risk of a crisis breakout.

Despite peace initiatives like the Shimla agreement and the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), desired outcomes could not be achieved for different reasons. Pakistan's approach has always been not to promote the crises but to mitigate it. Pakistan has continued to propose SRR for the establishment of durable peace, avoidance of an arms race and enhancing regional stability. However, India has continued to reject these proposals while attempting to focus on the issue of terrorism alone without going into the root-causes of the phenomenon.

The process of CBMs between India and Pakistan has always remained jinxed. India has manifested in every possible way that it does not want a peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes with Pakistan and has chosen to remain disengaged. India is unlikely to change its course of action owing to the US support and resultant dismissiveness towards Pakistan.

## **Conclusion**

The differing political agendas of successive governments in Pakistan and India have remained the key constraining factor in establishing a comprehensive mechanism to discuss outstanding issues between the two states. While Pakistan's approach towards its relations with India seems to follow a constant policy, the political interests of the ruling parties and individuals in this regard have generally driven India's approach.

To achieve enduring peace between the hostile neighbors, the two states need to prefer conflict resolution over conflict management. Conflict or crisis management, no matter how sophisticated, is not a substitute for conflict resolution. The negotiations on possible CBMs, in this regard, should be a regular feature of the bilateral relationship even in peacetime. This could help prevent the crisis from occurring instead of heeding to resolve it after it is full-blown. This approach can lead to achieving regional stability in South Asia. A normalized relationship between India and Pakistan can help generate confidence which in turn could reduce the possibility of use of hard power.

Although the onus for conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and crisis management is more on the larger South Asian State than its smaller neighbors. However, stability and peace in the region is hostage to Indian leadership's arrogance and unwillingness to peacefully resolve the outstanding disputes and use such terrorist attacks for their narrow political objectives

India is investing far more time, effort and resources in expanding its military capabilities than improving peacebuilding and reviving diplomacy. Excessive preoccupation with the technological or strategic means must not lead us astray from focusing on the actual and more important political ends.

Equal and undiminished security for all is a principle upon which all inter-state relations must be pursued in order to ensure mutual benefits of peace, progress, and prosperity. Unequal distribution of wealth and power leads to less, not more security.

## **References**

Ahmed, N. (2016). Modi: The Man Behind The Anti-Pakistan Rhetoric. *Express Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1178074/modi-man-behind-anti-pakistan-rhetoric/>



- Article 370: What Happened with Kashmir and Why it Matters. (2019). *BBC*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708>
- Article 35A: Why a Special Law on Kashmir is Controversial. (2019). *BBC*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40897522>
- BJP Election Manifesto 2019. (n.d.). *Document Cloud*. Retrieved from <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5798075-Bjp-Election-2019-Manifesto-English.html>
- Cheema, Z. I. (2010). Development of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia. In Z. I. Cheema, *Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and its Implications for South Asian Security* (p. 394). London: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, S. P. (2013). Prospects. In S. P. Cohen, *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum* (p. 149). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- FM Qureshi, US National Security Advisor Discuss Regional Security Post-Pulwama Attack. *Dawn*. (2019). Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1468994>
- Full Transcript of Prime Minister Imran Khan's speech at the UNGA. (2019). *Business Recorder*. Retrieved from <https://www.brecorder.com/2019/09/27/524851/full-transcript-of-prime-minister-imran-khans-speech-at-the-unga/>
- If India takes One Step, We Will Take Two: Imran Khan. *The News*. (2018). Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/346523-imran-khan-sheds-light-on-his-foreign-policy>
- Imran Khan's Speech in Full. (2018). *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/imran-khan-speech-full-180726124850706.html>
- India Abolishes Occupied Kashmir Special Status with Rushed Decree. (2019). *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved from: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2028388/1-indian-home-minister-proposes-scrap-iok-special-status/>
- India Calls Off Foreign Ministers' Meeting With Pakistan. (2018). *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/india-calls-of-foreign-ministers-meeting-with-pakistan/2018/09/22/e804e1e8-be22-11e8-8243-f3ae9c99658a\\_story.html?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.716fa531ad74](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/india-calls-of-foreign-ministers-meeting-with-pakistan/2018/09/22/e804e1e8-be22-11e8-8243-f3ae9c99658a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.716fa531ad74)
- India Claims 'Surgical Strikes' Across Line of Control in Kashmir. (2016). *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan.html>
- India Financed Problems For Pak In Afghanistan, Says US Defence Secretary Nominee Chuck Hagel. (2013). *Times of India*. Retrieved from [http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/18694475.cms?utm\\_source=contentofinterest&utm\\_medium=text&utm\\_campaign=cppst](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/18694475.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst)
- India Hits Pakistan Terror Launchpads In Surgical Strikes Along LoC. (2016). *Indian Express*. Retrieved from <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-conducted-surgical-strikes-last-night-in-pok-to-safeguard-our-nation-defence-ministry-3055715/>

- India Revokes Occupied Kashmir's Special Autonomy Through Rushed Presidential Decree. (2019). *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1498227>
- Indian Forces Fought Along Mukti Bahini: Modi. (2015). *The News*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/12923-indian-forces-fought-along-mukti-bahini-modi>
- Indian Ruling Party Narrowly Wins Key State Election. (2017). *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/18/asia/indian-ruling-party-wins-gujarat-bjp-modi-intl/index.html>
- India's Statement Regarding 'No First Use' Policy On Nuclear Weapons Is Irresponsible. (2019). *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1499826>
- Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-U.S 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. (2018). *Ministry of External Affairs India*. Retrieved from <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30358/Joint+Statement+on+the+Inaugural+IndiaUS+243+2+Ministerial+Dialogue>
- Joshi, M. (2015). India – A Counterweight to the Rise of China. *Observer Research Foundation* Retrieved from <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-a-counterweight-to-the-rise-of-china/>
- Kashmir is not India's 'Internal Issue', UNSC Moot Affirms. (2019). *Pakistan Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/08/16/kashmir-is-not-indias-internal-issue-unscc-affirms/>
- Kashmir Now a Flashpoint has Potential of Turning into Nuclear War. (2019). *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1505188>
- Kashmir special Status Explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A? (2019). *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/kashmir-special-status-explained-articles-370-35a-190805054643431.html>
- Khan, S. (2009). Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the Conflict. In S. Khan, *Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan* (p. 86). London: Routledge.
- Khawaja, A. S. (2018). In A. S. Khawaja, *Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists: The Grand Trunk Road to Confidence Building Measures between Pakistan and India* (p. 239). Islamabad: National Defense University.
- Krepon, M. (2017). Kashmir And Rising Nuclear Dangers On The Subcontinent. *Arms Control Wonk*. Retrieved from <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1202759/kashmir-and-rising-nuclear-dangers-on-the-subcontinent/>
- Kugelman, M., & Hathaway, R. M. (2013). *Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs To Be Done? What Does It Matter?* Washington, DC: Wilson Centre.
- Menon, S. S. (2016). Restraint or Riposte? The Mumbai Attack and Cross-Border Terrorism from Pakistan. In S. S. Menon, *Choices Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy* (p. 74). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Milking Airstrikes for Politics: Congress Blasts Amit Shah for saying 250 Terrorists Killed. (2019). *India Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/balakot-250-terrorists-killed-says-amit-shah-manish-tewari-reaction-1469735-2019-03-04>

- Modi Admits India's Role in the Fall of Dhaka. (2016). *The News*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/172728-Modi-again-admits-Indias-role-in-Fall-of-Dhaka>
- Modi govt calls off Pakistan-India Foreign Ministers' UNGA Meet. (2018). *Express Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1808696/1-modi-govt-calls-off-pakistan-india-foreign-ministers-unga-meet/>
- Modi Warns Pakistan Against 'Threats'. (2019). *Express UK*. Retrieved from <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1116158/india-pakistan-war-mother-of-nuclear-bombs-kashmir-world-war-3>
- Narand, V. (2014). V. Narand, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (pp. 55-93). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- No point in Talking to India, says Imran. (2019). *Pakistan Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/08/22/no-dialogue-with-india-over-occupied-kashmir-pm-imran/>
- Our Nuclear Weapons are not for Diwali: PM Modi. (2019). *India Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha-2019/story/our-nuclear-weapons-are-not-for-diwali-pm-modi-on-pak-nuclear-button-threat-1506893-2019-04-21>
- Pakistan Promotes 'Strategic Restraint Regime'. (2006). *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. Retrieved from <https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-promotes-strategic-restraint-regime>
- Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest. (2016). *The White House*. Retrieved from <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-92716>
- Qatal Ki Raat. (2019). NDTV. Retrieved from <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/lok-sabha-elections-2019-qatal-ki-raat-pm-narendra-modi-speaks-of-us-claims-after-pakistan-capture-o-2026340>
- Quinlan, M. (2018). Thinking About Nuclear Weapons. *Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, 10. Retrieved from [http://fisherp.scripts.mit.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Thinking-about-Nuclear-Weapons-RUSI-WHP41\\_QUINLAN1.pdf](http://fisherp.scripts.mit.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Thinking-about-Nuclear-Weapons-RUSI-WHP41_QUINLAN1.pdf)
- RAW Supports Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Acknowledges Indian Analyst in Top Daily. *Express Tribune*. (2017). Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515080/raw-supports-tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-acknowledges-indian-analyst-top-daily/>
- RAW, NDS Funded TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar for Terror Attacks In Pakistan: Ehsanullah Ehsan. (2017). *Pakistan Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/04/27/raw-nds-funded-ttp-jamaatul-ahrar-for-terror-attacks-in-pakistan-ehsanullah-ehsan/>
- Ruling Party Wins Gujarat Poll. (2002). *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/12/15/india.gujarat/index.html>
- There is no Need for Another Surgical Strike: Army Chief Bipin Rawat. (2018). *Indian Express*. Retrieved from <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/there-is-a-need-for-another-surgical-strike-army-chief-bipin-rawat-5373081>

## The Al-Qaeda Revival in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 94-101  
njips.nust.edu.pk

**Farhan Zahid<sup>1</sup>**

Pakistan remains a country of vital importance for Al-Qaeda. It is primarily because of Al-Qaeda's advent, rise and shelter and not to mention the support the terrorist organization found at the landscape of Pakistan during the last two decades. The emergence of in Pakistan can be traced back to the Afghan War (1979-89), with a brief sabbatical in Sudan the Islamist terrorist group rose to gain prominence after shifting back to Afghanistan. It then became a global 'Islamist' terrorist entity while based in neighboring Afghanistan and found safe havens in the erstwhile tribal areas of Pakistan in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Prior to its formation in 1988 in Peshawar (Pakistan), it had worked as Maktab al-Khidmat (Services Bureau) during the Afghan War.<sup>2</sup> It had its roots in Pakistan, which had become a transit point of extremists *en route* to Afghanistan during the War. All high profile Al-Qaeda leaders, later becoming high-value targets, and members of its central Shura had lived in Pakistan at one point in their lives. That is the very reason the Al-Qaeda in Pakistan is termed as *Al-Qaeda Core* or *Central* among law enforcement practitioners and intelligence communities. Without going into details of Al-Qaeda's past in Pakistan the aim of this article is to focus on its current state of affairs and what future lies ahead of it in Pakistan.

### The Current State of Affairs

Al-Qaeda's South Asia chapter, the Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) mainly ran its business in Pakistan alongside some locally affiliated groups i.e. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its factions (such as Harkat ul Jihad-e-Islami, Harkat ul Mujahedeen, Jamaat ul Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jamaat Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan) (Zahid, 2017)<sup>3</sup> and some *splinters*. AQIS was established by Al-Qaeda in September 2014 (BBC, 2014) as a response to the then recently established Islamic State's Khurasan chapter (Rassler, 2008).<sup>4</sup> The AQIS began with a massive start but

---

<sup>1</sup> Dr Farhan Hanif Siddiqi is an Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) at the Quaid-e-Azam University (QAU), Islamabad.  
E-mail: fhsiddiqi@qau.edu.pk

<sup>2</sup> Maktab ul Khidmat wal Mujahedeen al-Arabia or Services Bureau for Arab Mujahedeen was established in 1983 by Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar, Pakistan. The non-governmental/charity organization worked as transit facility for Arab Islamist reaching Peshawar to participate in Jihad against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The said organization also established a number of guest houses (Bait ul Ansar) in Peshawar for Mujahedeen

<sup>3</sup> These organizations are characterized as Al-Qaeda associates and affiliates because of their close liaisons in providing Al-Qaeda safe havens, logistics, joint operations, and at times providing suicide bombers to Al-Qaeda for its operations

<sup>4</sup> Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent was established by Al-Zawahiri in Sep 2014 right after the IS-K chapter was announced by Islamic State's spokesperson Abu Mohammad al-Adnani in July 2014.

could not continue with its spree of terrorist attacks. The very first AQIS strike was attempted hijacking of PNS Zulfiqar a Pakistan Navy frigate in September 2014 (Golovnina, 2014; Express Tribune, 2016). Later on, the subsidiary organization could not manage to inflict major damage in Pakistan.<sup>5</sup> Its *Emir* (veteran ‘jihadist’ of Indian descent Asim Umar) reportedly operates from Afghanistan (Personal interview, September 12, 2019) where AQIS also takes part in the insurgency against the Afghan government and US troops (Roggio, 2019). AQIS was established by Al-Qaeda Central to serve a dual purpose: launch terrorist strikes directly under the banner of Al-Qaeda Central and to compete with newly established Islamic State’s Khurasan Walayat in Pakistan.

With a number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, the AQIS could not sustain the crackdown by law enforcement bodies; hence, the gained momentum of its activities was reversed in the next few years. On the other hand, IS-K, the local chapter to IS continued to strike terror in different parts of Pakistan. During 2018 and 2019, the AQIS was outperformed by IS-K as far as terrorist activities are concerned. IS-K perpetrated more than 200 terrorist attacks alone in Afghanistan. AQIS, on the other hand, suffered some major losses. The Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) of Karachi police arrested some of its high profile commanders and most-wanted terrorists and the organization could not manage to strike terror in retaliation.

Most important of all catches was the arrest of Umar Jalal Chandio alia Kathio, the Emir of AQIS Sindh province. The CTD Karachi arrested him from Karachi’s Gulshan-e-Iqbal locality on November 20. Chandio inspired the terrorists involved in the Safoora Goth incident in 2015. Before joining IS-K, Tahir Minhas alias Sain (team leader of IS-K Cell involved in the massacre of Shias at Safoora Goth Karachi in 2015) remained a member of AQIS and close to Chandio. A total of 47 members of the Ismail-Shia community were shot dead by the IS-K cell militants near Safoora Goth in the suburbs of Karachi. Chandio’s wife is also said to be an active member of AQIS (Dawn, 2018). After his arrest Raja Umar Khattab, in-charge of CTD Karachi revealed in the press conference:

Jalal was associated with Al Qaeda’s Arab network while Haji Sahib (code name) was active in Karachi and the Wadh area of Balochistan where the group’s mainly Baloch youths were involved in kidnapping for ransom, terrorism, and attacks on NATO forces’ containers.

AQIS commander of Karachi Ahsan Mehsud alias Roshan was arrested from Karachi in March 2018. Mehsud was involved in planning to assassinate secular party Muthadia Quami Movement (MQM) leaders in order to create chaos in the city. He was also considered close to the masterminds of the Safoora Goth incident (Ali, 2018).

Another Al-Qaeda subsidiary Jamaat Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan (a local cell of highly educated militants) that pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda surfaced in 2017 but did not last long (Dawn, 2017). The cell was remained involved in a series of terrorist attacks that swept Karachi during the summer of 2017. At least six terrorist attacks

---

<sup>5</sup> Here the subsidiary organizations mean the Al-Qaeda affiliates and associates in Pakistan. The militants of these organizations received training at Al-Qaeda-run terrorist training camps in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan (1996-2001).

five in Karachi and one in far-flung district Mastung district of Baluchistan province were claimed by Jamaat ul Ansar al-Shariah Pakistan (Zahid, 2017). The cell was busted by law enforcement forces in Karachi but its *Emir* Abdul Saroush Siddiqui managed to flee; reportedly to Afghanistan (Personal interview, September 24, 2019).

With these important leadership losses, the AQIS and other Al-Qaeda affiliates the Al-Qaeda Central could not manage to cope up and no terrorist attack was conducted by Al-Qaeda since then in Pakistan, though, TTP another Al-Qaeda associate continues to strike targets in Pakistan's tribal areas and Baluchistan province. There appears to be no direct Al-Qaeda involved in terrorist attacks since major arrests of AQIS commanders and busting of Ansar al-Sharia cell. Despite all this, it is believed that Al-Qaeda *Emir* Ayman al-Zawahiri is hiding somewhere between Pakistan and Afghanistan from where he intermittently releases his recorded video statements. Nevertheless, the death of Hamza bin Laden in the AfPak region indicates that Al-Qaeda still maintains senior operatives in Pakistan (Zahid, 2019).

### **Challenges**

Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, which used to be the most lethal terrorist entity and considered to be the 'original version' now appears to be in shambles. AQIS the local chapter of Al-Qaeda does not seem to be in a position to launch spectacular terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Apart from this, there are some organizational and regional challenges restricting Al-Qaeda and hindering its growth keeping in view of attaining its future objectives in Pakistan.

### **IS-K**

Al-Qaeda splinter (former Al-Qaeda in Iraq) seems to be a serious challenger to Al-Qaeda's dominant position at the jihadi landscape of Pakistan. IS announced the establishment of the IS-Khorasan chapter immediately after the proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate in January 2015 (Basit, 2018) but the interim organizational structure was put in place even earlier than that in July 2014 (Azaz Syed, Personal interview, September 24, 2019). The *Walayat-e-Khorasan* was initially comprised of defectors from Tehreek-e-Khilafat Afghanistan, TTP, Jundullah, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tehreek-e-Khilafat Pakistan and some other (south) Punjab-based terrorist groups operating in Pakistan (Giustozzi, 2018). Later on, the IS-K while using the IS's global brand, franchise, caliphate value, and financial resource has been able to lure in local radicalized Islamist youth in Pakistan. Law enforcement bodies in urban centers of Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and Sialkot (Zahid & Khan, 2016) have busted a number of IS-K cells. IS-K also established itself in Afghanistan neighboring Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and remained involved in target killings of military, police, and intelligence officials during 2015-17 (Personal interview, September 26, 2019). The US forces in Afghanistan killed IS-K's first four Emirs but its current *Emir* is a former Lashkar-e-Taiba militant, Shaikh Aslam Farooqi, who leads IS-K from eastern Afghanistan. The IS-K stabilized itself after Aslam Farooqi was appointed *Emir* of Khorasan province in 2017 and confirmed it in 2019 (Haltiwanger & Loanes, 2019). Since then the IS-K has been able to perpetuate consistent terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

While AQIS is on the verge of becoming dormant the IS-K has been perpetrating scores of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The IS-K was able to lure in support of local Pakistan Islamist terrorist groups and three Pakistani organizations,

previously aligned with Al-Qaeda, namely Tehreek-e-Khilafat Pakistan, Jundullah and TTP (Shahidullah Faction) joined hands with IS-K and pledged allegiance to IS Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Zahid, 2014). Apart from these local groups, the Afghanistan based Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (IMU) previously allied with Al-Qaeda-C along with Uighur and Chechen terrorist-based groups in Afghanistan pledged allegiance to IS-K (Sharipzhan, 2015). Amid the rise of IS-K and its parent organization globally the Al-Qaeda's local chapter, AQIS was established. The *raison d'etre* of AQIS was to steer Al-Qaeda back into public especially in times of Caliphate and to capitalize on the existing problematic conditions prevailing in Pakistan. AQIS with its veteran leadership of Asim Umar (Joscelyn, 2019) and direct guidance of Zawahiri has hitherto failed to galvanize any support and perpetrate the required number of terrorist strikes in Pakistan to stay alive in media.

Since it's surfacing in Pakistan the IS-K has claimed responsibility of 11 terrorist attacks with some terrorist attacks having fatality rate as high as 149 fatalities in Mustang election rally suicide bombing in July 2018. Recently the IS's central leadership has announced two new *Walayats* in South Asia i.e., *Walayat-e-Pakistan* and *Walayat-e-Hind* after the successful and concerted suicide bombings on Easter in Sri Lanka in April 2019 (Hussein, Sahinkaya, Kajjo, & Jedinia, 2019). To reinvigorate AQIS is indeed a challenge for Al-Qaeda central in order to take advantage of (dwindling) support base in Pakistan especially from the plethora of associated and linked (sectarian-religious-based) terrorist organizations.

### ***Looking for New Leadership***

Senior-most Al-Qaeda operatives and members of its high command are either dead or in prisons because of the consistent counter-terrorism efforts carried out by the US forces, drone campaigns, Pakistan military, and law enforcement agencies-led operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, and renditions by allied countries like Pakistan. Most of the senior leadership was targeted in Pakistan's tribal areas through drone strikes during the 2009-2016 campaign. Some very senior members lost their lives in Pakistan including Sheikh Essa, Abu Laith al-Libi, Khalid Habib, Rashid Rauf, Ilyas Kashmiri, Shaikh Usama al-Kini, Saad bin Laden, Shaikh Dawood, Atiya Abdul ur Rehman and others including Osama bin Laden and his son Khalid Bin Laden during Operation Neptune Spear in May 2011. Other senior members have been arrested by Pakistani security forces and handed over the US.

Currently, Al-Qaeda in Pakistan is short of able leadership to steer, lead, mastermind and command the execution of operations. There seems to be an acute shortage of leaders and recruits at the higher echelon of Al-Qaeda. The only leaders appear to be in the picture is Asim Umar, the *Emir* of AQIS. Other experienced local leaders like Hafeez Pandrani and Jalal Chandio have been arrested whereas some others such as Tahir Minhas and Saad Aziz defected to IS-K. Amid this situation, the AQIS lacks a sound, and seasoned leadership from the 'new' generation in Pakistan to lead the malicious terrorist organization. One hope for AQIS could be Abdul Karim Saroush Siddiqui who is the *Emir* of his own Al-Qaeda affiliated *Jamaat Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan*. Siddiqui is reportedly in Afghanistan where is fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban and AQIS (Personal interview, September 30, 2019).

### ***Shifting of Human Resources and the Destruction of Hideouts***

The DNI's release of Bin Laden letters and documents (The Bin Laden Bookshelf) captured during the Abbottabad raid by US Navy Seals indicate Bin Laden's focus on shifting human resources from tribal areas of Pakistan because of the fear of drone strikes in the region (Bin Laden's Bookshelf, n.d.). Moreover, Al-Qaeda also shifted its key leaders to Syria, Iraq and elsewhere because of pressure built up during security operations launched by Pakistani security forces in erstwhile FATA (tribal areas) of Pakistan. These operations were intensified after Al-Qaeda senior militants such as Abu Laith-al-Libi and others were found involved in masterminding terrorist attacks on the life of President General Pervez Musharraf (in 2003 and 2004). Some of Al-Qaeda's hideouts provided by TTP were also destroyed during military operations. Similarly, Al-Qaeda operatives managed to find refuge in urban centers like Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, and Rawalpindi. However, most of these hideouts were traced and operatives were either arrested or killed during encounters with law enforcement forces. With these consecutive security measures, the Al-Qaeda clout started to shrink in Pakistan, nonetheless, its influence remains and no major terrorist organization joined hands with IS-K with the exception of a few, as mentioned above. Presently it could be rightly assessed that all major Al-Qaeda high profiles such as Khalid al-Ayuri, Saif al-Adl, Abu Khair al-Masri, and others are no more in Pakistan-Afghanistan border regions. The only exception could be Ayman al-Zawahiri, who regularly releases video-statements but there appears to be no concrete intelligence about his whereabouts.

### **Future Prospects**

Despite these serious challenges Al-Qaeda still has reasons to believe that it could make its resurgence in Pakistan. The following are some critical (forthcoming) events and/or factors that may allow Al-Qaeda to regain its lost momentum.

### ***Afghan Taliban Back in Power***

The recent Doha Talks between Afghan Taliban and the US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad appeared to come to fruition with a possible end of the US's longest war. The talks are mostly about the US's exit strategy from Afghanistan rather than culminating into a viable and peaceful Afghanistan. The civil conflict between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban after the US withdrawal seems inevitable. This would also help bring Al-Qaeda back into action. The weak Afghan government may not be able to sustain the Afghan Taliban onslaught. This may be a too pessimistic scenario but there are chances of Afghan Taliban back in Kabul and during all these peace talks between the US and Taliban, the Taliban has not promised to oust Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan rather the Afghan Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen has recently denied Al-Qaeda involvement in the 9/11 attacks (Taylor, 2019). This clearly shows an Afghan Taliban tilt in favor of Al-Qaeda. The senior leadership of Al-Qaeda has big hopes for the Afghan Taliban getting back into power. The AQIS is already fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban against US and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan since its inception in 2014. The discovery of the largest ever terrorist training camp run and managed by AQIS in Sharabak, Kandahar in 2017 is a vital proof of AQIS activities in Afghanistan (Joscelyn, 2015). The Emir of AQIS Asim Umar is reportedly operating from Ghazni province in Afghanistan whereas other senior leaders are expected to be in and around Afghan Taliban strongholds in



Afghanistan such as Zabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, Logar, and Helmand. From the viewpoint provided in AQIS magazine *Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad*, the AQ Core is closely watching the proceedings in Doha with high hopes of Afghan Taliban returning to power.

### ***A Diminished IS-K***

Another prospect of Al-Qaeda revival in the region is the destruction of IS-K and a complete collapse of its order. Currently, the IS-K operates from Nangarhar province of eastern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan's tribal districts, whereas its associated cells still have footprints in the various cities of Pakistan. It is evident with the busting of IS-K networked cells in Karachi, Lahore, Sialkot, and Islamabad by security forces. During an interview, it was revealed that, at present, the IS-K strategy for Pakistan is depending upon existing, to an extent, dormant networks of domestic terrorist organizations fresh operatives from both the universities and urban centers. Initially, the IS-K brand worked well to recruit a good number of young, educated and urbanized individuals who joined the organization while pledging allegiance to Caliph Baghdadi. The momentum seems to reverse after the fall of Raqqa and Mosul and an overall shrinking of IS territories in Iraq and Syria. The IS-K has been facing a number of enemies at the same time, that is to say, Afghan security forces, US forces, Pakistani security forces, and the Afghan Taliban. Despite these odds against it the IS-K has proved to be a resilient organization and has hitherto been able to survive the onslaught and loss of four consecutive *Emirs*. This situation may not last forever as the Afghan Taliban have not allowed IS-K to gain much ground in Afghanistan and in Pakistan the security forces have taken stern actions against any possible IS-K surge in Pakistan. The US forces have dropped the 'Mother of All Bombs' (MOAB) at IS-K safe havens near the Pakistan border (Cooper & Mashal, 2017) and Afghan security forces have conducted numerous operations against the IS-K militants. A scenario with a diminished and defeated IS-K would only allow AQIS to gain space for itself.

### ***The Case of Pakistan***

As mentioned previously, Al-Qaeda was born in Pakistan in the backdrop of the Afghan War. The terrorist entity has roots and origins in Pakistan and also because of the number of years it spent, thus developed strong socio-political imprints. No other global terrorist organization such as Hizb ut Tahrir or IS has been able to make inroads as Al-Qaeda had in Pakistan. Similarly, the organization managed to converge multiple pre-existing (sectarian and/or religiously motivated) terrorist organizations into its broader *master-identity*. For instance, a number of pre-existing organizations have overlapping memberships and working relations with Al-Qaeda. Amid this situation, Al-Qaeda could once again restore such 'capital'. This aspect is important to be considered as Al-Qaeda has been able to achieve the same in Syria when two new groups (led by Al-Qaeda) veteran Sami Hijazi and established Jamaat Haraas ud Din and Ansar al-Tawhid in an effort to revive itself in Syria after its former franchises IS and Hayat ut Tahrir-al-Sham decided to part ways with Al-Qaeda. These organizations are formed while luring in members of other terrorist groups operating in the region. Both organizations operate separately but are in close contact and at times share resources for operational and logistical purposes in conjunction with

Uighur Islamist terrorist group Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) in Idlib province of Syria and in its surroundings.

### **Conclusion**

Keeping in view of the 'resilience' of Al-Qaeda it would not be ill-conceived to think of Al-Qaeda as a spent-force. The consistent targeting of Al-Qaeda's high profiles in drones and other means of counter-terrorism has led to the (temporary) fall of Al-Qaeda especially in South Asia and Pakistan in particular. The rise of IS is another factor that caused Al-Qaeda to take a back seat at the global scene. It would be pertinent to say that surfacing of IS has allowed Al-Qaeda to take a sigh of relief as all guns turned towards IS providing it a strategic retreat to regroup and re-emerge with a new strategy. What would be Al-Qaeda's long-term goals is a serious question but before that the terrorist entity needs to reinvigorate itself. There are of course challenges that may hinder its revival but certainly, there are prospects of its resurfacing as a potent and more lethal force. Indeed Pakistan has taken commendable steps towards countering terrorism and violent extremism, yet according to many scholars and practitioners, the environment remains conducive to Al-Qaeda's reinvigoration and revival. On the other hand, the return of the Afghan Taliban back in Kabul would help revive Al-Qaeda in the land controlled by their former hosts. This is indeed an alarming situation. Counter-terrorism during the last two decades has cost billions to the US economy in particular while fighting Al-Qaeda and a plethora of associated groups worldwide. It would be even costlier to restart a war against a revived Al-Qaeda in the region. The Al-Qaeda revival may also embolden the resolve of its supporters and sympathizers and this would usher in a new era of fighting terror against a new and more resolute generation of its militants causing much more trouble than ever. The need of the hour is to plan possible counter-terrorism measures in advance to contain Al-Qaeda revival in Pakistan while eliminating all predictable possibilities.

### **References**

- Ali, I. (2018, March 2). 'Most wanted' AQIS Militant Said to be a Close Aide of Safoora Carnage Convicts Arrested. *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1392746>
- Al-Qaeda chief Zawahiri launches al-Qaeda in South Asia. (2014). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29056668>
- AQIS 'high-profile militant' held in Karachi. (2018). *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1446665>
- Basit, A. (2018). IS Penetration in Afghanistan- Pakistan: Assessment, Impact and Implications. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(3).
- Bin Laden's Bookshelf. (n.d.). Retrieved from Office of the Director of National Intelligence: <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/features/bin-laden-s-bookshelf>
- Cooper, H., & Mashal, M. (2017). US Drops 'Mother of All Bombs' on ISIS Caves in Afghanistan. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/moab-mother-of-all-bombs-afghanistan.html>
- Giustozzi, A. (2018). *Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asia Jihad*. England: Hurst & Company.

- Golovnina, M. (2014). New Al Qaeda Wing in South Asia Claims Major Attack. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southasia-attacks/new-al-qaeda-wing-in-south-asia-claims-major-attack-idUSKBN0HC0YS20140917>
- Haltiwanger, J., & Loanes, E. (2019). Trump Wants US Troops Out Of Afghanistan: The Biggest Winner May Be ISIS's Surging Bloodthirsty Faction There. *Business Insider*. Retrieved from <https://www.businessinsider.com/trumps-push-for-afghanistan-withdrawal-give-isis-a-big-opening-2019-8>
- Hussein, R., Sahinkaya, E., Kajjo, S., & Jedinia, N. H. (2019, July 21). IS Decentralizing into 'Provinces' in a bid to Return. *VOA News*. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/decentralizing-provinces-bid-return>
- Joscelyn, T. (2015). Al Qaeda's Kandhar Training Camp 'Probably the Largest' in Afghan War. *FDD's Long War Journal*. Retrieved from <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/al-qaedas-kandahar-training-camp-probably-the-largest-in-afghan-war.php>
- Joscelyn, T. (2019). Senior Al Qaeda Official Praises Taliban's Victory in Afghanistan. *FDD's Long War Journal*. Retrieved from <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/06/senior-al-qaeda-official-praises-talibans-victory-in-afghanistan.php>
- PNS Zulfiqar attack: Five Navy Officers get Death Penalty. (2016). *Express Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1110057/pns-zulfiqar-attack-five-navy-officers-get-death-penalty/>
- Rassler, D. (2008). Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan. *CTC Sentinel*, 8 (3), 7-11.
- Roggio, B. (2019). Taliban Supplies Al Qaeda with Explosives for Attacks in Major Afghan Cities. *FDD's Long War Journal*. Retrieved from <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/09/taliban-supplies-al-qaeda-with-explosives-for-attacks-in-major-afghan-cities.php>
- Sharipzhan, M. (2015). IMU Declares it is Now a Part of the Islamic State. *Radio Free Europe*. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/imu-islamic-state/27174567.html>
- Taylor, A. (2019). Even in the Midst of Afghan Peace Talks, the Taliban Still Deny Al Qaeda was behind the 9/11. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/22/even-midst-afghan-peace-talks-taliban-still-deny-al-qaeda-was-behind/>
- Zahid, F. (2014). Al Qaeda's Future in Pakistan amid the Rise of Islamic State. *Terrorism Monitor*, 12 (20). Retrieved from <https://jamestown.org/program/al-qaedas-future-in-pakistan-amid-the-rise-of-islamic-state/>
- Zahid, F. (2017). Jamaat ul Ansar ul-Sharia – A New Endeavor by Al-Qaeda to Regain Ground. *Research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies*, 10 (1), 163-170.
- Zahid, F. (2017). The Return of Al Qaeda to Pakistan. *The Middle East Institute*. Retrieved from <https://www.mei.edu/publications/return-al-qaeda-pakistan>
- Zahid, F. (2019). The Death Of Hamza Bin Laden - A Serious Blow to Al-Qaeda's Ambitions. *Wikistart*. Retrieved from <https://www.wikistrat.com/post/the-death-of-hamza-bin-laden-a-serious-blow-to-al-qaeda-s-ambitions>

## **Civil-Military Cooperation in Post Conflict Development: A Case of North Waziristan**

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages102-107  
njips.nust.edu.pk

**Maria Sychala-Kij<sup>1</sup>**

### **Introduction**

Every conflict in the world, be it internal or external, leaves crippling scars on the affected region and the people that inhabit it. At some point during the resultant chaos, there appears a window of opportunity, which if used wisely has the potential to bring forward effective change. The said window of opportunity is hope for change, but it is also a challenge. The challenging aspect is to most optimally utilize this opportunity as an instrument to benefit the people and eventually rebuild the shattered society in a stable and long-lasting manner. The primary objective of this essay is to understand the very contours of post-conflict development in the context of North Waziristan (erstwhile FATA). The major aim of the essay is to understand the significance of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in post-conflict rehabilitation and development phases. The assertions, conclusions, and arguments in this essay are primarily based on the related theoretical and conceptual underpinnings.

### **Peacebuilding and Development**

Within the plethora of literature available on the subject, it can be maintained that there are two different schools of thought that facilitate a critical insight into the relationship between peacebuilding and post-conflict development. The former among these schools, the 'exclusivists', propose a separation of the two actions, however allowing for one action encouraging another (Smoljan, 2003). However, if the basis of understanding regarding post-conflict development is constructed on the second school of thought i.e., the 'inclusivists', it can be claimed that peacebuilding cannot succeed without development, just like development cannot be materialized without peacebuilding. Therefore, the two processes seem to be interdependent and simultaneously work together towards a common goal. The mentioned 'inclusivist' approach has garnered substantial followers in recent years and has been considered as an effective approach to ensure sustainable development and peacebuilding.

Post-conflict development is a process that consists of the operations carried out following a conflict. It must be noted here that in order to designate a conflict-struck area as a post-conflict zone, there are several other markers that point to the certainty of the fact that the conflict in the region has culminated and that it is viable to plan development ventures in the area. Once the conflict-struck area is deemed as *post-conflict*, policies pertaining to its (re) development are formulated with special attention to the scope of their effective implementation. According to Smoljan (2003),

---

<sup>1</sup> *Maria Sychala-Kij* is a student of Bachelors in International Relations at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland. She is currently finishing her semester abroad at Bilgi University in Istanbul, Turkey.  
E-mail: spychalakijm@gmail.com

the contours of post-conflict development revolve around institutional reforms, social reconstruction, and reconciliation as well as the rebuilding of shattered state organs, communities, and economies. Since post-conflict period can neither be described as neither peace nor conflict (it is a period marked by frustration, episodic violence, chaos, suspicion, and mistrust) the road to recovery hence, needs to be planned while keeping in view an in-depth analysis of the underlying issues; the causes which led to the conflict in the first place.

Without defining the causes, one would not be able to avoid them in further development therefore it could lead to a relapse into conflict. Malik (2009) in her analysis points out horizontal inequalities as the key drivers of radicalization and violent conflict in Pakistan. Horizontal inequalities (real or perceived) are measured among groups defined by various dimensions, such as gender, religion, ethnicity, and class. They become a source of conflict when for example, one of the groups is marginalized or because of unmet expectations and/or unheard grievances (e.g., Stewart, 2002). Citizens abide by the social contract and accept the authority of the state, as long as it provides them security, public services, quality education, and reasonable economic condition. However, a failure in providing the mentioned services can result in the emergence of other non-state actors that tend to fill the vacuum. Such incongruity between expectations and gratification occurs if expectations are constant but the level of conditions keeps on diminishing. It is the state's responsibility to provide necessary stability and governance; however, some states are unable to do so. Therefore, the role of the international community and related organizations (as interventionists) becomes inevitable and such support is usually mobilized through the United Nations that itself politicizes the processes of post-conflict development and peacebuilding.

Post-conflict development is an arena confronted with numerous challenges, most notably, the almost impossible task to break the nexus between poverty, underdevelopment, and violent conflict. Another challenge is the issue of good governance. Whilst it is an undeniable fact that the post-conflict environment needs effective and goal-oriented management, the bigger questions remain as to *who* will be responsible and *what* exactly can be deemed as 'good' governance. Here it is important to understand that the 'good' is a relative concept and may have varying conceptions in distinct contexts. Various actors (such as the army, civilian administration, foreign aid agencies, etc.), can either take the lead or collaborate with each other in order to bring back the normalcy of life after violent conflict. Within this context, CIMIC is a concept that offers a framework within which civil and military institutions collaborate at the national level, in the aftermath of natural or human-made disasters. Nevertheless, there is little consensus among scholars regarding the construct CIMIC, particularly in terms of its operationalization (e.g., Ankersen, 2008).

The introduction of CIMIC in post-conflict scenarios is relatively new, thus faces operational-related challenges during post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement, and development phases. In the conflict-ridden areas, the necessary cooperation between the civil and military institutions has frequently led to contentions and controversies (ibid). The major critique has been expressed through terms such as militarization or securitization of development, particularly during the transition phase. In response, various scholars have defended the dominant role of security as it provides the precondition for any effective developmental or

peacebuilding-related initiatives. Nevertheless, (ideally) CIMIC provides a framework within which the institutions can be integrated with shared goals and objectives

### **The Case of North Waziristan**

North Waziristan (erstwhile FATA) is currently going through a post-conflict development phase. There are very few places in the world, if any, that have such complex demographic, socio-cultural and historical dimensions. These factors can help us to understand the conditions, which led the whole region to be infested by violent extremism and terrorism. Geographically, North Waziristan is bordered with Afghanistan and is surrounded by rugged mountains with a harsh climate. It is home to the Wazir and Dawar tribes, known for their exceptional bravery and toughness — ‘born warriors’. They were referred to as the ‘Hell’s door knocker’ by the British Army (Khayyam, 2016), as they resisted any foreign interventions during the colonial rule; especially in terms of administering and disarming them. The attempts of ‘governing’ the region also remained unsuccessful, therefore an agreement was drawn up and North Waziristan was granted a high degree of autonomy with the promise of no external intervention in exchange for peace and loyalty. After the partition of the sub-continent (in 1947), Pakistan continued the British policy while leaving North Waziristan (along with the entire erstwhile FATA) as a self-governing agency, with an independent status and tribal governance system. In other words, no form of central government or any other form of formal state authority was put in practice. The peace *within* was maintained through the respect of tribal elders and local norms, such as *Jirga* and *Pashtunwali*. *Pashtunwali* is a tribal code that defines the ‘Pashtun’ and shapes certain behaviors to be practiced by the ethnic identity. Some of the fundamentals of the Pashtun identity as dictated under the code of *Pashtunwali* are *Badal* (revenge), *Melmastia* (hospitality), *Nanawatai* (asylum), *Tureh* (bravery), and *Sabat* (loyalty) (e.g., Benson & Siddiqui, 2013).

According to Benson and Siddiqui, this does not imply the lawlessness of the people but rather being effectively stateless and able of maintaining *order* without the involvement of government courts, judges, police, army or other state institutions. However, the customary-law-based system of governance, as well as the deeply rooted tribal identity created a culture of independence that the people of North Waziristan already got used to over the long period. Indeed, this has created significant challenges for the present attempts of governing the territory, after its merger with the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KP). FATA Reforms Bill 2018 incorporated North Waziristan (along with other agencies of FATA) into constitutional mainstream and put an end to Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). Positive outcomes following the initiative can already be seen in the form of an actual extension of basic civil and judicial rights in the recent elections that took place on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2019. However, this is just one step, and the historically developed political and economic isolation persists in the region. As long as the poor socio-economic conditions do not change and a substantial number of the locals continue to survive below the poverty line, the vicious circle of poverty, underdevelopment, and violent extremism will continue to pose a threat of relapsing into violent conflict (Smoljan, 2003).

Indeed, the main idea behind the amalgamation of North Waziristan with KP is to address the structural conditions that led to the manifestation of violent extremism and terrorism in the region (poverty, underdevelopment, lack of employment and education, un-governed spaces, etc.). There is a realization amongst the policy-makers that the unattended conditions were skilfully used by the terrorist elements to secure the local support. In addition, it is also important to understand that the Taliban occupation not only resulted in the destruction of physical capital/infrastructure but also significantly dismantled the local social capital. In response, the Pakistani Army carried out various necessary military operation, however, Operation Zarb-e-Azb played an instrumental role in bringing normalcy to the region. However, the much-needed military operation resulted in massive displacement of local communities, thus creating another simmering issue for both the military and government. According to the data presented by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) till 5<sup>th</sup> September 2014, the number of registered displaced populations from North Waziristan was 961,000 (Hameed, 2015).

As for now, CIMIC has been most visible in the operations connected with the resettlement of the Temporary Displaced Persons (TDPs). Civilian administration with the support of foreign aid agencies effectively facilitated the TDPs in various relief camps. 'Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Unit' (RRU) was also established with the support of foreign agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Pakistan Army.

Considering the on-going transition in the region (particularly in North Waziristan), it appears that most of the post-conflict reconstruction and developmental related work is being spearheaded by the Pakistan Army. In particular, the military is committed to "[...] ensure fast track restoration of essential services, re-construction/renovation of civic amenities and regeneration of livelihood [...] with the realization that it is easy to destroy but difficult to construct' (Golden Arrow Division, 2019). Furthermore, the focus is on building infrastructure, education, mosques, developing access to health care facilities as well as improving the supply of water. The revival of livelihood is carried out through the army's support of agriculture (providing equipment, land, fertilizers, pesticides, and training). A Women Vocational Training Center and Youth Employment Scheme were also established to ensure an equal level of education and economic opportunities. The army also focuses on 'Winning Hearts and Minds' (WHAM) of the people through organizing public celebrations. A de-radicalization center was also set up as a means of transforming former terrorists and reintegrating them into society.

Army's involvement in post-conflict development has been unconventional as it goes beyond providing security and steps into the field of improving livelihood, which normally would be considered as the function of the civilian government. The usually visible line segregating military and civilian involvement appears blurred and ambiguous in the case of North Waziristan. Between the Pakistan Army spreading their area of influence and the historically conditioned and deeply rooted respect for tradition, international organizations may be perceived as a threat to the society and its culture (Yousaf et al., 2018).

The case of North Waziristan is a classic example to study the untraditional role the Pakistan Army has played in the post-conflict scenario. That is to say, it became the central pillar to balance both the 'security' and 'development' in order to

ensure sustainable peace in the region. Nevertheless, the role of the military (in the absence of civil-security and institutions) has also led to a great deal of criticism that resonates with the idea of securitization of the post-conflict setting. Various other concerns are being raised through the platform of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). These developments in the post-conflict scenario necessitate the role of civil and government institutions to play an instrumental role in the development phase rather than relying exclusively on the military. There is also a greater need to involve the indigenous community-based organizations in North Waziristan (embedded within the socio-cultural setting), which are eagerly looking forward to supplementing the developmental-related initiatives.

## References

- Ankersen, C. (2008). *Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-conflict Operations*. London: Routledge.
- Aslam, R. (2008). Rethinking 'Wana': A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conflict in the Tribal Region of Pakistan. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31(8), 665-683.
- Benson, B. & Siddiqui, Z. (2013). Pashtunwali—Law for the Lawless, Defense for the Stateless. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 37, 108-120.
- Chaudhry, S. and Wazir, M. (2012). Peacebuilding in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan: Conflict Management at State Level. *Tigah, A Journal of Peace and Development*, 11.
- Fleschenberg, A. & Yousufzai, T. (2019). Writing Stars in the Sky or Decentering the Global Discourse of the 'War(s) on Terror' through Narratives of Those Displaced. *Geopolitics*, 24 (2), 462-486.
- Greenwood, L. & Balachandran, G. (2014). The Search for Common Ground: Civil-Military relations in Pakistan. *HGP Working Paper*.
- Hameed, N. (2015). Struggling IDPs of North Waziristan in the Wake of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. *NDU Journal*. Retrieved from [https://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra\\_pub/articles/ndu-journal/NDU-Journal-2015/05-Struggling-IDPs.pdf](https://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/ndu-journal/NDU-Journal-2015/05-Struggling-IDPs.pdf)
- Khan, K. & Nyborg, I. (2013). False Promises False Hopes: Local Perspectives on Liberal Peace Building in North-Western Pakistan. *Forum for Development Studies*, 40 (2), 261-284.
- Khayyam, U. (2016). Waziri Culture and Pashtun Tribal Governance System: A Missing Link to Halt the Deadliest War in Wild Waziristan. *Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 5 (1).
- Malik, S. (2009). Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict in Pakistan: Is There a Link? *Economic and Political Weekly*, 44(34), 21-24. Retrieved from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260467704\\_Horizontal\\_Inequalities\\_and\\_Violent\\_Conflict\\_in\\_Pakistan\\_Is\\_There\\_a\\_Link](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260467704_Horizontal_Inequalities_and_Violent_Conflict_in_Pakistan_Is_There_a_Link)
- Pakistan's delicate civil-military balance. (2014). *Strategic Comments*, 20 (1), ix-x.
- Panic, M. (2005). Reconstruction, Development and Sustainable Peace: A Unified Program for Post-conflict Countries. *CDP Background Paper*, 8.
- Smoljan, J. (2003). The Relationship between Peacebuilding and Development. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 3 (2), 233-250.



- Stewart, F. (2002). Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. *QEH Working Paper Series*, 1-37.
- Thomas, L. (2015). *Beyond Khyber Pass*. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications.
- United States Institute of Peace. (2019). *Countering Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan*. Special Report. Washington, DC.
- Yousaf, N., Khan, M. & Hussain, S. (2018). Rehabilitating North Waziristan. *Policy Perspectives*.

**The United Nations in 21<sup>st</sup>  
Century (Dilemmas in World  
Politics) by Karen A. Mingst,  
Margaret P. Karns, and Alynna  
J. Lyon**

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 108-109  
njips.nust.edu.pk

**Ayesha Masood<sup>1</sup>**

The United Nations in the 21st century: Dilemmas in World Politics is a noteworthy book on the world's leading international organization and international relations which provides a comprehensive introduction of the United Nations (UN), its functions and its role in the promotion of peace and stability. and the book has a lot to offer in terms of the United Nations in the broader context of global politics; reflecting mainly on its history, challenges, and reforms, etc. The book offers an in-depth account concerning the functions of the United Nations i.e. how the UN works and also sheds light on the numerous challenges faced by the organization in the present century. From terrorism to piracy and from evolved threats to human security such as cybercrimes to climate change and global warming, the authors in the book accord **due to** importance to the new players on the international scene.

The authors Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Krans delve into investigating and deeply analyzing the resources available to the organization for the pursuit of its responsibilities. In addition, the primary aim of the book is to look at the past failures of the UN and prescribe how reforms should be made to overcome the mistakes from the past from happening again and also to predict viable futuristic approaches envisaged to facilitate smooth functioning of the organization.

The book is an inviting read as it takes a multidisciplinary approach diving into the history of the UN since its formation. The book is divided into chapters that reflect on the history of the United Nations and statistical knowledge by analysis, diagrams, and charts that expose the UN to its very core- facilitating a deeper cognizance about the functioning of the organization. The dedicated focus within the book aiming to explore various dimensions of the international organization with a broader perspective of international relations makes it even more intriguing of a read. The book addresses the issues and challenges that the UN has faced since its inception starting from cultural practices to climate change advances and various other affairs related to equality. The role of powerful countries in the world has also been discussed within the book chapters, in particular in terms of exploring the avenues which shall enhance the role of these countries in bringing peace and stability to the world by meaningfully contributing to the UN.

Generally, the book discusses three overall themes including governance, sovereignty and leadership to explore current issues like terrorism, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), evolving conceptions of human security and internal

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ayesha Masood* is currently pursuing her MS in Peace & Conflict Studies at Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad  
E-mail: masoodayasha94@gmail.com

reforms. Moreover, the authors blatantly address and discuss the incompetence of the UN as well, addressing the instances of issues and cases where the organization could have taken a firmer stance and attained more than it actually did.

This new edition of the book also includes case studies on peacekeeping and the use of force in Congo and Mali, transnational terrorism and the emergence of ISIS, the Security Council's failure to act in Syria, the Syrian and global refugee/migrant crisis, and the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals leading to the framing of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The book is divided into eight chapters and each chapter comprehensively covers a distinct theme of the UN. The book in its opening chapters discusses the dilemmas faced by the United Nations in different contexts. It outlines how exactly the United Nations system works, how it was founded and what is the political structure of the organization. In addition, the book also identifies the major actors present in the United Nations system including the Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), coalitions and blocs, small states and middle powers, and finally the United States and other major powers, as well as the UN Secretary-General and the Secretariat. Following the opening chapters, the ensuing chapters in the book discuss the role of the UN in peacekeeping and ensuring security and stability globally. The aforementioned premise of activity has been discussed in deeper detail using case studies such as that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali. Globally threatening factors such as nuclear proliferation and counter-terrorism have been thoroughly discussed with the case study of Darfur and Bosnia.

The book further delves deep into the role of **the UN** in the development of notions such as women empowerment and poverty alleviation. It also discusses human security and environmental factors contributing to it. Examples of HIV AIDS, ozone depletion and pollution have also been discussed in the concluding chapters of the book. Lastly, and most importantly, the authors ponder on the history of the UN, particularly in terms of its negligences and mishandling of issues that could have had better solutions. In doing so, the authors also proposed amendments in policies and structures to ensure avoidance of any problem/failure in the future.

Conclusively, considering all the significant details and incidents mentioned in Karen and Margaret's notable work, it would not be wrong to claim that the authors have done a splendid job in providing a deep insight into **the** working of **the** UN and the challenges faced by it.

**Civil War and Democracy in  
West Africa: Conflict Resolution,  
Elections and Justice in Sierra  
Leone and Liberia by David  
Harris**

NUST Journal of International  
Peace & Stability  
2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 110-111  
njips.nust.edu.pk

**Mudasser Javaid<sup>1</sup>**

In the book titled *Civil War and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia*, author David Harris comprehensively exemplifies how in the twenty-first century, elections are viewed and used as determinants in post-conflict settings. The author builds on the aforementioned argument while generally tracing the development of conflict resolution in Africa during the post-Cold War era, but while dedicating distinct attention to such developments in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Through the case studies of the two West African states i.e. Sierra Leone and Liberia, the author critically analyzes the emphasize accorded to the role of elections as the core of conflict termination and how the failure to participate in elections leaves states consequences which are completely uncalled for. The author lays substantial stress on questioning the role of the international community in strengthening the significance of post-conflict elections and conceptions of transitional justice, especially the emergence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) generally, alongside the emergence of ad hoc hybrid systems such as the Sierra Leone Special Court (SLSC) particularly. The author does not just illustrate a vivid picture of the literature on contemporary conflict resolution more broadly but does so specifically in relation to the African continent and the emergence of the new war notion in respect of Africa's various intra-state conflicts. Harris, in this account also provides a detailed portrayal of thematic considerations and developments in relation to the conflict in Africa, exploring the ideas of ethnicity and motivation such as greed vs grievance debate. Although the main focus of this book is conflict resolution and democratization, the study of elections as the converging point which serves as the intersection of local actors, international bodies and post-conflict elections constitutes the central thematic underpinning of the book.

A total of five chapters in the book explore the historical roots of conflict in the aforementioned two case studies, outlining a comprehensively detailed interpretation and conceptualization about the nature of war itself, and the two major elections held under consideration in each case (i.e. 1996 and 2002 for Sierra Leone and 1997 and 2005 for Liberia). The concluding two chapters examine the role of elections more broadly, as well as transitional justice, and their combined utility as determinants of a new democratic arena. The book is a well-informed reading when considering the analysis of not only the historical genesis of the conflict in both cases

---

<sup>1</sup> Mudasser Javaid is currently pursuing his Masters in Peace & Conflict Studies at the Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad. E-mail: bhindermudassar7@gmail.com

but the campaigning and political interplay that emerged in the context of post-conflict elections. In both cases, the first election proved to be a false dawn for peace and stability. Another glaring aspect of the book is its avoidance of macro-level explanations for both the conflicts (i.e., Sierra Leone and Liberia), with the author contrarily delving into a thorough analysis of contexts throughout and providing credible evidence for a wide range of opinions on certain events and actions.

The author keenly analyzes 'the impact of the international discourse surrounding elections and how certain actions, for instance, the lack of international support for building up the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) as a political force influenced the long-term effect of an election. He finds that the argument for the international funding of political parties across Africa is persuasive and points to the clear benefits that emerged in examples such as South Africa and Mozambique. Clearly, the author aims to build on the huge amount of inconsistencies between flawed post-conflict elections and stronger, more stable affairs where minor flaws and irregularities may arise, yet the overall will of the populace emerges.

In the Liberian context, the author puts forth the impact of decentralization of power and alternative voting systems, with presidential, House, and Senate elections allowing for both national and local issues to emerge in voters' considerations. Furthermore, the author seems to convince the readers that this decentralization prevents the concentration of power in a single majority power and eventually results in a remarkable balance of power across the parties in the House, Senate, and Executive. This points to the fact the avoidance of a zero-sum game is surely a political strategy to be welcomed.

Though, the book critically analyzes both case studies thoroughly but **lays a huge** emphasis on different thematic interpretations. Regardless, it does lack the analytical criticism of the international community and the prevalence of judicial solutions over political ones. The final two chapters probe into the difficulties of quickly arranged elections where the underlying causes of conflict remain unaddressed in the face of short-term stability. The author still points out the problematic sidelining of the very issues that caused the emergence of armed groups in each case. He also points out that in the Liberian case, the liberal solution of justice in a post-conflict scenario is at best a potential threat to stability and at worst unworkable and dangerous. Even then, the author fails to address the international political motivations behind such attempts or stating more critically, appears afraid to raise the question, that does such democratic elections mean to help the states in times of disruption or do they help the international community, irrespective of the aftermath?

Furthermore, effective criminalization of the most if not all combatants also has the effect of delegitimizing violent change and of downplaying domestic and international causes of the conflict. Constitutional engineering methods must be tackled on a case-by-case basis to try to foster political inclusion, widening of political representation despite its potential effect on the ability of a state to affect policy and the continuance of patron-client politics. Conclusively, the book not only provides some critical insights into the democratization efforts in post-conflict scenarios but also leaves the door for questions open; questions which are critical and must be raised in order to enhance the post-conflict rebuilding strategies for states, with special reference to Africa.

## Guidelines for Author(s)

The authors are advised and requested to *read* and adhere to the guidelines mentioned below:

1. *Submission of Manuscripts*: Submission of a manuscript is to be done electronically by attachment via email, preferably by the official email in use by the authors: [editor@njips.nust.edu.pk](mailto:editor@njips.nust.edu.pk)
2. Manuscript submitted to NJIPS should not be published elsewhere or under consideration concurrently for publication in any other academic avenue.
3. *Preparation of Manuscript*: The maximum length of the intended article(s) for publication in the Journal is 6000-8000 words. A short abstract of 250-300 words with (four to five) keywords should precede the introduction.
4. Contributors are to submit a separate *cover page* containing their contact details which should contain their full name(s), contact number(s), official email address in use, current institutional affiliation, brief note (fifty words maximum) about areas of interest and highest qualification/ degree attained. Corresponding authors of papers submitted should be indicated and their contact details (mentioned above) shall be provided as well. The authors will receive a copy of the *edited* volume (soft and hard copies) containing their articles.
5. *Abstract*: The submissions accepted for publication in the NJIPS must have abstracts of around 250-300 words structured around the following markers (preferably in the same order):
  - a) The abstract should be accompanied by a title comprehensively indicating the subject/ themes of the article,
  - b) The abstract must begin with introductory lines that introduce the reader to the context of the study,
  - c) The introductory lines must be followed by a coherent, logical organization that reflects the theoretical literature, conceptual background or the thematic underpinnings of the study,
  - d) This must be followed by a brief mention of the methodological approach that has been adopted for the study,
  - e) In order to highlight the inquiry or problem under view, some lines (two to three lines) should elucidate what the study seeks to answer, and
  - f) The abstract should conclude with two to three lines about how the study aims to contribute to the respective area of research and what makes it significant over other studies that have been carried out so far.
6. *Text Formatting*: Manuscripts should be submitted in Microsoft Word document/ format with the following in mind:
  - a) use a normal, plain font (i.e. 12-point Times New Roman) for the text including footnotes,
  - b) the manuscript should adhere to a singular style of spelling (United States English),
  - c) use italics or single inverted commas for emphasis,
  - d) the titles of the subsection(s) should be italicized and should be aligned to the left,
  - e) use the table function, not spread sheets, to make tables which should contain a clear title related to the subject matter and the source of information in case of secondary data,
  - f) similar injunctions, as tables, should be followed for figures,
  - g) abbreviations should be defined at first mention and used consistently thereafter,
  - h) acknowledgments of people, grants, funds, organizations, etc. should be placed in a separate section on the last page before the mention of references. The names of funding organizations should be written in full, and
  - i) save the file in DOCX file/ format (Microsoft Word 2007 or higher).
7. *Referencing of Manuscript*: NJIPS *only* accepts American Psychological Association (APA) Sixth Edition format for referencing. Contributors are requested to pay exhaustive

attention to the referencing of the articles/ manuscripts on the format mentioned above and consult the guidelines of the referencing style thoroughly for all data entries into the article. Also, the manuscripts should contain footnotes for additional information and not employ the use of endnote.

8. *Privacy Statement:* To ensure objectivity and transparency in research and to ensure that accepted principles of ethical and professional conduct have been followed, authors should include information regarding sources of funding, potential conflicts of interest (financial or non-financial), informed consent if the research involved human participants. Authors should include the following statements (if applicable) in a separate section entitled, *Compliance with Ethical Standards* before the references when submitting a manuscript:
  - Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest
  - Research involving Human Participants
  - Informed consent
9. The corresponding author should be prepared to collect documentation of compliance with ethical standards and send if requested during the peer-review process or after publication. The Editors reserve the right to reject manuscripts that do not comply with the above-mentioned guidelines at any point in time during the publication process. The author will be held responsible for false statements or failure to fulfill the abovementioned guidelines. In addition, NJIPS urges and expects a professional code of conduct in its correspondence with its contributors/ authors.
10. Authors must disclose all relationships or interests that could have direct or potential influence or impart bias on the work. Although an author may not feel there is any conflict, disclosure of relationships and interests provides a more complete and transparent process, leading to an accurate and objective assessment of the work. Awareness of real or perceived conflicts of interest is a perspective to which the readers are entitled. This is not meant to imply that a financial relationship with an organization that sponsored the research or compensation received for consultancy work is inappropriate.
11. *Review Process:* NJIPS pursues a double-blind peer-review process for each and every submission. The authors/ contributors are informed about the feedback and they are expected to make the changes outlined by the scholars/ academicians of the peer-review process. NJIPS also sends its authors/contributors to the report(s) of the Turnitin Similarity Index in order to ascertain that their contribution is based on original work. However, prior to the blind peer-reviews, the Editorial Team assesses the language, syntax, use of grammar, referencing style, etc. of the manuscripts submitted and would be within its authority to send a review to the authors/ contributors for changes before they can be forwarded to the experts on the matter for their feedback. In addition, the Editorial Team will make the final decision/judgment on how well the author has accomplished his/ her task. NJIPS adheres to meticulous methods of reviewing its submission in order to **disseminate scholarly literature and discourse, within Pakistan and abroad.**
12. *Open Access and Publication:* The **edition** volume of NJIPS shall be published online (website: [www.njips.nust.edu.pk](http://www.njips.nust.edu.pk)) initially which will be freely accessible and will be made available in its printed version later. The authors will remain updated throughout the reviewing and publishing process by the Editorial Team of NJIPS. All final decisions regarding the reviewing and publication process will be taken under the explicit authority of the Editor-in-Chief of NJIPS.

The Editorial Team of NJIPS can be reached at all times in case of any confusion and query. Together, with our contributors and authors, we wish to inculcate a deeper cognizance in contemporary peace and conflict dynamics, nationally and internationally.

### **Disclaimer**

The views and opinions presented in the research articles and essays in this journal are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the policy and/or stance of the NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability (NJIPS).



NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability by NJIPS is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial 4.0 International Licence.

