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Ayesha Ishfaq[1]

Abstract

The research surrounding the effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) has been an on-going process ever since the inception of these operations. The available literature discusses the successes and failures of the missions depending on variables such as the host country's dynamics, mission mandate, and end result etc. However, the experience of the peacekeepers is rarely, if ever, a consideration in understanding the success/failure. Pakistan is one of the largest troops contributing countries to UNPKOs; therefore, it has a huge reservoir of returning and actively serving peacekeepers. The field area challenges and host country's environment experienced by the troops play a significant role in discerning the outcome of a UN mission. This research focuses on assessing the challenges and perceptions of Pakistani-UN Peacekeeping Troops in achieving the underlying objectives of United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The assessment is based on the primary data collected through interviews from Pakistani UN peacekeepers discussing their in-field challenges, motivations, perceptions, experiences and training. The study endeavours to highlight the contribution of Pakistani Troops to achieve global peace in today's complex peacekeeping environment.

Keywords
Peacekeeping, global peace, Central African Republic (CAR), multi-cultural troops, UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs)

Introduction
Since the birth of United Nations in 1945, world leaders have joined hands to encourage peace and security throughout the world. While the UN charter envisioned a thorough spectrum of conflict management and conflict resolution, over the years

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many challenges have surfaced. Some of the hurdles are purely conceptual while others demand more practical and experiential insights. Peacekeeping operations were initiated as an instrument keeping in mind the end goal to help conflicting nations with returning to peace. The UN Charter declares that its fundamental aim is 'to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war'(UNO). In this regard, Peacekeeping operations were initiated under UN banner in 1948 with the arrangement of an unarmed military group following the cease-fire between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In the initial years, the UNPKOs were tasked to fulfil three functions. Firstly, it was expected of the peacekeeping forces to maintain impartiality in their conduct with the parties in conflict. Secondly, it was necessary up until the 1990s that the parties consented to involving the UN peacekeepers in the resolution of the conflict. Lastly, the UN peacekeepers were tasked to avoid the use of force (Krasno, 2005). Typically, modern peacekeeping missions are deployed with or without the compliance of conflicting parties, depending on international legislation and mandate to sustain and implement a peaceful environment impartially and without using combat arms (unless mandated otherwise).

By the end of 1998, 35 UN missions had been deployed as compared to only 13 in the pre-cold war era (Duffey, 2000). The shift in intensity of conflicts, in the post-cold war era, from interstate to intrastate conflicts drastically expanded and evolved the peacekeeping operations. Contemporary peace missions do not solely rely on military troops to perform the task of 'traditional' peacekeeping by monitoring a peace agreement. They now comprise of a multilateral force including a civilian component that undertakes the responsibility of political negotiations, humanitarian assistance, peace-making and peacebuilding. Consequently, modern peacekeeping has been viewed as a valuable third party intervention, instead of a token military presence in the conflict zones.

Article 43 of the UN charter was envisioned to provide the legal basis for a permanent force under the auspices of UN Security Council (UNSC) to ensure peace and security (Woodhouse, 2010). However, it has yet not been brought to action due to various limitations. Until the UN does not form its own standing army, the member states will have to provide troops and equipment for setting up a peace mission in the conflicted areas of the world. Currently, about 100,000 military, police and civilian personnel from 125 countries are deployed in 14 peacekeeping missions spread over four continents ("UN Peacekeeping", 2018).

In similar vein, Pakistan has ascended to assume the role of one of the largest contributors of peacekeeping troops in this multi-national force that contributes to global peace by offering specialized military services. Pakistan has thus far participated in forty-three missions in over twenty-six countries with a contribution of over one hundred and seventy-two thousand uniformed personnel. It is currently involved in seven missions with a contribution of five thousand and eighty-one personnel. Pakistan ranks on number four, as the largest Troop Contributing Country (TCC) in the world, whereas it is the second largest contributor in terms of its military deployment. Moreover, Pakistan is the sixth largest police contributor in the world. For the international policing duties, it has also sent its paramilitary personnel.[2]

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[2] Data accessed from the Department of Peacekeeping Training (PKT) at the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Despite the proactive role that Pakistan plays in contributing to global peace under the banner of UNPKOs, the deployed troops remain unapproached in regards to understanding the challenges they face. A gap prevails between the understanding of actual and perceived challenges faced by Pakistani troops that impacts the effectiveness of a UN peacekeeping mission such as MINUSCA. This necessitates the study of challenging aspects of UNPKOs through the lens of UN-Pakistani peacekeepers to conceptualize and assess individual and military level challenges. The rationale behind focusing the research on the Central African Republic (CAR) was driven by three factors: (1) The mission started in 2014, hence, it is relatively new as compared to other UN missions; (2) it has a unique 'peace enforcement' and 'robust' mandate as compared to other mandates of peacekeeping missions; and (3) Pakistan has the second largest troop deployment as compared to other nations deployed in the area (see Graph 1).

CAR, which is slightly smaller than the size of the State of Texas in USA, is a country in the middle of the continent between the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Cameroon, Sudan and South Sudan. The country fell into unrest in 2012 when Muslim rebels from the Seleka umbrella seized control in the Christian dominant part of the nation. A counter force in the form of Christian volunteer armies, called the Anti-Balaka, ascended to combat the Seleka in 2013. Seleka surrendered power to a transitional government in 2014 under the constant pressure from global forces. Violence continues to take place despite active government forces and presence of UN peacekeeping troops (Carayannis & Fowlis, 2017).

The United Nations (UN) launched its first peacekeeping mission in Africa in 1960. Since then, over 20 operations have been authorized throughout the African continent. The UN operation in CAR represents one of the last threads of security for many Central Africans as officials warned of genocide (Welz, 2014). Over the past two decades, the United Nations (UN) has launched three peacekeeping operations in CAR. The latest mission called MINUSCA was operationally mandated in 2014. Going back to where peacekeeping in CAR began, it can be observed that since 2013, troops from multiple countries have been deployed to manage the situation. In July 2013, the African Union Peace and Security Council authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission titled MISCA. Deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation despite the deployment of MISCA and on-going human rights abuses in CAR, the Security Council in 2014 approved the establishment of a nearly 12,000-strong UNPKO named as MINUSCA, to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian access in the war-torn country (Siradag, 2016). In accordance with Resolution 2149 (2014), MISCA transferred its authority to MINUSCA on 15th September 2014. As of 2018, MINUSCA has a total of around 14,632 personnel serving as peacekeepers including civilian, police and military troops with Pakistan as the second highest contributing country (see below Graph 1).

This research is a compiled narrative of Pakistan's involvement and resolve to restore international peace and stability through its participation in UNPKOs.

Moreover, this research aims to fill gaps in the existing literature surrounding the challenges of UNPKOs, by viewing it from the perspectives of peacekeepers.

Graph 1: Top Ten Troop Contributing Countries *("MINUSCA")*

Also, the aforementioned advantages heavily rely on primary data as it includes the perspectives of peacekeepers with insights into the ground realities of peacekeeping.

Methodology

Ten semi structured interviews were conducted in 2018 to collect the peacekeepers' take on the challenges faced by them on ground and its relation with the mission's effectiveness. The perspectives were gathered on peacekeeping as an effective tool for global peace, their understanding of peacekeeping and their assessment of themselves as peacekeepers. An extensive questionnaire was drafted to understand the ground realities and challenges. The questionnaire was further substantiated by the available literature and pilot interviews with participants who had served in various peacekeeping operations. It included questions ranging from operational to social and psychological challenges. On average, each interview lasted for about 45 minutes to one hour. Most of the interviews were conducted face to face while a few were conducted through a telephone call. The interviewed participants varied in their ranks and duties.

The study endeavoured to cover all the ranks from Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) to a Brigadier level officer who served as a sector commander in the field. By the 7th interview, the data saturation was evident however; three more interviews were conducted to get further input. Military Operations Directorate at the Army General Headquarters was contacted to provide the contact details of the peacekeepers that had served in MINUSCA for this study. Another aspect of the research was taking what peacekeepers said at face value, responding to and interpreting information as true. While no particular efforts were made to verify what peacekeepers reported in their interviews, many of their thoughts were reflected in the reviewed literature. The recorded audio clips of the interviews were later transcribed, analysed, coded and clustered into various themes. The themes were finally analysed in light of the available literature which revealed that the interviews did to a great extent, correspond to the literature.

Limitations and Ethical Considerations

Only the peacekeepers who had served in CAR were chosen for this study, therefore the pool of peacekeepers eligible for the study was limited. There has been no female deployment in CAR from Pakistan so far, hence a gender balance for the study could not be achieved. The interviews reflected thinking and feelings at particular moments

of time, not necessarily what the same person would say on a different day. It proved challenging to convey exactly the emotions expressed during interviews. All the participants of the study have been kept anonymous due to their personal preferences and ethical requirements. The respondents were requested to sign the consent form that detailed the overall research and usage of the recorded interviews. For the purpose of maintenance of transparency and confidentiality, pseudo-names have been assigned to the participants of the study.

Results

The 21st century has brought an evolution in the challenges faced by peacekeepers. The shift from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict has completely changed the dynamics of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping of today is different from the peacekeeping of the cold war era. This new change in conflict dynamics has spurred peculiar challenges that have left UN with a new dilemma of tackling these predicaments.

The challenges mentioned by the peacekeepers are divided into four main themes: operational, socio-psychological, motivational and multinational force. These themes are further divided to give a comprehensive assessment of challenges.

Operational Challenges

Since the inception of UN peacekeeping missions, militaries around the world have been employed in numerous environments presenting unique challenges to the peacekeepers. The challenges are wide ranging from terrain, to politico - social, nature of tasks, resources available, training, mandate, joint operations and psychological issues, to name a few. All such issues have an impact on the troops' overall performance. However, issues regarding the provision of adequate equipment, training, understanding of mandate and rules of engagement directly impact the operations of the mission and can therefore be listed under the operational challenges faced by the peacekeepers in the peace missions abroad. These operational challenges are very critical as they sometimes land peacekeepers in life threating situations. Pakistan army has contributed to peace and stability around the world under the ambit of UN, and has accumulated vast experience of operating in varying environments. In view of this, during the deployment in MINUSCA the issues identified by the Pakistani peacekeepers in accomplishing their task are discussed under separate headings.

Ambiguities in Mandates and Rules of Engagement (ROE)

For a successful initiation, peace keepers rely on three avenues: a mandate, a peace agreement, and a UN Security Council resolution. The Security Council is responsible for providing germane mandate that explicates the operation. The mandate underscores the tasks to be performed during this process. This aspect might be troublesome in areas where there is little peace left to keep. Additionally, certain international obligations and limitations of Security Council might influence the mandate itself. As a result, mandates may be drafted in a way that leaves room for interpretation and ambiguity (Swope, 2011). Most respondents conveyed some reservations regarding the precision and explicit nature of the mandate. In cases where the mandate is vague, such as when political discord prevents a unified agreement regarding the host state, the entire mission may become destabilized from the very beginning. Unfortunately, due to volatile events on the ground, the council

rarely finds the opportunity to draft a strategy before formulating a peace mission. Resultantly, most operations are influenced by the international politics and organizational limitations.

On the other hand, streamlined and up to date mandates might look good on paper, but can also come with their own set of problems. Due to their multilateral nature, mandates have become lengthy and tedious, distracting from core priorities and focusing on multiple and evolving tasks. Consequently, it may become difficult for peacekeepers to keep track of all the tasks or even prioritize them according to different phases of the mission (Nadin, 2014).

UN missions in 21st Century are being sent to more hostile and chaotic environments, where the mission is more about peace-enforcement rather than peacekeeping. Such missions are given the peace- enforcement or in other words 'robust' mandates. Mandates are responsible to cover the political, social, diplomatic and operational aspects of the mission whereas; Rules of Engagement (ROE) are means to implement those policies. ROE is also the only effective way to control and limits the use of force on ground. While the mandate is drafted by the Security Council, the ROE are agreed and signed by the troop contributing countries to implement the will of UN on ground. However, when the tasks assigned in the mandate do not comply with the ROE required by the troops in field then it impacts the effectiveness of the mission (Simpson, 2016). The mandate authorized by the Security Council to MINUSCA is of peace-enforcement because of the active conflict situation between the rebel groups. However, this 'robust' mandate creates ambiguity in the minds of peacekeepers due to its contradictory nature to traditional peacekeeping. In similar vein, Karlsrud (2015) argued that UN missions have mandates authorizing the use of force, but these normally do not specify enemies and situations on the ground. Moreover, Blocq (2006) highlights the ethical dilemmas and moral confusion related to peace- enforcement mandates. He has mentioned this ambiguity as the 'fog of UN peacekeeping' and how the peacekeepers should be prepared for it. Many respondents of this research also shared similar concerns. Major Alan expressed that they suffered traumatic experiences and material losses due to ambiguity about the use of force against the rebels in certain situations.

Lack of Resources

In addition to a lack of trained personnel, many peace keeping operations have also been plagued by budget cuts. While peacekeeping is cheaper than its opponent, war, it requires hefty finances that require judicious handling. All member states are required to pay a fixed amount towards the annual budget, however, for some developing countries; this may not always be feasible. Additionally, with new conflicts, arms, troops and monetary resources may be sub-directed elsewhere mid-mission. This aspect can greatly jeopardize the momentum of the peace mission. Moreover, a dearth of critical equipment required to fulfil United Nations mandates can create a gap between expectations and performance. Moreover, failure to resource crisis struck areas with the correct development tools can foster spite in civilians. As such, there is a lack of professionals that are needed for lasting socioeconomic development Therefore, without the proper provisions, discord between objectives and lack of resources could undermine the mission's credibility as projected by the literature and the primary data collected from interviews. As Brigadier James narrated:

> Whichever mission there is, whether it is pertaining to CAR or otherwise, the mission never has enough resources to address all the factors that need its help, and to fully fulfil the requirements of the mandate. At many places there are many folds less troops deployed than the requirements of the area. Then the civilian and military leadership needs to decide where to focus the help on, where the trouble lies. So the concentration of troops would be there. Mission sources are never ever adequate and in terms of compatibility also. There is no communication infrastructure. There are no roads in the country. If one has to travel from the south route to anywhere, you can't go there via roads because there are none. There is no road connecting places. There is jungle terrain in between also that hinders communication even further. These are major factors that affect the mandate and why it is not implemented (Personal interview, 6th June, 2018).

Similarly, Major Matt recounted: "Our hands were tied behind our backs, we had old equipment. We were an army assigned to go do a job without adequate equipment…we faced a casualty in an ambush due to the lack of Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC). […] We borrowed an APC from our neighbour Battalion to rescue our men from the ambush" (Personal interview, 13th June, 2018).

Social Challenges

Culture differences in a new region can be overwhelming for peacekeepers unless they are adequately trained. Differences in social, cultural, and religious setting can be hard to accept for certain members. From dress codes, eating habits, to social interactions, the pronounced differences may become a source of anxiety for peacekeepers, especially if there is a lack of training before deployment. These differences can reflect on job performance, as well as morale of the troops. Peacekeepers may become prejudiced and biased towards one faction based on cultural and religious differences, and as a result affect the mission's success. In addition, language can also become a source of communicative hindrance for the troops. Language is a powerful tool for coherent interaction and understanding; however communication gaps can lead to misunderstandings and false assumptions.

Communication Gap & Cultural Cleavages

Goodwin (2005) in her book 'The Military and Negotiation: The Role of the Soldier-Diplomat' has emphasized on the military tactical level negotiations undertaken by a non-duty soldier in line with the *Article 33* of Chapter VI of UN charter that prefers to resolve conflicts through negotiation, mediation ,enquiry and conciliation. She has further explored the concept of negotiations at the individual troop level that is encountered by multiple challenges including volatile environment, urgency in decision making, threats, personal competence, language, and culture barrier. Moreover, strong hold on the local language and culture is not only fundamental for smooth negotiations, but also vital to social acceptance amongst the local populace.

Pakistani peacekeepers in MINUSCA faced a similar challenge of communication gap and cultural shock due to the language barrier hindering their interaction with the locals to build friendly relations for better negotiations. The Pakistani contingent was deployed in Kaga-Bandoro, the town which was under siege by Seleka rebels. Pakistanis at numerous occasions faced difficulties due to

insufficient understanding of the local language and culture. As explained by Captain Brad:

> […] Not being able to communicate our stance due to language barrier only meant aggravating the sentiments of a particular faction in the host country. We could not entirely integrate into CAR culture due to a huge language barrier as opposed to, for example, the French forces. This further reinforced the tension between the fighting parties, rather than bringing the crisis under control, ultimately impacting negatively, on the effectiveness of peacekeeping agenda (Personal interview, 3rd July, 2018).

Trust Building

The religious nature of conflict in CAR among Muslims and Christians necessitated proactive impartiality and neutrality in dealing with the parties. Many respondents pointed out the baseless scepticism of local Christians towards Pakistani Muslim peacekeepers. According to the participants, such incredulity was demoralizing for the peacekeepers, who were deployed to sacrifice their toil and blood for another nation away from their homeland. When the respondents were questioned about their personal bias coming into play towards the Muslim groups, they answered that it was nearly impossible to favour a certain group based on your personal preference as the UN measures to ensure impartiality were very strict.

The Psychological Aspect

Peacekeeping missions can range from observation and monitoring, to serious anti-rebellion law enforcement. As a result, missions can sometimes turn out to be more dangerous, and peacekeepers are required to be vigilant for such eventualities. Well trained soldiers can quickly adapt to evolving roles and will readily respond to threats with skill; however, untrained soldiers may not be able to respond appropriately to the severity of the situation. Bartone and colleagues (1998) note that these unqualified militants may use brute force on civilians or open fire when faced with threats. While most of the circumstances warrant serious response, these instances can have sombre psychological repercussions for the peacekeepers. Resultantly, it is important that soldiers, health care professionals, and leaders have a clear idea of the objectives and procedures of the mission.

Psychological Trauma of the Home State Conflicts

Jun and Nomura (2002) note that peacekeepers may face multiple stressors during the missions. For many soldiers and militants, operations away from home can be a challenging feat, especially in dangerous situations. For many the psychological trauma stems from being cut off from friends and family members for extended periods of time. For example, unfortunate events of December 16, 2014 Army Public School attack in Peshawar Pakistan (BBC, 2014), was a serious demoralizing event for the deployed troops. Many soldiers were left in shock, shocked at the idea that their own families and countrymen were in danger while they were serving in a foreign land.

Health Related Issues

In addition to above mentioned stressors, peacekeepers are also required to be vigilant about their health in the mission areas. Unfortunately, most missions are conducted in the African continent where the health system is fractured and major infections are

prevalent. Despite precautionary measures, soldiers may find themselves suffering from common ailment, and in rare incidences, serious diseases. In addition to the anxiety and stress from the particular disease, affected personnel may be isolated from healthy soldiers as a precautionary measure. This aspect fosters loneliness, and depression among peacekeepers. Brig James noted that missions in Congo were particularly difficult due to the prevalence of Ebola, Congo fever and AIDS. Many soldiers are required to keep hand sanitizers to minimize risk of contact through hand holding. Additionally, he noted that Lassa fever in Sierra Leone was common and dead bodies had to be burned in order to contain the spread of virus. Major Matt expressed, that the fear of catching contagious diseases caused hindrance in their daily routine tasks. It made them extra conscious while dealing with the locals, thus hampering development of better inter-personal relations. However, he also acknowledged that UN health care facilities did their routine check-ups to ensure their safety.

Depression and Low Morale
Due to the isolated and dangerous nature of the mission in CAR, it is not uncommon for soldiers to face frequent depression spells, as well as a myriad of other psychiatric problems. Being in a foreign land away from home, foreign culture, hostile environment, lack of resources and overstretched missions have psychological repercussions. Many soldiers may also suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) after dangerous missions, especially in cases where the death of fellow soldiers or civilians is involved. Moreover, in lengthy missions, boredom may also take a toll on the troops. For operations that require high activity over extended periods of time, troops may feel over worked and exhausted. As a result, work performance may suffer. Major Matt noted, "[…] being in a constantly stressful environment, troops were mentally strained. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was continually out for patrolling to respond to emergency situations. Additionally, it was very hard for troops to complete their given responsibility within the time due to poor road infrastructure. Even after we were back at the camp areas, frequent radio beeps kept us alert to leave on short notices" (Personal interview, 26th June, 2018).

Similarly, Captain Brad expressed, "Now that I've gone there and returned, I can say that Waziristan is an easier mission as compared to MINUSCA. […] The level of mental tension in CAR was much higher as compared to Waziristan" (Personal interview, 3rd July, 2018).

Fortunately, the instances of depression and anxiety among Pakistani troops are comparatively lower as compared to their contemporaries. Few respondents attributed this finding to the two-month vocational break given to soldiers after lengthy deployment for 6 months or more. This paid leave allows soldiers to relax, visit friends and family, and reboot, which proved beneficial for their psychological well-being.

Multinational Force

Cultural Differences and Diversity
The UN peacekeeping missions frequently employ trained personnel from various ethnicities and backgrounds. Duffey (2000) noted that UN forces are not a homogenous group of individuals. Moreover, keeping the language differences aside,

each battalion from another country brings its own culture, assumptions, strategies, training and understanding of the mandate. In order for peaceful operations, leaders need to acknowledge this cultural diversity within troops and find common ground between parties. Additionally, these multi-cultural troops are faced with diverse tasks and therefore, require strong management skills. As a result, lack of communication can create a gap between performance and expectations, and reflect badly on the mission's success.

Similarly, in accordance with the views of the respondents Elron (1999) in the book titled *Blue Helmets and White Armor: Multi-nationalism and Multi-Culturalism among UN Peacekeeping Forces*, claims that multi-national peacekeeping forces are often plagued by cultural discords. Military cultures, enforcement laws vary across every TCC and the host countries. The training guidelines are given by the UN but the responsibility of training lies on the TCCs. The mission- worthiness of the UNPK troops can also create a discord within the mission. If the troops and leaders do not share a common language, or develop implementation differences, the success of the mission can become a difficult feat. Problems also arise when contingents are reluctant to serve under another nation's command. Such discontinuities within a peacekeeping force limit its ability to operate in a coordinated military manner adversely impacting the mission. Captain Brad argued, "if I were to say where I was under greater tension, Waziristan or the MINUSCA, I'd say the latter...especially because it was a mission that lacked coordination and resources and sometimes one had to serve under a commander from a third country" (personal interview, 3rd July, 2018). But the diversity within the mission can also prove to be an asset. Major Alan noted, "we had a good relation with the Moroccan contingent, they helped us in translating the local language …. We also learnt different strategies of jungle warfare from the African contingents deployed in the same area" (Personal interview, 11th June, 2018).

Results (Perceptions, Understanding and Personal Motivation)

Oxford dictionary defines perception as "the way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted" or as "intuitive understanding and insight". Looking deeper into perceptions can give insights into the peacekeepers motivations and experience. Perceptions or concepts shape a person's action on ground. In the section below, peacekeeping perceptions have been assessed under three themes: their understanding of peacekeeping, their perception about peacekeeping's contribution to global peace, and Pakistanis' role as peacekeepers

'Peacekeeping' for Peacekeepers

Peacekeeping is primarily conceptualized by peacekeepers who were interviewed, as work by third parties, focused on preventing violence, protecting people and supporting local problem-solving and/or making space for local people to find their own solutions. In general people tend to emphasize one aspect more than the other, but included references to several aspects of peacekeeping in their reflections and experiences.

An aspect that frequently came up during the interviews was how the peacekeepers considered peace keep in as a noble and honourable job. Their motivation to go on a peacekeeping mission was reflected in their perception of high moral duty to serve humanity. Major Matt expressed, "peacekeeping for me is a noble

cause of protecting innocent people who are being killed in the name of religion, ethnicity or for power. My job was to protect them and reduce their suffering" (Personal interview, 26th June, 2018).

Despite the popular criticism on UN for ineffectiveness, Hultman and colleagues (2013 & 2014) note that the presence of UN military troops in active conflicts reduces the number of battlefield civilian deaths. Peacekeepers also mentioned that their presence in the field deterred rebels from committing atrocities against the civilians. Major John said, "by our presence we deter violence and destruction of property, but if you look deeply at what we do, the primary goal really is, we give voice to civilians, to give them that level of confidence" (Personal interview, 13th June, 2018).

Captain Brad noted, […] "when you go there, that's when you understand what contributions have you made, how you've been saving people but only if you're sincere in your approach to serve the larger world peace" (Personal interview, 3rd July, 2018).

Contribution to Global Peace

UN is widely criticized for the peacekeeping missions, as reflecting a narrative that comes out of neo-liberalism and serves the hegemony of western powers. Current peacekeeping is described as operating to stabilize the status quo so that the corporations of wealthy countries can exploit the resources and people of the developing world (Duffield, 2010), without the drawbacks of their governments actually occupying them (Human Security Report Project, 2010). Military peacekeepers echo some of these concerns; in the discomfort they describe at times when they perceive their work as imposing unwanted solutions. They also feel a sense of powerlessness and disappointment when they are unable to do much that is good for local people.

Major Matt relates: "In my personal opinion, the P5 deploy a UN mission where they want to extract the resources from" (Personal interview, 26th June, 2018). Captain Brad comments that "If there are no UN peacekeeping missions we may have more causalities than we've seen in previous years. But in the beginning, when the French went there they were the ones who carried this out, perhaps if they had not gone none of this would've happened. The thing is, they set a ground there and then obtain their gains from there. The scope of this matter is much larger than my comments can explain.' (Personal interview, 3rdjuly 2018)

When the frontline peacekeepers were questioned regarding the contribution of peacekeeping missions to global peace and whether these missions should be continued, majority of the peacekeepers were of the view that it saves lives and reduces human suffering and thus contributes to world peace. They also mention the peacekeeping missions that achieved recent success, like mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone. According to most of them, these missions should be continued.

Pakistani Troops as Better Peacekeepers

Pakistan not only ranks amongst top troop contributing countries, but also has the capacity to meet some of the challenges faced by peacekeeping forces. Pakistan's experience with 'war on terror' on its western border and the deployment at Line of Control in Kashmir makes Pakistani armed forces a well-trained military to tackle operational challenges. Pakistani military's civil-military cooperation strategy post-

Somalian crises to deal with on-ground issues in intrastate conflicts make it a suitable force for peacekeeping missions (Krishnasamy, 2002).

The editor of the Bosnian news magazine *Djanana Islamovic* wrote that: 'Pakistani Battalion (PAKBAT) in Bosnia has not only protected us from brutal assault of Serb offensive, but also has infused a new spirit into our lives. They have given us all sorts of humanitarian help, taught us the values of Islam and above all have gave us a constant medical care in form of their hospital' (ISPR, 1995).

Pakistan armed forces also routinely participate in Aid and relief operations in emergency situations including natural disasters at home. Pakistanis perceive themselves better peacekeepers because of their military operation against terrorists in erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and their hands-on experience with managing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and their rehabilitation and reintegration. Brig James added, "Pakistani soldiers, just like many other armies with combat experience, are more effective peacekeepers. They understand the field challenges, and how to overcome those challenges, they are physically fit and are very well trained. Their domestic experiences of dealing with the state institutions and managing variety of calamitous situations is unmatched" (Personal interview, 4th June, 2018).

Conclusion

This work began with a curiosity about how frontline peacekeepers understood effective peacekeeping. The study was started with a belief that people who do peacekeeping on the ground, on the frontlines, would have different perspectives and knowledge than people who theorized about that work from other positions. The literature on effective peacekeeping or the success of peacekeeping rarely includes the views of frontline peacekeepers. Pakistan, being one of the largest troop contributing countries (TCC), has a major edge in adding the views of peacekeepers in the literature. This reservoir of Pakistani peacekeepers remains under-utilized in this regard. Thus, it seemed important to address this gap by adding the voices and experiences of frontline Pakistani peacekeepers to the literature. The assumption that frontline peacekeepers face challenges that the higher officials and policy makers have not anticipated is seen through the idea of annual 'chiefs of defence conference' and 'force commanders briefing' to elaborate the challenges faced on ground by the peacekeeping forces. This Ban Ki-moon Chiefs of Defence Conference began in 2015 in response to the advice of Military advisor to Under Secretary General, Lieutenant General Maqsood Ahmed. According to Maqsood Ahmed […] "The idea behind this conference was to gather the military Generals of the troop contributing countries on one platform and discuss the challenges faced by their respective militaries on the peacekeeping missions abroad and to provide suitable suggestions. The purpose of this conference was mainly to bridge gap between the Security Council and their expectations from the troop contributing countries" (Personal interview, 15th August, 2018). This conference that was in held in 2015 for the first time, has now become a regular practice of the council. The idea of this conference validates the hypothesis that there lies a gap in understanding of peacekeeping operations between the men on ground sent by troop contributing countries, and the Security Council.

With the change in conflict dynamics in the recent era, the peacekeeping in the conflict zones has also evolved. The UN has shifted from 'traditional'

peacekeeping of just monitoring peace agreements through unarmed or armed troops to peace enforcement and peacebuilding mandates of the peacekeeping missions. Due to this advancement in the peacekeeping mechanism the troops are sent to increasingly difficult and hostile environments where they frequently encounter life threating situations. It is, therefore, more important than ever to recognize the challenges they face at their level and equip them accordingly to avoid any loss. These in-field challenges listed by the troops, encompassing operational, social and psychological challenges might not have grave implications but hamper the overall effectiveness of a mission. The ambiguity of rules, non-availability of resources, lack of effective communication and poor psychological wellbeing create critical situations that put the safety of troops and civilians at risk in chaotic environments. Moreover, these aforementioned challenges appear to be vital in distinguishing a successful mission from an unsuccessful one.

This research was further expanded by assessing the perceptions of peacekeepers while performing their duties. Peacekeepers perceptions indirectly reflect their motivations and passion to serve on a UN mission. Pakistani peacekeepers in general viewed peacekeeping as a noble job related to reduce human sufferings. Most of them believed it contributes to global peace despite the popular criticism on UN's intentions to deploy a mission. However, such concerns were also mirrored in their responses. Moreover, Pakistanis considered themselves as better peacekeepers due to their active involvement in peace operations in their home country.

Finally, this study has aimed to fill the literature gap by assessing the in-field challenges and perceptions faced by the frontline peacekeepers belonging to one of the largest troop contributing country. There is room for extending this research into other missions as the scope of this study was only limited to one mission. Another important aspect in further research could be the comparison of challenges faced in different missions and finding what mechanism worked where and why. In this study, there were no female police or civilian peacekeepers as a part of the sample group. Adding this diversity could give deeper insights and improve the efficacy of peacekeeping missions.

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Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Opportunities for Pakistan

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Abstract

Pakistan's inclusion in Shanghai Cooperation Organization is optimistically seen as a turning point in the changing geopolitical landscape of Eurasian belt, as well as bringing new opportunities for Pakistan. This paper explores the prospects of economic development and political cooperation that Pakistan's membership of SCO offers. The practice of multilateral diplomacy has helped in mitigating regional tensions and augmenting collaboration in the world history, therefore, the paper explores the possibilities of SCO as the best multilateral forum for Pakistan. Although SCO is perceived as an anti-Western alliance, its extended membership is building on the allies (old and new) of the US, particularly inclusion of India and Pakistan is challenging the stance. Moreover, SCO has shunned the notion of anti-Western outlook and the widespread perception to balance out the supremacy of US at the regional, as well as global level. Even so, SCO is catering all prerequisites of the collaboration of regional actors in Central and South Asia and furthering cooperation in the economic field. In this setting, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the analytical framework of new regionalism in South and Central Asia. The second part examines core factors that have led to the extension of the SCO. Finally, the paper evaluates the impact of the extension of the SCO on Pakistan. The study concludes that notwithstanding challenges, the SCO provides opportunities for economic development and political cooperation between states.

Keywords

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Development opportunities, Pakistan, Central Asia, South Asia

Introduction

Political and security developments in Pakistan have been captivating since 2015 because of the fast track implementation of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The period from 2013 to 2018 has been decisive for Pakistan because of the cascading effects of growing interdependence and regional transformation. The interdependence has not only brought changes in Pakistan's foreign policy but its domestic politics has also been modified. Pakistan is an important stakeholder of regional security and integration, thertefore, its national level renewal is dependent on

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regional development and the crucial regional alignment. The SCO has plans to improve connectivity between its member states and same is the purpose of CPEC. Presently CPEC is being considered the opportunity of economic development for Pakistan. However, severe security challenges seem to curb economic activities. In this regard, SCO can prove to be instrumental in improving the security situation in Pakistan, precisely in eli8minating networks of terrorists.

The SCO encourages its member states to establish an economic order; it ensures security and lays emphasis on the promotion of peace. However, some political analysts have compared SCO with the Warsaw Pact and predicted that SCO will turn into a counterbalance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Haas, 2007; Dauekeev, 2011). Therefore, this is regarded as a beginning of a new Eastern Bloc (Haas, 2007). Peter Brooks of the heritage foundation asserted that Russia may be looking to create a new and improved Asian Warsaw Pact, wielding large armies, big economies, nukes and lot of oil/gas (Brooks, 2013). Contrary to the Western views, the policymakers of SCO and analysts of member states, especially in China and Russia have stressed that SCO is not a military alliance particularly membership of Pakistan and India has validated that even allies of US (old and new) are in it. They counteracted that this organization is not working against any state and this alliance is only curbing three evils namely terrorism, separatism and extremism. A Russian intellectual Alexander Lukin stated that attempts to turn this organization into an anti-Western or anti-US bloc are doomed to fail because this would contradict the fundamental interests of its members who are interested in cooperating with the West in many areas (Swanström, 2012). So the purpose of this alliance is not to create an anti-American bloc, nevertheless, it aims to increase regional collaboration. A leading authority of Central Asian affairs asserted that over the years SCO has tried to contribute to regional peace and stability (Song, 2016).

Keeping in view it's economic and security strengths, it is plausible that SCO can help Pakistan in reducing border tensions and zone of peace will be extended to South and Central Asia. Pakistan has made achievement in mitigating interstate skirmishes since the joining of SCO such as the opening of Kartarpur border (Narowal district) between India and Pakistan (Dawn, 2018). Thus, the study underlines the advantages of joining SCO for Pakistan. Generally, small states are compelled to cooperate with external powers for certain reasons of communication, development, security and technology (Eder, 2001). The underpinning idea is that regional security cooperation has brought medium and great powers together on the platforms of collaboration. It intends to explore China, Russia and Central Asian state's efforts of regionalization and impending opportunities for Pakistan.

The SCO charter and public statements repeatedly accentuate that this organization respects its members' sovereignty and rejects interference in their domestic affairs (Cooley, 2012). This paper examines the factors fostering SCO and it endeavors to find the relevance of model (China-Russia intimacy) with Pakistan and India for the settlement of bilateral issues. It also evaluates the strengths of the SCO signaling strong economic bonds in future. Nevertheless, this paper revolves around the questions; why is SCO so important for Pakistan? To what extent this foreshadows benefits for Pakistan? To answer these questions, an attempt has been

made to prove SCO as an instrument of the improvement of relations between antagonist states by providing them with a political and economic platform.

The Concept of New Regionalism

The formation of regional organizations for security drives has been increased worldwide since the end of the World War (Bailes, 2007). Currently, regional organizations are equally important for small and great powers and do have strengths and weaknesses. A number of related theoretical viewpoints are needed for understanding the intricacies of present-day regionalism. The new regional approach is featured in neo-realist and liberal institutionalist paradigm. Liberal institutionalists believe that maintaining mutual benefit and promoting cooperation among state is vital whereas neo-realists consider state interests determine the decision whether states compete or cooperate (Baylis, 2001). Liberal institutionalists recognize the anarchic system, the primacy of military power and the importance of states' interests. They contend that organizations are scaffolding cooperation, which cognize the security competition between states and endorse peace and stability (Baylis, 2001; Burchill, 2005). Farther, they assert that organizations provide security related information to states that they can reduce uncertainty and other risks that could emerge out of anarchy (Bayeh, 2014). This discourse helps to understand the role of SCO in mitigating tensions between (rival) member states.

Under the light of a new regionalism approach, the empirical factors of the formation of SCO are explained with the key assumption that a hegemon power has included weak (relatively) powers in an alliance for the sake of influence (Gordetsky, 2003) whereas in response to the proximity of hegemonic power, the smaller states have tried to adopt balancing strategies in regional formats (Allison, 2004). The partnership of China, Russia, Central Asian Republics (CARs) and Pakistan set in new regionalism in South and Central Asia where China appears a leading state. The new regionalism approach helps in understanding regional integration of Asian states; it focuses on exogenous features influencing other states' policies. It also expounds that once a great power joins in regional integration, it changes the influence procedure and growth of integration. Besides, the integration process causes other states to change their response strategies and their interaction with each other (Sanaei, 2011).

In the given context, it is evident that having a regional hegemon for the process of regionalization is necessary. Major organizations are exhibiting the control of hegemons such as Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in which Indonesia, India and USA are dominant, respectively. Similarly, SCO exhibits China's supremacy in SCO in which its bordering states are members. SCO has featured some tenets that differentiated it from other (mostly Western lead) multilateral organizations and caused its popularity. Russia and China have successfully coped with diverging interests in the region and they not only coexist but encourage other member states to cooperate. The extension of SCO and the consequent response strategies of other states indicate upcoming prosperity to Pakistan as it is opening up new avenues of economic cooperation and frequent trade with Central and South Asian states.

The collaboration of Russia and China, in SCO, is certifying the principle that great powers' presence is important factor for regional integration where other states are ready to cooperate with them. Push and pull factors are dominating features of SCO and all neighboring countries have learnt to operate in an integrated system for example Central Asian states, despite difficulties, are surviving with new members. The Central Asian region has been used as a hunting ground for geopolitical influence by regional and global players (Laruelle, 2010); however, regional prosperity and integration were largely ignored before the disintegration of Soviet Union.

In the early 1990s, Moscow and Beijing had developed congenial relations as they realized the need of teamwork would be the solution of regional tensions. China used cooperative means (trade) and brought other states in its influence peacefully. Before the 1990s, the two regional giants, China and the Soviet Union were indulged in hostile relations; however, gradual understanding of the regional complexities drove two nations closer to each other. Both states along with the heads of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the treaty of Deepening Military Trust in Border regions in 1996 and balanced settings in the region appeared (Weiqing, 2016). Thus, in 1996, *Shanghai Five* provided an ideal vehicle to accomplish the goal of regional stability which later on turned into SCO. In April 1997, these states signed the treaty on the reduction of Military Force in Border Regions and subsequently annual summits of the Shanghai Five occurred in the capitals of Kazakhstan (1998), Kyrgyzstan (1999) and Tajikistan (2000) (Xiangyang, 2005). In 2001, the annual summit was held in Shanghai (China), and the organization named Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formed, with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. Hence, an informal border settlement mechanism upgraded as a formal regional organization (Weiqing, 2016). In June 2002, the charter of SCO was signed which expounded the organization's purposes, structure and principles.

Subsequently, China and Russia moved to gradual improvement in their relations and finally entered into a strategic partnership. It continued to expand physically and the inclusion of other countries, observers, guests and permanent members made it a huge organization. Overall, SCO offers a platform from which the complexity of relations and existing conflicts of South and Central Asian states can be settled down, under the leadership of Russia and China. Therefore, it is anticipated that SCO will be helping in reducing tensions between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Peaceful Coexistence with Divergences

Member states of SCO belong to different cultures and religions (Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism) but the geographical linkages are binding them together. However, CARs are entrapped in internal issues such as the agitation developed in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan because of the political, social and economic glitches, the horrors of civil war in Tajikistan and dreads of post-revolution in Kyrgyzstan are alive in the minds of neighboring nations. Similarly, Pakistan thirsts for energy as its economic development is dependent on continuous energy supply. Hence, pull factors have converged all regional powers and it steered Pakistan and CARs together to harmonize their interests as a solution to their problems. Despite the inter-state

conflicts, member states agreed that enlargement of the SCO can prove to be fortunate for them. Furthering this argument, the Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid stated that it is an assured conviction that an expanded SCO will be more effective body to address the numerous security and developmental challenges that our region faces (Jha, 2015).

The SCO member states are subsisting with huge dissimilarities as they are followers of different religions, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Hindu, Buddhist, but still, coexist for economic betterment. Undoubtedly, common security concerns brought these countries together, common threat perception had steered Russia and China on a podium and now SCO unites countries with straying agendas. Moreover, *Shanghai spirit* is the underpinning of SCO, characterized by 5Cs namely cooperation, confidence, coexistence, communication and common interests (Kavalski, 2016). The organization seeks shared interests resulting in all members benefiting from it. The rapid development of SCO attests to the fact that cooperation among countries can transcend differences in ideology, values and different geopolitical understanding (Xiangyang, 2005).

Indeed, SCO has become an attractive platform for regional states as several countries have applied for its membership. The organization, after giving full membership to both Pakistan and India in 2017, is embarking on a new journey towards common security, shared prosperity and now representing the largest part of the world (Bedeski, 2012). It is not only focused on fighting the three major evils of terrorism, extremism, and separatism but shaping a web of regional affluence has become its directive. The presence of major and regional powers along with Central Asian countries, indicate the prominence of regional cooperation, which is essential to the growth and development of the region.

Nevertheless, the inescapable competition has converted into the contribution of states in regional economic growth. The proactive role of patron states has made this organization an Asian titanic. The vast energy resources in the region naturally make the SCO an important organ to procure the world energy economy. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are energy rich states. Although Uzbekistan is not to the whims of oil and gas market, its natural gas exports are balanced in comparison to Turkmenistan's, for instance, 1.5 billion cubic meters gas is going to Kazakhstan, 5 billion cubic meters gas is for Russia, and 4.3 billion cubic meters going to China (Putz, 2017). The resource rich Central Asia is not only advantageous for China but for the other members of SCO. Members can get a chance to expand their businesses as Business Council of SCO is a good centre for the member states. In addition, Interbank Consortium of SCO has allotted 80 billion U.S. dollars and 114 billion Yuan (equal to 17.81 billion USD) for carrying out development projects in the states member of SCO (Asia Plus, 2017). However, the geographical positioning of Afghanistan between South and Central Asia is perturbing the economies and hampering trade.

Despite the fact that Afghanistan has always remained as an insulator between South Asia and Central Asia, China is making distinct efforts to keep Afghanistan into the limelight. The reason can be the fact that China seeks cooperation of member states to not sponsor separatist groups in China (Kavalski, 2016). Evidently, Afghanistan's observer status in SCO and at the same time in

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) shows Russian-Chinese' endeavors to indulge locals in concrete solutions.

Regional Peace and Connectivity

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China quickly recognized CARs. It was largely due to its shared borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China's arrangements were primarily security driven and resulted in the normalization of relations with newly emerged neighboring states. Beijing was of the view that engaging Moscow would be substantially fruitful and it will facilitate negotiations with Central Asian states. In the early years of independence of CARs, Beijing was actively involved in increasing its presence in the region because it wanted to make CARs a counter-balance to both Russia and US (Olcott, 2005). From the Strategic point of view, the engagements between China and CARs have expanded rapidly and made a neighborhood, Pakistan and India, convinced that Beijing seeks a region of peace and prosperity and harmony of interests.

Energy cooperation is the linchpin of China-CARs and Pakistan-CARs relations, China has completed the construction of important pipelines to transport Central Asia's resources eastward (Hanks, Santa Barbara) and Pakistan has signed several energy projects with CARs (Sadat, 2015). So far, China is the most powerful and active country in the SCO and have potential to shape, indirectly, the domestic policies of the whole Central Asian Region and helping bringing them close to South Asian nations. Although, Moscow desires to exercise its traditional influence through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and CSTO of which China is not a member. However, CSTO and SCO have agreed to cooperate (Dermott, 2007). In addition, CIS is also a guest attendee of the SCO which represents harmonious setting.

In short, both states have realized that the collaboration is the only way to settle down issues and materialize their desired objectives in the region. Beijing and Moscow would like SCO to carry on monitoring and reviewing different ways, to defuse extremist activities and to increase economic interaction. For example, two projects of Pakistan and CARs exist in blueprint, Central Asia, South Asia 1000 (CASA-1000) electricity transmission line with Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) gas pipeline project with Turkmenistan. Both projects were expected to begin, however, both face challenges and have already delayed their work for years because of lack of security. Stakeholders are skeptical that in the absence of security, such expensive projects would be taken hostage by militants for ransom (Sadat, 2015). In such circumstances, China, in order to ensure the security and stability, took a great leap westward and all relatively weak bordering states have become members of the SCO as it functions for making a secure region.

Pakistan is facing a number of challenges at national, regional and global levels, and membership of SCO can prove to be helpful in resolving the issues. Islamabad and Moscow are visibly becoming close to each other. In 2017, the meeting between Pakistan's Prime Minister (former) Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and his Russian counter-part on the side-lines meeting of SCO pronounced their contentment with the start of bilateral relations and cooperation (Zeb, 2018). From this vantage, Pakistan can convince more and more states to support Islamabad's stance on

membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) can be raised (Zeb, 2018), grievances with Afghanistan and Kashmir dispute can also be discussed. This affiliation will make more opportunities for Pakistan to expand its relations with other SCO members, observers and guest members during their head of states, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister level meetings.

Risks and Opportunities for Pakistan

SCO can be a helpful forum for Pakistan; however, several glitches are attached to it which is being discussed here. Full membership of the SCO was a long-time desire of Pakistan, it has been the observer member of SCO since 2002 but after fifteen years, finally, it was granted the memberships of the organization. Pakistan and India, as observer members of the SCO, had participated in security cooperation and upheld the Shanghai Spirit which emphasizes on mutual trust, equality, common development and respect for cultural diversity (Xiaoqiang, 2018). The extension in the membership of the SCO marks the regional growth as SCO had long been centered only on Central Asia. Pakistan could not make significant economic ties with CARs in more than twenty five years as their economic activities remained halted due to the stubborn behavior of Afghanistan. Moreover, India is not willing to cooperate with Pakistan rather it is against the growing linkages of CARs with Pakistan. Notwithstanding some tensions, it is evident that in order to get connected with CARs, India cannot bypass Pakistan.

There is an anticipation of several rewards to the members of the SCO and so is for Pakistan. The full membership of SCO provides the opportunity to work together and increase bilateral as well as multilateral trade, especially after the completion of the CPEC; it would be practicable to increase the volume of trade. Therefore, new opportunities for businesses and economic development are expected for Pakistan. Certainly, SCO is a solution to the energy crisis of Pakistan as SCO is distinctive in holding together energy producers including Kazakhstan, Russia, Iran and Uzbekistan as well as energy consumer states such as China, Pakistan and India. Pakistan would be able to establish close relations with 'SCO Energy Club' (Haas, 2010) and it can control energy deficit. Hence, while working together with energy producers and consumer, Pakistan would be able to learn to manage its resources and this will guarantee sustainable development.

Access to Central Asian markets would be easy for Pakistan and the frequency of import and export will increase. Pakistan already has bilateral ties with CARs and full membership of the SCO will be helpful for Pakistan to enhance its relations, it will enable Pakistan to strengthen its trade. Pakistan is also a member of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) (Nakao, 2017), however unfortunately, this forum is thriving on the functions of Karachi and Gwadar port and their connectivity with CARs but geographical constraints halted direct linkage of CARs with Pakistan. Since Gwadar port is functional, Pakistan can persuade all members of the SCO to join CPEC, to be part of international trade through the sea. Furthermore, Pakistan's several connectivity projects with CARs such as CASA 1000 and CPEC are irksome for India, however, networking through the SCO will reduce hostility in relations owing to the common friends in the alliance.

The SCO has twofold meanings; first, to attain economic advantages, second, to strengthen security. The alliance, regarded as the handy diplomatic lubricant, (Berry, 2007) can steer states on one page. Hence, SCO membership can bring Pakistan and India closer and their long-standing issues can be settled down with the help of their cohorts. The 18th SCO summit took place in June 2018 in Qingdao (China) where leaders of two states (Pakistan and India) sat together and important issues, including peace in Afghanistan, were discussed. Before this foreign ministers of two states met in Foreign Ministers' meeting of SCO (held in April 2018). Under the auspices of SCO, there was a joined military drill in September 2018, to dismantle terror networks. This was the first military exercise in which both Pakistan and India participated (Hali, 2018). Although, the combatants of the two states work together under the aegis of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces (UNPF), however, for the first time they engaged together in a counter-terrorism exercise (Sengupta, 2018).

Pakistan and India have joined such a platform where, unlike South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), they are not two dominant poles rather they are working with other powers. Thus, SCO membership can soothe tension between India and Pakistan; both get an opportunity to sit together under one roof for the solution of regional problems. Projects of mutual benefits will fascinate both states to conciliate such as TAPI which is equally beneficial for Pakistan and India. Moreover, this situation possibly can spur cooperation and both states may be ready in future to restart Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI). These projects are central to regional development and can be helpful in knitting ties. Most likely China and Russia's influence on Pakistan and India can help to improve their relations as India is the importer of Russia's military hardware and Pakistan is a close ally of China.

Apparently, military exercises may not be taken seriously in academia; however, these can be expected to be building confidence and trust among the partaker states (seen as an important part of confidence-building measures). This will be promoting companionship between the soldiers of two nations. Such pieces of training may also be helpful in promoting and projecting soft power between India and Pakistan.

Some of the principals of the SCO are exemplary such as respect of sovereignty and non-interference of states in internal matters (Song, 2016). This will help Pakistan to seek the assistance of other member states and no country will interfere in each other's internal matters. The organization has remained active in directing its members not to intervene in internal policies of other member states. Instead of the critical evaluations of other states matters, the organization should help other governments. All key documents of the SCO, including the charter of the organization, focus on the rule of non-interference.

To deal with the issue of extremism, terrorism and separatism, member states are very conscience. Extremism itself is a vague term and it needs to be wisely handled. For pragmatic cooperation, fighting against terrorism, separatism and extremism is an important objective of the organization. The focus of SCO is on increased military support, intelligence sharing and counterterrorism exercises, it is poised to play a significant role in international efforts to curb terrorist activities. Pakistan along with CARs, at a definite point, may want to retain the Islamic practices

for nation-building purposes which are internally important. Nevertheless, some leading experts in Russia and China have articulated unconventional views considering the SCO would be more effective because its roots are in Central Asia and the influence of the organization will increase with the participation of new states in SCO (Torkunov, 2006). Russia and China are skeptical about taking any position that equates Islamic practices with extremism and even not too assertive. However, all the member states are concerned because of the issue of separatism in their border areas and members have high hopes that SCO would promote security and stabilization in a partnership against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

The new membership of the bordering countries of Afghanistan may be helpful to settle down the problem of terrorism in the region. The SCO members are determined to turn Afghanistan into a genuinely peaceful state as they are currently stakeholder of it. All stakeholders are ready to hold talks for finding peaceful solutions in war-ridden Afghanistan. Peace in Afghanistan is the key to development in the region because terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, are trying to set its feet in Afghanistan which is dangerous for world peace. The organization ensures sending strong warnings to extremist elements in Central Asian states, China and Russia. The dire need of the hour is to make states to collaborate for the exchange of information to counter the threat of ISIS in any country of Central and South Asia.

Pakistan's accessions to the SCO will strengthen its ties to China, Russia, CARs and South Asian states. In terms of energy trade, Pakistan is important for the other South Asian States as for imports of gas from Iran and Turkmenistan can be transported through a pipeline across Pakistan. Apparently, there will be no overt opposition by Russia against such a route but Moscow's fears about new South Asian members will be a concern for it and other members of the SCO.

Conclusion

The formation of the SCO has proven that a strategic and financial rapprochement is possible between opposite poles. Moscow and Beijing have extended bilateral trade and negotiated arrangements in the field of energy, with members of SCO and their relations, have appeared to be frequently on a winning streak. The inclusion of India and Pakistan envisages regional stability. Despite many obstacles, SCO is growing efficiently because it negotiates issues whilst hampering regional development. The organization is considerably influential in the region, as it bolsters the capacity of neighboring countries of Afghanistan to defend their borders. Since, the main efficient area of the organization is security that is to fight against three evils, terrorism, extremism and separatism; it would help Pakistan in its ongoing efforts to eliminate terrorist structures. For Pakistan, the underlying cause of becoming a full member of SCO was the security and protection of CPEC.

The organization is a model for Pakistan and India as it exemplifies a unique reconciling model of Chinese-Russian relations with a positive indication of continuous decline in antagonistic gestures between these two powers. Pakistan can use this platform to address its issues with India, conflict prevention and initiation of pacific dialogue among its member states is also anticipated. Since SCO has offered opportunities to Pakistan to strengthen its trade relations with Eurasian countries, it must harness its business community. Moreover, in order to ensure regional peace and

stability, a proactive role of SCO is indispensable in Afghanistan. India and Pakistan must understand that this alliance is an opportunity for them as the SCO is not directed against any area but a network to settle conflicts and promote peace within the region.

The local governments of the members of SCO have been keen to get the economic advantages and to ensure peace in the region. The SCO has strong potential to function as a vehicle for building the economies of CARs and to take along them into the global showground through Pakistan. It is therefore regarded as a network for the promotion of peace and stability within the region. It can be anticipated that the signing of commercial/ energy projects with CARs, tensions between India and Pakistan will be mitigated as both are stakeholders. With the growing interaction of the leaders of SCO member states, prospects of mutual collaboration and harmony of interests have been increased. Pakistan should take SCO as a valuable forum to resolve energy crisis as some energy projects are already started under CPEC. Undoubtedly, it is a platform for Pakistan to address its issues to mitigate its adversarial relations with neighboring countries. Pakistan's direct interaction with Russia and China, India and Central Asian states will open new opportunities for economic development. However, India and Afghanistan should join peace talks to attain common objectives. Pakistan must seize this moment to fix its problems as all the members are ready to cooperate. The greater consensus is direly needed to earn profits as lots of benefits can be achieved through prudent policies and utilization of the organization's mandate.

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Pakistan's Susceptibility to 5th Generation Hybrid Warfare due to its Prevailing Fault-lines: A Comparative Analysis with Yugoslavia

Humayun Hassan[1]

Abstract

Warfare has witnessed a paradigm shift ever since the fall of USSR. The examples of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka are depictions of how this warfare destroys the opposing force. The world witnessed disintegration of former Yugoslavia in early 1990s due to internal warring factions. Literature argues that besides multitude of causes, a major role was played by socio-economic, religious and sectarian fault lines. Multiple scholars have argued that similar fault lines and problems are present in the contemporary Pakistan. These problems are prone to exploitation due to our inbuilt problems such as sectarianism, religious radicalization, and economic disparities. However, to a great extent, Pakistan has fared better than former Yugoslavia because of its ability to launch a multi-faceted offensive strategy, ranging from direct military action to counter-propaganda, and economic counteractions. To this end, this paper is a qualitative analysis of the exploitative component of 5th Generation Hybrid Warfare, how Pakistan has been successful in thwarting the threat and maintaining peace. Using existing literature and case studies, this paper also signposts the need to take certain measures which will be instrumental in preventing such issues from taking roots.

Key Words

5th Generation Hybrid, Warfare, Economic and Religious Fault Lines, Propaganda, Pakistan

Introduction

On April 14, 2018, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, the Pakistani army chief first time confessed that Pakistan is facing a hybrid warfare. While addressing the audience at the passing-out parade at Pakistan Military Academy, General Bajwa was of the view that a hybrid war has been imposed on the country to weaken it internally, by dividing it along ethnic lines (Syed, 2018). Although the ceremony was being broadcast live throughout the country, the primary audience of his message, apparently, was the graduating batch. Therefore, when the Chief re-emphasized the need for Pakistan's future soldiers to be prepared for a high-tech, decentralized, and unconventional warfare, it created an opportunity for one to analyze the nature of this warfare in the country.

The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the resulting war of terror have significantly marred the security situation of Pakistan. While the country did not have

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any conventional war or a large-scale skirmish during this period, Pakistan has still incurred hundreds of military and thousands of civilian casualties ("Pakistan lost over 50,000 civilians in war on terror", 2018). Moreover, this instability has also taken a toll on Pakistan, at the economic forefront (Mustafa, 2018). This paper, therefore, is an attempt to investigate nature, causes, consequences, and counterstrategy for Pakistan to tackle this faceless, multifaceted war that has embroiled the country for the past 17-years.

While considering the case of former Yugoslavia, an analytical comparison with Pakistan is made which helps one identify the causational similarities among both countries, such as religious sentimentalism among various population groups, ethnic and economic discrepancies. Furthermore, the case studies of Sri Lanka and Afghanistan act as preview and historical examples that enable one to fathom the sort of war Pakistan has been facing in recent times. It is a war in which internally dispersed and visually undistinguishable enemy use guerilla tactics to implode a country and weaken its security forces.

If one considers the current situation of Pakistan with consideration to the case of former Yugoslavia, the questions arises that, given the congruence between both countries in terms of their existing fault lines, how is Pakistan faring considerably better in this war (Agha, 2016). Additionally this paper also finds out how Pakistan continues to gain traction in this war where Yugoslavia failed and disintegrated eventually. This paper is also an attempt to identify the counteractive measures, adopted by the state of Pakistan to thwart the terror groups and areas where the country still needs to improve, in terms of fighting this 5th-generation hybrid war.

Methodology

This qualitative paper is primarily focused upon using secondary, empirical research and considers existing literature on the subject to extrapolate findings for the case of Pakistan. The time period for Pakistan's security challenges spans post September 2001, and the examples from previous decades are intended to provide a historical context to the reader. The fundamental comparison is drawn between Yugoslavia and Pakistan due to the fact that both faced exploitation due to their ethnic, religious, and economic fault lines. The cases of Sri Lanka and Soviet-Afghan War are discussed to provide the reader some background about specific aspects of hybrid war that are relevant to Pakistan.

Hybrid Warfare

The concept of nation states and their territorial sovereignty has been in order for centuries now ("Treaty of Westphalia", 1648). One of the most significant outcomes of the World War II was the creation of the United Nations, with an aim of reducing conventional wars. Therefore, a new era of warfare began, which, unlike those of its preceding eras was dominated by using tactics that could eventually implode a nation from within. The 5th gneration war, which is also regarded as hybrid warfare, may be defined as a multi-faceted, invisible war, in which the adversary is unaware of the enemy, and perception management ensure deception, manipulation, (Puyvelde, 2015). The 5th generation warfare can be distinguished from any ordinary war as the purpose is not to acquire territorial mileage from a country, rather to denigrate its very ideological, cultural, and economic foundations, hence causing an implosion, possibly a civil war within, which would make it susceptible to hostile foreign intervention.

If the primary aim of a war in previous times was to capture territory and overthrow the government, the decentralized hybrid war seeks to annihilate a nation and all of the intangible dimensions that unite its people, through the creation of rogue elements that are generally religiously or ethnically motivated (Dhankhar, 2017). This change in objective, therefore, resulted in change of tactics to achieve said objectives. Guerilla Warfare, economic terrorism, psychological operations, and propaganda, through cyber means, low-intensity conflict, and amalgamation of politics, media, and general citizenry are aspects of 5th generation war, which are as complex as they are novel, making it appropriate to first understand the historical framework.

Historical Context

The idea of avoiding a direct conflict with the enemy and engaging in a series of low-intensity conflicts in order to capitalize on its strategic vulnerabilities, the 'death by a thousand cuts' approach, dates back to the ancient Rome (Hickman, 2017). This strategy was first observed during the Second Punic War (218-202 BC) when General Fabius Maximus, the Roman dictator entangled the qualitatively superior army of General Hannibal, in a series of small skirmishes and guerilla attacks, with an intent of exploiting the tactical drawbacks of his army, which eventually exhausted the morale and resources of Carthaginians, hence thwarting their advances. Since the inception of the Fabian Strategy (Peckard, 2017), multiple facets of 5th generation warfare have been used historically, in congruence with the geopolitical and strategic idiosyncrasies of the involved stakeholders.

Considering how the Fabian Protocol was first implemented, more than two millennia ago, one can establish a premise that for any entity to launch a successful hybrid, decentralized war on their enemy, there needs to be a prevailing set of vulnerabilities or fault lines, within the enemy ranks that can be exploited to use an appropriate warfare scheme, which may range from terrorism to psychological operations for the creation of ideological discrepancies.

In the pre-Soviet era, world witnessed a drastic proclivity among the nations of the world to engage in such tactics. As the bipolarity ended and the United States emerged as the sole superpower of the world, the possibility of an all-out, large-scale war reduced significantly, if not diminished entirely. Factors such as globalization and the resulting economic and geostrategic interdependency further bolstered the argument that a conventional, face-to-face battle of armies had become a thing of past.

The caveat, however, was that the prevailing conflict of national interests, along with paltry capacity of the United Nations to prevent conflicts, made war inevitable, even if had to be re-orchestrated according to the peculiarities of the unipolar world. Recent history has quite aptly helped one decipher that all the major facets of this hybrid war, such as propaganda, economic exhaustion, ethnic and sectarian violence are not sufficient individually, if one intends to defeat a nation, instead of a country. This distinction is pertinent to fathom as the existence of a nation is not dependent upon the army of state, rather the foundations of a nation are primarily based on its culture, ideology, and codes of conduct. However, one or more of the elements of this sort of warfare may and have been used in recent times to acquire important strategic objectives and at times cause an outright defeat to the enemy.

The Soviet-Afghan War

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the USSR enjoyed an overwhelming military superiority as compared to the local factions resisting it. Moreover, the Soviet air force at that time was one of the most modernized and well-equipped forces of the world. This decade long Russo-Afghan War and the subsequent withdrawal of the USSR, is regarded as one of the watershed moments that brought the downfall of the Soviet Union. One may argue that this war is a classical depiction of how United States and Pakistan as its ally, launched a proxy war against USSR, and inflicted a decisive defeat to the much larger and resourceful Soviet forces.

This may be regarded as one aspect of hybrid warfare. The Pakistani establishment, in collaboration with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), protected and trained the Afghan freedom fighters, who used the treacherous terrain to engage in a guerilla warfare against the Soviet forces. At an ideological and propaganda front, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was described by the West as a violation of human rights and a sign of Soviet imperialistic motives. A narrative was created at a national level in Pakistan, which was founded upon the concept of *Islamic* brotherhood and *Jihad* against the infidel foreign forces that sought to occupy a Muslim land. Riedel (2010) argues that the narratives that were painted in these cases seemed to be quite fruitful, as the USSR faced an ever-increasing international pressure against its actions, along with diplomatic isolation. The situation in Pakistan became more conducive to supporting the Afghan Taliban who were fighting a 'holy war' against the Soviet occupants. Both of these aspects of the Russo-Afghan War are examples of how different aspects of a hybrid war work in tandem with each other, on varying front, in order to achieve a unified strategic objective.

If the guerilla war fought by the *Mujahideen*, and other local factions thwarted the Soviet advance in Afghanistan, the information warfare and propaganda created by the enemies of USSR deprived it from leverage. Additionally, the Soviet withdrawal was aggravated by the economic strain faced by the Russians, resulting from maintaining, equipping, and maneuvering a large army. An example of the economic exploitative aspect of the Soviets in Afghanistan is the use of Stinger missiles, by the Mujahedeen against the Soviet aircrafts and helicopters. The stinger missile did not require much technical prowess from its user and was used to eliminate costly, state-of-the-art air assets that costed millions of US dollars per unit.

The lack of counter-propaganda measures and perception management by the Soviet Union proved to be costly exploitation by its enemies, which drained its resources, exposed its economic fault line and made its stay in Afghanistan untenable. Hence, the Soviet Union had to resort to a strategic withdrawal from the country in 1989 (Keller, 1989).

Propaganda and Information Warfare

Perception management and propaganda play an incisive role in launching a successful hybrid war against a country, making that particular country prone to international intervention. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq is one such example. Although the ultimate motives of the United States for invading Iraq are still subject to debate, it is quite clear that the strategy that was used by US and its allies to justify

a violation of the territorial integrity of Iraq was made possible only due to precise propaganda and media warfare tactics ("WMD in Iraq", 2004).

The US 'weapons of mass destruction narrative' of Iraq was the focal point of this propaganda and media warfare. While the Iraqi government failed to adequately launch a counter-narrative, the western powers were equally adept at creating a substantial international pressure on Iraq. It can therefore be argued that the inability of the Iraqi establishment of that time to effectively counter the propaganda exposed the country's fault line to adequately manage the information and media aspect of the hybrid warfare.

The Case of Sri Lanka: Socio-Economic Imbalances

Another example of the effective employment of 5th-generation warfare tactics to engage an enemy and challenge its operational capacity, is the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka (Lalwani, 2017). One of the catalysts for this entire civil war can be considered as the colonial era legacy of Tamil-Sinhalese rift. Since the Tamils were in a minority, the colonial rulers used affirmative action, at the expense of the Sinhalese majority, to promote and accommodate Tamils in the public sectors. The animosity, therefore, was created between both ethnicities, on the basis of apparent economic inequity. Later on, in the post-colonial Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese majority, that was now in power tried to overcompensate the perceived injustices that had happened to them a few decades ago by introducing many measures which rolled back the incentives enjoyed by the ethnic minority groups of the country.

The most pertinent case in this regard was that of the 'Sinhala Only Act'(Hoole, 2016), which catapulted the already-present ethnic friction to new heights. Consequently, the Tamil struggle soon took a militant turn and, thus began one of the longest civil wars in recent times lasting more than two decades (Bajoria, 2009). Commonly referred as LTTE, the organization first came to the public eye in 1976, under the leadership of popular, yet infamous Tamil leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. The purpose of this organization was to create an independent national state for the Tamil people, predominately in the northern and eastern parts of the country. This, therefore, started a bloody civil war in Sri Lanka, which lasted effectively from 1983 until 2009, when Prabhakaran was finally killed in a military operation ("LTTE Chief Prabhakaran dead", 2009).

The prevailing ethnic divide between the Sinhalese people and the Tamils was exploited by the Tamil warring faction, in order to launch an offensive against the state of Sri Lanka and create a state within a state. Due to their technical and financial shortcomings, the Tamil rebels could not resort to launching a full-scale war against the army of the state, along with the possibility of facing international disdain in case they try to illegitimately overthrow the government (Hickman, 2017).

Another noteworthy aspect of the 5th generation, hybrid war in case of LTTE was terrorism and suicide attacks. In fact, two world leaders Rajiv Gandhi, in 1991, and, allegedly, President Premadasa, in 1993, were killed by LTTE through their terror attacks (Gargan, 1993). In case of Sri Lanka, the existing fault line was the ethnic divide, which was fueled by the perceived economic injustices. This is one of the classical cases in which one understands the vulnerability of the exploited fault lines and their role in weakening the state.

A Multifaceted War of Exploitive Nature: Yugoslavia and Pakistan

In all of the scenarios, it is evident that the tactics used by various entities against the respective states were all elements of what we regard today as the 5th-generation warfare. This war is personified by the blurring lines between politics, economics, ethnic and social divides, and geo-strategic objectives. Since focus of this paper is on Pakistan therefore, it would be prudent to consider a relevant example of Yugoslavia where both religious and ethnic fault lines existed.

The Buildup for Yugoslavian Disintegration

The former Yugoslavia was one of the most ethnically and religiously diverse countries of Eastern Europe. Fundamentally, the country consisted of three major ethnic and religious entities: the Croats, who were predominately Catholic Christians, the Serbs who followed the Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and the Bosnians who were Sunni Muslims (Hammel, 2010). Although the Yugoslavian wars fought in the early 1990's are considered to have multi-layered, social, political, and ethnic motives behind them, the religious diversity in the region was a result of the events that rooted back centuries. It was only after the World War I when the country entered an era, which resulted in certain measures that proved to be fatal for the former Yugoslavia. The history of this country is divided into three eras; first Yugoslavia, second Yugoslavia and the third Yugoslavia.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the World War I, the Balkan region went through a series of reforms and reshaping. The Croat-Serb discord started in the immediate aftermath of World War I when the Pairs Peace conference faced significant struggle to devise a new plan for the newly formed state (Đokić, 2010). The Croats were in favor of a federalist form of government however, the Serbs wanted to protect the rights of their population that was spread all across the country.

The ultimate decision was in favor of the Serbs, in which a unitary state was formed, with the power to run the affairs handed to the royal monarch and the legislative council. The king disbanded the existing setup in 1929 through a royal decree, and divided the country into nine administrative regions. This ensured that the new divisions made eliminate the threat of ethnic nationalism in the constituent region. In 1939, merely a decade later, the Serbs and Croats came to an agreement in which the Croats were given significant level of autonomy to govern the region in which they were in a majority. The entire setting was abrupt due to the inception of the World War II. One of the most important developments that occurred during the axis control of the region during the World War II was that they established an ineffective puppet state in Croatia and also legitimized the terrorist organization, known as 'Ustase' ("The Editors of Encyclopaedia", 1998). The group persecuted the Serbs, in the areas where the Croats were dominant, under the pretense of 'protecting the Croats'. Such events created a sense of hostility and animosity between both ethnic groups.

The socialistic rule marked the beginning of a new era for the former Yugoslavia. In 1946, Joseph Broz Tito, along with his communist 'comrades' gained control of the country. The kingdom was abolished and there was an introduction of the federation, comprising of six nominally equal constituencies: Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. As much of the Eastern

Europe at that time, there was a natural proclivity in Yugoslavia to join Soviet camp. Tito introduced many economic and legislative reforms, such as nationalization of the public assets, new union and labor laws, and tax and revenue laws. In the early 1950's the country experienced considerable economic prosperity, especially in the realm of the average and lower class workers of the country. However, the socialistic model proved to be unsustainable. The absence of free market and private ownership of property proved to diminish the efficiency of the average worker and slowed the growth of the country (Uvalić, 2018).

It is also pertinent to note that with the passage of time Tito had become authoritarian and had accumulated too much power. An instance of this was observed in 1974, when the presidency of the state was, in essence, gifted to Tito until his death (Browne, 1974). This centralization of power, coupled with the inability of the government to adequately utilize the resources of the state nationalized a few decades ago, only bolstered the economic fault line of Yugoslavia. It also proved to be one of the factors of the civil wars in 1990's that eventually disintegrated the country. Moreover, there was a historical disparity among the regions of Yugoslavia as the north had always enjoyed a significant economic focus, partly due to the fact that it was closer to the great European powers of that time. Nevertheless, this economic and developmental discrepancy was only bolstered during the times of royalty and socialism, which further deteriorated the situation. The unsustainable model of communism resulted in inflation, foreign debt, and a decline in the quality of life of the average citizen. This further enhanced the already-existing rift between the wealthy North and Northwest, and the South and Southeast. On June 25, 1991, the Slovenian and Croatian units declared their succession from Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina followed soon after. In the meanwhile, Montenegro and Serbia created a separate state, which like other newly formed neighboring states, was drenched in a nationalistic spirit. The conflict therefore was inevitable.

The Terror Financing Across the Border

Fearing the persecution of the Serbs in the Croatian region, the Serb government supported in the local Serb rebels, and provided them with resources and ammunition. The Croatian War of Independence can be viewed from the lens of the 5th-generation hybrid warfare, as the fault lines in the case of Croatia were considerably similar to those of Pakistan. The Croatian army had a unitary force, along with the country's bureaucracy but the people at the helm of affairs were mostly Serbs, who were either direct or tacit supporters of the Serb nationalism narrative (Ramet, 2010). Also, the local Serbs who were in a definite minority were used by the Serbian state as a tool of information and propaganda war to justify their intervention the region, under the pretense of protection of Serb minority. Moreover, the local rebel groups that caused terror and violence against the newly formed state of Croatia could not have thrived as much, if they were not supported from the neighboring state. This exact model of this may be observed in the case of Pakistan where the local militias, such as Baloch National Army and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan have used the protective umbrella of Afghanistan (Marty, 2018).

In Slovenia, the Yugoslavian army faced a standstill as the local police and paramilitary had blocked all the major passages to enter the region. As a result, after a series of conflicts and low-intensity battles, both parties agreed to a three-month

moratorium. The Bosnian war, which lasted from 1992 until 1995, was a mix of ethnic and religious disparity among the fighting forces. Also, this war was unique as it may also be regarded a 'proxy war' of Croatia and Serbia' fought in a different country, by different people, under the tacit or, at times, with open support of both of these countries. The war was primarily fought for territorial gains between the renegade army of Radovan Karadzic, with the help of Serbian government in Belgrade, (Inavukic, 2018) and the Bosnian and Herzegovinian forces. Initially the war started as a proxy, where the Bosnian-Serb Army, the Republika Srpska (RS), was supported by Serbia and the other faction was supported by the Croatian military and government.

The tactics used by the RS can be classified as a decentralized, hybrid war. For example, the use of propaganda was observed conducted by the Serbian army and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), to violate the territorial integrity of Bosnia. Moreover, after consolidating the control of the area, there was a systematic, ethnic cleansing of the people, which relates to the sectarian and ethnic exploitative aspect of this sort of warfare.

Lessons from Yugoslavia: The Case of Pakistan

The historical and the socio-political peculiarities of the former Yugoslavia were pertinent to consider as the model of 5th-gneration warfare was quite similar to the one that Pakistan has been facing. Before understanding the current state of affairs in Pakistan, one has to consider the historical perspectives that have shaped the social, political, economic, and religious dimensions of the country. An economic disparity has been visible in different regions of the country. For example, Baluchistan, which is rich in terms of natural resources, is one of the most impoverished provinces of the country (Bari, 2017). However historical trends reveal that the region of Baluchistan in particular and that of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in general have not been regarded as hospitable and climatically appropriate for agriculture. Even in the medieval times, the conquerors usually bypassed this region in a search for a more fertile and livable land, which is arguably one of the reason why Punjab, Sindh, and their other eastern parts of the former United India were more populated and economically developed.

The Economic Fault-line of Pakistan

In the context of Pakistan today, there are many aspects that have led to the creation of a vulnerable economic fault line in the country. For example as per economic indicators, Baluchistan usually comes in the last place (Staff Report, 2018). This phenomenon can be related to the former Yugoslavian situation faced during the early and mid-twentieth century. The under developed South and Southeast were envious of the economically advantaged North and Northwest, a parallel of which can be observed in the case of Pakistan where similar tensions have existed. This historical perspective does not justify the lack of development and economic opportunities for the people of impoverished regions. It is fault line that was created and enhanced due to negligence or downright bias, by the state, against the people of these areas (Mustafa, 2012).

Religious and Ethnic Extremism

Pakistan, similar to erstwhile Yugoslavia, is also a nation of ethnic and sectarian diversity, which has been exploited by the enemies and terrorism. If Republika Srpska

was an ethnic terror group in the case of Yugoslavia, then 'Lashkar-e-Jhangvi' and the militant wing of 'Sipah-e-Shaba Movement' are the ethnic terrorists from Pakistan (Mahsood, 2017). The question is, that these ethnic and sectarian differences have existed in the country since its inception, why have they become more visible now? To answer this, one can argue that the ground was paved for such violence during the Russo-Afghan War, when a few factions were favored by the ruling class.

Once such players gained strength, it was only a matter of time that they would engage in identity politics to gain traction among the masses of Pakistan. Since most of these factions did not have any national agenda and their existence in the political sphere was entirely dependent upon their identity politics, the rise in ethnic and sectarian violence, therefore, was inevitable. Also, the timeframe and the larger geostrategic picture in the 1980s played an indirect role in the strengthening of such groups as well. With open Pak-Afghan border, small arms proliferation was rampant. As the Mujahedeen were armed inside Pakistan, there was an opportunity for the local groups in Pakistan to create and arm their own militias too.

Information Warfare and Counterpropaganda

One aspect of this hybrid war that Pakistan is facing, which differentiates it from the former Yugoslavia, is the more aggressive nature media and informational component. Moreover, there has been an effort to create an ideological fault line in the country, which can be attributed to the role that media and the propaganda played in shaping the opinions of the people. The ideological divisiveness was first created by a systematic attack on the spiritual dimensions of Pakistan. It was observed only in the post 9/11 era that the majority of Pakistani media and opinion-makers were found, rather surprisingly, attacking the very ideals upon which this country was created. The narratives, such as *Islam holding back Pakistan's path to modernity*, along with a foreign cultural invasion, especially in terms of the family content, was aired, which, often times was in a direct conflict with the cultural and religious norms of our own country (Shaukat, 2015; Ispahani, 2017).

It can be argued that the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan, after the American invasion of Afghanistan, along with the media and cultural warfare are not coincidences, rather a deliberate and precise plan to create an 'ideological fault line' in Pakistan, to create a situation in which both ideological extremes are in a state of conflict with each other (Hussain, 2011). If a nation is doubtful about the very foundations of its identity, it becomes relatively easy to divide it along ethnic, economic, and religious lines.

The Complementation of Territorial Gains with Perception Management to Ensure Sustainability

Pakistan today is facing hybrid war on multiple fronts. It may be assumed that the state has now realized that the nature of this faceless war demands a multi-faceted counteraction. The military action, in the tribal areas of Pakistan is just one component of defeating the enemy, as has been the case with previous military operations. This argument can be validated by the recent shift in the popular narrative in Pakistan, regarding these violent non-state actors and more importantly, the ideology that they represent. Additionally, one may argue that despite the territorial recovery made by the Pakistan Army in the Northwest and Baluchistan regions, the apparent sustainability of these gains has become possible due the counter-

propaganda, information campaign launched against such radical ideologues. The same Pakistani Taliban that were branded as the flag-bearer of Islam are now being regarded as the outcasts, the 'Khawarij' ("Fatwa against Taliban", 2012). The situation in Baluchistan and Karachi is not different. The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other factions have lost local support in the region, which is an unprecedented occurring in the region's contemporary history. In Punjab, the religious extremist groups either have been banned from political activity or have failed to accumulate any significant vote bank, in the general elections of 2018.

Most of the gains made by the state of Pakistan, in the retaliation of the hybrid war relate to the media and information aspect of it. It can be argued that the current state of relative calm in the country can also be attributed to the development of a counter narrative to 5th generation hybrid warfare. It is only because of the political and national unity that the military and other law enforcement agencies have been able to uproot the hostile elements that were previously deeply entrenched in our society.

Economic Vulnerabilities of Pakistan

Regardless of all the military, ideological, and political gains in Pakistan, the economic realm is where the country needs to engage in developing a practical counterstrategy, which would set it free from the shackles of foreign debt. Considering the current economic situation, a state that can be bankrupt in a few weeks without any foreign loan, Pakistan has hit the economic rock bottom (Kay, 2018; Gopinath, 2018).

The silver lining, therefore, is that Pakistan needs to focus primarily on its economic vulnerabilities alongside its military countermeasures to hybrid warfare. The measures mentioned in the National Action Plan of 2014, which pertain directly to the economy and terror financing can be amalgamated with creating another national consensus among the people of Pakistan, to start a unified, national campaign against corruption and ensure ruthless justice on every front, as was the case in starting operation 'Zarb-e-Azb' (Butt, 2016).

Conclusion

For actions such as the military operations to be effective and sustainable, there needs to be an unquestionable national consensus first, as any room for disagreement can result in creation of new fault lines. Any nation that is engaged in such a decentralized, multi-pronged war needs an effective combined counterstrategy against all facets of such warfare. It is a unique form of war because the conventional military wisdom may not necessarily apply to win such a war. Mere territorial acquisitions and elimination of terrorists may not help a country win. In a battle of ideologies, the perceived victim tends to gain sympathy among the masses. The understanding of perception, information, and common national narratives play a significant role in determining a country's eventual fate in a hybrid war. It is one of the most pertinent lessons from the history and this study, especially if one considers that the main difference between Pakistan and Yugoslavia is that of effective perception management.

The perception management tactics used by the establishment of Pakistan has to uproot the ideological bases of the terror groups. Another underlying lesson from the case of Yugoslavia and contemporary Pakistan is that the military or territorial gains may not be sustainable if the national narrative is absent or doesn't resonate with the

masses. The fatwas against the terrorists and the effective use of NAP to build counter national narrative are the actions with lasting effects. Therefore, it can be argued that the perceived successes of recent Pakistan Army's operations are more effective as compared to the ones launched previously, precisely due to effective use of media and information sources to gain public support (Nabi, 2016).

The scenarios of Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka depict that the people of a nation become more prone to engage in violence and, thus, allow foreign actors to exploit their discontent, and existing fault lines. The long-term economic prosperity of Pakistan depends upon how aspects, such as internal security, law and order situation, ease of doing business, fiscal transparency, and investment opportunities pan out in the future. Moreover, accountability and corruption prevention will primarily result in diminishing prevailing monetary line losses. It is evident that the only way for Pakistan to tighten up loose ends is to focus on neutralizing its economic vulnerabilities. In essence, the very factors that were used to bring Pakistan on the brink of disintegration can be used to help it escape this quagmire.

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The Perils of E-Governance – Impact of Trump's Tweets within US-Pakistan Relations

Huma Javed[1]

Abstract

Theory of e-governance postulates the integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for delivering information, government services and transactions. It enhances efficiency and effectiveness in government system through three main elements: improving government processes (e-administration); connecting citizens (e-citizens and e-services) and building external relations (e-society). The global political arena is witnessing an increasing number of leaders expressing their ideas, policies, and sentiments through social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp etc. Within this vein, the US President Donald Trump stands out among most world leaders because of his excessive use of Twitter for the domestic as well as international relations,. Ever since taking over the office, President has handled thousands of tweets, with many of these influencing the US relations with foreign governments. To this end, this paper is an analysis of Trump's one year (June 2017 to June 2018) tweets, relating to Pakistan, and how they have affected the already deteriorating US-Pakistan relations and larger peace within Pakistan

Key Words

E-Governance, Twitter, Trump, Pakistan- US Relations, Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

Introduction

The Information and Communication Technology (ICTs) have spread extensively in 21st Century owing to significant vitality and accessibility. With the emergence of internet and world-wide-web (WWW), the rise of online communication has become a prerequisite of globalized world as it developed newer forms of communication. The systematic online communication opened new ways through social media and online forums which provide complete novel social interactions.

Fifty years ago, no one could have imagined internet or social media, however, the world has caught up with this change as fast as it arrived. (Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011) argues that social media services were first developed in 1978 when first Bulletin Board System (BBS) was developed. Subsequently, in 1997 the early version of social media was introduced, and 1999 was the year of

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online live journals and blogging. The turn of the century witnessed introduction of multiple social networking sites, with development of *Myspace*, *Word Press*, *Facebook*, *YouTube*, and *Twitter* etc.

With the passage of time, social media channels have expanded everywhere, people share and exchange their thoughts, views, and ideas. These platforms are growing fast, and have taken social sites, chat apps, microblogs, business network, online forums, and photo/video sharing under one umbrella. The introduction of Apple version of Smart Phones by Steve Jobs, literally revolutionized the social interactions (Weinberger, 2017). The influence of social media is expanding, every year the number of social media users is rising. Similarly, Aichner & Jacob (2015), explains that the social media users have increased intensely between 2015 and 2017. The social media platforms have expanded and people are getting closer with the world. Aichner & Jocab (2015) also reveal that the penetration of social network has expanded in North America, Europe and some parts of Asia Pacific. The number of social media users is growing fast. The ease of sharing innovative ideas, information and knowledge, is likely to benefit an increasing number of individuals. It has become a platform that is easily reachable to anyone. These technologies essentially impact the large conglomerates, individuals, political figures and world leaders who interact with each other. The dynamism of social media goes beyond connecting, sharing and learning, since it has completely substituted the "communication practices", modified "balance of power" and foremost "social leadership traits" (Ainin Sulaiman, 2014).

Facebook is the most popular social networking sites, and Twitter is the most powerful micro blogging platform (Osepashvili, 2014). Twitter claims allowing 300 million monthly active users to compose 280-character messages and convey information to the people (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 2010) . It is the most visited social media platform and has more than 319 million active users (Molina, 2017). These figures are not fixed and are increasing every day. Twitter has now become an open social media platform for politicians, where they spread their opinions and promote electoral campaigns and political strategies.

Twitter has gained more traction as a platform for real time political debates, with very high profile officials discussing matters of national and international interest openly. World leaders have exceedingly opted to use this platform to interact with their clientele domestically, and with foreign leaders in real time. Strauß, Kruikemeier, van der Meulen, and van Noort (2015) contended that twitter provides a diplomatic platform where top world leaders such as Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Sushma Swaraj, Queen Rania, Pope Francis and many other are actively participating with millions of followers. In the same way, Wauters, (2014) states that Barack Obama has the most followers on Twitter (43.7 million and counting), Joko Widodo president of Indonesia; 5 million+ followers) and number three, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (just south of 5 million followers). Similarly, Pope Francis, the ex-pope of the Catholic Church, has more than 14 million followers across multiple accounts (for different languages).

More recently President Trump stands out among most world leaders because of his excessive use of Twitter for the domestic as well as international relations, and

political affairs. Ever since taking over the office, he has handled thousands of tweets, with many of these influencing the US relations with foreign governments. Trump entered the Office in January 2017 and made novel use of twitter ever since. His excessive usage of Twitter, sometimes negatively impacted the US relations with many of its erstwhile allies such as Pakistan. Tracing the usage of twitter by Trump for one year (June 2017-June 2018), this paper endeavors to understand Trump's obsession with this platform as a governance tool. This research also looks at the ingenious use of an open platform for conducting diplomacy, revealing policy statements and subsequent impact on international relations and US foreign policy.

The Concept of Twitter Governance

Twitter is a powerful and open social media tool for enhancing modern communications between online users. The platform fosters alerts and notifications for different events that may interest a particular user. Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes (2010) argues the strength of Twitter Governance lies in the ability to unite users with one another and thus promote their activities through electronic means. The growing practice of Twitter depends on how they are combined into networks of citizens and how they interact to spur their participation in public services and administration. This online networking is becoming influential and making progress in connecting the world. A study by Weeks, Ardevol-Abreu, and Zuniga (2017) shows that worldwide leaders embrace online channels and have brought new ways of openness through e-governance that never functioned before. This new trend presents a platform for free communication, and now it has become a powerful weapon. Twitter has become a prime social media site for top world leaders/politicians, where they prefer to communicate directly with people. They share their daily activities, news policies, press releases, live political debates and important announcements to discuss substantive issues. Palmer, Dann, and Balandin (2018) contend that almost 276 heads of state and government, and foreign ministers, in 178 countries, representing 92 percent of all United Nations (UN) member states are active on Twitter .

It further exhibits the intense involvement of world leaders and governments facilitating policy promotion and advancing political objectives. Barack Obama was the first leader who showed his presence on Twitter, his 2008 innovative presidential campaign initiated the idea of e-governance through Twitter, drawing lot of traction (Tumasjan et al., 2010) . Other world leaders enjoying Twitter popularity include Modi from India, Xi Jinping from China, Putin from Russia to name just a few. Twitter-based e-governance is involved in supporting and promoting top-down connections in more innovative manner. It is a powerful tool for social mobilization, accountability and promoting all thoughts through tweets. It has proven to be the quickest tool for reporting news, as it is a double-edged weapon in creating opportunities and bridging gaps.

Twitter based governance has progressed rapidly in the recent years. It is routinely used by politicians to reach out to the masses; their tweets not only become viral but are also shown on TV as a breaking news. The concept of twitter based governance is not a new trend in both political and academic discourse, as it gained momentum in

terms of its meaning. It has now become a useful mechanism in today's worldly affairs.

Theoretical Framework of E- Governance

The theory of e-government postulates the use of electronic services to integrate ICT for delivering information, government services, and activities to the people through electronic transactions. With the growing trends of ICT, the paradigm has transformed from traditional government system to electronic government.


Figure 1: E-Governance Sectors[2]

Figure 1 above shows the communication in e-governance is sustained through multiple channels and varying degree of interactions such as government to government, government to citizen, government to commercial and businesses, government to civil society organizations and citizens to citizens etc. (Meijer, 2015). The wide range of e-government services emphasize on information technologies to retrieve, transmit and manipulate information which are beneficial for different sectors. Each e-government sector provides an improved capability of information and services for online communication. The intention is to improve the services of e-governance sectors in different directions and to adopt new technologies of e-governance through trust and utilize potential strengths of citizens (Banday & Mattoo, 2013).

Gupta, Dasgupta, and Gupta (2008) in their study explains that e-governance is an innovative system of governance, and many governments have started implementing this because of its speed, efficiency and uninterrupted communication through ICTs. Twitter also acts as a tool for promoting knowledge-based information electronically between citizens and government officials.

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[2] Created by the author

E-governance allows for the direct participation of the people, and entails five different sectors of delivering government services, exchange of digital information and accountability between Government to Government (G2G), Government and Citizens (G2C), Government and Employees (G2E), Citizen and Government (C2G), and Government and Business/Commences (G2B). E-governance model introduces new information of communication that makes an important contribution to accomplish good governance goals and reforms by fostering transparency, and by empowering people. The e-governance model has long term plans that impact on democratic governance system by employing ICTs. The ICT supports and transforms governance processes by advanced digital technologies (Kolachalam, 2002). The integration of ICT ensures the delivery of services to Government and Citizens (G2C). It facilitates people to access information and make the governments more efficient by playing a crucial role in speeding up the flow of intercommunication between government and citizens (Heeks, 2001). Citizens and Government are the backbone of any form of e-governance, followed by a robust G2B channel that is the commercial communication in terms of sale/purchase of products and services. In G2C initiative citizens are facilitated for their interactions with the government and has been termed as 'citizen-centric (Kolachalam, 2002).

From the above discussion an idea emerges that e-governance is a new development framework that expands the governance. It is fast, secure, and allows social interaction between the government and the public. It permits citizens to communicate with government, connect with government officials, and decision-making processes (Ghayur, 2006). The potentials of e-governance strategies provide citizens a platform where they get connected with different world leaders, share personal opinions, experiences, and ideas on various matters' albeit, it has some limitations that restrict its development and lessen its credible effectiveness. One of the major challenges of implementing e-governance is dependence upon four linear stages. Layne and Lee (2001) postulate these stages include presence, interaction, transaction, and transformation. The entire process is completely transformed and redefined, through interactions between various sectors. Moreover, it addresses policies, political and foreign affairs on the basis of inclusion.

Perils of the Twitter E- Governance

In the light of above discussion on e-governance sectors, the new face of digital governance has been studied by multiple scholars examining the major challenges of e-governance that transform digital services into new dimensions of communication. The new dimensions develop potential prospects for online users through G2C relationship (Perez et al., 2018). The application of ICT in e-governance has been identified by Sarrayrih and Sriram (2015)as a development and deployment regularity platform which supports in building and re-building of a knowledge based society . The advanced ICT tools in e-governance provide widespread information and services that faces many risks, issues and challenges. One of the major issues is the transformation of government from traditional to electronic approach, it is not only about transformation of e-governance but it is also about bringing new models and processes. The private government information, policies and self-presentation of

responsible authorities are persistent, prevalent and aggressive as it constantly changes and includes risks from multiple fronts.

The arrival of President Trump in the era of Twitter e-governance introduces a new ominous phase by making it a more common trend despite its arguable pros and cons. He uses twitter as a platform to sustain and express his political power and communication. President Trump expresses such strategies that can construct his self-presentation and negative 'others' presentation (Jackson, 2016). Twitter is the fastest tool for reporting news. There are several instances which indicate the level of engagements of the world leaders like Tayyib Erdogan, Narendra Modi and Barack Obama etc. Twitter is an extraordinary channel; it connects the people from all over the world through diplomacy and communication.

Donald Trump decided to use this platform through his account @realDonaldTrump and became active in March 2009, accumulating 53.2 million followers and making him the 18th most popular account on the social media (Piksar, 2018). Trump uses twitter as a vehicle where he declares most of his political discourses. His tweets mostly criticize politicians, media persons and world leaders. Many media conglomerates like CNN, CBC, and BBC routinely rebroadcast his tweets.   On January 3, 2018 Zanotti (2018) noted that 'It's not only Pakistan that we pay billions of dollars for nothing, but also many other countries, and others ….. As an example, we pay the Palestinians Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a year and get no appreciation or respect.' Similarly, he also stated against North Korea that, the Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times. will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!

This controversial side of Trump's tweets generated extensive public discussion (Jackson, 2016). Tweets changed the way in which people manipulate but they completely forget what is right and what is wrong, especially when communicating online

In a similar vein, Roy (2017), in his *Vanity Fair* story argued, some Facebook employees had left as far as asking founder Mark Zuckerberg, whether the company had a responsibility to try to stop him.

Twitter based e-Governance is primary vital form of communication from the perspectives of Trump, he knows very well about the role of media strategies in his politics. Lecher (2018) argues that according to Drudge Report, Brad Parscale who was the digital director of his election campaigns in 2016, handled his online campaigns, did ghost writing on his tweets and built a website for him as well. Similarly Brad Parscale who is uniquely equipped and managed his online political prospectus, he is also likely to run Trump's 2020 online campaigns. Kentish (2017) on the other hand contends that Dan Scavino, director of social media and Trump's assistant, manages his social media accounts and shared content that depicts conspiracy, false agendas and allegations. He admitted that with Trump's consent he promotes fake stories on twitter. It is very interesting to note that Trump never uses technologies directly, he has assistants who manage his social media accounts and fulfill high-tech demands. He's on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter that is controlled

by his mangers. He surprises many domestic/global leaders, the traditional media, and the public through his tweets. As a President, his Tweets have targeted international allies most recently Australia, Mexico, Pakistan and prowled international arena which is clearly recognized as the abuse of power (Anderson, 2017) . His online engagements and personal attacks of messages exhaust Twitter moments, and amplify his personal grievances against those who are against his administration's priorities. The Washington Post reported about Trump's criticism on the deal of the resettlement issues of refugees in the US between Canberra and former president Barack Obama (Solomon, 2017). e reported, it a dumb deal in which Obama's administration decided to take 1,250 asylum seekers from Australian-run detention centers on the Pacific islands of Manus and Nauru who are trapped in the Australian coast whereas Australia rejected to allow them (Solomon, 2017). After his Twitter post, the Sean Spicer the 28th press secretary stated about Trump's consent to honor the agreement between the Former president and Australia over refugee's issues. It shows the drawbacks of e-governance, on the face of it he honored the deals while on twitter he called it a worst deal (Solomon, 2017).


Figure 2: Image of Trump's Tweets shown on Time Newspaper (Solomon, 2017)

Gutsche (2018) noted that Trump's administration faced serious criticism on the policies of separating immigrant children from their parents. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) noted 429 different cases where parents were separated from their children, ranging from toddlers to young teenagers. Trump levelled his unconfirmed claim that many of the immigrants from Central America were gang members and linked them to "animals". According to Sonnad (2017) his offensive language and tone could be an effort to achieve a certain political goal.

In the initial days of his Oval Office, no one paid attention to his tweeting habits. But gradually his tweets were noticed as offensive. Undoubtedly, Twitter is a powerful online forum, a modern and an influential way of communication for many leaders .The e-governance theory also postulates a huge potential in pursuing an innovative way to reach out to the people.

US-Pakistan Relations (Historical Context)

Historically the relationship between two countries has never been smooth, and has always been marred by many ups and downs. The nature of US-Pak relationship is multifaceted and tenuous, and Jaffrelot (2016) has identified the relationship as "clientelism". By 1955, Pakistan aligned itself with the US in SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). This connection was further boosted during Afghanistan Saur Revolution in December 1979 (Kronstadt, 2004). The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the role

played by Pakistan military was decisive. Resultantly, by the end of 2001, there were four million Afghan refugees; UNHCR reported in 2017, that 1.3 million registered Afghan citizens still remain in Pakistan. (Piyasiri Wickramasekara & Eisazadeh, 2006).

In 1989, USA left the region leaving behind the burden of millions of Afghan refugees, and more importantly the burden of Taliban, born out of Russo-Afghan War. Refugees spanned across the country and many of them got involved in several delinquencies (Hussain, 2005). On the other hand, the emergence of Taliban as the rulers of Kabul, provided another prospect to the foreign militants as well as Pakistani religious militants to enter Afghanistan. These militants' intensified terrorist activities in Pakistan and it became a major victim of terrorism. After 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration coerced Pakistan into US-Afghan war or Pakistan would be "bombed back to stone age" (Musharraf, 2006, p. 201). During the past almost two decades, Pakistan has been fighting against terrorists, it helped US in Soviet war and faced criticism, labeled as terrorist even though it had been supporting the USA in its global war on terrorism.

During Hillary Clinton's tenure, she also gave a direct warning to Pakistan "you can't keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors"(Myers, 2011). Similarly, Obama administration also warned Pakistan and its security, because he wanted to bring a change in the traditional American approach. Robert Gates, the defense secretary between 2006 to 2011, explained a dismal picture of the US–Pakistan relationship with a serious trust deficit (Armitage, Berger, & Markey, 2010). The Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and CIA Director David Petraeus visited Pakistan and interpreted their concerns to stop giving support to the terrorists in Afghanistan (Brian Michael Jenkins, 2011). In the same way, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta used harsh words against Pakistan (Cobb, 2011). In such circumstances, Pakistan suffered enormously in the war against terrorists. Soon after the Trump's assumption of office, his tone was different but it changed in a short span of time (Taylor, 2017).

Impacts of Trump's Tweets on Pakistan

After 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was confronted with a plethora of problems, the unremitting and callous struggle between the terrorists and the state of Pakistan, caused immense losses. Pakistan suffered physically, economically and socially since 9/11 and its intensity increased for the first decade of 21st Century (Fani, 2005). President Trump's provoking tweet after such protracted conflict and immense losses mischaracterized the contributions of Pakistan. Trump (2018) on his Twitter account stated,

The US has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe heaven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help, No more!

Despite the fact that Pakistan started several military operations and took actions against terrorist organizations, it hardly received any appreciation from USA. Even the attitude of America's new administration towards Pakistan's image and perception

is full of anti-Pakistan rhetoric. "Since becoming president, Trump made a mockery of Pakistan in an Islamic summit in Riyadh", delivered a critical Afghanistan policy, and proclaimed that Washington has placed Pakistan "on notice" (Shahid, 2018). His tweets against Pakistan detoriated the Pakistan-US relations as he claimed that Pakistan had given safe haven to the terrorists.

On Twitter, he started with the war of words instead of establishing peace. Reich (2018) claims that his tweets deliver a unique insight as they are an inevitable part of his presidency he resorts to the war of words. He recently stated, "My use of twitter is not Presidential it is modern day presidential" (Ott, 2017). In January 2018, Trump first tweet criticized Pakistan that showed drawbacks of e-governance. Sampath Kumar (2018b) stated that Defense Minister Khurram Dastgir-Khan reacted as well, he said, "Pakistan is an anti-terror ally of the US and provided the American military with land & air communication, military bases that decimated Al-Qaeda".

His tweets sparked criticism and created unrest in the country. Pakistan summoned the US Ambassador and called an emergency meeting of its national security team. The tweet also ignited protests from hundreds of members of the Difa-e-Pakistan Council, a coalition of Islamist parties in Karachi (Sampathkumar, 2018a). Wit (2016) said, "Pakistan has now become a new North Korea for the US, the outburst of tweets from Trump's twitter account sounded like war bugles..

Analysis

Prior to the twitter analysis phase, an informal canvassing of tweets was conducted to examine different patterns of Trump's tweets. For this, Twitonomy, a subscription-based service was used to download the datasets for openly accessible tweets. Twitonomy is a useful tool to analyze the number of retweets and likes per tweet. The number of responses on Trump's tweets regularly changed making it difficult to get an accurate number because of large number of replies and participants. Twitonomy has some limitations to measure the number of people who reply to the tweets, and have not been incorporated in this analysis. The staff members of Trump are the ones who have access to his twitter handle. In 2017 Trump endorsed Pakistan and its forces over the rescued of Canadian-American family who was held hostage by the Taliban (Kassam & Janjua, 2017). He immediately took to the twitter and praised Pakistani responsible authorities for their cooperation.

However, after four months, at the start of 2018, Trump started the New Year by setting a more offensive tone of relationships between Pakistan and USA. His first tweet on Pakistan was shocking as, he used threatening words and challenged the role Pakistan has played in Afghanistan. Growing pressure, criticism, blame games, and threatening environment reduce the chances of any improvement in bilateral relations. Former U.S. President Barack Obama, in his major 2009 speech on Afghanistan policy, had used harsh words against Pakistan, as compared to Trump (Ahmad, 2010). But over his years in office, Pakistan – US relations remained fairly well.

Conclusion

Through an analysis of Trump's tweets, this paper highlighted the key perils of e-governance which criticize governments, organizations, and media. Trump tweets

about a number of subjects including policy making, self-praising, criticism and personal attacks.

On the basis of existing research, this paper contends that the e-governance through social networking platform plays a prominent role in shaping peoples' political attitudes. The general perception of e-governance is multifaceted because it is not about networking or a website for information access, rather it is about transforming the fundamental relationship between the government and the public.

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The Securitization of Refugee Movements in Contemporary Politics

Noorulain Naseem[3]

Abstract

Securitization implies moving a situation up the security agenda of a state, so as to perceive it as a potential existential threat to national security. This article attempts to analyze the post-cold war refugee situations in context of the securitization concerns they raised for states hosting them. Here both the traditional and non-traditional contours of security are highlighted, including incidents of direct armed conflict between sending and receiving dyad, external intervention, infiltration or facilitation of trans-national movements across international borders and compromise of territorial integrity in the wake of these movements. The current narrative of persecution and accusation around refugee movements has led to unnecessary bias, directed towards those fleeing conflict zones. There is a need for a delicate balance between concerns of state and human security in the wake of these movements. This can help to understand why these seemingly humanitarian disasters have lately been identified as a securitization concern for host states in international politics. The analysis also uses social constructivism to establish the host state's challenges; which may account for as an incremental threat to the integrity of host state's ethnic, demographic and social constructs. The primary question that the paper seeks to address is to why and how these movements were able to raise security concerns, though they are usually associated with destitution and marginalization, yet lately have been associated with diffusing negative externalities of violent conflict zones across international borders.

Keywords

Refugee movements, Trans-national rebel movements, ethnic conflict, insurgency, terrorism, social constructivism

Introduction

The post-cold war conflicts have been identified with the presence of ethnic violence, intrastate nature of conflict, involvement of non-state actors, strong external intervention, protraction of conflict, and mass refugee movements across international borders. With the dilution of traditional borders and increased mobility in general across regions, the diffusion of crime, rebellion, and arms from inside an active violent conflict zone, has become twice as challenging for the states hosting refugees.

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Though refugees in general may not be perpetrators of violence and crime, neither are all refugee movements a source of diffusing violence across borders, nevertheless the political and social construct of these movements is so intricately adjoined with the legal and humanitarian status of their stay, that the host states find themselves in a tricky situation where concerns of state security and human security of refugees is difficult to balance (SR, 2017) The Standing Committee on Protracted Refugee situations stated in 2004:

> "A consequence of protracted refugee situations is that they can serve as incubators for future problems… Large, disaffected and alienated populations relying on subsistence-level handouts are prime targets for recruitment into armed groups. And the frustration of being a refugee- of living in squalor and obscurity, and of feeling that injustice continues in one's homeland-can lead persons to commit dramatic actions that draw attention to a cause" (Mogire, 2011, p. 139).

Refugees, Mobility across Borders and Security as a Construct

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) protocol 1965 and1971 defines a refugee as someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence (Betts et al., 2012). Academics on the other hand take a holistic view of this issue with the *de facto* definition defining 'refugee' as people that flee conditions of general violence such as civil or international wars and the breakdown of political regimes, in addition those escaping direct government persecution, are also considered to be refugees. It is further important to differentiate between the term 'refugee' and the phenomena of 'refugee movements', using these interchangeably can result in incorrect beliefs, narratives, and resulting misplaced sense of fear and persecution around an otherwise neutral group of people (Zolberg et al., 1989).

The phenomenon of 'refugee movement' refers to masses crossing international borders in destitution and plight fleeing persecution or fear of persecution, rendering border controls and normal security procedures useless. These populations also enjoy a globally recognized and usually a communally facilitated status which allows special legal, political, and at times social and diplomatic rights of stay, and settle in a host state. This gives rise to an evolved environment inside host states leaving the state itself and refugee community's security paradigm, their identity, interest placement, and political balance vulnerable to actors. This might result in the refugee community considering the arrangement(s) as an opportunity to become mobile, operative and influential across international borders.

The UNHCR reported that there are around 25.4million refugees worldwide in 2018 (UNHCR, 2018). It is important to note that the destitution and restricted political, economic, and social life in which refugees are deemed to survive (inside or outside refugee camps) can push them to take dangerous measures. On the other hand, their diluted power status in international politics leaves them exposed to violence and exploitation inside and outside the violent conflict zone. Any security concerns emerging from these migrations must be viewed as both: conditions triggered or highlighted due to refugee contact or migration patterns inside host state. The host state here, along with the refugees that it hosts, could thus become both the victim and the culprit of any unrest caused by these movements (Cohen, 2002).

To approach refugee situations from a potentially securitized perspective, the understanding of term security also needs to be broadened from its normative and/or traditional interpretation. That is to say, the whole idea of security must be seen as a social construct, inter-subjective in nature (i.e. depending on the perceptions arising as

a result of interactions and negotiations between actors in international system). The growing interest of academics and policy makers from moving security away from purely objective notions onto a more subjective level of analysis points to the evolving need to define security in a way where it may be relevant to a sound political stance and a representative of scientific research. This is fundamentally about the difference between the absences of threat versus the absence of fear from a threat. Human security for example, can be seen as an expression of state security though not a direct causal measure of it at all times. This though has happened in direct correlation with an actual rise in violent domestic conflict, rise of asymmetric warfare and terrorism, as an expression of power and influence across the world ever since the end of cold-war (Bladwin, 2002).

This evolved nature of threats in post-cold war politics has resulted in rise of non-traditional security agendas which at times come under strong critique on accounts of being overtly subjective rather than responsive. The issue of mobility of immigrants towards Europe in this regard, has been discouraged from being approached from a securitized position, as it might encourage persecution and building up of fear against certain communities and groups, particularly at hands of the polity. The Copenhagen School of Security though endorses societal values and basis of national cohesion to be a worthy referent to security, yet it strongly discourages the concentration of policy making on communal issues at hands of elites for fear of exploitation and negative popularization for political purposes (Sulovic, 2010). This can be observed during the recent American presidential campaign also in Europe's (societal) reaction to the possibility of opening its borders for Syrian refugees.

This paper aims to analyze *why* refugee movements have moved from being a normative humanitarian concern for states hosting them to a potential securitization concern in both academic and political rhetoric. The analysis views Post-cold war refugee situations in context of the subsequent issues of security breaches inside host states as well as the related international trends like trans-nationalism, terrorism, and rise in ethnic conflict. Reassessing the socio-political costs and indirect contribution of these movements to induce unrest and conflict in communities that host refugees, could help to rationalize the reservation shown towards hosting refugees; to be either based on material facts or not.

Social Constructivism and Refugee Migrations

Refugee movements can be of serious consequences to the host state given their influence and potential to capitalize upon the socio-political and ethno-cultural constructs of the state. Social constructivism considers the mass social contact resulting from this movement to be significantly consequential to the perceptions of ethnicity and nationalism. It further argues that both of these do not qualify to be given conditions for a group to define identity and interest basis (Esman, 2007). Instead, these are social and political constructions depending on the room for instrumentalization and interest of either the polity or the group elites. This implies that refugees induced on basis of ethnic linkages or political gains could have significant impact on mobilization and organization inside host state by capitalizing on conducive socio-political environment, which they may alter or politicize significantly for causes and ideologies being fought for inside the conflict zone or state of origin (Brass, 1991).

Here refugee management protocols and refugee management policy must also come into discussion. It must be noted that two of the most significant post-cold war refugee movements hail from Afghanistan and Syria; 70 to 80% of this influx is

being hosted by Pakistan and Turkey. It is important to consider that the mentioned countries are either not party to or else maintain the geographical limitations under *1951 Convention*.[4] This means that the ground reality for managing stay and mobility of refugees falls largely at the hands of host government and UNHCR, however have limited capacity to manage, finance or administer the settlement. The politics of refugee situation is thus inevitable to come into play. Sometimes this politics overrides the legal obligations attached to this status, especially for developing states where these movements continue to remain subject to manipulation or else ends up manipulating host state environment to their favor.

Refugees and Diffusion of Violence across Borders

Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) observed a positive correlation between presence of civil war and subsequent conflict in neighboring states and associate the movement and stay of refugees with these phenomena. The trends of trans-nationalism, mobility, and exchange of arms, rebels and ideologies which take place in disguise or under facilitation of these movements results in the negative externalities of civil strife to move across international borders. Here the closing of borders for refugees may result in dire ethical and political costs for states, meanwhile the negligent handling of the issue can result in security issues for host states as well (Salehyan, & Gleditsch, 2006). Consequences of violent conflicts thus become globalized: through internationalization and diffusion of violence via transfer of weaponry, military strategies, political unrest and cultural frustration. Refugees are consequentially identified as one of the carriers of these negative externalities across international boundaries.

Salehyan (2007, 2008, 2009) further identified the probability of direct military confrontation between the sending and receiving dyad of refugees, mostly due to trans-national rebel and militant movements that move across borders in the wake of a violent conflict and sometimes take refuge and recruits from inside refugee camps of host states (see also Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2011). This could either be a government or a group invited organization, thus facilitating recruitment and operations of rebel groups from amongst refugees. Social Constructivism views the presence of ethnic kin, sympathizers of ideology in the form of religious, social or cultural similarities, and host state's ethno-political or geo-strategic interests, as a few major facilitators, when it comes to refugee's choice of host state as well as host state's decision to accept them. This entails that the social constructs are not only decisive in granting asylum to refugees but also how much their stay will affect the subsequent construction of violence and rebellion inside their potential host state.

In the contemporary politics, another complication is the rise of trans-national organizations in conflict zones. The patterns of mobilization, networking, financing, and information flow which these organizations thrive upon across borders, can heavily capitalize on the refugee situations; to operate, commute and take refuge in host state in disguise or under facilitation of these refugee movements (Salehyan, 2009). Cross border rebellion and insurgency by Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) and Tehreek-e-Taliban is complimented by extensive mobility of ethnic diasporas across international borders in the wake of protracted conflict and ethnic violence in the Middle-East and Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaraguan Civil War and the situation from the rebel sanctuaries in Zaire after the Rwandan genocide further portray how ethnic conflict

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[4]For further information: UNHCR Archives on Refugees and Asylum seekers in Turkey and Pakistan. http://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey, https://unhcrpk.org/asylum-system-in-pakistan/

and transnational rebellion thrives on refugee situations and the mobility from refugee migrations (Staniland, 2010). Refugees are more likely to contribute to rebellion if they are located in weak and/or rival states. The 'refugee warrior' phenomenon is documented in a large number of case studies, supporting the notion that conflict and refugees are mutually reinforcing (Salehyan, 2007).

Another concerning trend is the rise of 'refugee warrior' communities from inside the refugee camps in host states which has resulted not only in organized insurgency and rebellion against state of origin, but certain groups inside state of origin or even resistance towards host state governments in post-cold war conflicts. Examples are of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Jordan, Cubans in the United States and Tutsis in Uganda, as politicized refugee groups mobilized against governments back home. PLO had also been operating against Jordanian government and alleged involvement of Tamil refugee in assassination of Rajiv Gandhi or Tutsi refugees organized against Ugandan regime are further examples of refugees organizing against host polity (Gerdes, 2006).

More alarming in fact is to observe how under some circumstances the host government and organized rebel groups have used and instrumentalized the refugees against rival governments and groups in refugee's state of origin by raising and supporting refugee militia and warriors to launch attacks against political rivals (Stedman & Tanner, 2004). Here refugees become an active resource for waging war, refugee populations. For instance, refugee populations from Central and Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central America have been actively reported to be engaged in military activities that were either intended to oust or else to destabilize the government in their countries of origin. The tricky equilibrium that a host state may have to achieve in the wake of refugee movements is the need to balance its state security needs along with humanitarian or human security needs of the refugees. This entails state's structural, cultural and regime capacity to contain and sustain the refugee population, which in case of developing states is a challenging task.

The restriction of refugees to camps and attaching stigma of terrorism and violence to them encourages recruitment and identification of refugees with extremist, separatist and combatant elements. The demographic, political and social balance, if tips in opposition to the government, the state may find itself slowly embracing the crisis from across borders. Refugees conditioned from a sectarian or ethnic revolution are more likely to organize from refugee camps as militants to gain back influence in home state (Milton, Spencer, & Findley, 2013).

The host state in this case becomes trapped in an extremely devious situation where overly securitized refugee management policy can result in relative deprivation and alternative incentives for the refugee to seek validation and assistance from trans-national crime and terror nexus active across borders. A refugee's marginalized and frustrated profile in such cases make for an ideal recruit. One such example is of the policy adopted by Pakistan in managing the Afghans for over three decades. It was complimented by negligent and unstable administration or government at centre and ended up in permeation of borders, rising of rebels and militants from camps and an overall culture of violence and crime thriving in areas where mixing of refugees and militants from across borders with local groups (Edwards, 1986).

Refugees from economically weak states have increased vulnerability to fall victim to organized crime or indulge in rebel activities for financial gains. Activities of terrorists and organized criminals frequently reinforce each other. Terrorists engage, either directly or indirectly, in organized criminal activities (such as, trafficking, smuggling, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and the illicit trade of natural

resources) for financial and/or material benefits. Such benefits contribute to undermining state security, stability and social and economic development, which in turn may create or maintain the conditions for organized criminal groups to flourish. On the other hand, organized crime groups may employ terrorist tactics, including the strategic use of violence, to enable their objectives (Ekey, 2008).

Factors facilitating Diffusion of Violence from Refugee Movements

However, refugees alone cannot be solely held responsible for diffusing violence across international borders or spillover of conflict in neighboring states without certain conduciveness and facilitation. The factors, facilitating this diffusion, can be identified as geographical overlapping of ethnic groups, moral or ethical linkages, and strategic incentives for states exploiting refugees (De Silva & May, 1991; Howard, 2010).

Realists and neo-liberalists may not be able to see the refugee situations as consequential enough to be perceived as a potential state security threat. This is primarily because the relative resilience which states are able to show in front of instances of full blown wars or ongoing insurgency shows why securitization of refugee movements does not fall into the normative premise of security studies. Nevertheless, the surge in ethnic violence, ideological instruments of strategic depth and the ability of trans-national movements, to permeate and operate across international borders, is something which has given the states significant challenge to maintain peace and stability inside their territory. In Middle-East for example, the Arab-spring movement, the trans-national rebel and terrorist networks operative (in particular) across Levant and the continuous external intervention via means of non-state actors and ethnic politicization in that region is complimented by various factors; such as, regime changes, coups, collapse of states and rise of new borders with the merging of old borders in the shadows of conflict and mobility. During this time, Middle-East was able to exchange largest number of refugees (especially since 2015), across fellow region states or ensue masses fleeing persecution from political or direct violence to other regions as well (Ahsan, 2016). This is yet another case of proximity of refugees' mobilization with rising trends of trans-nationalization and externalization of crime, terror, and insurgency within and outside state borders.

The insecurities of Europe regarding Syrian refugees happened with the ISIS attacks across European hemisphere in 2015, although the fear was misplaced, yet its premise cannot be ignored on the basis of being rather misplaced or misconstrued at least in context of social constructivism; which see mobility and social contact to be of potential consequence to the long term societal and political security of states. Security here is not only the issue of identity and nationalism but also the threat of transnationalism to hijack and reconstruct grouping, identity, and interest placement for individuals or communities inside a host state, in order to reinforce foreign ideologies which may be belligerent in nature. The ability of ISIS and Al-Qaeda to recruit and mobilize their assets from across regional boundaries comes relevant here.

Loescher & Milner (2005) insist refugees to be a source of international conflict particularly in case of protracted stay. The authors have further identified the greatest risk of spillover of conflict in host state via 'refugee warriors'. Factors effecting the incentive and opportunity in this case can vary from strategic intervention from regional states in the conflict zone, misuse of humanitarian aid by refugees, and an under-scrutinized and securitized refugee management policy (in general) on behalf of host state.

Zolberg (1989) coined the term 'refugee warrior' identifying refugee communities with political leadership and armed sections engaged in warfare for

political ends. The probability of mobilization inside host state for causes being fought inside the conflict zone increases significantly when the refugees have ethnic or identity based cushion(s) inside host environment. This can be in the form of sympathetic diaspora, favorable form of government, or affinity linkages which transcend across borders, and help such actors to operate and remain disguised (as refugees) inside host states. Instrumentalists also see ethnic and communal facilitation as a potent force in politicizing a groups as soon as an opportunity arises, which can vary for rebel groups; from gaining recognition and power inside conflict zone, financers in the form of sympathizing states having strategic stakes inside the conflict or else aspirant leadership which aims to challenge a government or group by organizing and mobilizing against it, which could be inside conflict zone or even inside host state.

It is very interesting to note the rather slow built up of narrative around the potential and actual security threats which refugees have been able to pose for host states. The academia seems fixated on the traditional security notions and over-estimates the ability of states to survive repetitive and incremental attacks on its security paradigm. Although refugees have not been able to completely disintegrate a state or transcend international borders by means of force, yet the growing trend of refugee situations posing an array of security situations for host states is a challenge which needs to be taken into due account. In case of developing countries facing the issue of refugees, significant over burdening of their institutional capacity because of the influx can cause negligence towards its own population; thus becoming vulnerable (Howard, 2010).

In case the securitization of refugee movements is manifested in the form of barring them from seeking asylum, instead of designing a responsive and proactive policy to manage them and any threats associated, then that is mere perversion of current level of data and analysis on the instances of unrest and violence as a result of these refugee movements. Such an analysis is by no mean extrapolated on all refugee populations. In case of Kenya, for example, the refugee policies moved from being friendly in 1970s, to tolerant in 1980s, and eventually turned aggressive to the point of forced repatriation and eventually barring entry at borders in 1990s. This however happened as a reaction to the presence of rebel and armament and instances of launching rebel attacks from Kenyan soil that hosted refugees from various states in conflict across the region. Nevertheless, it is an example of a reactionary securitization policy directing persecution on a larger community which was not involved *per se* in security breaches or criminal activities against host state - as an organized entity (Nduati, 2015).

The preconditions to refugee movement's ability to instill unrest and violence across borders can be result of marginalization, destitution, political vacuum, identity crisis, ethno-nationalist movements, diluted state writ or fragile institutions. In the context of international borders, the bargain and mobility of refugees between states and the management of these movements, if considered a political and social construct rather than a purely humanitarian or legal issue can help to understand some hidden costs associated with hosting refugees. From a constructivist approach, particularly social constructivism, these factors facilitate ethno-identity based conflicts in host state to be instilled from mass social contact in the wake of refugee movements, inside a particular host state (De Silva, 1991). Hence the presence of weak government institutions and ungoverned territory in areas near refugee settlements and transit points further invite political forces to exploit this vacuum of power and extend spheres of influence (often trans-national in nature) and thrive on criminal and terrorist activities. Such conditions invite hot pursuit and belligerence

between regional states and puts territorial and political sovereignty of host in direct distress.

Many of these pre-conditions are not in the control of refugees and any gaps in policy or fault lines in ethno-political paradigms of host state are merely an instrument to be exploited by violent actors; 'actors' disguised as refugees. States have ultimately all the power in international system and any power which non-state actors enjoy are often delegated or tolerated by states for strategic and political gains and can be further conceptualized as an attempt to use security as an instrument for political ends (Salehyan et. al., 2011).

These preconditions are based on a holistic experience from refugee migrations in post-cold war scenario which is marked by a rapidly changing geo-strategic and socio-political environment. If handled negligently, the rising number of refugees and potential statelessness and destitution which may arise as a result of these movements eventually can give a challenge to international community. Refugee management processes are inherently embedded within complex political, economic, social and cultural imperatives. Policy making in this regard is bound to be complicated with conflicting interests at community, state or organizational levels. The international refugee regime has failed to help host states and international community in general, to achieve dichotomy between purely humanitarian aspects of such movements with those of potential security risks.

Established threats from refugee movements can be summed as 'spill-over' effect of arms, rebels and ideologies across borders, diffusion of conflict and ethnic unrest in host state, and intervention from other states. Also, dispute between sending-receiving dyad, societal and political unrest from demographic and cultural changes, rise of warrior refugees inside host state, instigation of insurgency, and separatism are found to be in direct correlation with protracted refugee states in developing states (WDR, 2010).

The insistence of current narrative and rhetoric regarding refugee movements for being purely securitized or else humanitarian in nature simply adds to the confusion around this issue. The refugee becomes a voiceless community in this scenario and thus becomes subject to further alienation and persecution. In addition, the refugees become unable to tell their story and defend their rights against the state that seeks to secure itself. Non-state actors exploit them as instruments of asymmetric warfare between international powers. With regards, international refugee regime is sometimes reduced to a watchdog status and local community becomes bound to suffer exhaustion and frustration due to overstay of these uninvited guests. Meanwhile the demands of Geneva Convention relating the status of these people go un-noticed or ignored, and the destitution which refugees suffer from, pushes them to take drastic measures and opens doors to be used as scape goats for blames of terrorism, insurgency and criminal activity.

Conclusion

This article attempted to identify the instances and their pre-conditions where the refugee movements in post-cold war politics moved from being purely humanitarian to a security concern for host states. The socio-political consequences from these movements can be seen as a major facilitator to these movements, introducing negative externalities of conflict across international borders. The direct security breaches reported and observed in the wake of refugee movements cannot be seen independent of the pre-conditions (ethnic, social, cultural, political and diplomatic in nature) which encourage negative externalities of conflict zones to be diffused and transferred in disguise of under facilitation of these movements across international

borders. This calls for looking at many issues as socio-political constructs, such as; international borders, refugee-asylum agreements, international refugee regime's intervention in host state's refugee management policy and duration, financing as well as location of refugees. These constructs are often subject to power plays and attempts from various international actors to gain influence over the refugee population, the host state or non-state actors for strategic gains inside violent conflict zone. In case the securitization of refugee movements in contemporary politics is poorly managed, the emergent security related issues could be used as an excuse to persecute millions of people seeking asylum. An utterly biased and unjust rhetoric on academic and political level could be encouraged around this issue, leading to further persecution of this fleeing violence already. Instead, due responsibility and accountability should be attached to the financing and stay, management and mobility of refugees. In addition, the focus should also be on the methods of intervention inside conflict zones that have been able to cost substantially on the human capital and infrastructure.

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Addressing Gender Imbalance in United Nations' Peacekeeping

Azam Agha[1]

Introduction

The Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) is the backbone of United Nations' Peacekeeping operations worldwide. The history of United Nations Peacekeeping operations can be traced back to1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East (ME). Since then its presence has been recognized and appreciated by all those affected by armed conflict and/or to humanitarian crises. Men in uniform have been at the forefront of its face in difficult and violent situations regardless of the areas being remote or urban in nature. As with many 'traditional' aspects of Peacekeeping operations (such as force application), the continuously changing environment has also influenced the 'face' itself to be changed, *albeit* at a slower pace. For instance, the need for incorporating women into this so far purely 'men in uniform' domain is being considered in all facets of its operations. Women with their natural affinity to Peace-making, and their ability to access gender restrictive societies is continuously being recognized as a necessary resource for UN operations.

It must be noted that given the inherent diversity within the UN framework, the troop contributing countries (TCCs) too, largely vary in their religious, ethnic, and social backgrounds. And whereas some countries are ready to be in a position to comply with this need, i.e. to integrate more female peacekeepers in their contingents, other countries still appear to be making an effort to come to terms with the idea. Fact of the matter is that, despite the urgency and realization, there is still a vast gender imbalance in UN's human resources committed to various tasks in different missions.

The aforementioned gender imbalance was identified by UN in October 2000, and resultantly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved *Resolution 1325* on 'Women, Peace and Security' (reference please). It was for the first time that the UNSC recognized that women and girls are also adversely affected by (violent) armed conflicts and therefore should have an essential role in peace support processes and Peacekeeping operations. Since its passage, the *Resolution* has served as a milestone towards better integration of women's perspectives in peace processes. Following the passage of the Resolution, various UN requirements continued to pour in (see; resolutions: 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, and 2242), stressing the significance of the role that women can potentially play

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in societies ridden with violent conflict and/or an evident absence of peace (Promoting Women, Peace and Security, n.d.). Consequently, as per the current directives under practice, all TCCs are obliged to comply with at least 15 % of females in all categories of their manpower including military, police, Staff Officers (SOs), observers, or as part of contingent. Some member states of the UN have willingly contributed women peacekeepers in missions; however, the ratio compared to men still remains visibly low. Evidently, in 2017 it was observed that, women's representation among military troops and police officers in UN peace operations remained low at 4 % and 10 % respectively (UN Women, 2018).

Since its inception, Pakistan has been one of the top few contributors to UN Peacekeeping efforts worldwide and has willingly taken part in various kinds of operations. In fact, Pakistan stood among the top five countries of the world with largest troop contribution to UN in 2018 (Statista, 2019): the list includes Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Rwanda and India. Despite an honest desire to address the previously identified gender imbalance by the TCCs, the societal norms and traditional patriarchal culture has majorly obstructed the road towards a total fulfilment of UN requirement—i.e. addressing gender imbalance. Although Pakistan's military and police force(s) have substantially promoted the idea of gender balance in UN operations, the country still falls short of being fully compliant status, fulfilling all the requirements of the UN.

One of the main arguments for under-representation of women in the UN Peacekeeping missions surrounds around the 'conditions' related to mission operating environments; often frugal and living conditions rated as 'tough'. Moreover, any posts and consequent roles of UN peacekeepers are isolated and characterized by 'Spartan' living conditions, implying their inability to survive such rough field conditions. In some cases, handful members of UN Peacekeeping missions live in fairly close proximity of each other (primarily in make-shift or rented accommodation) with often limited access to water, thus making living conditions more difficult for women as Peacekeepers. Adding to these conditions, physical dangers of abduction, sexual harassment and threat to life make it further discouraging for those TCCs who are already plagued by their societal norms, yet working to ensure the gender balance. In this backdrop, it becomes imperative to critically examine the underlying issues and involved multifaceted factors, particularly in the context of Pakistan.

UN Policy on Addressing the Gender Imbalance

Since the conception of Peacekeeping, it has been a male-dominated field employing soldiers from diverse backgrounds and cultures contributing towards peace and stability in troubled and war-torn societies. While considering the multifaceted nature of conflicts and natural calamities, the roles entrusted to UN peacekeepers have constantly been evolving. Similarly, critical focus on combatants has also witnessed a dramatic shift towards more inclusive approach. Consequently, contemporary peacekeepers are increasingly finding themselves communicating and interacting with local communities; large percentage of which comprises women and children. Accordingly, inclusion of women UN peacekeepers helps to reduce conflict and

confrontation and provide a greater sense of security to local populations, particularly while dealing with women and children. It has been well observed that, the induction of women members in various missions has significantly improved access and support for local women, apart from providing role models for women in the community. Above all it has broadened the skill set available within a peacekeeping mission, which in itself is a significant contribution. The UN believes that increased recruitment of women is critical for (cited from, Karim, 2017, p. 825):

- Empowering women in the host community;
- Addressing specific needs of female ex-combatants during the process of demobilizing and reintegration into civilian life;
- Helping make the peacekeeping force approachable to women in the community;
- Interviewing survivors of gender-based violence;
- Mentoring female cadets at police and military academies;
- Interacting with women in societies where women are prohibited from speaking to men.

In view of the above, the Security Council adopted *Resolution (S/RES/1325)* on Women, Peace and Security on 31 October 2000. The resolution reaffirms the significant role of women in the realm of peacekeeping. The said role necessarily stretches from their on-field presence as trained peace keepers, their efficacy as peace-builders and negotiators and their character in advancing humanitarian responses during and following conflict situations. Their effective presence also points towards the emancipated role of women and the prevalent norm of gender equality within the UN framework. In this regard the Resolution 1325 directs all actor states to ensure increased women participation from their respective countries in various UN peacekeeping and security missions. Alongside ensuring their involvement, the Resolution also meaningfully attends to the task of warranting a safe working environment for these women peacekeepers. In this regard, the Resolution upholds the need to guarantee a working environment that is free from all sorts of gender -based violence, particularly, rape and other forms of sexual abuses. It must be noted, that when on field, the intensity of these threatening elements multiplies by leaps and bounds. The resolution provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for Member States and the entities of the UN system (OSAGI, n.d.).

In 2006, DPKO adopted the UN Policy Directive on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations. This initiative added an additional mandate to the credentials of the DPKO, entitling it to add a gender balanced work force at all operational levels; be it at ground level or on managerial/ administrative basis (Luchetti, 2017). The policies chalked out in this framework further laid down minimum requirements for female deployments; and a report monitoring the progress of efforts by member states to improve the gender balance situation with a keen attention to issues pertaining to the deployments apart from practical propositions

concerning the security and safety of conflict fields. An additional component of these guidelines was their insistence on the fact that the missions should maintain gender based data on the numbers of male and female military personnel within their respective national armed forces alongside the appointment of a Gender Focal Point within each military group with clear description of designated tasks; and assessing the operational impact of the deployment of female personnel. These efforts came coupled with the appointments of Military Gender Advisers and Military Gender Focal Points entrusted with the responsibility of supporting the integration of a gender perspective into the work of the military component during a peacekeeping mission (DPKO/DFS Guidelines, 2010, p. 39; see also, "Gender Responsive United Nations", 2018)".

As per rules laid down in the directive, these personnel were to be placed in the military chain of command within a mission on duty. Contrastingly, the mission's Gender Adviser who had to be a civilian, (as laid down in the framework) was to provide an overall strategic guidance and direction to support the integration of a gender perspective into the work of various components of a peacekeeping mission (DPKO/DFS Guidelines, 2010, p. 39). It was further expressed that the duties of the Military Gender Adviser and the Mission Gender Adviser meant to be coordinated throughout the mission.

Since 2009, the UN has stressed upon contributing world states to make sure that the contribution of female peacekeepers from their respective countries is substantial and that it continues to rise. In order to make the inductions and then the role of women peacekeepers more formal from its own end, the UN, decided in 2011 that a Gender Focal Point be appointed before a full-time dedicated Military Gender Adviser became available. In a similar vein, the UN now also requests national contingents to appoint Gender Focal Points, and several missions have them. However, no Military Gender Advisers have been appointed at the operational level.

The above detailed discussion explicates that, TCCs are still struggling to comply with UN instructions in addressing the gender imbalance and major reason for the lack of policy implementation seems to be non-understanding of various resolution, rules, and instructions. Sahana Dharampuri in her study very aptly captures this dilemma for the TCCs as she argues that: "UN member states are aware of Resolution 1325 but most do not understand its full implications for UN peacekeeping beyond increasing women's presence in missions. During many interviews conducted for this study there was a general sense of fatigue and lack of clarity about Resolution 1325" (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 12). It thus becomes imperative that TCCs should constitute a board at appropriate levels of their decision making to critically analyse *Resolution 1325* and all its subsequent forms for meaningful adoption of strategies for effective compliance.

Issues Causing Gender Imbalance

Major portion of worlds' uniformed services and especially the militaries consider soldiering an area where females cannot cope with even the routine life demands. Extra resources to accommodate women in field locations, is another military recurring concern by the relevant authorities. For instance, former Indian army chief,

General VP Malik stated that, "The Indian armed forces cannot do something socially unacceptable. Would you want your wife or sister to share a bunker with five other men like they do in Siachen?" (Nair, 2010, n.d.). Apart from traditional disdain for perceived so called 'weaknesses' of opposite sex, it is inherent male protective reflex which is likely to cloud his judgment during crisis time. Apart from male dominated military mind-set there are a host of other issues which hinder integration of women in armed forces and thus constitute a problem for TCCs to comply with UN policies on the issue.

Patriarchal culture spread around most parts of the world has further egged on the issue of gender imbalance. Female (as 'self') is considered as weak, fragile and inviolate, thus requiring protection by males. Even though the concept has been successfully challenged and reversed to an extent among more advanced nations of the world, the idea still has to be defeated to provide an even playing field for all. The dogma is so deeply rooted that in some parts of the world women themselves subscribe to it and are reluctant to breach limits laid down for them. Men on the other hand assume the role of 'protector' and 'provider' and therefore are reluctant to witness females among them coming into harm's way. Even their professional judgement is assumed to be marred when confronted with a situation where women under their care or company come to be threatened. All this needs to change if we are to benefit from equal participation of almost half of world's population in all fields. After all women have proved themselves equal to men in most challenging fields so far reserved for men by becoming successful astronauts, race car drivers, deep sea divers, mountaineers etc.. Armed forces are likely to be one of the beneficiaries of such change in line with other workplaces in society.

Largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions belong to third world and have their unique problems which may also be visible among more affluent nations of the world. First among many are societal and ethical taboos against female mainstreaming in the society. Culture, and in some cases even religion becomes a hurdle in path of women becoming equal partners with men, at a societal level. Upbringing of female child in such societies is steeped in favouritism towards males even to an extent where female embryos are terminated for want of male heirs. Discrimination during feeding times, opportunities to education and later lower wages for females in the job market, all contribute towards women's suppression. Women when allowed to access education are reduced to selected subjects, which are traditionally accepted for female jobs in society. All this loads the dice against females and consequently, few high achievers in traditionally male dominated fields become apparent. Female segregation in various institutions and work place further contribute towards breeding gender based taboos. To this end, greater and more wholesome opportunities towards female education can gradually reverse this trend.

Isolated observer outposts are often physically cut off from rest of the force and may have to depend on meagre local resources sometimes augmented by UN. Living conditions in some cases are devoid of space, availability of running water, climate control under severe weather conditions, and provision of medical help. Patrolling duties in the field often expose peacekeepers to dangers of violence, abduction and/or

rape. For a small number of male peacekeepers, the isolated conditions may result in moral depredation and may in certain cases become a threat for their female colleagues whose number is bound to be minimal. Certainly, cases of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers, is not an unheard phenomenon. Whereas these conditions can be ameliorated to an extent within formed military or police units and within large headquarters, the issue cannot be overlooked where individual or small numbers of female peacekeepers are active at isolated posts. Further safeguards can be ensured during pre-deployment training in mixed teams where female members are sufficiently trained to take care of themselves in case of a violent encounter. Similarly, exposure to working with opposite sex during training would also go a long way towards reducing male curiosity resulting into greater confidence and mutual respect.

With the availability of more emancipated women ready to take on fields (so far reserved for men), armed forces would also emerge as beneficiary and be able to bridge this gender gap within its rank and file. Societal and ethical norms, however take long time to be established, therefore mainstreaming the women participation in society should be a long-term strategy. For the time being, existing female presence in the armed forces of various nations can be harnessed and volunteers can be inducted through an extensive basic military training for UN peacekeeping assignments and subsequent deployment. This being a stop gap arrangement would go a long way towards opening up greater female participation from a bigger pool still, as and when it becomes available.

Way Forward

Intricacies involved in gender imbalance are varied and complicated. These can neither be wished away nor overcome in a short while. A sustained and focused approach is needed at national and Service level to be able to address the situation. Following are some recommendations with long and short term results to get out of this controversy and be able to become useful members of UN peacekeepers' team. Even though these recommendations are focussed towards Pakistan military, some can also be useful for others when suitably modified.

Short Term Measures

- Immediate constitution of a dedicated team at army headquarters for analysis of various UN resolutions and DPKO's instructions on the subject for a systematic and effortless compliance.
- Look for suitable candidates from among the female officer corps to fill officer cadres required in categories of Military Observers, Staff Officers and contingents as is being presently done. Vacancies among lower ranks can be picked up from amongst very large pool available in Armed Forces Nursing Service. These when suitably trained in basic military fields and where possible equipped with required language training can prove extremely useful as medics and mediators with UN patrols, Observers as well as in field units.

- Fresh recruitment as officers of suitably qualified women in fields of Negotiation, Women and Child protection, Sexual Exploitation against Women and Children etc., and their rotational employment with our Peacekeeping effort.
- Extensive pre-deployment training of female participants along with their male counterparts without any gender deference and thus reduce misgivings about each other and to build mutual confidence.

Long Term Measures

- Gradually remove gender segregation from playgrounds to work place by providing safe and encouraging environment.
- Provide equal educational and professional opportunities to females.
- Abolish gender specific wages.
- Create newer opportunities for females within armed forces and police.

Conclusion

UN's desire to bridge the gender gap among its peacekeepers is necessitated by a considered opinion arrived at jointly with the member states in the past and later supplemented by useful role that female peacekeepers have already demonstrated in some field missions. Consequently genuine desire of TCCs to comply with the policy is marred firstly by lack of understanding the requirement, and secondly by non-availability of sufficiently trained female members in their armed forces and police. Gender discrimination and lack of opportunities for women in third world societies make it further complicated for the armed forces to pick, choose and equip their contingents with correct gender balance. Risks and difficult living conditions in mission areas further discourage the employer as well as the participants, it is therefore imperative not only to initiate necessary steps towards improving these conditions but also to prepare intending participants through intensive training. Above all it must be remembered that only longer term measures would result into long-term benefits and therefore all efforts must be concentrated towards mainstreaming of females into society through equal opportunities in fields of education, job parity and gradual shift away from patriarchal culture.

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Understanding Evolution of China's Peacekeeping Policy in the 21st Century

Fahad Nabeel[1]

In recent years, China has enhanced its personnel and financial contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). According to UN statistics, China is the largest personnel contributor among the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and 11th largest contributor among UN member states. In terms of financial contribution, China is the 2nd largest contributor, next to the USA, to the UNPKOs in 2018 (Gebrehiwot & Demissie, 2018).

The normative posture on state sovereignty and non-intervention hindered Chinese participation in UNPKOs during the 1970s. However, Chinese attitude towards UN peacekeeping witnessed gradual adjustment from the 1980s to the 1990s. The shift in Beijing's attitude was witnessed so that its economic development-oriented reform and opening up strategy could benefit by having a favorable international environment. During the 1990s, China fielded only 532 personnel and its financial contribution constituted a mere one percent of the UN peacekeeping budget.

In the 21st century, cultivating an image of being a responsive power, reinforcing the United Nations, and sharing shared apprehensions for peace and security are the major objectives which have contributed in enhancing Chinese participation in UNPKOs. Changes in Chinese national identity have been identified by Yin He as the main driving force behind changing the attitude of China towards UNPKOs (He, 2018).

At the start of the millennium, China contributed the least number of personnel among P5. From the early 2000s, China has evolved its peacekeeping policy by increasing its personnel and financial contributions. In 2013, China was only contributing roughly three percent to the total financial contributions for UN peacekeeping. But since then, it has upped its contribution which now constitutes 10.25 percent of the total UN peacekeeping budget (Pauley, 2018).

Coupled with financial support, China has dispatched 2,519 personnel as of June 2018. Apart from personnel and financial contributions, China has also contributed in improving the overall capacity of peacekeeping personnel training by opening China Peacekeeping Police Training Center in 2000 for police personnel training and the Ministry of Defense Peacekeeping Center in 2009 for the exercise of military personnel.

Apart from participating and learning through various peacekeeping-related international activities, China has emerged as an active organizer of UN peacekeeping training by hosting academic exchange activities and international training courses at its police and military peacekeeping training institutions. It now maintains peacekeeping reserve force consisting of 8,000 People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops for UNPKOs. Consequently, UN Secretary General António Guterres remarked that China has become a "bridge-builder" and "honest broker" in global conflicts (Zhihao, 2018).

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The emergence of China's leading role in peacekeeping missions' aims to foster favorable relations especially in Africa, the continent which hosts the most UNPKO missions. Over the past 15 years, China deployed more than 30,000 personnel to the continent as part of various UNPKOs (Gebrehiwot & Demissie, 2018). The underlying principle behind Chinese involvement in Africa-based UNPKOs is the aspiration to become a great power in international affairs is seen as the underlying principle behind Chinese involvement in Africa-based UNPKOs.

Strengthening of the Chinese military is another objective of China's leading role in peacekeeping missions. PLA is able to improve its "military operations other than war" (MOOTW) and modernize its security forces through the deployment of troops abroad. The peacekeeping missions help PLA by improving its mobility and supportability, gaining operational experience, assisting the purchase of progressive weapon systems and expertise and access to practices, operational doctrine and training methods of foreign militaries. These engagements also offer PLA with opportunities to improve their capabilities in counter terrorism, mobility operations, and logistics (Annual report to Congress, 2018).

Similarly, Logan Pauley argues that China can play a greater role in peacekeeping missions by supplying its own defense equipment to other states (Pauley, 2018). UNPKOs is a great forum through which China can modernize its military capacity by gaining benefit in the form of joint collaboration and knowledge transfer with other states. China burnishes its image as a concerned international stakeholder by appearing as more interested in the peace and reconstruction of fragile states.

Apart from strengthening the military, China's enhanced role in peacekeeping missions is viewed as a national image building mechanism which strives to improve its reputation abroad. Coupled with its increased efforts and diminishing leadership role of the USA, China is projecting its image to the international community as a "teacher of peace, civilization, and might" by assuming the leadership role in UN peacekeeping. Chinese state media also remains abuzz with Beijing's achievements in UNPKOs by attributing success to "China's quality" and "China's standard".

A number of factors have been identified which helps in understanding when and why China decides to deploy its troops for peacekeeping missions. While studying 18 cases of China's participation/non-participations in UKPKO from 2003-2017, Sunghee Cho concluded that the significance of host states as export markets proved to be a better predictor to understand whether China will or will not participate in a peacekeeping mission (Cho, 2018). For example, Sudan ranked as the sixth largest importer of Chinese goods in Africa before the start of the United Nations Mission in Sudan in March 2005. Prior to the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire in April 2004, the country ranked as Africa's 11th largest importer of Chinese goods.

Contrary to prevalent assumptions, the significance of host states as exporters of resource-related materials did not factor as good predictor to understand pattern of China's involvement in UNPKOs. A case in point is Chad, which hosted the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, which ranked 45th largest importer of Chinese goods in Africa but ranked as Africa's 15th largest exporter to China.

Sovereignty-related concerns constitute another key factor which helps in understanding China's participation/non-participation. In the 18 UNPKOs from 2003 to 2017, concerns regarding sovereignty issues factored in two-thirds of the total peacekeeping missions during this period. Over the years, China has shown openness

regarding UNPKOs by making its understanding more flexible to "use of force" and "impartiality" conditions but still firmly stick to obtaining consent from host states. For example, China sent its personnel to Lebanon in March 2006 for UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which operated since March 1978, after UN Security Council resolution 1655 mentioned that Lebanese government undertook actions to reinforce connection amongst its armed forces and UNIFIL.

While studying non-participation of China in some UNPKOs, Marisa Mori compared China's participation in United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and its non-participation in United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). She concluded that an important motivating factor to send Chinese personnel to Mali and to not participate in MINUSCA was the state's aspiration to be perceived as an equivalent to France, UK and US.

In Mali, all four countries faced a collective security concern of violent Islamist groups. However, further research needs to be done to strengthen this argument (Mori, 2018).

Like its national identity, China's peacekeeping guidelines have also evolved in the 21st century. China believes that the core doctrines of UN peacekeeping; impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence, consent and in defence of mandate are the keys to win the confidence and support for UNPKOs and ensure the smooth conduct of these operations. Although, China still believes in the upholding of these principles, its approach to and application of these principles have evolved.

According to China, the approval of the host country is required for the establishment of any peacekeeping operation (PKO). However, it also acknowledges that sometimes efforts of the international community are needed for achieving consent. In recent years, China joined the global community in urging Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syria to approve the UN peacekeeping and collaborate with the international body.

Despite insisting on non-interference of external forces in internal affairs of a state, China's practice of "impartiality" principle has evolved to accommodate the involvement of the international community in peace efforts for conflict-affected countries. Over the years, Chinese officials have met opposition parties of Libya, Syria and Afghanistan to actively participate in the peace processes of disputed countries (He, 2018).

Beijing, which still expresses concerns regarding the coercive actions, now engages in such actions in PKO provided that the peacekeeping operation is authorized by UNSC and the ground situation reasons it as indispensable to use force. In recent years, China refrained its long held attitude of not contributing security troops to PKOs by deploying a security company for the first time to MINUSMA in December 2013. In 2015, 700-person infantry battalion was also contributed to UN Mission in South Sudan.

Despite continued support to UN peacekeeping missions and international security governance, China faces certain challenges with respect to its part in UN peacekeeping regime. The two main challenges China currently faces are lack of leadership roles for China in UN peacekeeping regime and a dearth of Chinese input in the formulation of agendas and ideas about UNPKO activities.

Despite having significant influence in UN peacekeeping affairs, China remains under-represented in UN peacekeeping regime. Beijing ranks 14th in the ranking of most civilian employees by any country in the UN Secretariat. Only 11 Chinese nationals are posted on D1 or above senior level posts in the UN Secretariat.

China was invited in two out of six UN-nominated important expert panels to analyze and advice on UN peacekeeping activities since 2000.

To some extent, China itself is to be blamed for its under-representation by not having enough experienced personnel to staff high-level positions in UNPKOs. But the trend is changing. Four Chinese officers have commanded UNPKOs since 2007. On the other hand, China has failed to present its perceptive with respect to post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding. The waning presence of Washington due to cutbacks to personnel and financial contributions to UN peacekeeping engagement has provided Beijing with the opportunity to assume leadership role in UNPKOs. If China is to assume the leadership role in UN peacekeeping, it has to address the challenges discussed above.

The capacity building of its military and civilian personnel needs to be enhanced so that they can be considered for top level positions at United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Similarly, it needs to train its peacekeepers by imparting them with necessary skills to interact with local communities, NGOs and gather intelligence to safeguard peacekeepers and workers. By doing so, this will help China to present an alternative perspective of promoting reconciliation and development in post-conflict societies. China also needs to work with regional organizations like African Union by enhancing their financial and training support and to intervene in humanitarian cases in accordance with the mandates of regional organizations. This will help China in resolving the dilemma between its non-interference policy and the UN mandate of protecting civilians.

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Book Review: Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: A Story of Defiance, Deterrence and Deviance by Hassan Abbas

Minahil Riaz Toor[1]

Dr. Hassan Abbas is a Pakistani-American academic whose interest area lies in South and Central Asia. He is presently a Professor and Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at National Defense University, Washington, DC. Similar to his previous books, Hassan Abbas has taken up yet another topic that revolves around the statehood of Pakistan.

The book is a nine chapter long comprehensive case around Pakistan's road to becoming a nuclear state. He starts by a focused spot light on Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. The author has framed his questions around Dr. Khan and his critical role in developing the nuclear weapons programme, links of military and bureaucracy to the nuclear network, strategic and monetary motives surrounding it and finally juggling the blame game among the parties involved. In addition, he bases his arguments around a theoretical understanding to authenticate his claims academically.

The structure of Chapter II assists the reader to contextualize the reasons for Pakistan to become a nuclear state. He invites the reader to visualize the strategic culture that pushed Pakistan towards this option. He establishes a case that starts from the beginning of Pakistan's formation, the induction of religion in state affairs, the pivotal role of Kashmir dispute to exasperate the conflict between India and Pakistan, showcase of a headstrong military that led Pakistan towards a national security state, and the socio-political challenges that led to the disintegration of East Pakistan.

The author mostly focuses the discussion on Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons technology in Chapter III. He derives reason from the work of *Bhumitra Chakma* and *Willaim Epstein* to explain that security concerns, national prestige, technological boost and domestic politics has pushed the country towards such a critical goal. The writer has subjected Pakistan's nuclear aspirations to be driven by a security dilemma in the region, which is essentially created by India. He narrates that the nuclear programme was first conceived at a civilian research stage during 1954-1965.

Later, from 1965 to 1971, Pakistan went through a 'push' and 'pull' in its nuclear policy and nurtured a Pakistani bomb lobby. However, between 1972 and 1984 marks the critical time when Bhutto reoriented Pakistan's nuclear policy and started the nuclear weapons programme. This chapter not only brings into attention the individual as well as organizational communications but also defines the interplay of United States, Britain and China on the nuclear project.

The series of chapters IV, V, VI explains the relations and linkages of Pakistan with Iran, North Korea and Libya respectively. The writer visibly attempts to expose the alleged primary role of Dr. Khan, and covert role of some civil and military officials, in nuclear proliferation by assisting these countries in terms of technical consultancy, manufacturing components and shipment of related equipment.

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Allegedly this aided the efforts of Iran and North Korea to enrich uranium for their nuclear projects. While the controversy around Pakistan and Libya is hinged upon transnational nuclear technology sales enterprise. The author indicates that it was after the Libyan case, that the wide-range possibility of non-state actors to accrue advantage out of nuclear proliferation came into the limelight around the world.

Chapter VII carries a thorough approach assessment of Dr. Khan and other officials who were involved in nuclear proliferation activities in Pakistan. He has streamlined the driving forces for this attempt in terms of personal interests, religious motivations at the state level and anti-western attitude at the international level. While in the next chapter, the writer states that Pakistan's decision making is affected by civil-military rivalry and protracted political instability. He claims that these prominent factors distracted the government from keeping an eye on the back channels that possibly facilitated nuclear proliferation efforts. He also ascertains that due to poor command and control structures, monitoring and accountability mechanisms, Dr. Khan and his helping hands were protected from any direct government intervention regarding nuclear proliferation activities, since the government's official stance denies any state involvement in the matter.

The concluding chapter IX suggests that nuclear proliferation occurred in three stages and with three different countries. With Iran, Dr. Khan was working on behalf of Pakistan. While with North Korea, Dr. Khan was instrumental as a representative of Pakistan as North Korea was providing ballistic missiles to Pakistan's government in exchange for their nuclear assistance. As for the Libyan case, Dr. Khan was working independently with his close associates and was compelled by his self-fulfilling personal and monetary motives.

According to the author, the Pakistan nuclear web of associates was well camouflaged in the system in which no irregularities could be determined, despite the evidence that suggest any peculiarity. He further touched upon the 'see-saw' nature of a possible Saudi-Pakistan nuclear collaboration. Finally, the writer carefully converged the contents of his book, deliberated on strategic deterrence and nuclear postures of both the countries. He also suggests Pakistan to take concrete steps for the safety and security of its nuclear weapons programme.

In the light of these accounts, this book undoubtedly covers the subject at hand from all its nooks and corners. It indulges in an in-depth analysis of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and the debate surrounding it. I would commend the author for digging deep into the case, and painting an elaborate picture from a vast array of sources. However, the aims of the book that the author highlights lack novelty (pg. 3). The speculative debate over Pakistan's nuclear program, its legality and proliferation activities was hyped by the West since 2003 disclosures. After fifteen years, a reader expects a book on this matter to bring a new dimension to the existing case. Not only was this aspect unattended, rather the book turns out to be another reinforcement of western view.

The write up is also embroils into a repetitive attempt to instill a rogue, deceptive and emotionally aggressive identity of Pakistan. Right from its title, the author has established a perception that the reader should be expecting *defiance, deterrence and deviance* in Pakistan's behavior during its nuclear journey to destination. In addition, the contents of the book and its arrangement suggest a case of representing Pakistan through internationally frowned upon motivations. The buzzwords used pre-establish what the reader should anticipate in the book, with respect to Pakistan, before giving the reader a chance to develop his/her own assessment and point of view.

This also displays how the discourse in the contemporary day and age works on the demand and supply model. The research grant awarded by a US based foundation and an Indian publishing house would naturally have a demand for Pakistan's anti-military and establishment write up, which the author has provided to them on a platter. Moreover, as *Hussein Alatas* explains the Intellectual Imperialism in *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, in order to be acknowledged internationally, one needs to produce a narrative that is in line with what is being produced by countries who dominate knowledge and its circulation around the world. This is why, the writer, being a Pakistani had the advantage of accessing raw data and processed it on the terms of who dominates knowledge in the South Asian region directly and indirectly. As a result, the book was deemed to be tilted towards the Indian narrative of Pakistan's nuclear bomb.

In addition, most of the sources and quotations cited in this book are denting Pakistan's struggle to develop the nuclear bomb. For example, the author cites western scholar Jim Walsh's remark on Pakistan being 'the biggest and most important illicit exporter of nuclear technology in the history of nuclear age'. Such sources are accompanied by Pervez Hoodbhoy, Stephen Waltz, Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins among many others. Therefore, it may also be noted that the for-to-against ratio regarding Pakistan's nuclear bomb in terms of references, is likely to be visibly disproportionate.

In this context, it can be observed that the author very astutely introduces an allegation against Pakistan, hammers it through works of dissident authors and implies the allegation to be virtually true to the reader. The writer has also used theoretical evidence to substantiate his view against the Pakistan's nuclear bomb in Chapter II. He mentions Scott Sagan's (a proliferation pessimist) line of argument that 'Pakistan lacks institutional mechanisms for civilian control over nuclear decision making, and their militaries are also inward looking' (p. 11). He strengthens his theoretical arguments by indicating that 'nuclear nationalism' in nuclear myth makers can pave way for nuclear proliferation and implicitly relating it to induce violence in Pakistan's nationalist behavior.

Later in his book, the author grounds the development of the nuclear bomb under religious motivations. He penetrates this argument in Chapter III by showcasing that Pakistan being developed in the name of Islam is a home ground for religious militant groups and religious political parties who influence politics and policies in Pakistan. Also, in Chapter VIII, the author reiterates the infiltration of religion in state structure by expressing that officials at Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) were routinely inspired by religious slogans and ideology. In addition, the unsubstantiated claim that Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN) was formed by two senior nuclear engineers at KRL which had maintained links with not only Al-Qaeda, but was also affiliated with Al-Rasheed Trust, which is listed as a terrorist organization by US. In doing so, the author positions Pakistan as a religiously extremist country unable to handle the responsibility of being a nuclear state. However, it is imperative to understand that it was imminent for Pakistan to preemptively prepare for the forthcoming strategic culture, primarily influenced by nuclear weapons.

The author, in Chapter VII, has also linked Dr. Khan's nuclear proliferation activities, as his attempt to assist the Muslim World in developing the bomb and personal financial motivations. In this manner, Chapter VIII indicates lose control and monitoring of the state over nuclear sites. The writer makes a point in signifying Dr. Khan's personal motivations that led towards nuclear proliferation, since he needed the financial aid to maintain his public relations exercise and fuel his intent to become

the next President, which overshadowed his responsibility ethic. But this certainly does not give the author a free pass to allege against the statehood of Pakistan and direct the reader to question Pakistan as a responsible nuclear weapon state.

Even when religion is taken out of the equation, the writer makes his case through the words of Pervez Hoodbhoy (one of the opponents of Pakistan's nuclear bomb), who believes that Pakistan's nuclear bomb was driven by its aspiration for pride and confidence. In explaining so, he blames the state failures to work as a push towards developing nuclear weapons, since according to Hoodbhoy that was the only 'sense of achievement' Pakistan had. In this way, the author has instrumentally used word play to define the identity of Pakistan. He has crafted a low capacity building, subjugated policy making and institutionally corrupt expression of Pakistan that lacks an indigenous ability to be virtuous. The author has represented Pakistan's preemptive efforts to be Indian obsessed and concurred that Pakistan's policies are shaped to counter India alone.

The anti-western lens of Pakistan has also been brought under the limelight. The author working in America and acknowledging the support of universities and centers based in US for his research work, naturally positions Pakistan as the 'other' to establish a better stature of United States in the process. He has depicted it as a responsibility of US to manage the strategic environment of South Asian region in Chapter II. While the writer drafts a case that displays a nuisance that may emerge due to nuclear weapons in the region, Chapter III gives evidence that US herself introduced the nuclear option to Pakistan in 1954 at Bahawalpur. But when Pakistan built up her nuclear weapons program, and refused to adhere to United States domestic anti-proliferation laws, it was again US who imposed sanctions on Pakistan. Even though later in 2008, the author writes that US had financially and technologically assisted Pakistan to secure its nuclear arsenal and declared it protected. These contradictory plays of practices by US, mentioned in the book, must put the spot light on her, rather than asserting Pakistan's worldview to be anti-western and reflecting deceit in Pakistan's international behavior.

The above samples that take shape of a discourse movement where the author has implicitly and explicitly played with the language expression to construct a frivolous and radical identity of Pakistan. This book, therefore, may be considered as a set of textual representational practice to define the social reality of Pakistan; its military, incompetent decision making power, wavering institutional controls, and a state image as a whole. Religious motivations, anti-western view, Indian inspired actions and reactions, indifferent state management etc. are the key words that highlight the nature of the book. Although the writer quotes Amartya Sen, who says that the divisive power of classification places people in separate unique boxes and therefore must not be adopted as a scale, but still the author himself indulges in a practice of labeling and identity construction through language manipulation. As a scholar, one must realize the importance of neutrality in discourse and honor his responsibility as an academic to develop a discourse that does not confine an identity to a state. It is advised to the reader that his exemplified piece must not be mistaken as factual since it is an amalgamation of opinions and statements, and not the official version. The bent of mind that the author displays is strengthened with such scholarly evidence, which shows how history can be articulated and represented according to the eyes of the beholder.

This book is a must read for Pakistani nuclear strategists and thinkers to examine different point of views that may be against national interest. This book may create inspiration for nuclear experts and policy makers in Pakistan to respond on the veracity of the contents and their reservations.

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