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UN Peacekeeping as Pakistan's Soft Power Asset: An Analysis

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Abstract

The power of attraction and admiration is soft power. Generally, it is perceived that hard power cannot generate soft power, but the protective role of military in humanitarian crises and conflicts negates this prevailing misperception by specifying their contexts and effective utilizations; hard power assets can be transformed into soft power resources. This paper argues that the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions are the source of soft power and Pakistan, being an active participant in this field, can utilize this asset for shaping the preferences of others. Overall, it did earn admiration from international community and managed to build its soft image abroad through peacekeeping missions. Pakistani *blue helmets* not only earned the admiration and appreciation of the people of the conflict-zones and earned praises, but from international community also. However, to what extent has the country utilized this asset of soft power to exercise its influence in the global arena remains debatable. Although Pakistan's UN Peacekeeping missions have been an instrument of building the country's soft image, it is publicized in a far less productive manner. Peacekeeping can be used as a means to enhance the country's presence and the level of participation in both international and regional organizations. By effective application of soft power strategy in tandem with public diplomacy, Pakistan's UN peacekeeping can provide the country with the platform where its narratives can be projected effectively and its influence can be exercised adroitly.

Key Words

Soft power, UN peacekeeping, Pakistan, military and police troops, hard power

Introduction

Presently, the world resembles a dynamic system where locus of power are many and distributed across various tiers of the international system. The modern world is fast evolving into a hyper-connected web of economic, military and cultural power. However, this growing interdependence does not necessarily imply harmony in a 'self-help' international system (Nye, 1990). The dominant hue of indirect dependence and networked interactions among states, trans-national actors, societies and individuals offer a novel insight into how non-military components of power (soft

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power) are gaining weight more than ever. Today, the states are equally interested in sustaining, maintaining and wielding their influence through soft power.

The concept of soft power is centuries old. The famous Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu's seminal work, *Art of War*, is considered as a fundamental element in utilizing statecraft without striking a blow (Hunter, October, 2008). Confucius maintained that a state's soft power lies in its leadership. Hunter and Laozi put forward "the idea of attraction as soft power" (Hunter, 2009). Franklin D. Roosevelt discredited the idea of interventionist policies and introduced a new dimension of gaining influence in the international arena by means of "freedom of speech, religion and freedom from want and fear" (Kennedy, 2001). The American Political Scientist, Joseph. S. Nye, is credited with formulating the idea of soft power into an International Relations theory. His theory remains one of the most convincing theories.

He described soft power as a power of persuasion and co-option which is exercised to wield influence (attract) on others with the help of appealing ideas such as democracy, human rights and cultural norms (Nye, 2011). The mere application of these sources of attraction does not generate soft power but it is the fulcrum of the societies, institutions and policies that help a states achieve its interests (Gill & Huang, 2006). Popular culture, media, educational and cultural institutions are a source of soft power (Purushothaman, 2010). Although military can be a source of attraction, however misuse of military resources undermines a state's soft power (Nye, 2005, p. 160).

A state's policies, both internal and external, are an important tool to create and utilize soft power in the international arena. There are many resources at the disposal of a state, which can be used singularly or in-tandem with other soft power assets as a policy tool to generate, sustain and maintain such power. Primarily, there are three major resources of soft power: political values, culture and foreign policy (Nye, 2008, 2011). The enhanced bargaining position of a state among nations, transnational appeal of its cultural and political values as well as effective use of its foreign policy tools in international arena enables it to alter others' preferences without coercion. These resources of soft power create appeal, win admiration of the international community, and help frame agenda-settings and influence situation-structuring in the global affairs (Nye, 2008).

Soft power is an evolving concept, so is the academic debate on its assets. Interestingly though, this debate develops a hue of ambiguity when it comes to military. It is generally perceived that military is not a source of soft power rather it generates hard power only. The United States (US) has frequently employed its military resources to gain more influence through its soft power. The pioneer of soft power, Nye (1990), briefly touched upon military as a soft power asset in his article, "Soft Power". He referred to the protective role of US military in the Middle Eastern and European countries as a relevant bargaining asset among the states. Later on, in 1990, in his article, "Think Again: Soft Power", Nye explains that "a well-run military can be a source of admiration, and military to military cooperation and training programs can establish transnational networks that can enhance a country's soft power" (Nye, 2005). From his inferences, it can be assumed that hard power can be transferred into soft power given a relevant context and proper application.

Across the world, military resources are used in the UN peacekeeping missions for a range of foreign policy goals: increasing a state's influence in international arena, projection of its commitment towards international peace and stability, localization of a conflict, international trade, and alliance politics (Meiske & Ruggeri, 2017). From this perspective, UN peacekeeping missions emerge as a soft power asset. China (Ding, 2010), Norway (Egeland, 1989; Stokke, 2010), and Turkey (Önis, 2011) are among those countries which have been deftly employing this foreign policy tool for gaining soft power. Peacekeeping has been characterized as a component of Pakistan's soft power (Shah, Khattak, & Attiq, 2016), but there is a need to undertake research on analysing this aspect of soft power. This study tries to analyze how Pakistan's peacekeeping missions proved to be assets of soft power, what have they achieved so far in this regard and, to what extent can Pakistan utilize this source of power. To this end, two important questions arise: Why military is a soft power asset in UN peacekeeping? And how peacekeeping is a soft power asset for Pakistan?

Is Military a Soft Power Asset?

Soft power emanates from attraction and admiration, which eventually gives an edge in bargaining among states. The resources which produce this attraction are called soft power assets (Nye, 1990). Specifying the military context, transfers hard power into soft power and the same applies to their resources. However, the specification is not adequate to generate soft power. This specification, in fact, defines the nature of power resources but their effective utilization and choice of policy tools in employing these resources help gauge a state's actual power. There are many precedents when states transferred military resources into soft power assets. A well-run military is itself a source of admiration (Nye, 2005). The protective role of military gives an edge in bargaining among states alongside projecting the values and norms of its state for winning admiration and creating attraction (Nye, 1990). The role of military in providing relief in the face of a humanitarian crisis or a natural calamity results in winning hearts and minds across nations. Moreover, it also serves as an instrument to establish trans-national networks among states and international actors which help elevate a state's position among nations.

The US utilized its military resources more than often to achieve soft power. In 2005, the admirable humanitarian relief provided by the US military forces to the victims of the South Asian earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami facilitated in repairing Washington's global appeal. Another example is when, after WWII, Washington employed its military resources to lay down the foundations of democracy and liberalism in Japan and Germany (*ibid*). With the help of US forces, Japan emerged as a peaceful democratic state and managed to acquire a powerful economic standing in a short span of time. Japan has been a close ally of US and it is one of those countries where US favourability is higher (Bolluyt, 2018). As per Kawai (1951), Japan has been a testing ground for American influence in Asia:

The official view – professed by the United States Government and Japanese Government – is an optimistic one. It projects that Japan is one place in Asia where the American policy turned out to be a brilliant success. The Japanese people have been deeply impressed by the superiority of the democratic way introduced to them

by wisely benevolent American forces. As a result, Japanese have consequently become willing converts of democracy.

Across the world, states are using their military resources for gaining soft power and UN peacekeeping has become their significant foreign policy tool to achieve this end. In peacekeeping missions, military force is not applied as a means of coercion rather it is guided by the consent of conflict parties, neutrality of intervening parties and their non-use of force except in self-defence or in the defence of the mandate. For a state, these missions facilitate smooth integration in the international institutions and depict its good will and commitment towards global peace and security as a responsible actor. This helps enhance a state's image and its credibility in the global community. Troops' competence and performance in handling the tasks in peacekeeping win admiration of international community. The troops of a state are in a position to project their country's values, culture and norms which strengthens a country's soft power.

UN peacekeeping is also a means for the contributing states earning rewards in the UN such as representation and appointment of the contributor state to senior posts in peacekeeping operations, their inclusion in mission-planning and decision-making process at various levels, and consultation with them on the matters related to peacekeeping (Krishnasamy, 2001). In this way, the UN peacekeeping mission enables a state to participate in agenda-setting and framing structures in international system. There are generally two options for a state to participate in peacekeeping: contribution to the budget or through the troops. According to the Article 17 of the UN Charter, every member state is legally bound to contribute to peacekeeping. It states that financing of the peacekeeping missions is a collective responsibility. The UN General Assembly assigns the expenses of peacekeeping according to the economic wealth of its members, however, the permanent members of the UN Security Council are required to pay a larger share owing to their special responsibilities towards international peace and stability. Those members whose economic wealth is relatively less, they send their military and police troops to the missions, on voluntary basis (UN peacekeeping, n.d.).

China uses both of these options as a part of its soft power strategy. China's necessity to 'open up' to the world resulted in its increased participation in the peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping contributors mark as a vital component of China's soft power strategy. Hirono and Lanteigne (2011) argue that peacekeeping is establishing China's reputation as a responsible player in international institutions, furthering China's economic interests abroad and fostering cooperation with other states while ensuring its peaceful rise. They further contend that by contributing both in terms of peacekeeping budget and troops, China is changing this perception that it is a threat to international peace, rather portraying itself as a perpetrator of peace.

For China, UN peacekeeping is a strategy of strengthening its global stature as well as building its image of a peaceful nation which is committed to international peace and stability. China increased its contribution in peacekeeping missions along with paving its path to global economic supremacy while United States' soft power was declining worldwide. In fact, peacekeeping is an inexpensive means, at the disposal of Beijing, to ensure stability in Africa especially in those areas where it has invested greatly (Lanteigne, 2014). For China, peacekeeping has become increasingly

important component of its soft power strategy. Its peacekeeping contributions have fostered friendly ties in bilateral and multilateral relations.

Pakistan's Blue Helmets

Pakistan's participation in UN peacekeeping has normative underpinning especially with regards to international liberal values. These missions facilitated Pakistan in identifying itself with the larger international community and global liberal norms. Pakistan's peacekeeping missions reflect its commitment towards international peace and stability, the process of decolonization in the Cold War era, protection of human rights and disarmament (Krishnasamy, 2002). Since independence, Pakistan employed UN peacekeeping as a tool of its foreign policy for projecting its commitment towards international norms of peace, security and stability. Since its inception, Pakistan has always assigned a special value to the issues of global peace in its foreign policy calculus. This is in conformity with the foreign policy guidelines laid down by Pakistan's founding father, Quad-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Standing for the cause of global peace has been a strong commitment of all the governments through Pakistan's political history. This unwavering resolve transpired into active participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Pakistan has a long history of association with UN peacekeeping and it is one of the largest troop, both military and police, contributors to the mission (Hussain, 2017). Its participation in the mission started in 1960 when it sent its first contingent to UN Operations in Congo. By 1990, it began to emerge as a large-scale contributor in the missions. By the mid-1990s, it had deployed 10,000 troops to 13 UN peacekeeping missions, and by the mid-2014, this number reached 150,000 personnel to 41 missions (Malik, 2014). Even after worldwide retreat from UN peacekeeping in the late 1990s, Pakistan maintained its peacekeeping contribution (Krishnasamy, 2002).

Pakistan assigns special value to peacekeeping operations not only for international peace and security but also for Pakistan's role in fulfilling this responsibility. On account of its persistent commitment, Pakistan established itself as top-ranking international peacekeeper and peace builder, won admiration from international community, projected an attractive face of the country through its invaluable services and broadened the base of international cooperation with international community. Pakistan earned admiration from international community for playing a major role in the peace process, for its expertise which is required to undertake a peacekeeping operation, and the capacity to meet some of the unprecedented challenges in this domain.

Former UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon acknowledged Pakistan's crucial role in peacekeeping and admired the professionalism of the troops, "[...] I've had the privilege of seeing first-hand professionalism and commitment of Pakistani police and military personnel [...]. In places like Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia, Pakistani units were instrumental in the much improved political and security situation that the people of these countries enjoy today" (APP, 2016a, n.d.). Similarly, Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Haiti, paid a tribute to Pakistani troops for their able services in the mission, "[...] the others before you had probably four or five times more troops and had difficulty controlling situation.

The PAKBAT's performance was consistently impeccable and earned admiration of everyone, Haitians and foreigners alike" (Samaa Web Page, 2012, n.d.).

Krishnasamy (2002) notes that Pakistan's services in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina resulted into earning praises. To this end, local media has always framed the contribution of Pakistan military positively and have widely acknowledged that PAKBAT saved the locals from the brutal attacks, gave them all form of humanitarian assistance and, most importantly, provided them medical care by establishing hospitals.

Ahmad (2015) notes that the valour, courage and professionalism of Pakistani blue helmets have been instrumental in winning the hearts and minds of the local communities. They relentlessly worked for providing assistance in paving the way for a peaceful environment. They built roads, dug well, repaired local infrastructure and as a token of thanks, a school was named 'Pakistan School' in Haiti. He adds that in Somalia, Pakistan was delegated with the responsibility of recovering illegal arms for ensuring safety of all the peacekeepers in the conflict zone. Pakistani troops' success in effective handling of security situation won the hearts and minds of the locals, which was reflective from their slogan "Pakistani and Somali Walal Walal (Translation in English: Pakistani and Somali are brothers)".

For carrying through peace mandate of the UN, Pakistani blue helmets successfully cultivated social relations with the local communities without compromising the fundamental principal of neutrality in peacekeeping. By doing so, Pakistani forces created friendly environment for establishing trans-ethnic peace and stability as well as won the goodwill and cooperation of the locals. In the UN mission to Cambodia, the United Nations Trans-national Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Pakistani troops took many initiatives to create a suitable environment for mobilizing locals for elections, which is a pre-requisite to further peace process. They organized social events such as sports activities, funfairs and cultural festivals. Along with these social activities, they ran a nation-wide campaign for creating awareness among the locals about the importance of elections. They also organized many social events which were intended to stir a democratic spirit for conducting elections. It was due to their painstaking efforts that about 90 percent of the people in the province Preah Vihear balloted their vote. Pakistani troop's success in developing enthusiasm among the locals was also evident when the local made the efforts to walk 25 kilometre to cast their vote (Mahmud, 1994).

Pakistani troops went beyond the call of duty for carrying out the UN peace mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Pakistan provided assistance in repairing roads, reconstruction of schools and installed lights in parks and streets for facilitating study at night. In recognition of the Pakistani efforts, a school was named "Pakistan School" (Ahmad, 2015). Their activities induced a new life among the locals and earned the respect from high-ranking individuals. UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Haiti, Mr Enrique ter Horst appreciated Pakistan's services, "since the arrival of Pakistan Battalion in Haiti, the UN realized that Pakistan Army is not only a formidable fighting force but peacekeepers and peace builders in the best sense of the world" (Ahmad, 2015, n.d.).

In recognition of the growing popularity and their capacity to function effectively in local communities, both the SRSG and Force Commander in Haiti,

Brigadier General Pierre Diagle recommended that Pakistani forces should be requested to make part of a new mission, the UN Mission in Haiti (Krishnasamy, 2002). This is how peacekeeping missions brought rewards for Pakistan in the UN. Moreover, this intangible form of power helped Pakistan to influence the UN's decisions and effectiveness in peacekeeping, however, the extent of the effectiveness remains debatable.

Analysis of Pakistan's Soft Power through Peacekeeping

The recognition that Pakistani blue helmets achieved through peacekeeping is reflective of the fact that in these missions, they are well-poised to project Pakistan's norms, culture and values abroad. Through successfully carrying the peace mandate of the UN, they established the fact that Pakistan is capable of creating the conditions for peace in extremely challenging situations and also that it is all for global peace. These missions smoothly integrated Pakistan into the UN and helped itself to secure a place as a peacekeeper in the global community. Pakistan successfully projected its soft image, won hearts and minds of the locals, and earned praises for its expertise and skills. If a well-run military brings admirations, Pakistani blue helmets did earn it in peacekeeping. Their protective role in conflict-zones won hearts and minds of the local communities. International institutions and high-ranking individuals paid tribute to the services of Pakistani peacekeepers.

Pakistan depicted its good will with respect to global peace and security on international scale. These missions enhanced its credibility and projected its soft image in an effective manner. The hard work Pakistani blue helmets put in bringing peace in the conflict-stricken area enhanced Pakistani nationals' image in the eyes of the other peacekeepers and the locals. Pakistani troops relentless efforts in ensuring peace and safety facilitated in forging friendly ties with the countries. For instance, after successful completion of peacekeeping mission in the West Irian, the Indonesian President stated that Indonesia and Pakistan came closer to each other and called them the best ambassadors of Pakistan (Ahmad, 2015).

These missions also served as a productive avenue for Pakistan to open new vistas of cooperation with the respective regional organizations and their member countries. Pakistan has an extensive experience in peacekeeping. Not only it showed that it has the capacity to successfully undertake these missions but also demonstrated that it can meet the unprecedented challenges in peacekeeping. With this background, Pakistan's ambassador to UN, Maleeha Lodhi offered to help African countries in improving their peacekeeping abilities (APP, 2016b). Based on its sterling history of serving in UN peacekeeping, Pakistan can develop its own model of peacekeeping. She also stated Pakistan is ready to explore new avenues of cooperation with the African Union (AU) and its member countries by making a reference of Pakistani peacekeepers in the region. If this trajectory of engagement with the African countries is maintained, Pakistan can exercise peacekeeping as a tool of multilateral diplomacy in the regional and international organizations.

These missions have been helpful in dispelling this notion that Pakistani women are left behind in such mission. In UN peacekeeping, Pakistani women served on multiple important fronts in the capacity of doctors, nurses and police officers. Their presence creates an environment which is conducive for resolving the women

related issues. In 2011, Deputy Superintended police officer, Shehzadi Gulfam, won first-ever International Female Peacekeeper Award for her extraordinary performance in peacekeeping (Salman, 2016). In order to encourage female troop participation in peacekeeping operations, UN Women and Centre of International Peace and Stability (CIPS), situated in National University of Science and Technology (NUST) Islamabad, have been conducting pre-deployment women training.

CIPS is also working towards building a trans-national network of channels in peacekeeping through training peacekeepers from the world. It focuses on capacity building of the personnel which are engaged in UN peacekeeping mission worldwide. Its training programs is vital in capacity building for peacekeepers in the field, both in theoretical and practical terms. It has established a chain of networks with schools, universities and think tanks for sharing best practices in peacekeeping. This is also one dimension of peacekeeping which Pakistan can utilize to enhance its image and credibility among international quarters of research and policy-making in this field.

To What End, Pakistan Needs Soft Power?

Hard Power is the coercive power to command others whereas soft power is the cooperative power – “getting others to want what you want” (Nye, 1990, p. 167). By utilizing soft power assets, a country can directly or indirectly, structure a situation in its favour by shaping preferences of other states in a way which are consistent to its own (*ibid*). Peacekeeping missions are a source of developing preferences of others, be it about an image of country or enhancing its bargaining power among other nations, hence, the question of its utilization arises. This question is contingent upon a state’s own preferences which are generally in the form of a broad spectrum. It is imperative to know as to what extent Pakistan, having peacekeeping at its disposal, wants to shape the preferences of others by utilizing this asset of soft power.

It is true that Pakistani peacekeepers gained recognition at international level but the extent to which the UN and international community actually recognizes its contribution towards global peace and security is quite limited (Krishnasamy, 2001). There is a need to fill the gap between declared and actual recognition of Pakistani Peacekeepers. One factor that is associated with this gap is that the peacekeepers are paid for their services but this notion seems to be more of a propagated myth for three reasons. Firstly, the economic profits of peacekeeping of third world states’ peacekeepers are not sufficient enough to have a positive impact on their economies (*ibid*). Secondly, South Asian countries participate in these missions for a number of motivations ranging from political and diplomatic (*ibid*) to strategic domains (Yamin, 2017). Thirdly, it is not monetary incentives but the global outreach and impact of a soft power resource which generate soft power. For example, Hollywood has been one of the most potent tools of American soft power strategy despite the fact that it is a corporate industry. In fact, soft power lies in how effectively narratives are presented and then commodified. In the modern age of information, ‘money for charity’ and ‘aid for development’ never come without political strings attached rather they are used for propagating certain narratives. It is for a state to maximize the benefits of any instrument of global outreach, such as Peacekeeping.

Here arises the issue of conceptualization and operationalization of soft power assets. First, overall there is a need to identify what targets Pakistan wants to

achieve from exercising soft power, of which peacekeeping is just one component. In the domain of idealism, Pakistan's rationale of participating in peacekeeping is commitment to global peace and security and projecting its soft image but, in realist terms, it sends its troops abroad when there are clear cut strategic advantages (Yamin, 2017). If Pakistan is desirous of capitalizing on peacekeeping as a tool of soft power, it must identify its goals that it aims to achieve.

Recommendations

Pakistan has plenty of soft power assets and UN peacekeeping is one of them. It exudes the confidence and has demonstrated capacity to earn its name as an international peacekeeper and peacebuilder alongside maximizing the benefits which come in handy. Generally, there are three major objectives which Pakistan wants to achieve through peacekeeping. Firstly, it wants to establish itself as a responsible state which is fully committed to international peace and security. Secondly, it wants to dispel this distorted notion that Pakistan is not a peace-loving state and cannot create the conditions which are conducive to peace. Thirdly, it wants to enhance its standing in the international as well as in regional organizations. To this end, there are three broad measures which Pakistan needs to take: publicize, institutionalize, and step up.

Publicize

- Mass media and social media campaigns must be launched to portray the country's image as a proud international peacekeeper. State media should produce some documentaries in collaboration with international media houses i.e., CNN, BBC etc.
- A campaign should be run on media, both social and traditional, to create awareness about Pakistan's peacekeeping efforts and sacrifices that it made during its long-association with UN peacekeeping.
- Pakistan's embassies and consulates must project the country's role in peacekeeping missions. Various seminars and workshops would be conducted to highlight Pakistan's achievements in peacekeeping missions. Representatives from the concerned countries can be invited to pay tribute to Pakistan's military for its efforts and sacrifice.
- A nation-branding campaign should be launched to popularize Pakistan's peacekeeping efforts.
- The UN pays tribute to the services and sacrifices of all the peacekeepers each year on May 29, which it marks as International UN peacekeepers' Day. Pakistan observes June 5 as National Day of peacekeepers but there is a need to pronounce these efforts. The documentaries of Pakistani blue helmet should be run and dramas should be aired on media. Quite long ago, a popular PTV drama, Alpha Bravo Charlie, depicted the hard life and professionalism of Pakistani troops. More such dramas should be produced.
- A separate tab on Pakistani peacekeepers' services and sacrifices should be created on the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR).

- Pakistan must highlight its efforts for peacekeeping missions in regional level at SAARC and SCO etc. and global forum such as UNO.

Institutionalize

- Civil-military fusion is required to utilize peacekeeping missions in more effective way. Primarily, peacekeeping missions are taken as military's domain. Civilian leadership needs to play its role to project Pakistan's role in peacekeeping. For the desired cooperation and mutual understanding, a strong collaboration among MOFA, Military Operations Directorate and research institutes is required.
- Comparative approach with the other peacekeepers like US, China can be used as a policy tool to enhance Pakistan's soft power.

Enhance

- There is a need to transform soft image into soft power. Generally, peacekeeping missions result in improving country's image in the concerned country not as source of soft power.
- Public diplomacy is needed to promote soft power in the countries where Pakistani peacekeeping missions have been successfully deployed in the past.
- Pakistan must enhance its role and show active involvement in post conflict and peace-building mission of the countries where it remains engaged in peacekeeping operations.
- Pakistan may offer its share in building human capital through education and training through student exchange programs, similar to the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation in similar fields.
- People to people contact should be maintained through cross cultural activities even beyond the tenure of deployment of peace missions.

Conclusion

States use soft power as an element to persuade other states and actors to achieve their goals. Their quest enable them to increase the leverage of bargain among various nations. Apparently, military power is key component of hard power, but use of military in UN Peacekeeping missions can transform it into soft power. Irrespective of level of power and influence, the states like US, China and Norway have been using Peacekeeping missions to enhance their role in the regional and global fora. Through Peacekeeping, they earned power and prestige which has contributed to their soft power assets. Similarly being responsible member of international community, Pakistan has been playing vibrant role in UN peacekeeping missions. The world has acknowledged its efforts and sacrifices for the establishment of international peace and stability.

Pakistan's blue helmets have made enviable performance in the conflict-torn areas of the world. Despite all these achievements, there is plenty of scope to utilize these missions as an asset of soft power. In Pakistan, soft power is taken as a synonymous for soft image, there is a need to conceptualize this idea as a form of power for enhancing influence and gaining power. For this, Pakistan must identify its

targets and contexts in which it wants to generate and exercise its soft power. Further research must be undertaken on measuring Pakistan's soft power, its efficacy and drawing an individual as well as aggregate index of its soft power assets. Extensive research should also be taken on systemically assessing the intervening variables which can facilitate in completely transferring Peacekeeping into soft power asset.

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Diversification of Foreign Policy, From Peacekeeping to Strategic Presence: The Case of Pakistan in Africa

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Abstract

Pakistan began its participation in UN peacekeeping in 1960 and became one of the top Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) during 1990s. Barely two decades following its creation, Pakistan demonstrated a unique sense of shared responsibility and humanity by contributing troops to bringing about peace and harmony in war ridden zones, this unique propensity has been on display amidst all odds and limited resources. However, it puzzles a rational mind, why Pakistan would choose to commit, deploy, and labor its troops to such perilous venture regardless of all odds and limited resources. Most of the peacekeeping missions are concentrated in Africa and Pakistan has significantly participated in these missions to bring peace and harmony to the continent. But the question is what strategic dividend and goodwill Pakistan gets from these missions, particularly the African peacekeeping missions. To articulate these issues more vividly, the paper is divided into two sections.

The first section of the paper takes a theoretical lens to understand peacekeeping and is followed by an attempt to understand why Pakistan has been an adherent peacekeeping nation. In addition to peacekeeping as a tool of foreign policy, the second section of the paper argues that there are numerous strategic ‘untapped’ areas, wherein Pakistan can equally strengthen her foreign policy in Africa, if policymakers would consider diversifying into these areas. Therefore, this paper posits that an amalgam of peacekeeping and exploitation of these untapped areas can add to the meaningful presence of Pakistan in Africa and by extension the fulfillment of her foreign policy objectives.

Keywords

Peacekeeping, foreign policy, Pakistan, Africa

Introduction

The Second World War did not just strip the world of the fundamental principle and sense of humanity, it exposed the extent to which the intoxication of power and selfish national fraternity can anchor and lead mankind towards abysmal juncture. At

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the dawn of sanity and the realisation for collective security rather than collective destruction, the international community embraced and promoted peacekeeping as an integral part of the international norms. Interestingly, this norm gained tremendous reception overtime within the global north and south respectively.

Foreign policy is the traditional enabling mechanism of state crafted for the fulfilment of state's national interest. Traditionally, states have always activated diplomacy as political tool "to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resorting to force" (Berridge, 2010, p.1). The manner with which a state positions itself and relates within the comity of nations also comes under the ambit of diplomacy. With the increasing acceptance of peacekeeping as an essential foreign policy element, the question is, does it amount to diplomacy? Several studies have tried to equate peacekeeping with public diplomacy (Armstrong, 2010; Coulon, 1998). Nonetheless, the two should cease to be conflated, even though there is a growing intersection of the two.

The notion and practice of peacekeeping has no fundamental equation with traditional diplomacy, because the latter is not mere negotiation, bargaining process between two or more states, but an action premised to achieving certain outcomes that might be inimical to the ideal of the parties involved, yet the best of alternative to adhere with (Schelling, 1970, pp. 64-84). Diplomacy as an instrument of statecraft is always between states, never predicated by the resolution to enforce military intervention by a larger multinational body (like the UN) for the sake of ensuring global peace and security. Unlike other forms of military intervention, peacekeeping mission is always a secondary activity following the exhaustion of warring parties and often subject to the consent of the disputants (James, 1990, p.1). The consent of disputants though is an essential feature of diplomacy and an important commonality between peacekeeping and diplomacy, yet unlike the former; the latter often precedes war and not to mention exhaustion of warring parties.

Similarly, peacekeeping cannot be likened to the popular concept of disarmament, which "includes the limitation, control, and reduction of the human and material instrumentalities of warfare" (Claude-Jr, 1970, p. 123). In as much as peacekeeping carries some of the essentiality of disarmament, such as enabling warring parties to disarm in order to create room for negotiation and ultimately return to peaceful coexistence. It is indeed not the conventional disarmament conduct amongst states, geared at non-militarization or elimination of arms race, rather peacekeeping is "a whole new dimension in the use of military forces" for restorative peace (Bidwell, 1978, p. 635).

The "Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the UN Charter, which stipulates that there can be no use of force except in self-defense, and which requires the consent of the host government and a ceasefire for deployment" (United Nations, 2012, p. 12) underpins the uniqueness of peacekeeping. In the light of the UN Charter, peacekeeping is traditionally classified, because it focuses "on the containment of conflicts between countries through border demarcation and the separation of forces after inter-state wars" (*Ibid*).

Even though the world has not witnessed the scourge of a world war in decades, yet peacekeeping has gained greater relevance given the proliferation of scattered wars the world over. Most of the war-concentrated regions are being

shaped by the invisible hands of international actors bent at protecting and promoting their own interests in the war regions. The outbreak of conflict also stems from the inability of domestic stakeholders to compress their incompatibility region into agreeable frontier (Galtung, 1958). While some powerful reference elements have instrumentally made conflict possible because of their self-centeredness, the question remains why other nations should contribute their own armed forces, when the harbingers of the conflict are not ready to solely sacrifice their own armed forces to extinguish the flame they had selfishly ignited. Therefore, peacekeeping is irrelevant and needless if the selfish interest had not prevailed over careful rumination of political fallout of conflict.

Contemporary conflicts might be incomparable to the two World Wars, yet they have their unique dynamics and complexities. Moxon-Browne (1998) argues that contemporary conflict is increasingly dynamic with lesser predictability and whether or not the structure and content of current peacekeepers are capable enough to combat the dynamic challenges. Though more important, does this dynamic provoke the need for reinvention and redefinition, reformation of how we construe peacekeeping in the larger canvass of conflict resolution.

Theorizing Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping mission is part of the international project of shared responsibility, upon which the constituent members of the UN contribute national troops (as shared responsibility) in resolving conflict in conflict-ridden zones. In as much as peacekeeping is a practical venture, it is imperative to have a theoretical perspective of it.

In his seminal work on peacekeeping, Zhou opines that “the theoretical concept of international peace-keeping is that the control of violence in interstate and intrastate conflict is possible without the use of force or enforcement measures” (Zhou, 1984, p. 1). From a broader perspective, the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali argues that peacebuilding is a “mission that seeks to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 32). As one of the eminent practitioners and writers on peacekeeping, Indar (1984) argues that it is utopian to think that peacekeeping could actually resolve political disputes, when governments hold back their full commitment towards the fruition of peacekeeping. Without the serious engagement of mediators, peacekeeping will have ceased to be an instrument of averting global conflict and violence and maintaining peace.

Interestingly, the adoption of peacekeeping as a popular idea by the UN was championed by diplomats and leaders from countries having little or no credential for aggression against other country. Canadian politician Lester Pearson and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold were believed to have been instrumental in formalizing and ensuing peacekeeping becomes part of the UN (Ryan, 1998, pp. 26-39).

The legitimacy of peacekeeping has been a discursive piece amongst intellectuals and policymakers. If the UN is largely the assembly of democratic nations, constituted to democratically bring peace to the world, the question is, how well the institution has lived to the spirit of democracy, rather than being clouded

by the tyranny of the small oligarchy—great powers (Bhutto, 1967). Hence, the undemocratic characterization of the UN undermines the legitimacy of peacekeeping (Simons, 1995), it is also indicative that authoritarian regime within the UN often becomes selective about peacekeeping.

Keeping in view the nexus of peacekeeping and foreign policy, scholars have been grappling whether or not peacekeeping should be considered an ethical dimension or rebranding foreign policy through an ethical and moralist approach. This is suggestive of the fact that nations have graduated from the traditional realist paradigm of selfish foreign policy, morally unobligated to the problem of other states. Presumably, the ethical consideration is a transformation of state from the Hobbesian beastly propensity to a moral actor, knowing the worth of helping others in distress.

It is understandable that politics and ethics do not intersect and conflate; politics is intrinsically unethical; invariably politics cannot be moralised (Machiavelli, 1970). Thus labelling peacekeeping as moral politics will be a novel idea, particularly to the realist school that would rather want disengagement of the two. Moral theorists of International Relations would argue that efforts like peacekeeping underscore the maturity of state and the emancipation from realist prism of anarchy and self-centeredness. This implies the graduation from self-interested entity to a political community that is no more bounded by territorial boundaries and parochial statist notion of self (Heins & Chandler, 2007, pp. 3-4).

Peacekeeping missions indicate the relevance of institutionalism, a vital component of liberalism. Peacekeeping reinforces the holistic, interconnected, and interdependence of sub-system within the system. The interdependence of peacekeeping resonates with the cosmopolitan/Kantian school that sees state's moral duties transcending territorial boundary and hence the ethical policymaking meant to promote the interest of humanity. Interestingly, realists consider such supposed ethical policymaking as "act of manipulation of duplicity or ideological disguise" because whatever maybe the action of a state, it is nonetheless aimed at achieving its selfish (realist) national interest as stated by Richard Nixon in 1968 "the main purpose of American aid is not to help other nations, but to help ourselves" (Hancock, 1989, p. 71).

Through the light of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), one might begin to inquire which schools of thought of foreign policy lend explanation for peacekeeping. Is the decision of a nation to become a peacekeeping nation premised on national wisdom of ethicality—part of state's religiosity, sense of humanity, or is it simply the discretion of the leadership or the collective wisdom of the bureaucracy or an action guided by external incentives (structuralism and financial gain). Finding a quick answer to these questions would mean understanding the dynamics of domestic politics in a given peacekeeping nation. Yet, a generalisation of states' reasons might be inappropriate; instead a contextual analysis will always be useful for better comprehension.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new thinking that crisscrossed International Law and Human Rights Law (HRL). Traditionally, both laws operate in different arenas and address different entities. But the post-Cold War era blurred the distinction between the two and rather created an enabling space for the marriage of both laws. The nuptial bore the internationalisation of HRL and hence the new

‘interventionist’ world politics in the form of peacekeeping (Cunliffe, 2007, p. 72). The transformation from ‘sovereign as authority to sovereignty as responsibility’, coupled with the need of redefining matters that could be considered as ‘threat to international peace and security’ explains the birth of ‘sanctioned interventions’ by the UN. The redefinition of security and threat reaffirms the position of the English School that the international community would disagree on justice, but coalesced on order (Linklater, 2005, p. 58), therefore security threats stemming from humanitarian crises have come to be regarded as issue of international concern.

It is true that peacekeeping has become complementary to the regionalized security institutionalism that inundated global politics in the post-Cold War era. Upon the emancipation from the ideological over layer during the Cold War, most developing regions realized the necessity to regionalize their security concerns, hence the third wave of regionalism and formation of regional security organizations (Fawcett, 1996, pp. 16-18). Rather than placing all their security concerns on the shoulders of their former benefactors (superpowers), the end of the Cold War engendered introspective disposition, by which nations formerly aligned to the two superpowers created their own regional peacekeeping forces like Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Why Pakistan is a Peacekeeping Nation?

In the light of FPA, certain questions require answers to understand Pakistan’s decision in become a peacekeeping nation. What moral incentive(s) propel Pakistan towards peacekeeping missions? Does it have bearing with ethical foreign policy? Could it be due to the notion of humanity embedded in the Islamic tradition/faith? or was Pakistan prompted to become a major peacekeeping nation due to the cultural sympathy engrained in her culture or it is mere fulfilment of Jinnah’s foreign policy mission of “Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world? We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter” (MOFA, n.d.)².

Barely two decades into her creation as a nation-state, Pakistan embraced a pragmatic foreign policy which was least expected of a newly crafted state that had to be grappling on how best to settle as a new member of the international community. Pakistan’s foreign policy of intervention and interference in other states through peacekeeping missions went beyond the noble peaceful neighbourhood enunciated by the founding father. In consonance with Jinnah’s groundbreaking foreign policy, Pakistan made its first peacekeeping deployment in the 1960 Congo crisis; few years following the first use of peacekeeping mission by the UN to resolving the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. Since 1960, and following the end of the Cold War, Pakistan

² See, Guiding Principles of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan (MOFA) <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=guidingpri>

remains consistent and among top prominent non-Western countries contributing troops to UN missions (Meiske & Ruggeri, n.d.). Over the last five decades, Pakistan has participated in peacekeeping activities in twenty-six (26) countries; forty-three (43) UN missions, and contributed more than 180,000 troops,³ among which some have sacrificed their lives for the cause of bringing peace to the world. The following picture graphically shows, where Pakistan stands as part of the troop contributing countries (TCC) (see figure 1 & 2); an indelible and courageous effort toward global peace.




Figure 1: Pakistan overall fifth largest troop contributing country. UN Peacekeepers Deployed Worldwide

Source: Department of Peacekeeping Training, Centre for Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Science & Technology, Islamabad.

There is paucity of academic piece on the imperative reasons for Pakistan’s choice of becoming a peacekeeping nation. Although, Malik (2013, p. 207) suggested that “Pakistan’s senior officers often decide the scope and scale, logistics and operational details of the Pakistani contingent, though within the larger of military-bureaucratic nexus and a final shot by the foreign ministry.” Other scholars argue that Pakistan’s choice of becoming a peacekeeping nation is geared at identifying itself as a responsible member of the international community and despite grappling with her own domestic issues; she remains committed to UN peacekeeping missions to evade being labeled a failed state (see e.g., Abiola et al., p. 154).

³ Based on the data gathered from the Department of Peacekeeping Training, Centre for Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Science & Technology, Islamabad.




Figure 2: Pakistan as third largest troop contributing country. UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide

Source: Department of Peacekeeping Training, Centre for Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Science & Technology, Islamabad.

Methodologically, unlike other researches on the subject, this study deemed it insightful and instructive to understand the motivation for peacekeeping through the lens of past Pakistani peacekeepers, particularly the ranking officers, who led deployed mission in different part of war-ridden areas. Although getting in contact with large amount of ranking officers was one of the limitations of the study; nevertheless, the research was able to gather qualitative information from the accessible officers, who had once led Pakistani deployment abroad. Most of the officers concurred that peacekeeping is an integral part of Pakistan’s foreign policy and it is clearly a manifestation of how Jinnah envisioned Pakistan’s relations with the rest of the world. To the officers, Pakistan’s peacekeeping engagements symbolize ethical foreign policy, rooted in humanity. Surprisingly, they all are agreed that peacekeeping has not delivered much expected prestige to Pakistan. For them, foreign policy objective is measured by state’s capacity hence Pakistan is a peacekeeping nation because of her military capacity, strong military establishment and blessing of the parliament. Since peacekeeping efforts are not just arduous, it requires the services of soldiers with families, hence the financial matter – incentives.

Diversification of Foreign Policy: From Peacekeeping to Strategic Presence

Peacekeeping is considered tool of foreign policy and Pakistani troops are largely committed and present in Africa given the latter’s profile as the most conflict ridden

zone, then it suffices to assert that Pakistan pays considerably attention regarding its foreign policy towards Africa. It is equally apposite that Pakistan's foreign policy towards Africa is largely limited in scope due to reasons such as dearth of strong political will to deeply engage Africans, the pretext of distance, cultural factor, news media sentimentality of Africa as 'good for nothing' save poverty and conflict. While these factors might have held back the optimal manifestation of Pakistan in many African states, other Asians, such as the Arabs, Chinese, Koreans, and even Indians continue to make meaningful headways on the richest continent – resource wise. Pakistan might not be financially buoyant as these Asians, but it is not incapacitated to diversify her foreign policy and engagement in areas other than peacekeeping in Africa.

If peacekeeping is a tool of foreign policy and expectantly should yield certain dividends, the question is, has Pakistan been reaping the dividends of peacekeeping, particularly from the African continent, where most of the peacekeeping takes place. Pakistan's peacekeeping missions in Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Western Sahara, Chad, Darfur, South Sudan, Mali, and Central African Republic might have given Pakistan certain degree of diplomatic prestige. The goodwill of Pakistani peacekeepers would probably be retained and impact the consciousness of these African nations that have witnessed intractable conflict, but such impact can be unlearned and faltered by time.

Complementarily, diversification of Pakistan's foreign policy into unexploited areas will profoundly add up to any form of peacekeeping effort in Africa. Other than peacekeeping, Pakistan requires more pragmatic, enduring, and strategically impactful foreign relations with Africa. The amalgam of peacekeeping and the exploitation of these untapped areas would eventually led to the fulfillment of foreign policy objectives.

To start with, in the area of peacekeeping, Pakistan should strengthen her diplomatic ties by working with peacekeeping nations in Africa. For instance, Ethiopia and Nigeria are foremost African peacekeeping nations; the fact that they share common value of peacekeeping can be better premise and platform to foster strategic partnership through the sharing of professional skills on peacekeeping and collaboration in many other areas of shared interest.

Military Cooperation

In addition to procuring military hardware from major powers, with her ingenuity, Pakistan military establishment has created a *niche* for itself in areas of military industry. The strength of Pakistan's military is not restricted to being one of the major and reckonable militaries in the world or her contribution in the UN Peacekeeping missions; today Pakistan is one of the world's powerful and largest military economies (Schumpeter, 2011). Pakistan's defence industry is increasingly growing in high technology (Haq, 2011), the sophistication of her world class indigenous production, estimated around \$1.5 billion per annum and the adoption of partial import substitute policy is a lesson to learn from this South Asian country. Pakistan "has achieved self-sufficiency in several areas of defence production. We cannot lower our guard against the threat from our adversaries" (Syed, 2014, n.d.).

African military cooperation with Islamabad is largely confined to training of African officers in Pakistan and occasional procurement of military hardware. Within the South-South and military cooperation, Pakistan's foreign policymakers should be awakened that it is long overdue to reach a strategic partnership and collaborate in the production of military tools and hardware with African countries. Instead of mere procurement of hardware, Pakistan should invest professionally in such venture. Islamabad should reach an understanding, signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) (through diplomatic channel) with many of the African countries, to see such venture attain a constructive conclusion. To the benefit of the partnership, Islamabad should show the willingness to share with African countries her military potential, particularly rendering out F-16. The addition of such military hardware will not only be a remarkable addition to Africa's military hardware inventory, but will further strengthen diplomatic cooperation. Pakistani military will attain greater height in the event of joint collaboration in production of military tools and hardware. Besides, Islamabad can enter a strategic partnership with African countries to acquire the technical know-how for submarine-launched cruise missile. Of recent, Pakistan demonstrated a "submarine-launched cruise missile capable of delivering various types of payloads and useful for credible second strike capability, augmenting and deterrence" (Zahra, 2017, n.d.).

With the facilitation of the peacekeepers, who have served in Africa, Pakistan should develop strategies for cooperating and working with African nations on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgencies. Over the years, Pakistan has been grappling with similar issues confronting most African nations, while Islamabad has recorded degree of success in certain areas, for instance in SWAT and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), such success stories should be shared and pragmatic facilitation should be rendered to African nations encountering similar issues. Pakistan will always be remembered in these countries for being instrumental.

The recent clampdown on Boko Haram by the Nigerian Army came to fruition due to the sophisticated military hardware procured from Pakistani military. Having struggled with terrorism and extremism over almost two decades, Pakistan and Nigeria and many other African nations can further emasculate this global menace through intelligence sharing. Becoming a strategic partner means a deeper military cooperation with African countries, invariably such a status would earn Pakistan military officers a degree of concession when dealing with their African counterparts, facilitate diplomatic support on international issues, and perhaps broadened and enrich Pakistan-Africa military training and exercise.

Agricultural Cooperation

The abundance of farmlands all over Africa makes the continent a potential world food basket. With an increasingly growing population, natural disaster and incessant conflicts, Africa cannot afford to deny the exigency of food and agricultural self-sufficiency. African economies are wearing the burden of the massive importation of food and the dearth of proportionate production for domestic consumption. As the fifth world producer of dairy produce (Pakistan Today, 2013), the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) ranked Pakistan as the thirteen (13th) rice producer and standing among the world's top ten producers of wheat, cotton, sugarcane, mango, dates and oranges (FAO). Pakistan should not simply make her

world class (Sella & Basmati) rice, sugar and dairy produce exportable to Africa; but should be enthusiastic to share agricultural techniques and strategies. Foreign policy objectives and national interests can well be fulfilled if agricultural energy and know-how is shared with African brothers. More importantly, Pakistan can become instrumental for nations such as Congo, Central African Republic (CAR), and many other affected by protracted war to resuscitate their agricultural economy. Doing this will be an enormous advantage for Pakistan without men in boots.

Infrastructural Cooperation

Blessed with the black gold and many other natural resources, Africa stands to be one of the wealthiest continents, but the dividend of the resources remains a distant reality for many Africans. Undoubtedly, Pakistan is a developing nation with her own issues, but her strength as resilient country keeps the country alive and animated. Infrastructural wise, certain African nations can benefit from Pakistan.

Couple of years before becoming Pakistani premier, Prime Minister Shahid Kaqani Abbasi as the petroleum minister visited Nigeria, to his astonishment and shock; he was alarmed by the extent to which Nigeria squander her Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) a vital energy for both domestic and industrial utility. According to the World Bank, Nigeria wastefully flares her gas without adequate and proportional utility (Asikhia & Orugboh, 2011).

Despite not being an oil producing economy, same gas (Compressed Natural Gas–CNG and LNG) is affordably and comfortably circulated and used in many homes across Pakistan. This South Asia country has one of the largest networks of gas connecting households, for the purpose of cooking and heating. In the light of south-south cooperation and further indulgence in Africa beyond peacekeeping, Pakistan can facilitate a robust energy utility, though glaringly, Pakistan is equally fighting her own energy crisis, yet Pakistan can facilitate Nigeria on how best to utilize LNG and CNG, employ Pakistan's professionalism for the successful circulation of the product to every home across Nigeria. During the last 9th (ninth) D8 summit held in Istanbul, Turkey, the Pakistani PM reiterated Pakistan's commitment to work with Nigeria in many areas, which does not exclude the energy sector (DNA, 2017).

Easy and smooth mobility of goods and people is existential for any economy. Any economic system will be a failure, when all sectors or segments of the economy are either not functional or lack connectivity. The potentials of African GDP is long undermined, not because they lack industrious mind, but all due to the dearth of distributive infrastructural facility. Understanding the role of distributive infrastructural facility, the four provinces of Pakistan are well connected by motorways and highways, well-constructed by local construction companies and meaningfully maintained at least in accordance to Islamabad's capacity. Pakistan has one of the best of motorways in the whole of South Asia, an infrastructural development that belies the stigma of a failed state (Scrutton, 2009). These motorways and highways have been constructed by local construction companies (not foreign companies) with patriotism. The motorways and highways is an evidence of sustainable development. Billions of rupees were expended on this country-wide project.

Most peacekeepers who had served in Africa would not be ignorant of the dearth of this infrastructure in certain areas. The professionalism of Pakistani construction companies (civil and military) can be shared with nations, where Pakistan has had a peacekeeping footprint and those free from war. Pakistan can be relevant, not as a nation ready to provide Africans the money for infrastructural development, but helping through her professionalism to contain the inadequate and depreciated infrastructural facility impeding trade connectivity. The huge commercial transaction around the countries in most African nations is sabotaged by the calamitous infrastructures. The loss of lives, time, money and property epitomises the calamitous situation. A fact known to many Africans that lack of good roads does not only endanger lives, it engenders criminals to cause travellers and motorists dreadful menace. Instead of solely promoting the worth of her khaki boys, Pakistan can bring forth her professionalism in this respect. Pakistan can equally be a good competitor among existing foreign companies that have satisfactorily benefited from the wealth of Africa in the area of distributive infrastructural facility. Pakistan and African nations can collaborate in the area of construction at the managerial and technical level. Material and human resources necessary for the infrastructural construction will exclusively be African.

Conclusion

It is long overdue for Pakistan's foreign policy makers to come to the realization of policy diversification. The country is long entrapped and yoked in the Cold War alignment. For quite too long, Islamabad has cultivated a fundamental attachment with Washington; less engagement towards Europe and lesser towards Latin America and Africa. Though of recent, the country has started looking more eastward. Regardless of all the media sentimentality towards Pakistan, the international community cannot relegate the relevance of Pakistan in the area of peacekeeping. Its presence in conflict ridden areas makes in one of the most persistent troop contributors to UN peacekeeping missions. Most of these missions might be in Africa and Pakistan is always there, but Pakistan needs to translate and transform its presence in Africa into more strategic and pragmatic ventures. Premised on the knowledge of the peacekeepers, policymakers in Islamabad should effectively use the knowledge to open new chapter in Africa-Pakistan relations beyond the realm of peacekeeping.

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Nature and Impact on Perceptive Understanding of Nationalism in the Conflict in Balochistan

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Abstract

The conflict in Balochistan is based on the concept of nationalism. The frequent recurrence of conflict is dependent on understanding the concept of nationalism by the population. The study attempts to understand a general trend towards the notion of nationalism among the people of Balochistan. It used primary sources of data collection in the form of interviews of sample population of Balochistan. The questions asked in the interviews are compiled by coding and corroborated by memo-driven analysis. The results of the study explore different themes like nationalism, political parties, popular narrative and understanding of the conflict. The analysis projected that there exists a general understanding in the population about the idea of nationalism as being a political ideology employed for communal gains and struggle. The research is an exploratory attempt to streamline different opinions about nationalism. It also indicates a willingness of population for cooperation with the state authorities despite the application of nationalist struggle for secession.

Keywords

Balochistan, conflict, nationalism, politics, demographics

Introduction

Balochistan is a vast, arid and semi-desert region divided in three countries. Historically, it has been a major battleground for many empires which have held nominal control over its boundaries. The people of this region have been nomadic and semi-urban for a long time. All these factors have developed a sense of pride and confidence in its inhabitants. The long history of this self-pride has also made this region witness a lot of conflicts. Wars with the British colonizers and resistance movements against Pakistan have impacted the history and politics of this region, developing the sense of separate identity and authority for the Baloch people. This has made the concept of nationalism flourish in the region with indigenous concepts and political objectives.

Baloch nationalism has historically been justified through the self-rule and unacceptance of any authority by Baloch people. It takes a modern and reactionary tone after the intervention of British control over the region. The modern concepts of

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nation and nationalism settled in the tribal politics of society with prominent leaders. This nationalism became the basis for political movements and collective authority in the region which change with the partition of subcontinent and the accession of State of Kalat with Pakistan. The change in control of authority and further consolidation of Pakistani control changed the nature of Baloch nationalism. Tensions started on the question of provincial autonomy leading to armed conflicts (Gichki, 2015, pp. 241-251). The conflict in Balochistan is evident in the history of Pakistan. In its seventy years, Pakistan has faced several resistance movements and armed insurgencies in its largest province. All of which have intended a retraction of Pakistani authority from the province. This is the basis of the concept of Baloch nationalism which defines political control and authority in Balochistan is the right of its natives. The gradual complexity of this concept determines its popularity and pertinence in the question of Baloch identity and politics of the province. The current insurgency started in the region in 2000s and is referred as the most violent and destructive struggle (Bansal, 2010, pp. 115-121). This paper attempts to understand the contours of current Baloch nationalism and analyzes the relationship between nationalist ideology and insurgency.

Baloch nationalism has been the ideological front for all the insurgencies in the region. The frequent usage of this concept for the political objectives of the armed conflict need to be understood in modern times. The study aims to understand the concept of Baloch nationalism and its role creating and sustaining recurrent conflicts in Balochistan. The study is a primary research aiming for an exploratory understanding of pertinence of the concept of nationalism and the local conflict in Balochistan.

Theoretical Perspective

The research employs the concept of nationalism that has been defined as a group with 'shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity' (Smith, 1986, p. 32). The concept most successfully employed in the paper is argued by the constructivist school of thought as;

Constructivism merits careful consideration because awareness of how our understandings of the world are individually and socially constructed, and of how prevailing ideas mold our beliefs about what is unchangeable and what can be reformed, allows us to see world politics in a new and critical light (Kegley & Blanton, 2010, 2011, p. 46).

The theory establishes the idea of the paper and it is useful in understanding the concept of nationalism as it merits the consideration of people and their ideas about ideology of nationalism. As a phenomenon that has grown complex day by day and has many explanations, the concept of Baloch nationalism needs to be studied in the contours of this theory. The study is a discourse into the reasons of conflict in Balochistan. It however focuses on a singular aspect that is the ideational construct of legitimacy of conflict. There are however numerous other explanations that involve the economic cost of conflict, the human cost of conflict, and the societal impact by the conflict. Along with these, there are numerous other explorable concepts linked with this concept that include the discussion of rights and duties of state, in addition to the various other concepts. The paper however is limited to discuss one of the factors albeit very important in understanding the prolonged low-intensity conflict.

The paper used data which was collected through general population and informed opinion to analyze the understanding of the concept of Baloch nationalism and its perceptive capacity to cause conflict.

Limitations of the Study

This research lacks the data of active participants in the conflict. It lacks the opinion and perceptions of bureaucratic and government officials due to their binding to official duties. There is also a limit to the area covered due to the constraint of time. Along with these limitations, the unwillingness of few participants that were approached but rejected to provide their insights also limits the study.

Background of Baloch Nationalism

Baloch nationalism has its basis in historical facts, cultural similarities and territorial claims. The history of Baloch people as told in their oral poetry and war ballads introduce the characteristics of an ideal Baloch. These oral traditions also serve as the mythic foundation of Baloch character, norms and mores as well as the historical articulation of Baloch conquest, war and construction of Baloch state. Baloch (1987) in his book analyzes the origins of Baloch nationalism by stating the historical roots of Baloch state system. He states that along with social factors like language, culture and identity other factors like history, geography and climate evolved and nurtured Baloch identity and socio-economic structures of Baloch society. Dashti (2012, pp. 4-5) has analyzed the historical nomadic setup of the Baloch society and illustrated that:

Relationship between nomadic, seminomadic, and sedentary peoples within different Persian empires has always been characterized by shifting hegemony, rivalry, wars, and alliances on various pretexts. These changing relationships played important roles in the sufferings of the Baloch tribes and frustrated attempts of subsequent identity formation as a distinct ethnic entity.

Along with these historical interactions playing a part in the identity formation of Baloch people, several other factors are also involved. Bareesag (2004, p.23) is of the view that the separate identity of Baloch people is based on the understanding that “national identities are based on two elements: an ethnic element, which stems from cultural-historical legacies and a civic-territorial element, which stems from modernity”. These cumulative factors develop the identity of Baloch nation as distinct and different from the rest of outlying cultures and identities. Baloch nationalism begins from this idea of distinction.

Bareesag (2004), Axmann (2008) and Baloch (1987) describe the genesis of Baloch nationalism as a product of the geographical constraint of Balochistan. Comprising of arid lands, mountainous and desert areas, the fight for arable plains needed unified structure and a central system. This type of centrality was lacking in a tribal system such as that of Balochistan. Accession of lowland areas and arable plains brought upon this centrality and a proto-state structures formed. Dashti (2012, pp. 158-159) states in its impeccable work on Baloch history that

The development of a Baloch national consciousness was another stimulus in the establishment of the Chiefdom of Kalat. The subsequent birth of the Baloch state was an inevitable consequence of a long period of subjugations, deprivations, and denial of an honourable socio-political status for the Baloch by various powers. With facing ore oppression, the desire of the Baloch to acquire a dignified position among the community of nations became more solidified. With the right opportunity, they became

able to assert themselves by declaring the region of Balochistan, which was called Turan by the Arab historians, a state.

The system developed by Nasir Khan-I included taxation, land appropriation and military service for the Khanate of Kalat. The geographical boundaries of Kalat state and the subsequent structure of state was designed upon the incorporation and cooperation of the tribes and their individuals with the authority of Khan. The system was socially developed on tribalism and this was the dominant idea until the coming of British colonizers and their incursion into the tribal setting and system of Kalat. It can be assumed that Baloch nationalism was also an effect of British experimentation with the social and government structure of Baluchistan. It developed as a response to the alteration of Baloch social values by British colonizers. The modern roots of Baloch nationalism lie in the development of political parties that sprung up as a reaction to British system in Balochistan. The Sandeman system as argued by Axmann and Baloch introduced many changes in tribal system of Balochistan. These changes altered the traditional tribal structure of Balochistan by giving a greater control and importance to Sardars to weaken the Khan. The system also designated more authority and independence to local chiefs (sardars) enabling them to be at conflict with Khan (Axmann, 2008) (Baloch, 1987). This led to a deterioration of conventional system of authority and superiority of British in the affairs of Balochistan. These colonization techniques were challenged by Baloch thinkers targeting the role of British and their designated Sardars creating the first sense of nationalist politics in the region of Balochistan.

Bareesag (2004) and Baloch (1987) state the emergence of political parties and their leadership as one of the fundamental step in the genesis of Baloch nationalism. Mir Yousaf Ali Magsi and Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd have been called as the founding fathers and pioneers of Baloch nationalism. Their political stance and activities were the first sense of modern politics in Balochistan until 1947. Baloch (1987) has analyzed in detail the history and politics in the era before partition. He states the emergence of 'Young Baloch' party by Abdul Aziz Kurd as the pioneer of political movements in state of Kalat. This political awakening was further augmented in the form of Magsi agitation demanding constitutional reforms in the state of Kalat and formation of Anjuman-e-Itahad-Balochistan. Kalat state National party became the frontrunner of politics in the Kalat state and directed its agenda against the British colonizers (Baloch, 1987). This period set the tone for further ideas of Baloch nationalism and their incorporation in the Baloch identity. The change in the political and administrative landscape in Balochistan changed with the partition of subcontinent.

Baloch nationalism took different dimensions after the accession of state of Kalat and incorporation of Balochistan in the state of Pakistan. The struggle emerged from recognition of Baloch ethnic identity leading to provincial autonomy and culminating in the emergence of the idea of a greater independent Balochistan (Baloch, 1987). Baloch nationalism in the aftermath of 1948 is a continuation of the politics of sovereignty and this factor becomes the cornerstone of later nationalist ideas and movements. The idea of Baloch nationalism after the accession of Kalat gets more complex as added factors and variables are introduced into the phenomenon. The first resistance soon after accession started as the first in a series of later conflicts. Axmann (2008, p. 235) states that "Even today the rebellion is viewed as a landmark of the Baloch struggle for national self-determination and independence. It has been glorified by Baloch nationalists as the First Baloch War of

Liberation & National Self-determination against the oppressive state of Pakistan.” This idea of state oppression is also defined as the main cause of Baloch nationalist movement and conflict. Atarodi (2011, p. 13) describes this notion as “Baloch nationalism draws strength from a combination of economic, political, cultural and historical grievances.” Grare (2013, p. 5) is of the view that “Baloch nationalism relates to the broader national question in Pakistan. Politically, it covers everything from aspirations to full independence from Pakistan to demands for autonomy within the Pakistani federation”.

Another factor that adds to the current nationalist tendencies and further extremity of Baloch nationalist narrative is the economic exploitation of Baluchistan. The nationalist paradigm argues that the economic structure of Baloch society is deteriorating because Baloch people are not getting their due share in the resources and their monetary benefits extracted from their land. This argument is stated in the works of Kupez (2012, pp. 101-103), Samad (2014, pp. 294-304), Atarodi (2011, pp.38-39), Grare (2013, p. 512) and Mazhar, Javaid and Goraya (2012, pp. 118-120). The modern Baloch nationalism is also heavily based on this economic perspective. Adding to the economic perspective Wirsing’s (2008) innovative work describes the nationalist movement of Baloch people in the context of global energy politics by associating the resources of Balochistan and its effect on nationalist movement on state and global scale by describing the global energy politics and its subsequent role in Balochistan’s energy resources and politics.

The fact that the idea of an independent state is now the extreme stance of Baloch nationalists owes its inception and progression to the ideas of political authority and its manifestation in the region of Balochistan. The main source of politics in Balochistan revolves around Baloch nationalism but in different forms. There exist political parties that believe in the struggle for the rights of Baloch people by conforming to the state of Pakistan. These nationalist parties believe in political struggle for the province by demanding greater share of the resources of province, complete authority and control of the locals in their areas and absolute provincial autonomy. This is one side of the Baloch nationalist thought; the other side includes the organisations that believe in armed struggle. Their idea ranges from complete change of the nature of state, right of self-determination and self-government. The most extreme position of the Baloch nationalist perspective is the complete independence of Greater Balochistan through armed conflict with the states involved. Current multifaceted Baloch nationalism needs to be understood in the context of history, politics and economics of the region and through the ideas, perspectives and notions of the population groups.

This paper attempts to highlight the modern manifestation of Baloch nationalism in the conflict that erupted in 2006. It aims to understand the role of Baloch nationalism in the conflicts of the past and focuses on the current conflict. This paper also attempts to understand the role of Baloch nationalism and its effect on the political environment of Balochistan. It aims to analyze the capacity of this ideology in creating any future conflict and it tries to find the reasons for the extremity of Baloch nationalist perspectives. This discussion leads us to questions like

- What is the true application of nationalism in case of Baloch?
- Why do the conflict and politics in Balochistan tends to revolve around ethnicity and
- How nationalism manifests itself frequently and forcefully in the insurgencies of Baloch people?

The main question that the extant literature is silent about is the frequent recourse of the Baloch nationalist perspective in conflicts of the past with emphasis upon the usage of nationalism in current conflict environment as understood by the people.

The general observation which the literature provides is that there exists a huge role of political parties in propagating the idea of nation and nationalism. The literature proposes that the role of politics and political parties in Balochistan has impacted into the creation and propagation of the concept of nationalism. The literature presents different options in this regard. There are also two extreme positions in the conflicting parties. These two positions are completely opposite in their perspectives where one party states the indispensable outcome as being free of any state bindings and the other states that conflict is internationally funded by foreign interest aimed at destroying the integrity of the state. The solution, however, depends upon commonalities that can benefit people and the region. The hypothesis is based on the understanding of finding new propositions to the problem.

The conflict in Balochistan started as a small resistance and with time has evolved. Many different experiences with times has changed the basic nature of the conflict. The only thing that remains in the evolution of this idea is the changing nature of the political ideology on which the conflict has based. This ideology is now a complex phenomenon which needs to be investigated so that to find the causes of conflict. The problem lies in understanding the conflict in its entirety and needs many perspectives and ideas. The cumulative result of these perspectives has made a concept based on nationalist tendencies grow into a highly reactive ideology that is making the conflict grow more violent. The question argues about the nature, status and future of the conflict and whether the Baloch Nationalist ideology has, had or will have any impact on the conflict. The literature and general assumption is that widespread nationalism is the cause of conflict in the region.

Research Methodology

The study was conducted to understand the opinion of public, intelligentsia of the society and the political authorities. It is a qualitative study that informs the perspectives and notions of different strata of society and their understanding of the question of Baloch nationalism linking to conflict. The research design employed research questions in a simplified form to analyze the responses of participants. A portion of data has been collected from books and articles that argue the perspectives of parties that cannot be approached directly. Data collection devices employed were questionnaires on paper disseminated by hand, through volunteers and internet. The data obtained was then analyzed by coding it to suit to the related questions. The questions asked were collected to form variables for the research questions. In all the research design was made to be replicated and use the data source for further study.

The paper employs data from human participants. The participants were informed clearly and with record of their consent to agree with their provided information to be used for purpose of research only. The rights of privacy of participants, wherever demanded, have been honored in and out of study. The research has been composed through the funding of Lahore University of Management Sciences and United States Institute of Peace (LUMS-USIP) by their LUMS-USIP Junior Fellowship in Peace and Conflict Studies 2017.

Setting

The universities located in Balochistan were chosen as the setting of this research. The setting was quiet and at the convenience of participant. The participants were approached and all possible care was taken to make them understand the questionnaire. There existed some hesitation in the participants but with assurance of secrecy of data and use of research purposes, the data was obtained. The setting was suitable for discussion and the data was acquired giving the most time and care.

Population

The population of this study is the Baloch people from Balochistan. To understand the impact of nationalism on the mind of people, the population group was chosen to be specifically from Balochistan. The sample was chosen to be in the age bracket of 18-30 years. The chosen sample was purpose sampled to enable the perceptive understanding of participants. The participants were to answer a 15-question semi-structured interview schedule taking time of 30 to 45 minutes. The total number of interviewees was 90, with 65:35 male to female ratio. The response is anticipated to comprise of seventy people. The general characteristics of the population in this age bracket is moderate education, no to low-level income and dependence to another person. These attributes are however not studied in this study because it deals with the perspective of common adult population and does not involve the causal or quantitative relationship between individuals of society.

Nationalism in Balochistan is prevalent and evident in current time. It is most indicated by the insurgent parties and their resisting attitude and utter rejection of Pakistani state authority. The opinion of sample population resulted in understanding the impact of this concept in general.

Research Design

After the selection of topic and subject matter, an inquiry into the available literature presented the gaps present in the prevalent literature and the chosen topic. These literature gaps were made into open-ended questions that needed to be researched. The answers of these questions required data. Data was collected by means of questionnaires and other sources including articles and books. The data collected was compiled using coding. Coding was done two times, primary and secondary. Primary codes revealed the apparent themes and secondary coding generated the relevant answers. A corroboration pattern was used to enhance the effectiveness of data by testing any data against second coded data to establish that no more new themes could be extracted from data. This analysis revealed the relevant answers which were used for findings. Findings lead to interpretation of data to understand the answers to research questions previously extracted. The interpretation was summarized to produce new knowledge about the relevant aspects of further questions for theory, practice and methodology.

Instrument and Protocol

The interviews were conducted from the specified sample to understand individual ideas about the concept of nationalism, conflict and politics in Balochistan. The interview schedule was open-ended with 15 questions. The questions in the interview schedule were selected in the order to understand the research questions. For the research questions, questions on the survey describe the results that can answer the research questions perfectly. These questions are the simplification of concept to be studied in the paper while collecting related perspectives and ideas.

Data Analysis Strategy

Collected data was analyzed to know the answers to research questions. The data once collected, was initially grouped by the answers to related questions. In the survey the answers to questions correspond to the ideas useful for understanding the research questions. After coding this initial phase, an examination of the collected answers revealed the themes and ideas most communally discussed. These themes then were analyzed and coded again to examine the research questions. This secondly coded data enumerated the general ideas and prevalence of perspectives regarding the object under research. The explanations enlisted the perspectives of the different strata of society. The commonalities in all these descriptions were cumulated into a model.

The analysis of data collected presented various themes and subthemes. It also generated several different reiterated concepts but with different meanings. These themes produced the answers for the research questions and new research approaches have also been developed.

Participants

The participants were selected by purpose. They were approached in their institutes and were not forced to answer any questions. They were asked to grant their informed consent which was mentioned in the records as well. Many of the participants were not comfortable with sharing their biographical details so the researcher did not insist to obtain that information. A few of the participants did not answer some of the questions in the interviews but overall the response rate was satisfactory. The nature of research questions and various other personal factors made the data collection from participants a time-taking task. Out of 90 interviews, 50 were answered. 1 of these was discarded due to less numbers of answers by the interviewee. The response rate was 54%, and the number of male to female ratio in the study was 85:15 making the study male oriented. The area of the participants followed the sample and at least one participant from each area of understudied population sample answered the questionnaire. The age group of the participant lied in the 18-30 bracket fulfilling the proposed sample of study. Educational level of the participants was from intermediate to MPhil with most of the participants belonging to BS educational level. Participants were not asked to specify religious beliefs and employment level.

Data Analysis Strategy

The first step in the data analysis was finding the idea of the participant described in his or her words. For this a complete review of the collected data that included review of questionnaires, and secondary source material was done. The questionnaires were the first to be reviewed. The researcher analyzed each of the question assigning the emerging concept by coding several concepts. This coding was then reviewed to find the commonalities and exceptionalities of the data which revealed 15 major concepts. After that an analysis of secondary sources was included giving the total number of relevant concepts to be 25. The further concepts were cumulated into existing concepts due to relevancy. This garnered a second-level coding which was based on combining the relevance of the concepts. The labels that corresponded to inter-relationship and similar themes were coded into a distinct theme labelled. This coding revealed 4 major concepts which were then tested to reveal the answers of the research questions. After the coding at the second level the emergent themes were revealed. These themes were analyzed to generate the common patterns emerging in data. The patterns corresponded to relevancy of research questions asked. The third

level of coding revealed the major relationships between the data and research questions.

Primary Coding

Primary level of coding generating the relevant themes. These codes were added into memo-code that will be used for identifying the themes for second-codes. In primary coding 15 labels were designed that were Concept of nation, Identity, Difference in politics from other area, Nationalism, Role of Political parties, Causes of Conflict, Groups indulged in Conflict, Sectarian Violence, Possible Solution, Future Conflict, Fundamental Rights and awareness about them, Effect of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on Balochistan, Previous Instances of Conflict, Main reason, Steps for State. The coded data was simultaneously using both descriptive and in-vivo methods. These labels corresponded to the 15 questions asked in questionnaires. The labels and corresponding answers coded were in memo. The memo code revealed the different aspects related to the questions of nation, nationalism, conflict and its possible solutions, issue of sectarian violence, politics and political parties in Balochistan. In the next coding phase, the labels were then coded into 4 labels based on relevancy of concepts. The 4 themes specified were the Nation, identity and nationalism, Status of politics and political parties in Balochistan, Conflict in Balochistan, and Solution to the problem. Themes corresponding to the general premise of the question of nationalism and conflict.

Concept of Nation

This code revealed the specific attributes to the concept of nation as understood by the participants. The emergent data provides that almost all the participants had a general idea of nation. The most common attributes associated with nation were language, history, culture, traditions, values, territory and geography. Many of the participants also noted some unique attributes that include supportive political dimension and political maturity, education, justice and unity.

Identity

The memo revealed that the notion of self-identification depended upon the attributes of language, culture, traditions, norms, ancestry and birth. The most interesting attribute that stood out was war, which was used to describe the identity being a reason for war.

Difference in Politics from other Areas

The memo revealed that the codes in this label were the most diverse and unique. The code revealed that the difference lies in the inherent nature of politics as it includes nationalist sentiments, insurgent behaviours, tribal loyalties and political maturity.

Nationalism

The memo revealed that the most common concept associated with nationalism include hatred for another nation and love for one's own nation. The data suggested that, the idea of nationalism that Baloch people was based on a strong sense of bonding associated with one's nation. This included the idea that nationalism is a source of political supremacy and ultimate political maturity.

Role of Political Parties

Majority of people described the role of political parties as being negative and self-centred. One of the participant distinguished between the nature of political parties as being religious oriented, nationalist oriented and federalist oriented. The codes

generally viewed the federalist parties as being insufficiently active and negatively affecting the interests of people. While the favourable views were reserved for the nationalist parties involved in insurgency.

Causes of Conflict

The causes were stated as injustice, oppressions, unequal rights, resource exploitation, missing persons, deprivation of rights and involvement of foreign parties. The code revealed interesting behaviours that along with general causes that are listed in various studies, there is a wide belief in social causes like unemployment and military presence as being a cause of conflict.

Groups Indulged in Conflict

Majority within this code revealed that views for groups involved is neutral with various pointing out to the causes of social injustice, nationalist sentiments and statecraft as being the makers of these groups. The codes presented a theme that the views on this code are largely neutral.

Sectarian Violence

This code generated very interesting data results. Majority of the views related to this concept revealed sectarian violence as state created, state sponsored or state generated. The causation linked it to be a state policy for countering nationalist groups. The data however revealed a very general understanding about this and presented a mostly agreed theme for studying. The other code stated it as being the proxy war of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Possible Solution

The memo revealed in this label various aspects. These were intervention of United Nations for referendum or plebiscite, independence or Freedom of the province, greater provincial autonomy, and parliamentary equality. Self-determination and self-rule were also evident in the memo-code.

Future Conflict

The data in this code was diverse. One of the most iterated was CPEC. Other coded data revealed the relevant causes for future conflict may be religious, sectarian or tribal enmities. Other relevant codes included none or many, expansion of current conflict, local or international conflict.

Fundamental Rights and Awareness about Them

This label recorded data included with majority of the view that Baloch people are aware of their rights. These rights included basic rights, freedom of speech and self-determination and economic equality. A small minority disagreed viewing that people are not aware of their rights but they still had an idea of the fundamental rights.

Effect of CPEC on Balochistan

The memo code about this label which identified the recent development in international arena garnered a very clear result. Majority of participants are of the view that the Chinese investment is a very exploitative factor. The label indicated that CPEC is very negative to interests of Baloch as a nation by outlining that this project will result in Chinese colonialism, heavy Chinese population and further exploitation of material resources of Baloch. A very small minority, however, believed that this project will result in economic uplift and eradication of poverty in Baloch society.

Previous Instances of Conflict

The idea about previous conflicts that the data revealed is that, it created a sense of awareness in the people about their rights. The data also revealed that it was tribal, elite oriented and result of state policies. The results stated mixed opinion about these instances, which indicated a strong sense of political knowledge in the people at large.

Main Reason

The idea generated from this label indicated that main reason of the conflict is the forceful annexation of state of Kalat, some terming it as occupation too. Apart from this general understanding that prevailed in most of participants, lack of education, harsh state policies and a general neglect were also stated as the reasons of conflict.

Necessary State Steps

This label was created to understand the possibility of creating a possible peace initiative that could be reinforced by state. The memo code outlined various steps that could be taken by state. The data indicated that rights of population should be delivered. The general feeling inferred from the participants' views indicated that there is still a sense of confidence in the state to fulfil its duties and solve the problems of conflict. The label was very prominent in understanding the possible solution of the conflict.

Secondary Coding

In secondary code, the analysis of primary data generating themes were analyzed again to find the interrelationship of different concepts. The themes were checked for relationships and combined into labels that identified with the cumulative concepts. The labels for similar themes are listed as nation and nationalism, conflict and its dimensions, status of politics and political parties, solution of the conflict and extra dimensions

The generated themes from secondary coding were formed by collaborating the fifteen-primary level coded labels based on the relativity. The five themes define the underlying major concepts associated with the question of Baloch nationalism and conflict in Balochistan. The first theme nation and nationalism defined the concept of nationalism as perceived by the people. The second theme politics and political parties revealed the understanding of nature of politics in relationship with nationalism. Conflict and its dimensions identified the various associated attributes of conflict. Solution of the conflict identified the possibility of solving the problem relating to conflict.

Corroboration

The third level of data analysis was tested by identifying extra themes generated from the data. The issue of grievances could exist as an independent primary level code but was assimilated in the causes of conflict. This stated the need that all data again be revised and corroborated with the existing labels. The raw data provided no further insights that have not been collectively assimilated into primary coded data. The primary data was tested again and all the primary coded labels had been associated with themes. The results hence corroborated with all the initial data and themes.

Discussion and Conclusion

The question of Baloch nationalism relating to conflict, requires a very detailed answer. The concept of nationalism is processed to depend upon many different concepts. It includes the attributes of identity and formation of nation. Identity serves

to be the basic idea of understanding a nation. Baloch identity depends largely upon the historical and current makeup of society. The study reveals that the concept of Baloch identity is the general trait of the society excluding any other identity. Majority of population believes in Baloch being an identity ordained through their history and cultural values. Baloch value their identity over other social constructs more owing it to their pride and valour. The identity corresponds to their idea of nation which is defined as the cultural, traditional homogenous group along with a specific geography. The intellectual idea is changed as it is defined in context of heterogeneity as a valid foundation for Baloch nation (Marri, 2017). Some terming it as 'civic nationalism' (Marri, 2017) defined as the coming together of different groups into forming one identity. Another idea is based on geography being a source of 'strength' (Marri, 2017). Others are of the view that the Baloch nation also does not focus upon race as being a factor for nation. The concept of identity and nation in case of Baloch are very much complementing in nature as both these ideas depend upon similar attributes of society.

Nationalism is defined in the context of any political movement for a common goal. The concept of nationalism prevailing in Baloch society views it as such with highlighting the nature of this Baloch nationalism as a political philosophy for attaining national goals. It is also defined to be a process for achieving superiority and common goals for national autonomy, independence and freedom. It however lacks the status of being the popular belief as the population lacks an overall understanding of the political and militaristic attributes to the ideology. Many people viewed nationalism as being an armed struggle neglecting the importance of the political pros and cons. The intelligentsia is however very informed and has very knowledgeable views about nationalism. They defined nationalism in context of historical achievements of this ideology citing the example of nation state structures. Other differentiated between the concept of ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism and defined the contours of involvement of state in supplementing and neglecting of this ideology. The most interesting development that the data informed is that there is a gap between understanding of general population and informed population about nationalism and its role in state-formation. This means that there is not a general belief that nationalism has a direct relationship with the armed struggle for a free state as demanded by the separatists. There exists a huge gap between the notions of separatists and general population.

The understanding of conflict in the region is apparently very complex. It is a phenomenon that has been associated with the paradigms of violence and incapable state structures. The concept of this conflict is viewed as a general trend of disruption and venting of anger against the failing and incoherent state policies in the region. There exists an idea that the present conflict is not a new one but substantiated from past conflict. The relationship between the present and past conflict is very much a failure of state's understanding of the conflict. The present sentiment defines the basis of present conflict as being the outcome of state's unjust behaviour with the Baloch people. The other dimensions include the political handicapping of province and inequality in the provision of rights. The economic disparity has been evolved into economic deprivation.

The general trend of society is to term any new development activity as an extraction of resources without the consent of popular choice. This leads to other causes that can inevitably evolve into a new conflict in the future. One of these includes the recent collaboration between China and Pakistan into CPEC. There is a widespread belief that this project is very unjust and poses existential threats to

Baloch society, people and culture. There is however a very interesting idea that people still believe in the state and its role in resolving the problem. The solution is apparent yet very despairing. If there is a will to understand the cause of conflict and solving it, there is a segment of society that still believes in the power of the state to do so. This involves understanding the structures of political power in the society. The truer representation of people's sentiments is divided but a very heavy majority is unhappy with the status of politics and role of political parties. The political parties of today are not deemed as the true representation of public, they have been stated as self-centred and without any policy for Balochistan. The solution hence can be presented into a model for understanding the general public's opinion, understanding at a large scale the implications of conflict and taking steps for conflict resolution and prevention in the future.

The solution model is based on the belief that if not all the causes but most of conflict inducing factors can be toned down to build confidence in the capability and will of the state. The first thing is to understand that the solution lies in changing the attitude of state which should not hold its writ in every situation. The will of the state should be to accommodate people and provide their due rights. This provision includes multi-dimensional activities. The people should have their right of free speech, expression and display of political inclusivity. The state should create an environment to ensure that political and popular dissent be voiced into debates and arguments rather than creating an environment which deprives the people of their basic rights in the name of maintaining law and order. The political exclusivity has made people lose confidence in the democratic process increasing resistance and polarity in the society. The environment once created will allow dissension to be voiced through political parties and these parties should be composed of people which argue about political dissension in terms of state maintenance.

After the political process and establishment of democratic procedures, the idea of equality has utmost importance. The state should take measures to introduce policy based on making the population heard by installing confidence building measures. The best possibility is the recent project of CPEC. If this project is made to favour Baloch population socially and economically, there is a great possibility of toning down the conflict. With the economic and social benefits of this project, confidence within the state can be improved, which can further be augmented in building up true long-term measures for permanent solution to the problem.

The Concept of Nation and Nationalism and its Influence

Based on the data, this concept is understood by the population as related to social constructs of language, culture, history and traditions. The concept of identity also substantiates the notion of nation. Nationalism as understood by the data is most understood and aspires to be the most prominent political ideology prevalent in the region of Balochistan.

Status of Politics and Political Parties

The data presents an interesting development. As previously understood that political parties have a maximum role in building the current state of nationalism, the data rejects this proposition as it clearly indicates that there is no confidence of population in the political process and political parties in the present times. The current state of politics and political parties presents a huge gap of understanding between the inhabitants and elites of the land. The political parties are believed to be purely

working for their self-interest and have no role in shaping modern population's voices.

Solution(s)

Results suggest three options for solving the problem; involvement of third parties, complete independence from state and political autonomy. To resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner to co-exist and prosper, the state has a high burden to improve the social and economic aspects of population along with devolving authority as much as possible. There should be the creation of an environment that allows freedom of speech and ideas which could develop into true political voice of the region. The state can hence apply its agenda of betterment and uplift through truer representation creating maximum gains of policy implementation.

Basis of Conflict

The data states that the causes of conflict do not have just the nationalistic causes, they have been complemented by state failures, economic disparities and challenging power structures in the region. It is believed that the foremost cause is the feeling of people that they are underprivileged due to a systemic exclusion of state authorities. Nationalism as an ideology has developed in response to this feeling. Along with this general understanding is that nationalism is a political ideology turned into violent means by more extremist individuals. The previous instances of conflict in this regard have been helpful in creating more voiced opposition but not a general statement of complete people's representation. All the conflicts in Balochistan may have started from nationalism but does not have a direct relationship of cause and effect in the modern or future conflict.

Recommendations and Implications for Theory, Research, and Practice

The research has collected primary data regarding the perceptions and understanding of common people. This research has also highlighted sectarian violence as a significant cause of the problem in the region. The research can be used as a foundation to develop further understanding related to the causes and possible solutions of this problem. The research is also important to point out the discrepancies in policy formulation and implementation on governmental level. The study has highlighted the need to find out the social makeup of population in Balochistan in modern times. There is a lack of relevant data for correct identification of ethnography and political structure of the region. This study has added to the available theories of conflict that define the problem in Balochistan in terms of strategic significance and international economic competitiveness. There is a need to study this aspect of the conflict through using modern data analysis.

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China's One Belt and One Road: Implications of "New Eurasian Land Bridge" on Global Power Play in the Region

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Abstract

China's "One Belt and One Road Initiative" (OBOR) transliterated from Chinese "Yi Dai Yi Lu" is the prime focus of international politics. No other development has gained so much importance after Global war on terrorism. This paper will focus on impact of OBOR on regional politics with narrowed down focus on New Eurasian land bridge. This analysis of Eurasian belt will lead to study of counter policies of international players like USA and Russia to counter Chinese influence in the region. This analytical and prognostic study will bring into focus the impact of OBOR on international power play especially on the regional peace in Eurasia. To analyze the importance of OBOR and regional complexity we need to understand the theoretical aspects of connectivity and cooperation. Inter- Regional integration theory proposed in the work of Luk Van Langenhov with major tenants of regional integration is the best description of China's initiative. Another important corridor will come under discussion given its role as 'zipper' in Belt and Road Initiative that is China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The last part of study will bring to attention international response of key players towards OBOR whose strategic and economic interest in this part of world are at stake which makes current global power play much more complex and uncertainty prevails. But in this age of economic interdependence, finding ways for peaceful co-existence is crucial as no one can afford otherwise.

Key Words

China, One Belt One Road, Eurasia, Foreign Policy, USA, Global Power Play, China's Rise, Regional Integration, Regional Peace and Stability, CPEC, Globalization

Introduction

'Sino-centric world', 'China's rise' and 'meeting China's challenge' are few of the major defining terms of past few years in international relations and geo-strategic studies. One of the major changes in global dynamics which define international order is the shifting position of China in global economic edifice. International discourse is flooded with change in world leadership, factors contributing to this change and ultimate consequences but one needs to study deeply the factors and policies that are determining this profound change in international politics. This study will focus on

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
China's One Belt One Road initiative, analysis of Chinese President Xi's global policies and impact on global peace in general with a narrowed down focus on impact on Eurasian strategic complex. This Eurasian aspect will narrow down on New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor –one of six projects that come under Belt Road Initiative (BRI). This premeditated analysis will definitely lead us towards the complexities of counter strategies poured from this corner of world primarily backed by U.S.A in one way or other. As Hillman (2018) has argued that BRI is such a far-reaching project which is neither constrained by geography nor gravity, and since its inception in 2013 has extended towards Arctic, cyber space and outer space as well. Chinese claims about the significance of BRI are not only due to the attractive financial advantages it promises for China's inland and North Western underdeveloped region but also because it will re-establish the link to old silk route, the golden era of China's economy during Tang Dynasty. It will guarantee China's rejuvenation and achievement of 'China's Dream' offered by President Xi. China, being the mastermind and the originator, will obviously have the key role in these initiatives in all stages starting from the conception to implementation. It would not then be surprising if it also eyes reaping the maximum benefits accruing from these great economic connectivity projects. Spanning some seventy countries and requiring investment approaching \$4 trillion, the initiative is deliberately intended to reshape the global political and economic order. China's trade with countries along the Belt and Road rose 17.8% year-on-year in January 2018 (Hillman, 2018). China's belt and road initiative is the most significant development of China's foreign policy in 21st century. It redefines the global order as well as regional dynamics. Eurasian land mass bridge is not only the most significant route within China's 'BELT' in BRI but ultimately results in bringing out more significant players from whole Asian region well. The whole plan has forced the major powers like USA to revise their policies and bring out the plans based on connectivity and cooperation instead of more hard core plans of cold war i.e. based on ideological and military might.

Origin: What is BRI?

Despite the fact that BRI is also called 'New Silk Road' it is much more broader in scope than the 'Old Silk Road' or 'Go Out' Plan introduced by Chinese government in 1999. The Silk Road term was first used in mid-1800s by a geologist of German origin named Baron Ferdinand Von Richthofen (Frankopan, 2016). It was combination of land and sea routes connecting Xi'an to Rome crossing southern corridor via Iran and Turkey. Being spread across some seventy countries, it includes almost two-thirds of world population and Chinese investment under this grand policy is believed to reach \$4 trillion (Editor, 2016). It started with focus on Asia, Europe and Africa and will extend up to Arctic region through 'Polar' route. In this outgoing policy China is making an effort to strengthen the global connectivity through hard infrastructure i.e. roads, railways, telecommunications, energy pipelines and ports as well as through soft infrastructure with trade, transportation agreements as well as cultural ties on all fronts. Shared-Destiny, harmony and win-win cooperation are stated as the basis of whole plan. The current economic strategy of China also reflects 'Chinese Dream' with targets set for 2049 (Johnson, 2014), when China would be celebrating 100 years of its independence. This is another key distinction from ancient silk route which arose primarily from unplanned trade route of China's economic activity with trading partners whereas BRI is a planned grand strategy with a clearly defined vision.


President Xi Jinping popularly known as the paramount leader, the first Chinese leadership to be called so after Deng Xiaoping, introduced this significant foreign policy on September 7, 2013 during his state visit to Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. Initially known as ‘One Belt One Road, OBOR’ and now as BRI has two components: Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). The ‘belt’ the land connectivity plan and ‘road’ the maritime connectivity, includes one Eurasian land bridge and five corridors namely China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central-Asia-West Asia, China-Indochina Peninsula and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM).

It can be further categorized as northern, central and southern mega corridors. Northern corridor will connect two major regional powers i.e. Russia and China through web of infrastructure and energy sharing plan. The central mega corridor will connect China’s eastern coastal cities to historically and geographically important Xi’an city to Europe while crossing Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and finally Germany to Holland till Spain and UK. Within the central mega corridor two more connectivity plan exists that is CPEC and BCIM. Out of which CPEC has been described as not only a mega project but also a ‘scenario changer’ corridor given its economic and strategic importance for both China and Pakistan. It will connect important deep sea port of Gawader to China’s North western province Xinjiang, hence connecting SREB and MSRI in Indian Ocean. Last but not the least the Southern mega corridor is the ultimate maritime connectivity corridor which will connect China’s East to Europe while crossing all the strategically important choke points and ports ensuring the smooth maritime economic activity for China. Below are two maps which give an accurate picture of plan:



Map 1: Northern, Central and Southern Mega-Corridors

Source: Gilani Research Foundation, China Trade Research



Map 2: Inland China – Eastern Flank/ Segment of Central Mega-Corridor
Source: Gilani Research Foundation, China Trade Research

An action plan laid down by Ministry of Foreign Affairs China in March 2015, issued by National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) specifies the larger goal of BRI as follow (NDRC, 2015):

- To attain improvement in intergovernmental communication for better alignment in government economic policies and strategy for regional collaboration for development.
- To have better coordination of infrastructure plan to connect hard infrastructure devices like transportation network and power grids.
- To encourage the systematic expansion of soft infrastructure e.g. the signing of trade deals, aligning of regulatory standards, and improving financial integration.
- Encouraging people-to-people associations by cultivating student, expert, and cultural exchanges and tourism.

To achieve all these goal there are two financial engines: a multilateral Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with currently sixty four member states and twenty prospective members, and \$ 40 Billion Silk Road Fund. Apart from these two financial vehicles, Beijing has injected huge amount of capital through China State Administrative of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) in August 2015 in banks like Import Export Bank of China (EXIM) and China development Bank (CDB). Both banks have the benefit of the low borrowing cost as their bonds have this privilege of being treated as Chinese government debt with low interest rate and can lend from People’s bank of China as well. This in turn allows them to lend cheaply to companies involved in BRI projects. This is the reason that vast bulk of funding so far has been through China big state owned banks. This funding is promised to be increased more. Silk Road Fund will provide more funds i.e. up to 100 billion Yuan, overseas capital will be increased to three hundreds billion Yuan by banks, CDB. EXIM plans to supply more cash as special loans in BRI projects that is up to 130 billion Yuan and 250 billion Yuan respectively. Overall president Xi has promised at least 780 billion

Yuan (\$113 billion in US) to further facilitate the project and for smooth outcome (Hillman, 2018).

Domestic Compulsions

Before going into the details of Eurasian land bridge we need to understand the domestic and global needs which led China to adopt a project or foreign policy of such huge ambition. The world is changing, and one of the known realities of this changing dynamics is that China – in not very distant future – will be taking over the most powerful place in the global economic edifice. ‘Going Global’ strategy which was initiated by Chinese government in 2001, Chinese companies were stimulated to look for overseas opportunity. This was further encouraged in 2013 by adjusting the regular framework for outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to facilitate Chinese firms to be more competitive in international markets (Dobbs, Leung, & Lund, 2013). As president Xi stressed at G-20 summit in Hangzhou, it would be naïve to expect that China would remain a spectator in global economic affairs and would not prepare and present itself as a dynamic key player (Li, 2016).

Ethnic issues, policy incoherence and internal sources struggle are few of obstacles that impede the successful development of BRI. China’s comparatively less developed regions like Xinjiang and Yunnan are the key roads to develop regional geographical linkage. Xinjiang is the major connection in SREB to eight neighbouring central, west and South Asian countries. It is the main window of opportunity for China’s underdeveloped North Western region. Same way Yunnan in South West China is the key area to South-East Asia. East Asian province Fujian is the key connection of 21st century maritime silk route to various South East Asian countries. But the capacity of local governments of these key areas is quite low to fulfil the efficiency and pro-activeness that is required for the success of BRI. Internal resources struggle among local governments is another constraint. Hence, internal regional integration is key compulsion for BRI, which can help achieve the China’s equitable domestic development plan.


If BRI is able to fulfil the promise being ensured by Chinese government, it will lay down the solid foundation in perceived scenario. Some of the particulars in this regard are following. First, to maintain the current level of development economically and to achieve higher targets, there is need to ensure sustainable and secure energy supply chain and BRI makes it possible. Secondly to make a positive use of abundant capital available to China, it has to come up with a productive strategy and BRI is answer to that quest. Global financial experts believe that China can play a vital role as global financial balancer being the world’s largest saver. It is really vital in the wake of low returns on investment such as bonds. The infrastructure projects like roads, railways, bridges and many more ensures the investment of its large foreign currency reserves and consequently ensures the goodwill with its neighbours.

This strategy will also lead to the additional work for its state-owned and private enterprises. A noteworthy development in this regard is that the outflow of FDI from China has now reached to the FDI inflow into China (Dongmiao, 2017). The long term projects under BRI are therefore a golden opportunity to invest on a good rate of return and in a long term perspective. Over growing in some sectors and as well as the continuously growing demand of raw materials is another factor to move China in this direction. China has been facing shortage in eleven metals that are significant for gearing up its economy. Other similar issues include the increasing labour costs, increasing consumerism in wake of rising middle class, slowing of

growth rate, domestic restructuring and need for regional re-balancing. BRI is the answer and has potential to play vital role in the majority of these areas.

New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB)

The New Eurasian Land Bridge, a central BRI corridor is a mega plan to establish linkage between Atlantic and Pacific. It is different from Siberian land bridge (proposed by President Putin as center of his Asian diplomacy) which connects port of Vladivostok in Russia's east through Siberia to Moscow and finally to western European countries. Also known as the "second" bridge NELB will start from China's coastal cities of Lianyungang and Rizhao to Holland's Rotterdam and Belgium's Antwerp. The 11,800-kilometer-long rail link runs through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany, and serves more than thirty countries and three regions. China's state media has stated that this, ambitious yet possible plan, is going to connect China's North-eastern Lianyungang to Netherland's Rotterdam in Europe covering a distance of 11,870 km. Below is the map showing the route:



Map 3: New Eurasia Land Bridge (Edited by the author)

Until now various railway trade routes have become operational and have been included in BRI mainly due to the transcontinental connectivity, and consequent economic progress that they guarantee for involved countries. Some of the listed connectivity plans are as follow: the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe Railway (reaching Germany's Duisburg via Poland), the Chengdu-Xinjiang-Europe Railway (reaching Poland), and the Yiwu-Xinjiang-Europe Railway (reaching Madrid). There is a steady progress in the construction of associated highways, power transmission lines, and ports (Wijeratne et al., 2017).

NELB is the ‘leading edge’ of China master plan of connectivity through BRI. It is to ease the connectivity for Eurasian trade. As one of the principal among six projects, it is also known as branch of China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor. All the western powers have named it the most crucial plan which aims to streamline the mutual trade by improving already present railway routes and linking China's underdeveloped western region with Europe. The Russian trans-Siberian railway, branching northwest from Urumqi, traversing Astana in Kazakhstan, and then linking up with the Russian rail network at Yekaterinburg is the proposed route. By circumventing the southern branch of the trans-Siberian railway in northeast China,

trains will take a more direct route through Xinjiang. It will also branch out China's shipping away from seaborne routes that bottleneck at the Strait of Malacca (Wijeratne et al., 2017).

If compared with other economic corridors under BRI, the NELB is relatively straightforward as it traverses only three countries on the way to Europe, it focuses on goods transportation with already present infrastructure at well premeditated points, although it needs up gradation and modernization at some crucial points. The main concern of investment on this route is to improve the already existing infrastructure which will ultimately result in faster transportation of trade good between China and Europe and make it better option than seaborne and airborne freight operations. As of now containers containing trade goods are taken from Chinese to Kazakh rail cars at a small town in Almaty region of Kazakhstan and China (Xinjiang) border on truck-mounted cranes. This port entry serves as backbone of Eurasian Land Bridge. The same procedure is repeated at a small polish town of Siemianowkaw at Belarus-Poland border on entering Europe. This time and resources consuming process is only due the break- of- gauge between standard gauge in China and the Russian gauge used in former Soviet Republic states like CARs. China is still using the narrow gauge system installed by foreign companies mostly of European origin with standard west European railway gauge of 1,435 mm whereas Russian installed railway gauge is of 1,522mm (Duhalde, Arranz, Hernandez, & Long, 2018). With Chinese and European trade infrastructure already intact, it leaves only Russia and Kazakhstan segments in need of more financial investments to have more beneficiary and thriving trade routes via train. A \$2.7 billion plan has already been launched by Kazakhstan to upgrade about 724 km of this ancient track along the new Silk Road route (Ghiasy & Zhou, 2017). Russia in its quest to improve its continuously deteriorating economy and develop new regional collaborations has also been upgrading the trans-Siberian railroad through the 2000s, and is even thought to be mulling a western extension to the Japanese island of Hokkaido (The Siberian Times Reporter, 2016).

Caspian Sea is another geostrategic pivotal point as all the freight trade from China will eventually pass through north of Caspian Sea via Russia. An alternative option being considered is turning southwards from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey. It is called Iron Silk Road (Koçtaş Çotur & Onur Uysal, 2015). However, Due to less infrastructure and multiple border crossings this route has been sparsely used. This requires more transportation infrastructure to be operational. Some projects are already under construction. Caucasian states provide another viable option in this regard. Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project will reduce the journey to Europe across Caspian bypassing Iran. An alternative option being considered in this regard is through Turkey and Bulgaria while considering that any route passing though south of Caspian Sea will must cross Iran.

Complementing the vast railway infrastructure development is a huge 'Energy Connectivity' plan. China, central Asia and Russia have invested in very well planned oil and gas pipelines which also serve the energy starved Chinese economy. China-Turkmenistan gas pipeline is worth mentioning here as Turkmenistan energy sector received much need boost by being introduced in market though China-Central Asia gas pipeline.

Russia as a key player in NELB enjoys a unique status. Almost thirty percent of territory of Eurasia is occupied by Russia with a well-equipped transportation network in all segments such as rail tracks, sea routes, air, and road infrastructure.

China has successfully paved its way to attain new level of cooperation with Belarus and Poland as well. Being the third largest trading partner of Belarus after Russia and EU, they have increased the cooperation in various sectors like agriculture and food industry etc. It became the first CIS country to export beef and poultry to China in 2017. Pertaining to BRI, there is a lot of room for cooperation in different sectors along with infrastructure development as Belarus is also looking towards more public-private partnerships (PPPs) to successfully implement such projects. The China-Belarus Great Stone Park-China's largest offshore industrial park is one of the prominent indications of inroads that China is trying to achieve through BRI in Europe (Chan, 2018).

To analyze the overall regional complexity we need to take into consideration the theoretical aspects of geo-strategic connectivity and cooperation. It is explained through Inter- Regional Integration Theory. Inter- Regional integration theory proposed in the work of Luk Van Langenhove explains the inter-state collaboration and cooperation in appropriate manner. His narrative of eight important factors to ensure regional integration is best depicted through China's OBOR initiative. According to Langenhove these crucial factors include the strengthening of trade integration in the region, the creation of an appropriate enabling environment for private sector development, the development of infrastructure programs in support of economic growth and regional integration, the development of strong public sector institutions and good governance, the reduction of social exclusion and the development of an inclusive civil society, contribution to peace and security in the regions, the building of environment programs at the regional level and the strengthening of the region's interaction with other regions of the world are all the factors that contribute to regional integration and peace development (Söderbaum & Van Langenhove, 2005). If one analyzes the progress on BRI, so far, there is a lot left to be desired. China's policy makers are claiming repeatedly that the purpose of reviving old Silk Road is to re-gain that regional connectivity to revive the economic prosperity. But the world realities are more complex and heterogeneous. Cold war legacies and interest and presence of USA at crucial strategic point have made the situation much more complex. How China is planning to face all these challenges within Eurasian region which is ultimately going to make the dream of regional connectivity come true is a big question.

Great Power Play Game

Kazakhstan is an the crucial player in this grandeur strategy to achieve Eurasian integration but domestic governance issues and consequent foreign policy choices are the major concerns for China and Russia both. President Nursultan Nazarbayev's high level visit to US and meeting with President Trump in January 2018 is one of the consequent developments of efforts made by US to counter China's dominance in its neighbouring states. US state department has praised flourishing US-Kazak trade relations by giving a press release stating that their mutual trade reached \$1.9 billion in 2016. All the efforts made by US state department and the meeting arranged with current Kazak ambassador to US by high level think tank like Atlantic council to persuade Kazakhstan, reflects on how seriously and vigorously USA is trying to counter China's neighbouring regions. Their mutual cooperation includes growing military ties as well as cooperation on nuclear energy front. Provision of two crucial ports (Aktau and Kuryk) to US by Kazakhstan to establish an alternate route to Afghanistan bypassing Russia is significant strategic development in first half of this

year. Presence of more than 25,000 Kazakh students in USA is also an indication of such collaboration on soft integration front.

Despite this very constructive cooperation mechanism between US and Kazakhstan, Eurasian land bridge is an excellent depiction of how geography shapes the foreign policy preference of global powers like China, Russia and USA as well as of small regional powers like Kazakhstan. Its geographical location made it almost impracticable foreign policy option. Kazakhstan is very important part of Shanghai Cooperation organization. It is a central loop in China's significant Eurasian land bridge and for this purpose Chinese company is also constructing a colossal dry port Khorgos gateway in Kazakhstan. This world largest dry port will connect 'Khorgos gateway' in Kazakhstan to 'Khorgas' a Chinese city in Xinjiang. The problem here again on both sides of border is different gauge system as mentioned earlier. According to a World Bank report in 2014 titled 'The Eurasian Connection' (Rastogi & Arvis, 2014) it was claimed that in terms of speed and cost per kilometer, the Chinese proposed rail route though BRI offers matchless value. The first part of this plan is already functional as 293 km long track from Khorgos to Kazakhstan's Zhetygen terminal was completed in December 2011. In December 2012 track from both sides of borders were connected and now sixty five trains carrying 6200 TEU (Twenty foot equivalent unit) of cargo passes Khorgos every month. This crucial railway crossing between China and Kazakhstan is expected to handle 15 million tonnes of freight every year with a more buoyant situation of 30 million tonnes per year after the opening up of second Europe China rail link (Duhalde et al., 2018). This bona fide connectivity will help Kazakhstan achieves more prominent position in global trade.

Hence it is inevitable choice for states like Russia and Kazakhstan to be part of this grand strategy as they were already looking forward to the economic opportunities. The immense benefits through BRI provided trade routes can be gauged through 'Yiwu-London' freight train started on 3rd January, 2017 which carried forty-four containers of goods in just eighteen days whereas through shipping it takes forty days. Whereas, 'London-Yiwu' train which started on 10th of April, 2017 brought back eighty-eight containers of trade goods in just 20 days. It takes forty-fifty days to transport Chinese goods to recipient European markets but it takes half time if transported through central Asia train routes (Wijeratne et al., 2017). Seaborne trade routes cost ten times, much more time and financial costs of airborne routes are unfeasible in this matter. These beneficiary economic activities cannot be overlooked by any major regional or global power. However at the same time there are fears of being misused in the hands of a rising 'great power' particularly due to cold war legacies of exploitation of natural sources (as one of energy rich country) and fears of aggressiveness posed by dominating power.

Fallon (2017), though hugely doubtful about the greater benefits of BRI, admitted that improving rail routes and interconnectivity can bring greater benefits for the region as Chinese investment in transportation has been explicit as compared to previously present very low speed train route facility but still there is apprehension among the inhabitants of Central Asia that Chinese product might just pass through CA states towards Europe without giving any real benefit to Central Asian struggling economies.

Successful completion of dry port is adding up to the challenges posed to Russian aspirations in the region. Start of an oil pipeline in 2009 between China and Kazakhstan broke the monopoly of Russian state owned pipeline company Transneft in the region (Amighini, 2017). It seems that rise of China in this region is a greater

challenge for US as compared to Russia, because consequently it is challenging USA dominance regionally and globally. Russia on the other hand seems to willingly collaborate with China to gain larger economic benefits especially in the context of renewed NATO and US diplomatic aggression towards Russia after Ukraine crisis. Russia seems to accept Chinese dominance in the region and wants to maximize its benefit by being part of this 'Project of century' i.e. BRI as depicted by high level participation by President Putin in 2017, B&R forum. Though, some western analyst called Russia's acceptance of BRI as 'axis of convenience' or define their relationship as 'Frenemies'. Statistic shows that as of April 2018, Russia has increased its oil sale to China to 43%, where as 19% less oil is exported to Europe as China has become a more preferable oil trade partner for Russia (Longley & Lehane, 2018).

Andrew Higgins opined that expanding Sino-Kazakhstan ties are optimum indication of eroding of overwhelmingly dominant position of Russia in the region, although Astana has always tried to be on cordial terms with Russia in the wake of USSR's disintegration and its independence in 1991 (Higgins, 2018). It remains a reality that Kazakhstan cannot avoid having affable relationship with Moscow despite its growing economic collaborations with China. An analyst of Russian foreign policy, Samuel Ramani, argues that Astana does not have any choice in this matter as it will put it into Crimea like calamity by Russia (Ramani). Same kind of propositions was made by American Enterprise Institute (AEI) through a report (Gorenburg, 2018) released at same time President Nazarbayev visited US in January 2018 to meet his counterpart.

According to well-known report, (Tannenbaum, 1997) The Eurasian Land Bridge: the "new ilk Road—Locomotive for worldwide economic development, published some 20 years ago, the author talked about the Eurasian connectivity through infrastructure development as a 'locomotive engine' of economic progress despite the socio-political chaos in the region. The report criticized that Anglo-American geo-politician such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, tend to focus and highlight Eurasian continent for massive destabilization targeting the most vulnerable points like South-Central Asia, near east, Caucuses and Balkans. Given the circumstances such allegations were made some 20 years ago against the well know policy advisor in US is an indication of 'geo-strategic and economic' importance of Eurasian land bridge for US policy makers.

As president Xi outlined in his Belt and Road international Forum address in 2017 (Yamei, 2017):

History is the best teacher. The history (of the ancient Silk Road) showed us that we can move along with mutual respect and development and towards the future of happiness, peace and harmony if we bravely walk the first step...The countries along the ancient Silk Road were once placed with milk and honey, but now are full of turbulence, conflicts, and crisis. Such conditions must be addressed. We must have mutual cooperation, and a sustainable security outlook, try to tackle hot issues and insist on a political resolution.

Bruno Maçães in his 2018 book *Dawn of Eurasia* argued that the age of reconciliation in post-cold war dynamics brought Europe back together, although, not in a perfect way. The opening of China to global economic system happened in same decade in which a unified Germany appeared on world map. Both digital (software) and physical (hardware) infrastructure combined with deep chain values led to a valuable combination for effective development i.e. starts of neo-globalization. China through BRI, strive to be firmly in control in post-cold-war era new economic

linkages started to develop and old ideological battles lost their importance in shaping international politics. The Eurasia has emerged as new geographic entity. The revival of old silk route the return of old age but Bruno argues that it is dawn of new age (Macaes, 2018).

The most important spill over effect of this new age is for Russia – a renewed importance- as core of Eurasian super connectivity can redefine its regional and global status in power dynamics. Looking at Asia as center of Russia's larger regional and global goals is rather a new development instead of looking at it as backyard of world. Although Russia has outlined some counter plans like European economic Union (EEU) but till now it has not been able to create the same impact as BRI. Given the circumstances it seems quite viable, that Russia can maintain its powerful position by being a major player in China's BRI particularly through NELB.

In this era of Eurasian integration, primarily being materialized through BRI, it is vital to observe the nature of integration. All the states involved in NELB might be at different stage of development. But they tend to integrate on common goals. Statements from Chinese leadership depict a trend which tends to master modern technology and society without adhering to western politico-economic and social systems.

US, UK, Russia, India and Japan will have to redefine their roles in global power play on the basis of rules set by China through BRI. The smaller beneficiary states like CARs, East Asian states and Pakistan will truly bear the fruit of win-win cooperation if they act vigilantly. Significant input in research department by US policy makers is yet another indication of how seriously US is taking BRI, although there is continuous denial of China's success and rise on international platform. Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is one such example, which is producing a very organized research through its project "Reconnecting Asia" and "China Power" about how China's BRI is re-shaping the world and what should be the policy choices of competing powers. It is collaborating with other institutions too like top universities of UK to sponsor projects like "Across Eurasia in 60 days- A new Silk Road" in which group of academic researchers will travel from London-Yiwu touching all important nodes in NELB (Stevens, 2018).

The intellectual discourse on China's BRI from every part of world signifies the success of China's plan as indication of how readily the seventy involved countries have embraced the opportunity of economic integration. The policy makers, advisors to policy makers, think tanks, academia, business sector and many other stakeholders are writing and discussing the different facets of BRI. As in the current circumstances, US withdrawal from Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) under Trump administration and major changes in trade, environment and immigration policies at domestic level, concerns exist about the credibility of US global leadership role. At the same time China has clearly expressed the intention to take on more proactive global role during the new era of globalization to boost economic and social connectivity among states to support multilateralism. As Chinese state media stated unanimously in January 2018, that President Xi can take full credit in shaping the theme of world Economic Forum in Davos in 2018 i.e. "Creating a Shared Future in Fractured World". Seeking the partnership with Europe seems a logical decision in this matter, as its domestic compulsions do not allow it to lead the world single-handedly. It is an opportunity to create a common platform, not only for China and Europe but others as well from Africa to Scandinavian states, to integrate their individual development strategies with that of China. Central Asia which is also called the "fulcrum of New Silk Road" is going to receive the most valuable impact.

Shambugh (2014), argued in his book *China Goes Global*, that BRI is one of the most significant global development of recent times though he too is of view that certain domestic and international factors are hindering the China's way to be global power.

Andrew Small has also argued in that OBOR is Chinese plan to hail its strategic goals through it economic might. He asserts that through its plan of railroads, pipelines, ports will expand commercially as well as link whole Eurasia with extensive infrastructure plan and hence will lay down the basis of Sino-Centric World. He also clarified that within the whole Eurasian belt "South Asia" is the most promising region to attain its target and the most important one for China as well as CPEC is the ultimate connection between belt and road in BRI (Small, 2018). It is worth mentioning here that a Russian analyst also look towards this corridor as 'zipper' of pan-Eurasian integration (Korybko, 2015).

Conclusion

At the centre of China's economic diplomacy, BRI tends to achieve deeper integration of China in global economy while staying intact to its traditional politico-social system. When we say deeper, it's more than trade flow and investment tactics. It is the combination of commercial and cultural integration. Although named as initiative, it is a grand strategy to accommodate the changing international and domestic dynamics of China. To achieve global integration, one has to achieve the regional integration, and China is attaining that well, through all corridors under BRI which will ultimately lead to 'Greater Eurasia'. In this study, focus is on NELB but one cannot deny the importance of other regions like Middle East and Africa (MENA region) as prominent player in greater quest of global peace and integration. Europe as final destination of both SREB and MSRI is crucial political and economic partner. This vital strategic partnership emerged on global geo-political map when there was a lot of uncertainty towards multilateral cooperation mechanism mainly due to the policy re-orientation of major powers like US and UK. At the same time intra-regional geo-strategic conflict among many Asian and Middle Eastern states are also of great concern.

As President Xi remarked in Davos, "As long as we keep to the goal of building a community of shared future for mankind and work hand in hand to fulfil our responsibilities and overcome difficulties, we will be able to create a better world and deliver better lives for our peoples" (Yamei, 2017).

The concept of shared future and shared growth will be prevalent in China led world but it is up to other players too, how they determine their rightful share in this growth. Vigilant and proactive policies are needed and synergy in policy making apparatuses is required. Because despite the well-defined BRI plan, it is still a realist world where every state has to maximize its own interests, just like China is paving its way for its own global and domestic goals. Geography has and will continue to play the crucial role in foreign policy choices of states and it is up to the efficient leadership of CARS especially in case of NELB. Russia, Poland and Belarus are already making their mark in this project to get maximum benefits from geo-strategic opportunity that has come to their way. So in this new integration era where China is trying to re- draw regional and international boundaries, countries like Russia, India, Iran, Turkey and Japan are trying to promote their own visions of regional integration. The positive outcome is contrasting the post 9/11 world where the choices were to cooperate and collaborate for military operations, world is now cooperating and collaborating for shared growth and shared prosperity.

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Dynamics of Immigration: From Humanitarianism to Securitization

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Abstract

According to Realism, International Law allowed for immigration on the pretext of humanitarianism. However, since 9/11, constructivism has set in replacing humanitarianism with securitization. Host countries which had open immigration policies are now seeking secure borders for their citizens, hence significantly controlling the immigration inflow. Immigration and security have now become complimentary, a development revealed through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) which was recently merged with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Europeans have followed suit by being labeled as 'Fortress Europe' with stricter inflow to their borders. (Brandon, 2009). The paper addresses different aspects of the politics of immigration primarily the underlying factors that motivate, force or pressurize people to move from their country of origin to new abodes in foreign nations. Recent statistics show that migration has speedily spiked in the past decade and a half, reaching 244 million in 2015 from 222 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. The majority of migrants opt for Europe or Asia, making it two thirds of the migrant population (76 million and 75 million respectively). North America falls in third for the next highest number of migrants (54 million). The first part of this paper focuses on sovereign states and factors that place a burden on immigration for them. Then the history of immigration and post-war resettlement is viewed, and in the last part of the paper factors in on securitization and Muslim migrant issues are addressed.

Keywords

International law, realism, constructivism, immigration, securitization, humanitarianism

Introduction: State and the Burden of Immigration

Immigration policies are multifaceted and hence the followers and opponents of different types of immigration policies vary according to their priorities. Mark Ellis states that the geography of immigrants in the United States crosses with a federalized system for distributing welfare and other social costs of immigration. This gives rise to friction between the central and local government. The central government in this case is responsible for admission of immigrants into the country whereas the local

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governments undertake the management of social costs of immigrant inclusion (Ellis, 2005).

Snyder Michael sees immigration to the UK and especially to London has snowballed in recent years; London now stands in competition to New York and Toronto for diverse populations. The migrants are primarily young and hold diversity in their skills and countries of origin. However, one key factor which attributes to London's economy is the difference between immigrants originating from richer countries and those from poorer countries. Both categories of immigrants are reasonably well qualified but most of those from richer countries are likely to exit the country, while those from poorer countries are more likely to stay for a longer duration. This prolonged tenure of their stay then leads to a long-term population growth both directly and through their UK-born children (Snyder, 2007).

Nina Schulzek states that asylum seekers are primarily attracted to social democratic welfare states because of the benevolent welfare supplies and lack of employment opportunities, whereas the labor migrant edges away from such facilities in order to access the labor market (Schulzek, 2012). Freeman holds the view that existing literature on immigration extensively focuses on western nations and non-western nations are primarily considered as 'sending countries' (Freeman, n.d.). Michael Greenstone and Adam Looney elaborate the economic effects of immigration fluctuate immensely, depending on whether immigrants are untrained agricultural workers, or extremely skilled PhD computer scientists (Greenstone, 2010).

Historical Background

London, the capital of the once great British Empire on which the sun never set, started off as a city of foreigners since Roman rule. It was a commerce hub back in those days. However, with the demise of the Roman Empire in the 5th century, London's inhabitants were no longer immigrants but natural born citizens. With the institution of English rule by King Alfred, a span of fruitfulness for business ushered, leading to increased travelling through this trading center of merchants, diplomats and even servants. Lombard Street, a banking center took its name after Lombard tradesmen who settled there from the north of Italy in the 12th century. Between the 15th and 16th century there was almost a doubling of foreigners in the British capital, which intermittently angered the local residents due to the advantages granted to those 'visitors'. However the monarchy welcomed this influx as certain advantages came along with it - such as the avenues for accelerated tax collection. London became a center for trade and thrived as a cosmopolitan city even before the Reformation. By the mid of the 17th century there was a considerable growth in the number of immigrants, most of whom were fleeing religious persecution, such as anti-Semitism. Continental Europe hence, became a rescue location for the 'needy'. A direct impact of this expansion of foreigners was manifest in the form of increased expenses, making London one of the most expensive places in the entire continent. However it was not all about expenditure or high wages, the economy took a boost and more merchants became increasingly active in the emerging city (Snyder, 2007).

In the 19th century there was an increased influx of foreigners in London due to the famine in nearby Ireland. The Jewish number also swelled, primarily due to people fleeing the persecution in the surrounding region such as Poland and Russia.

Many Russian and Polish migrants achieved success in business as they continued to settle and made a life for themselves in the new country of their residence. Hence London was not simply a place of refuge for the oppressed; rather it became a business hub and a center of attraction for tourists and the elite (Snyder, 2007).

Post-war Resettlement

The period after the Second World War –brought widespread migration; most people sought refuge due to political victimization which had huge financial impacts. These impacts primarily included a splurge for the labour force in West Germany which continued to increase until the erection of the Wall between East and West Germany (Snyder, 2007). The breakdown of nationalities and the respective countries they mostly flocked to, is as follows: Turks took to Germany, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis flee to England, Algerians to France and Moroccans to Spain and France (Boylan, 2009). For the UK, its immigrants were primarily from former British colonies. That is to say, that it had to host, influx of immigrants moving in from Africa alongside those coming in from South Asia (Peach, 2007). Pakistanis in Britain however, are in the lead and a majority of them come from Azad Kashmir, specifically from Mirpur, an agro-based area. After two decades the Bangladeshis followed the lead. They primarily come from Sylhet; mostly a peasant region (Peach, 2007).

The 1950s and 1960s labor immigration was encouraged by North European nations who saw it as a tool for financial prosperity. For London, the 1960s saw a different influx of migrants, the ‘non-white’ flow infiltrating from South Asia. Many Pakistanis were ‘welcomed’ for accepting ‘unwanted’ jobs, which led immigrants in the north of England away from London. For production of products, inexpensive labor by off-shoring work became the preferable means for supplies to be traded (Snyder, 2007). Interestingly, a contradiction about the Muslim population in Britain is that even though they do not hold a strong economic status on the whole, they serve as exemplary role models socially, given the fact that they have strong family units (Peach, 2007).

The late 1980s witnessed migration on a much more heterogeneous level in Western Europe from war torn countries in Eastern Europe and the developing world. The information obtained by these migrants was from a more global media and communication with earlier migrants. London has most definitely been on the forefront of an increase in immigration since the past two decades receiving nearly 40 percent of the overall inflow. This amounts to three times its demographic share, reflecting a truly metropolitan culture (Snyder, 2007). Immigration has affected the following cities the most in order of greatest to least number of migrants: New York, Toronto, Dubai, Los Angeles, London, Amsterdam, Vancouver, Sydney, Miami and Melbourne (Snyder, 2007).

Securitization

Securitization on the borders is three-pronged, namely global, regional and domestic. At the international level securitization is limited, due to the fact that the different countries have different norms and diverse political climates where migration might not always be viewed as a security challenge. Hence, similar immigration policy is not likely. That said, in the aftermath of 9/11, somewhat alike migration policies are

on board; the foremost premise being that every Muslim is a possible terrorist. From the regional perspective, uniformity of securitization is again highly unlikely even for a regional entity like the European Union. This is so due to a simple reason that is that each country has its own priorities in the political and economic domains. Also, there is an imbalance in the flow of migrants. Lastly, diversity of perceptions towards migration impede the development of a consolidated securitization policy. At the local level, securitization takes place either by a single actor, for instance a political party or by multiple actors such as any political party, a religious unit and the media. The gravest threat lies in the securitization entity being unable to determine with discretion who poses a security threat and who doesn't; leading to the misguided generalization that all immigrants pose a terror threat. The negative impact of such securitization is the increase of racial discrimination and dislike of foreigners amidst the locals augmenting right-wing parties and neo-Nazi movements. An example of this intolerance can be seen in Greece where the neo-Nazi entity 'Χρυσή Αυγή' (Golden Dawn) has called for every expatriate to leave, pleading that each immigrant leads to unemployment for Greeks; a scenario all too familiar for places such as France, Canada and the Scandinavian countries (Themistocleous, 2013). The immigration resentment is not limited to these places. There have been open messages to foreigners in the Netherlands from Mark Rutte, the Prime Minister contending that both the expatriates adjust to the Dutch lifestyle or leave; in no manner will their dissent of the Dutch norms and lifestyle be tolerated (Henley, 2017). Such instances reflect the implementation of Constructivism into immigration policies.

While we discuss borders, globalization needs to be considered as a major concern in the present age. Globalization is a phenomenon that has ushered a post-geographical era. Although the world population is spread across the globe yet, news, events, communication, reactions are globally vibrant within seconds. Such occurrences apparently dilute states' sovereignty. Huge capitalist companies are not restricted to their home ground and domestic markets; they penetrate into the globe, leading to production and consumption globally (Cox, n.d.). With such apparent economic benefits, the question that must be addressed is that what has caused the shift in immigration policies from globalization and humanitarianism back to realism and securitization? Interestingly, the grandeur of sovereignty and rights to securitize one's borders has been revisited since 9/11. The hyper-reinforcement of boundary security is championed in countries where immigrants are keen to enter. The European Union internally is more porous but externally there are tighter border controls. This transformation has resulted in the exemption of passport procedures amongst EU countries, while entry into 'Fortress Europe' is more stringent. Globalization however, has not mitigated the right to citizenship, a right especially coveted where social welfare benefits exist. Such privileges prevail to become causes of immigration. The US-Mexico border presents its own pros and cons. Despite the fact that immigration to the US is becoming increasingly stringent; it is an accepted fact that numerous unlawful Mexican immigrants are the source of survival for the employers of California and Texas. It remains a paradox, for economic convenience, borders are diluted but for securitization all laws and rules are upheld with the highest of obligations (Cox, n.d.).

Muslim Migrant Issues

Issues of immigration are steadily making their way to the top of agenda priorities. Post 9/11, Muslim societies in the United States and Europe have been under tight scrutiny. The blame of the attacks resting on Muslims has led their entire belief system and actions to come under the microscope. There is apparently a contrast to the treatment Muslims face in the US as opposed to Europe. European Muslims take tougher repercussions due to some of the following reasons:

- The US is a country founded on the principles of a new settlement, whereas such concepts in Europe are not politically accepted.
- Muslims cling to their religious practices which distinguish them from an openly secular Europe.
- Muslims who migrate to the US tend to spread throughout the country and obtain good qualifications or succeed as merchants, opposed to Muslims in Western Europe who more or less assemble in enclaves and are comparatively less influential than their Muslim American counterparts (Ezzarqui, n.d.).

Post 9/11 terror attacks reveal that the offenders were not destitute individuals seeking monetary gains, rather educated youngsters with potentials for bright futures from various countries. What is especially troubling is when second generation British born Muslims adopt extremist ideologies (Inglehart, & Norris, 2009). The concept that integration is the solution to eradicate extremism is found to be contrary, if we take Omar Shaikh, the renowned British Muslim guilty of terrorism, he went to an elite private British school and not to any religious Muslim school. One of the 9/11 hijackers Zacarias Moussaoui has been described by his brother as having a non-religious rearing and his first entry into a mosque was in Britain in his mature years. These examples serve to relay that the socially integrated individuals are equally prone to terrorism. Interestingly, a Gallup survey reveals that Muslims in the UK display more confidence in their government and other agencies of the country in contrast to other UK citizens (Winter, 2007).

To a large extent internet is held responsible for this extremist ideology the youth edge towards. Cyberspace is believed to have filled the vacuum that individuals encounter when facing an identity crisis. Studies also suggest that some radicalized youngsters turn to extremism in the course of finding solace against the people who hold disregard for Muslims in general. This transnational space which is not monitored rears intense hatred and enlistment of future terrorists (Winter, 2007). A Pew survey revealed the American Muslim youth consider themselves to be Muslims first and then Americans (Barrett, 2007). However it is necessary to point out that no European Muslim has carried out an act of terrorism directly after his transnational space encounter and that personal contact has remained a pre-requisite for recruitment of such acts. One advantage of this type of enrollment is that these sites can be monitored with those possessing the required language skills. As heated discussions continue about maintaining a balance between civil freedom and increasing surveillance, the UK has taken measures for more securitization such as expanding its personnel in the M15 by 50 percent with a strong focus on employing Urdu, Arabic, Farsi speaking individuals; France has also made efforts in the same direction, but

other countries such as Germany and Spain are lagging in this area. The European welfare set-up allows immigrants survival means without employment whereas the US does not offer such generous 'gains'. The immigrants have to instead, work for the American dream. Geneive Abdo, an author and reputed journalist notes that more females are donning the *hijab* and increased Muslim youth are flocking to Islamic schools, owning their Muslim identity, sensing that assimilation is futile. One Muslim female shared with Abdo that certain people of her religion go to all ends to fit in, they drink and go on courtships, however her main apprehension was losing her modesty in the midst of her assimilation (Barrett, 2007).

Muslim Student Association (MSA) reflects hard core beliefs which frown on US foreign policy and Israel; alongside statistics reveal a visible increase in hate crimes recorded by Muslim organizations (Barrett, 2007). Moderate Muslim leaders walk a tightrope where they desire their communities to integrate into their respective adopted societies and at the same time do not want to be perceived as unfaithful by radicals of their faith. After the 9/11 attacks, financial support for Islamic religious causes has dipped primarily due to fear of being traced to terrorism (Winter, 2007). Another heated debate in Germany is that whether their law-abiding denizens who hold opinions opposed to German values and norms should have their citizenship revoked or not be granted citizenship if they are awaiting it? German authorities continue to ponder how to integrate Muslim leaders and religious organizations with *Leitkultur* ('German values'). If a comparison be drawn between the integration policies of France and Germany, a defence line for Germany is that France has generated generations of 'français de papier' ('officially French') without creating 'français-de-coeur' ('wholeheartedly French') (Laurence, n.d.). The US also takes issue with extremism in Europe apprehending there is a threat that these European passport holders can penetrate their terrorist intents on US soil, leading to a conflict between the transatlantic partners. Governments have taken action against radical imams accused of hate speech. France and Germany have deported those accused of such incitement. France has revoked the license of the Lebanese *al Manar* TV network guilty of spreading hatred and aggression. Europe aims to train imams schooled in the West as currently most of these religious leaders are 'imported' to these western countries. Such efforts however have led radical imams to go underground.

Prisons are another terrorist recruiting ground and are considered incubators for processing hard core terrorists. Criminals accused of petty crimes and drug accusations become indoctrinated and eventually get recruited to terrorist organizations. The US has started to segregate prisoners who are suspected radicals. However, Europeans have not followed this policy and continues to place such prisoners together, with the hope of rehabilitation, something they need to reevaluate. European prison authorities are also incompetent in their efforts to monitor suspects due to language barriers and not monitoring those who leave prison.

Countries where terror threats are on high alert, especially both sides of the Atlantic, have Muslim immigrants on the rise. Moreover the existing Muslims who have already acquired the respective countries' citizenship have a higher birth rate than non-Muslim families (Archick et al., 2011). The aging white Western European populace will lead to an increase of 'foreign' labor requirements. This vacuum will

likely be filled by the exploding and unemployed population of North Africa, Eastern Europe and Russia which provides means of unlawful migration. Another source of labor force are extended family members, for instance, statistics reveal that 50 percent of naturalized Pakistanis in Britain resort to marrying Pakistanis who then take on British citizenship (Modood, 2012). Consequences of Muslim progeny are that they are sometimes discontented and in spite of being European passport holders. In essence, they fail to integrate with their adopted country, leading to the ‘breeding of Osama bin Ladens’. Some suggest the solution to such mushrooming is the communal assimilation of these potential ‘lone wolves’ (Boylan, 2009). Although assimilation is welcomed for the results it ought to produce, the application of it is definitely contrary. For instance, in France wearing of *hijab* is not welcomed and hence such discrimination has its own fall-outs. The French secular status implemented a ban on all noticeable religious signs in schools such as crosses, Jewish yarmulkes and Sikh turbans in order to allow integrity amongst pupils. In contrast to this policy, the UK, Finland and Italy advocate tolerance of religious icons in public locations in order to support a multicultural strategy, stating that citizens have the right to live as hyphenated British-Muslims. Although the exact statistics for the Muslim population are not available since many European countries do not include a religion column in their census, one thing is for sure, the Muslim population is on a rapid rise in Europe (Peach, n.d.).

Holland’s replica of Donald Trump, right-wing Geert Wilders is adamant about his views regarding the negative impact of Muslims in his country. Although Wilders has been convicted of provoking prejudice through hate speech and many of his countrymen are in disagreement of his views, the Brexit and Trump’s victory predicted that Wilders would win the March 15th 2017 elections (Hjelmgaard, 2017). To the relief of many, Wilders did not win. However, he gained an increased number of seats and has explicitly stated that it is not the end of him (Graham, 2017). Wilders in his election campaign had even stated that he would ban the holy Islamic book, and further close down all Muslim places of worship. The threat of Islam to the Netherlands and whether the Dutch have done their share to safeguard their culture was a topic of discussion during the election debates. A recent survey revealed that Dutch Muslims, mostly with Turkish and Moroccan roots no longer feel at home in the Netherlands. The entire publicity during the election campaign was about Muslims, forcing Muslims to feel they are under surveillance, constantly being targeted as outcastes, so much so that they chose to address themselves as Moroccans rather than Dutch Moroccans. Interestingly, the physical color of a person has become very relevant, if one is white or not, white voters harbor resentment for immigrants’ posterity who have advanced up the social rungs of society (Bahceli, 2017). Furthermore, Turkey’s inclusion into the European Union has not been welcomed by all. Opponents consider the EU to be somewhat of a ‘Christian club’ so a Muslim nation’s integration signals to a possible clash of civilizations (Ezzarqui, n.d.).

The internal struggles within the Muslim community also have their toll. The Shia, Sunni divide and the spread of the Saudi Salafi/Wahhabi ideology, perceived as less tolerant, has greatly contributed to tarnishing the Muslim image worldwide. Where all responses have been weighed in, the following may also be worth mentioning, Donald Trump revealed in one of his addresses that Kausar Mohammed,

a young performer from California has sung a song 'Dangerous Muslim' with the message that Trump's rhetoric for Muslims may actually prove contradictory. The youth wishes to address Islamophobia and desires that all Muslims should not be categorized according to the stereotypes of the West (Kuruvilla, 2017).

Immigration in Other Regions

Apprehensions about migration overviews indicate that there are often outdated migration policies and since the rapid growth of terrorism there are increased limitations on welcoming foreigners. In the Persian Gulf, western foreigners comprise one-third to one-fourth of the working foreign population. They are financially strong but still not integrated. In contrast, the large South Asian and the Southeast Asian workforce, in spite of spending extended durations in the Gulf countries are not granted rights for permanent residency or citizenship. In Asia, immigration is a low political priority and not a topic in the limelight as in North America and Western Europe. Varied immigration responses swing from almost complete denial to active acceptance. South America has inter-regional migration, mostly pushed by factors such as financial and economic advancement along with some situations of political unrest. Argentina, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Mexico are key destinations for migrants from the same continent. Latin America also lacks in granting due legal standing to migrants, which hinders their options of finding stable work. Africa, due to its increasing poverty, rural people are forced to flee to cities in search of better employment. The widespread effect of AIDS on the economy and the increased civil strife has impacted the flow of people within the region (Ezzarqui, n.d.).

Conclusion

Asylum seekers are prone to choose welfare states for their country of destination for fear of being unemployed and not being granted work permits and because these social democratic welfare states provide benevolent welfare supplies. Labor migrants are more likely to be inclined to countries where welfare benefits are not widespread as such 'advantages' deter market efficiency and locating a working slot does not come with ease. The corporatist welfare state has claimed that both types of immigrants are definitely pulled by this welfare regime because considerably high welfare conditions along with market-based regulations have an advantageous blend for forced as well as economic migrants. The liberal welfare states contrary to common belief do not have a magnetic force for labor migrants, in spite of the perception that their economic policies pull migrants. The reason for this rejection is possibly their welfare benefits being too marginal (Schulzek, 2012).

An emerging immigration trend is "citizenship by investment". As countries become more stringent with their immigration laws, a budding and widespread industry is offering an alternative to citizenship through paying a handsome fee. This fee is paid in the form of property deals, businesses or donations to a nation's government, all in exchange for a visa or a passport. The most popular destination is the Caribbean with its golden beaches, where there is no outrageous investment plus the laws are more welcoming. Besides such magnets for investment, another factor to score points as the most sought after nation by immigrants is by evaluating which country has the most visa-free destinations on its passport. At the moment, Germany takes this distinction. Andrew Henderson, an American businessman is acquiring his

fifth citizenship, stating that such opportunities provide him reduced taxes and improved treatment. Such initiatives however, are not without their share of controversy. US senator Dianne Feinstein has introduced a bill to eliminate the EB-5 programmer, stating that it is not acceptable to sell citizenship rights to the rich, while millions tirelessly await their visa destinies (Beck, 2017).

As for securitization, Mark McIntosh & Steven Bogden state that Trump's immigration policy is three-fold, whereby its first target is US boundary protection, which is primarily directed towards a wall being erected on the Mexican border. Secondly, Trump aims to augment the assets and authority of the Federal law agency and thirdly, Trump desires to reduce immigration in order to adjust the US employee in the local market, due to a salary increase (McIntosh & Bogden, 2016). In regard to the Muslim factor, Leila Ezzarqui regards the compulsory courses and tests in the native language of the host nation as deliberated procedures towards integration. These are important but they are not mechanisms for integration and they should not overshadow pressing issues catering to education, health etc. (Ezzarqui, n.d.). Katrine Anspaha supports the fact that previously Muslims in Europe had little impact on EU's foreign policy however since the Global War on Terror, the Islamic factor cannot be overlooked and European decision makers need to make conscious efforts to make the Muslims inclusive to their policies (Anspaha, 2008).

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Essay: Protection of Civilians (POC) During War

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Introduction

It was anticipated that the end of cold war will herald the general state of positive peace and the world will yield the benefits of 'peace dividend', but it didn't happen. Between 1989 and 2000, more than 4 million people died in violent conflicts. Gupta, Clements, Bhattacharya, and Chakravarti (2002) noted that international terrorist attacks increased from yearly count of 342, during 1995-1999, to 387 per year during 2000-2001. Underdeveloped and developing countries bore the major brunt of the violence. Conflicts, that were ideological and having their roots in power management were largely resolved through the diplomatic statecraft or through use of military force. However, the conflicts that were unconventional in nature grew and gave rise to more complex and multidimensional intrastate conflicts. The new dimension in these conflicts can be identified through common features that generally include the use and spread of violence on the civilians causing great loss of life and serious breaches in the international humanitarian law (IHL). The history of IHL can be traced to the work of Henry Dunant and Guillaume-Henri Dufour in 1860s (ICRC, 2017). This law has a deep rooted connection with the discourse of the protection of the civilians. For its application, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is playing a key role in the implementation along with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The term 'protection' also encompasses the fragments of international refugee convention and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). As a result of these institutions implementing the 'protection', their mandates are clear in its manifestation and operational strategies. They have developed themselves as the 'lawfully oriented, diplomatic and influential engagement with national state and non-state actors'.

This essay will focus on the importance of protection of civilians by the armed forces in connection with the international institutions. It will also highlight the role of civil society and different sections of the civilians and how they are affected during the war. Last part will deal with the recommendations and conclusion.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

It is very important to talk on the sensitive topic of protection of the civilians in today's world. For soldiers, protecting the civilians has never been something to think

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about or something to reflect upon. It is what they are assigned to do. It is the part of their training which ultimately translates as their second nature. Soldiers, wear uniform for the purpose of protecting their own countrymen and civilians. This is something which is understood since the time when being a soldier became a profession. Soldiers protect villages, they protect towns, and when they even work for other armies and other countries, they are still expected in performing the task of protecting the civilians. Being a soldier, it is understood that when called upon to perform the peace keeping missions, there are certain set rules that need to be followed and certain duties that need to be performed for a successful mission. The advancement in other facets of warfare and its changed nature from interstate to intrastate, brought changes in the innate features of peace keeping missions as well. Peace keepers are now deployed to separate two parties in a conflict, parties which were exploiting the civilians by using them as a shield, or to exploit the gains of war and conflict.

With the passage of time, these issues and certain atrocities such as Rwanda took place and resulted in the UN talking about and coming up with the concept of the right to protect commonly called as R2P (UNRIC). The same concept later on evolved into two sub-concepts; protection of civilians and robust peacekeeping as it relates to peace keeping today. In this paper we will only be reflecting upon the prospect of protection of civilians. More precisely, R2P involves three explicit pillars: (1) the protection responsibilities of the state; (2) international assistance and capacity building; and 3) timely and decisive response (UNGA, 2009).

Protecting civilians based on international humanitarian law, human rights and the refugee law has become a norm. But when we look at the resolutions of these peace keeping missions, we find that the mandate of protecting civilians comes somewhere either in the middle or below the middle in the list of the mandates which have been given to the missions (UNGA, 2009). This shows actually how the Security Council looks at its tasks. Having including that, the Security Council simply washed its hands of PoC (Protection of Civilians) as it has been included in the mandate and the responsibility of the Security Council is over. No one questions if the mandate is doable or the sufficient resources been allotted for the task. On the slightest incident happening in a mission starting from the secretary general, his special representative and the force commander are called up to answer as to why civilians were victimized. It stops at the force commander; it does not include the police commissioner. The DPKO issued a concept note in 2009 on protection of civilians and its policy in April 2015, and in February, the implementing guidelines for the military contingents (DPKO, 2015). The compliance with this policy under the overall authority of the head of mission is mandatory for all civilian police and military personnel working in the peace keeping mission.

Protection of Civilians (PoC)

Protection of Civilians (PoC) implies using all necessary means up to and including the use of deadly force. It starts from negotiations that is talking to each other, and goes on to the use of deadly force aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians. Generally it starts with threats and goes on to the actual act of physical violence within the capabilities and the area of operation of the mission. If it is beyond the capabilities, it simply implies hands off; do not do it and without prejudice to responsibility of the host government.

The guiding principles for protection of civilians are by a set of legal and practical principles rooted in the UN charter and international law. They have their

priority mandate in any circumstance that makes it the primary responsibility of the governments. To fulfill this responsibility, governments ensure the presence of peacekeepers and make them responsible for the protection of civilians in the conflict or war prone area. Peacekeepers are thus on the active duty to protect the civilians amidst all the conflict between the warring parties. These peacekeepers are under the effective command and control unit to ensure the regular and operative accomplishment of the mission. The mission to ensure the protection of civilians is always consistent with the principles of peacekeeping. Thus the whole mission activity is synchronized to have a comprehensive approach as to achieve maximum results in minimum time.

These peacekeepers responsible for the protection of civilians work in cooperation with other humanitarian actors and civil society and in respect of humanitarian principles followed. This is an approach to include the common public in these activities as well. This will make it a community based approach of protection of the civilians. In the process of keeping the protection of the civilians, one important factor is kept in mind i.e. the gender perspective. Peacekeepers keep this in mind that there are places and situations where certain genders (especially women) are more vulnerable to violence than the others, so they have to act accordingly. Along with the gender perspective, children are also of great importance in these activities. Child rights and its protection are ensured as the mainstream concerns. The emphasis is laid to make the mission a wholesome activity; a comprehensive approach in cooperation with humanitarian actors, and in respect of humanitarian principles, a community based approach undertaken with gender perspective in mainstream and child protection concerns.

When the comprehensiveness of PoC is discussed, there is a three tier of action. The three tiers are mutually accommodating and reinforcing and as such should be implemented simultaneously in accordance with specific mandates in light of the circumstances on the ground. There is no inherent hierarchy or sequencing between these actions under all three tiers should emphasize prevention and preemption as well as of the host state's responsibility to protect civilians. In the first tier, protection through dialogue and engagement is ensured. This is the initial phase where the peacekeepers focus on dialogues to protect the civilians from the conflicting parties. They make sure that the conflicting parties keep away the civilians from their conflict thus ensuring their protection. This phase is the most delicate phase, where the peacekeepers work to establish dialogues between the two conflicting parties so that their rivalry doesn't harm the public. After ensuring the protection of civilians through dialogue, the peacekeepers or soldiers move towards the second tier that is the physical protection of the civilians. This provision of physical protection is the step to make sure that no civilian gets in the way of the rivalry between the conflicting parties. Then they move on to the third tier, in which the peacekeepers or soldiers work on the establishment of the protective environment.

PoC has an operational phases that is divided into four sub phases; prevention, prevention, response and consolidation. And these phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously and/or independently.

Shortfalls in PoC

The gaps and shortcomings of the PoC start with the planning process. The planning process for the individual missions is generally unaware of the kinds of protection or to whom it should be provided and from what and within what limits. Thus, the result

of the prevailing confusion about council intent and the gap in the guideline guidance is that UN mandates to protect civilians are not effectively translated into operational strategies. The impact of the lack of clarity on the planning process has effects for mission resources as well because the operational requirements for missions to implement protection of civilian's mandates have not been described. The parts of the planning process that focuses on securing resources do not account for the additional resource demands associated with the protection of civilians. Thereby, compounding the challenges for mission is once they reach the field. The majority of the current UN peace keeping operations does not have the mission wide strategies and address protection of civilians either as a day to day plan to tally mission assets to reduce violence and threats to civilians or to respond to crisis.

Some missions have started developing indigenous tools and strategies but mainly they are being conceived and elaborated on ad-hoc basis. There was a mission in Liberia in which sixteen missions would have a meeting of the force commander once a year. In all missions it was assumed and left as a task only for the military to resolve. There was no mention in any of the sixteen missions of a strategy or a concept or a planning process which involved the whole mission. That means the absence of involvement of senior leadership, the civilian staff of the mission and the police component, and it was assumed the military would do it.

A topic which has always been a taboo with the UN for a long time, the UN was averse to the use of the word intelligence in missions (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016). They called it information gathering. However, though late but it has been taken to be implied as an important component which would lead to threat assessments and allow planning in missions to take place. Therefore, the need for better information and intelligence specifically in relation to protection of civilian yet varies, inconsistent models exist. While the developed effective strategies that protect civilians, most missions do not have sufficient capacities to collect and analyze the information needed to address the day to day threats nor to predict the potential crisis that could lead to rapid escalations of violence.

A word about leadership; senior civilian and military mission leaders alike demonstrate no consistency in their level of understanding or the relative prioritization of the issue of the PoC. Where leaders do grasp the issue, plans and strategies emerge even with a substantive section in the mission dedicated to the protection of civilians. Senior leaderships will be decisive as to whether and how protection of civilians is addressed. A word about resources; in addition to leadership, the mission needs the requisite structure and capacity to develop and implement protection strategies. Again no consistent approach exists. Neither the best mandate nor the best led mission is likely to succeed if the operation is not designed and resourced to support its objective.

A few more of the short comings; the military component in a mission is invariably deployed based on political considerations. It does not take into account the military aspects and the military response planning which would dictate the response of the mission troops to various contingencies in the missions. Early warning systems are practically non-existent and they have to be developed individually by the contingents on their own. Flexibility and mobility in a high threat environment is very essential where protection of civilians is concerned. The response has to be on a 24-hour basis. A special component of various battalions should be ready to respond immediately. And most importantly, missions need air lift capacities to be able to move the troops from point A to point B.

Since contingencies do not exist, so the related crisis planning and response is absent. Cooperation with host country security services remains the concept or the mindset that it is a primary host country responsibility is what dictates and they can direct the peace keepers in the areas where they want them to operate. They tend to shy away from coming up with a joint response where the host country's security services are also incorporated.

The community needs confidence building, and the presence of the troops and their interaction with the communities, the ones which it will help out. Public information operations are extremely important. The UNO does establish in each mission area a very elaborate public information system like the UN radio and so on, which can be very effectively used. This concept however, has not yet been fully optimized. Training is left to the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the International Monitoring Teams (IMTs) in the mission, who mostly depend on what is there in theories and in the UN resolution. It does not talk about how the TCCs would respond in various scenarios and changing environment. There are hidden and national troops which continue to impede the response of the troops to various situations. Lastly, police contributing countries have presumed that police Units do not have a role in PoC. This dichotomy needs to be resolved at the conceptual level as soon as possible in order to avoid the internal conflicts.

Recommendations

Merely listing the shortcomings is not the proper way to end it, so some experience based recommendations are given to address the problems.

First and foremost, the enhancement of the operational control of the UN over military contingents, failures to follow PoC instructions issued by a peace keeping mission should be communicated to the UN headquarters for review with the TCCs. Clarification of the peace keeping task at tactical level needs to facilitate and speed up decision making on the ground. PoC is not a military function only, it is a whole mission mandate and includes UN humanitarian agencies, international and local NGOs etc. Improvement of working relationship and coordination with the humanitarian entities is essential.

This dichotomy remains as most of the UN agencies and NGOs assume that if they work in cooperation with UN troops, they would be assumed to be party to a conflict and would not be able to complete their role. Battalions must review the assigned Areas of Responsibility (AoR), undertake an assessment of whether they can undertake the PoC task in the whole AoR with the available resources or otherwise. If additional capabilities are required, they must ask for it. In case if the PoC, task cannot be met for the whole AoR, they must inform the chain of command, prepare contingency plans including reaction time for each situation and scenarios and they must rehearse. They must establish an early warning system in the AoR, coordinate with UN entities and incorporate them in the PoC plan and coordinate with the host country security service, involve local elders and community in collection of information and early warning.

Even the high level report talks about two aspects in relation to peace keeping. The first is to deliver on PoC, the current gap in many missions between the resources and mandates needs to be addressed. Secondly, every peacekeeper, civilian, military and police, must do all they can when civilians are under imminent threat. Political leverage and influence can be more powerful than the military response.

In brief, the UN's legitimacy is challenged every time civilians are at risk. And it continues to be the measure of mission success. Progress has been made in

developing guidance and training materials, and operational concepts for joint protection team, but increasingly dangerous environments require peacekeepers to be proactive and decisive. Static postures are no longer sufficient nor is it enough to protect by mere presence. It is essential for peace keeping to provide proactive protection. This requires a change in mindset among all those who formed the peace keeping partnerships, troops and police contributors as well as UN Security Council and the financial contributors.

Everyone must be on the same page about need to adopt a forward leaning posture. Peace keeping missions need to respond to threats to civilians at tactical, operation and strategic levels. This approach requires mobility, and rapid reaction with new capabilities, modified equipment accommodation and new technology. Force multipliers enabling capacities are central to these efforts. An example in translation of what has been explained above is the new name given to the infantry battalions as the Rapid Mobilization Battalions (RMBs) which could move and deploy wherever they are required.

In South Sudan, the mission rapidly erected PoC sites under tough circumstances, as an example (Global R2P, 2018). In Mali, peacekeepers patrolled the streets and helped repair roads and schools (Ladsous, 2014), in the DRC, the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade has expanded the reach of the mission to protect vulnerable civilians (UNSC, 2013). But such practices need to continue to ensure that peace keeping missions carry on innovating and reforming. Protection of civilians is all about expectations, and unless peace keepers, come up to the expectations of the affected population that they are out there to help, they will always be asked and accounted for as to why they did not respond.

Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

With the advent of globalization, there has been a sharp increase in the transnational, regional and international organizations. With its global reach and impact, media now plays an important role in highlighting the violations of the human rights along with these organizations. They have also showed a great influence in devising the public policy and implementing the international law. It has been observed that during the armed conflicts, the NGOs are the prime source as the voice of the victims of the conflict. They are the one to highlight the violations in the international humanitarian and human rights law. They work hard to generate pressure on the local government and to seek vigorous response from the international community. Similarly, when all the other layers of protection fail, then the domestic civil society comes into force as the main actor. They are not only comprised of the local organizations but also include the extensive network of religious societies, charities, independent activists, trade unions and human rights defenders.

Conclusion

We have seen a very slow process of evolution in the matter of PoC during the wars and conflicts internationally. The cohesion between the international military and peacekeepers along with the humanitarian actors and organizations is filled simultaneously, with numerous opportunities and challenges as well. Initially it was considered as the task of the human right organizations to protect the rights of the civilians during the war. But with the increasing role of UN in resolving conflicts and working on the peacebuilding efforts, it has been emphasized that the military

responsible to neutralize the conflict must also be responsible in protecting the civilians that are caught in the conflicting zones.

Unfortunately, the PoC has always been a low priority objective when considering the military contributions in any mission. The challenge is to transform this low priority objective to a high priority at the operational level. However, the PoC is making its way into the military doctrines, though the progress is quite slow. But the United Nations, by operationalizing this notion (DPKO, 2015), emerges as the flag bearer of this development. UN not only includes the protection of civilians as an operational concept, but also is undertaking efforts to promote the protection of civilians as a priority at the operational level.

The process of producing doctrines to operationalize the idea, by NATO and the respective member states, has been slow. The fragmented approaches feasible for the aforementioned concept of PoC may be merged together to form a comprehensive operational concept. The primary task is to produce greater harmony and coherence between the different elements and to make the PoC the core of the doctrine. This will serve as a unifying idea which can lay the foundation for the concept of operations.

Though the doctrine of Britain is ahead of other NATO states in the matter (MoD, n.d.), it is still far behind the approach of UN. Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of the task of protecting civilians and in order to synergies the scarce resources of the missions, most doctrines of the military have developed a consensus that the task requires a comprehensive approach or 'whole of a mission'. The task of saving lives demands a well-coordinated and planned approach. In addition, it is widely recognized that to move beyond the reactive attitude and to instigate proactivity, the planning process of missions must include, in the early stages, the civilian agencies and planning of civilian protection. Armed actors are not only held responsible under the international law for bearing arms, but interaction with them is also important in order to back their activities as well as to maintain a vivid understanding of the mutual mandates and roles. Humanitarian actors can render the risk of engaging peacekeepers or military forces in protection strategies more manageable.

A dialogue explaining suitable parameters for such interactions is important, but the transparency and consistency in these dialogues is even more important (Metcalf, 2012). Incorporation of humanitarians from the earliest phases of peacekeeping or military deployments is crucial in facilitating the understanding of the military regarding the nature of threats concerning the protection process and also the strengths, capabilities and constraints to carry out that action plan. It is also important to consider that, there are situations when the humanitarian principles, because of the interactions between military forces and humanitarian organizations become compromised. However, Metcalf (2012) argues that even then, there is possibility for interaction with the help of mediators or interlocutors. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs or any regional or local actor present on ground can serve the purpose. Taking into consideration the informed consent of the concerned parties, detailed guidance regarding the information sharing process and ensuring confidentiality will further assist in risk reduction for the victims and sources.

The real challenge for the humanitarian organizations while protecting the rights of the civilians is to maintain their neutrality and impartiality because it is important for their future strategies while working for the protection of civilians and their rights. It becomes more difficult when international organizations become the party to the conflict.

Acknowledgment

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(Book Review) The India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations by *Eswaran Sridharan*

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(Routledge, 2007)

Aizah Azam¹

The book titled ‘The India Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations’ offers a collection of insightful articles by different Indian and Pakistani authors. As the title suggests, the scholarship contained in the book mainly deals with the South Asian nuclear posture. The study further aims at examining the question of adequacy of deterrence and international relations theories at explaining the nuclearization doctrine of the two countries. The book also takes into account the cold war experience of deterrence and the application of those experiences to the episodic conflicts between India and Pakistan. It is a comprehensive study of nuclear doctrines of two competitors that explains theoretical relevance to nuclearization in the light of historic antagonism between the two countries. It paves the way to understand the transition that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrine has been through. In doing so, the authors have also based much of their work on the monumental contributions of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Bernard Brodie, Glenn Snyder and others. The following passages offer a general chapter-based analysis of the publications in the book.

Sridharan in his introductory chapter acquaints the readers with the significant uniqueness inherent in the paradoxical South Asian region. He clears the predicaments about the India-Pakistan nuclear posture by highlighting that the dynamics of the region’s nuclearization and deterrence lie at lengths from the USA USSR episode. He examines the underpinnings stemming from the pre and post nuclearization conflicts between India and Pakistan. Sridharan holds that India’s nuclear behaviour (ever since its explicit nuclearization) rests mainly on three pillars. These pillars include India’s search for an international status, its security imperatives against Pakistan and China and finally the need emerging out of its domestic politics. Sridharan’s central focus in the introductory chapter is to establish the adequacy of the deterrence theory to explain the aforementioned factors apparent in the Indian nuclear behaviour. The author is convinced of the fact that India’s domestic environment has an incredible role in shaping up its nuclear behaviour. While

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attributing immense significance to the contextual milieu that led to the nuclearization of both countries, the author establishes the neo realist strand of IR theory as the ideal niche to examine the course of South Asian nuclearization. That said, in Sridharan's view, the deterrence theory and the traditional IR theory still need ample redefinitions in order to be able to define the South Asian nuclear framework. Hence, by closely scrutinizing the Pakistan centric and Indo centric strategies pursued by India and Pakistan respectively, Sridharan's fundamental emphasis is to communicate the proposition that nuclear deterrence can be implied as a significant means of conflict resolution under certain circumstances as well.

Sridharan goes on to establish the grounds for constructing the relevance of international relations and deterrence theory to the South Asian nuclear discourse. He attempts to look into the institution of alternative theoretical paradigms that can add to a relatively profounder understanding of the subject. His main argument in this regard borrows from the teachings of Muhammad Ayoob and Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver respectively, the notions of subaltern realism and regional security complexes to explain South Asian nuclear conundrum. In this respect, he has explained how the classic determinants of realism defectively fit the third world veracities. Shridharan holds that the core value of deterrence theory is the centrality of survival. Applying this to India and Pakistan, he mentions endless instances where the two countries found themselves on the verge of a full scale war in post 1998 nuclearization, yet they did not resort to the atrocious option. In his view, India practices what Patrick Morgan referred to as the 'general deterrence'. General deterrence implies the maintenance of a broad military capability by a state to deter any possible attack rather than issuing specific threats to specified opponents. Sridharan also comprehensively questions the stabilization of deterrence as a guarantor of preventing future wars in the noticeably confrontational India- Pakistan relationship. While doing so, Sridharan vehemently rejects the widely believed assumption of denuclearization. Denuclearization of the South Asian region as a guarantor of peace and conflict resolution, in his view, is not at all necessary. However, initiatives such as extensive cooperation in economic, political and social spheres can serve as backers of regional stability.

Rasool Bakhsh Rais, one of the well-known intellectuals in Pakistan, elucidates three main themes in his contribution in the book. Firstly, he explores the dynamics and credibility of Pakistan's No First Use (NFU) policy. Secondly, he tries to uncover the potential consequences of the nuclear deterrence stability i.e. that how far has it been successful in curtailing a limited conventional warfare. And finally, Professor Rais attempts to gauge the impact of US presence in Pakistan (at the time of publication) over its nuclear stability. Professor Rais's contribution communicates the effect of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine on the overall regional stability. Rais has based much of his findings in the chapter on two broad assumptions. These include, firstly, the nuclear weapons must be treated as instruments that prevent wars and not the ones that can be put to use in the hope of maximizing winning potential. Secondly, the presence of nuclear weapons alone is not enough for averting war given the quarrelsome nature of India- Pakistan relationship. Rais considers that Pakistan's

nuclear goals are very modest. All it seeks is to ensure national survival against an historic larger adversary. Adding to this point of modesty, he asserts that it is undesirable for Pakistan to match India militarily. The inherent nuclear imbalance must and will stay no matter what. What Pakistan rather needs is a credible, effective nuclear capability but at minimum variable level. In a comprehensive conclusion, Rais asserts that Pakistan must learn from the Cold War episode that ambiguity, risk propensity and doctrinal flexibility are sufficient tactics to avert wars. And while having a considerable lead in conventional warfare and a noticeable gap in the nuclear resources, it is beneficial for Pakistan to continue with its NFU stance in years to come. Rais vehemently labels South Asia as a region that lacks strategic autonomy. Rais's conclusions offer Pakistan some piece of advice i.e. that given its economic stature, Pakistan must declare credible minimum deterrence as its nuclear doctrine. Also, it must chose to engage in a constructive dialogic process with India on all security issues. Lastly, in Rais's view, it is critical for the two nuclear countries of the region to establish an effective control and command system.

Bharat Karnad takes an aggressive nationalist view and vehemently dismisses any relevance of deterrence theory to the India Pakistan nuclear posture attributing it to the sheer incompatibility of their resources, size, power and most of all their military might. Karnad asserts that the possibility of India and Pakistan to land in a nuclear warfare is beyond comprehension for various reasons. Primary among such reasons is the fact that the two countries were once a single entity and share a certain level of cultural coherence till date. The most significant deterrent in the region, Karnad holds is the US presence in Pakistan (at the time of publication). The most glaring aspect of the entire chapter is the contrasting determinants of India's and Pakistan's nuclear policy that Karnad draws as the basis of his central argument regarding the inapplicability of deterrence theory to this case. In his view, the decisive determinants of Pakistan's nuclear policy are uncertainty, ambiguity and ambivalence. Indian nuclear doctrine on the other hand, based on minimum credible deterrence and no first use presents an ideal doctrinal discourse that characterizes reasonableness, maturity, moderation and responsible, economical use of nuclear weapons. He concludes by considering that it is in India's own national interest to make Pakistan feel secure.

In his brief, but very comprehensive contribution to the book, Rajesh Basrur has aimed at attributing meaning to the phrase credible minimum deterrence. He asserts that though CDB has been India's and Pakistan's declared nuclear policy, its complete enunciation remains scanty. Basrur begins by problematizing the term minimum. In his view, both the countries have evidently failed at defining the meaning that they take from the term minimum. He makes an effort to highlight the contours of competing paradigms to explain nuclearization of the two countries. In doing so, Basrur has also chalked out some agreeable features of minimum deterrence. Unlike other authors in the book, Basrur equates India Pakistan relationship with the Cold War episode and asserts that the two affairs differ only on the account of policy behaviour. He concludes by pointing out that though complete

eradication of nuclear weapons is not possible in the region, resorting to credible nuclear deterrence is the best option that India and Pakistan have. That said, it is of great significance to define the threshold of the terms credible and minimum.

Riffat Hussain is the second Pakistani contributor to this book. While most of his work is in lines with the scholarship already brought to limelight by other authors in the book, his contribution does have some salient arguments. Hussain has his focus centred mainly on examining the nuclear options in the contingencies between India and Pakistan while observing the nuclear and conventional capabilities of both states. One of the most significant points that Hussain makes is, his explanation of the post 9/11 nuclear milieu in South Asia. He has also shed light on the paradox inherent in the deterrence strategy, while declaring a willingness to abstain from using the weapons that suggest otherwise. Considering India's adoption of the NFU policy, Hussain asserts that the policy despite being popular, has failed to garner the desired acceptance, even from Pakistan. It does appear relevant in the post 9/11 atmosphere however. Concluding his comprehensive analysis of the conventional and contemporary policies, Hussain holds that India and Pakistan need to carve out CBMs and arms control agreements in collaboration with each other in order to make them more rewarding and successful.

Varun Sahni's broad analysis takes into account the stability-instability context with special reference to India Pakistan conflict. He tries to make sense of stability-instability juncture while basing it on the state behaviour of India and Pakistan in the past four major crises including the 1986-87 encounter, the 1990 episode, Kargil crisis and the 2001-02 chapter. He considers India's and Pakistan's incompatible nuclear doctrines, their divergent territorial ambitions, the offense-defence (im)balance and other such factors of the this shared and historic asymmetric warfare, as imperative to study while making a case for South Asian nuclearization. His concluding thesis dismisses the stability-instability paradox as a viable explanation for India-Pakistan nuclear posture. In Sahni's view the complexity of nuclear studies of the two states transcend beyond the bounds of such an explanation.

Generally, the book offers in-depth analysis regarding subjects that are imperative for the understanding of India Pakistan nuclear posture. It takes into account almost all features of the troublesome relationship shared by the two countries. The scholarship contained in the book, though thick and dense in its nature, has the potential to enlighten the reader of the aspirations, structure/typology and challenges of India-Pakistan nuclearization. The articles in the book, coming from both sides of the border, present the prevalent view regarding nuclearization in both the countries. However, a certain presence of biased views can be sensed in some parts of the writings. Especially Bharat Karnad's assumptions that out rightly dismiss Pakistan's nuclear capabilities are a bit hard to accept. The most commendable feature of the publications contained in the book, is their tireless effort towards bridging the gaps between theory and practice while simultaneously gauging the state behaviour *vis-à-vis* policy framework.

(Book Review) Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation by Saira Khan

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Routledge, 2010

Masooma Jafri¹

Saira Khan in her book 'Iran and Nuclear weapons: Protracted Conflict and proliferation', has discussed a number of key issues related to the Iranian nuclear program, and made an attempt to make explicit that why a state enduring economic pressure and international condemnation still looks forward to developing its nuclear capabilities, what are the drivers of the Iranian nuclear keenness to acquire the status of a nuclear power, and what is the relation between protracted conflicts and the risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons considering the Iranian case in Middle East.

The book is divided into three parts; the first part explores the factors that help to understand the Iranian nuclear urge. The second part provides the readers with the theoretical framework about the nuclear agenda of Iran in context with the protracted conflicts it faces. The third part is the case study of Iran that discusses in detail the start of the nuclear program and its progress throughout era when it faced immense and harsh economic sanctions and isolation.

In the first part of the book, the author discusses three level of analysis of the factors that the scholars have proposed to evaluate the Iranian nuclear program that are the individual, domestic and international level of analysis. While discussing the individual level of analysis, Khan elaborates how the Iranian nuclear program evolved under different leaders, starting from Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran under whose rule the Iranian nuclear program started. Under Shah's rule, Iran established Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1974 but Shah did not planned to acquire nuclear weapons nor did he intended to proliferate them. Regardless of this, the nuclear program continued, however it slowed down after the Iranian Revolution when Khomeini put an end to Shah's regime, but the nuclear program was never completely terminated. After Khomeini there were leaders like Rafsanjani who aggressively accelerated the nuclear program calling nuclear weapons 'poor man's deterrents' and there were moderate leaders like Khatami with theory of "Dialogue among Civilizations" intended to slow down the process, but neither of all of them completely prohibited the nuclear development. Ahmadinejad has been widely

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associated with the Iranian nuclear program due to the fact that he strongly supported the idea of a nuclear Iran, but worth mentioning is the fact that when he came into power he inherited a well-developed nuclear program. Keeping in view these facts, Khan asserts that none of the Iranian leaders can be categorized as responsible for the nuclear program of Iran.

Considering the domestic level, Khan asserts that according to the renowned scholars, the public is not well aware of the Iranian nuclear program which the writer labels as a characteristic of a proliferators' regime. Even though the surveys depict that almost 80 percent of the population supports the nuclear program, it is unclear what the support actually means. There is a divide among the political parties; the pragmatic conservatives and the ideological conservatives, about the status of the nuclear program, where the pragmatic conservatives support the idea of dialogue with US and the ideological conservatives strictly abide by the idea of making Iran a nuclear power. According to the author, the systemic level portrays a whole new picture which is more widely discussed in the international politics that Iran is convinced to acquire nuclear weapons due to the threats it face from regional and international enemies. Khan criticizes the nuclear analysts about their mere claim that security is the central drive for Iran's nuclear program as they have failed to discuss the why security is the main factor in this scenario.

The second part of the book presents the theoretical underpinning to clarify the proliferation tendencies of states indulged in protracted conflicts. Khan in this part places her plot that there are three variables that signify a determined proliferator; the independent variable which is protracted conflict, the intervening variables which are security, prestige, and bargaining leverage and the dependent variable which is nuclear proliferation. She postulates that a state that faces protracted conflicts is likely to acquire nuclear weapons for the sake of preserving its prestige and honor, and most of all its security. Iran is facing such conflicts regionally in the form of Israel, and internationally in the form of US. Also the regional territorial conflicts like the Iran-Iraq conflict 1980-1989 in past and the conflicts with Israel increase the probability of Iran to become a nuclear power. She further suggests that the asymmetric conflict with US in which Iran is the weaker state, propels it to escalate its nuclear program. Also being the weaker state Iran has to acquire the power or capability to either defeat its enemies or to gain leverage at the bargaining table. She supports her argument with facts like the enemies of Iran are allies; Israel and US; the rivals have nuclear weapons (US and Israel), and the fact that Iran faces territorial threats from proximity. She further mentions that all the proliferators in the world have been involved in some kind of protracted conflicts like US, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and China, and there were regional proliferators like India, Pakistan, and Israel, too, Khan asserts that all of these states developed their nuclear programs for their prestige and security; same is the case with Iran.

The third part is further divide into four chapters that discuss in detail the Iranian nuclear program which started during the Shah's regime and how the process faced an up and down in the momentum but continued over the pace of time. Khan's

analysis of the conflicts faced by Iran depict the relation between the independent variable (the protracted conflict), the dependent variable (nuclear proliferation) and the intervening variable (prestige, bargaining options, national honor and security). Khan labels the two protracted conflicts initially with Iraq and later with Israel the motivating force for the Iranian leadership to consider nuclear deterrence. After the Iranian revolution, the friendly relations between Iran and US turned into hostile relations overnight, which worsened with the series of unpleasant incidents like the 1979 hostage crisis, then in 1984 following the 1983 bombing of US marine barracks in Lebanon, Iran was added to the terrorism list. US support to Iraq and Israel in their conflicts with Iran was also a concerning matter for Iran. Along with this Iran's increasing number of agreements with Pakistan, China and North Korea for the development of nuclear program protracted the conflict between US and Iran. Iranian assets were frozen by US, harsh economic sanctions were imposed on Iran, and adding fuel to the fire Iran was called a rogue state for not only being a state engaged in terrorism but also for developing WMDs. Later after the 9/11 attacks US alleged that Iran has been sponsoring terror in Middle East and it also had links with Al Qaeda. In 2003, US intervention in Iraq was initially perceived as advantageous for Iran as it overthrew its long-term rival Sadaam Husain, but gradually it turned out to be unpleasant as the pro-US government was still present in Iraq. So the continued tussle between the regional actors and Iran and the hostile US policies towards Iran are the factors that keep Iran motivated to acquire nuclear power status.

Though this book is a good piece of academic writing for those who intend to study the Middle Eastern security dynamics, however it needs a better depiction of the regional rivalries and politics between Iran and Saudi Arabia which is a source of debate in the regional as well as international scenario. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been indulged in regional adversity for the sake of regional hegemony, and a major concern for Iran is the sound relations between Saudi Arabia and US. This directs Iran to look for a nuclear umbrella to protect its national as well as international interests. Also Iran's desire to unite the states with Shiite majority to form the Shiite crescent (states including Azerbaijan, Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain) and to lead them has also propelled the state to pursue its nuclear program. This can become a major driver of nuclear proliferation in the Middle Eastern region.

Khan's statement that Iran could consider to end its nuclear program if US would extend the hand of friendship is a very optimistic view. It does not seem to be a possibility that US would establish friendly relations with Iran whilst completely brushing aside Israel and the adverse effects this friendship could have in America due to the dominant Jewish lobby there. Also how can US overlook the regional ally Saudi Arabia and its rivalry with Iran for regional supremacy? Overall, the book is a good addition to the readings on nuclear proliferation and conflicts generated due to this struggle.

Author's Guidelines

1. Submission of Manuscripts: Submission of manuscript is to be done electronically by attachment via the email: editor@njips.nust.edu.pk. 2. Manuscript should not be published elsewhere or under consideration for publication.
3. Preparation of Manuscript: The maximum length of intended articles for publication in the journal is 6000 - 8000 words. A short abstract of 150-250 words with 4-5 key words should precede the introduction. Contributors are to submit a separate cover page containing their contact details. Corresponding authors of papers submitted should be indicated. Upon acceptance of paper, author would be required to sign a copyright transfer form. Authors will receive a copy of the volume containing their articles. All diagrams, tables, and figures should appear as appendix at the end of the paper.
4. Reference: We accept American Psychological Association (APA) format.
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 - vi. Use the table function, not spreadsheets, to make tables.
 - vii. Save your file in docx format (Word 2007 or higher).
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 - ix. Acknowledgments of people, grants, funds, etc. should be placed in a separate section on the title page. The names of funding organizations should be written in full.
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