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Indo-Israel Strategic Partnership in Indian Ocean and Outer Space: A Need for Regional Counter-Balancing Approach

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***Syed Fraz Hussain Naqvi¹**

Abstract

Indian space exploration has entered a new phase with the formation of the Indian Defence Space Agency (DSA) in 2018 and the procurement of anti-satellite capabilities in 2019. These two incentives prompted India to join the US, Russia, and China in militarizing outer space. Similarly, Israel conducted an ASAT test of the Arrow-3 missile interceptor aimed at the exo-atmosphere. While both India and Israel have described their outer space ambitions as removing debris from the lower orbit, the constant use of their military arsenals demonstrates their shared goal of obtaining the upper hand over their respective rivals, Pakistan, China, and Iran. Prospects for their partnership in outer space are highly contingent on their cooperation in other defence domains, especially maritime security. For India, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is of utmost importance due to China's growing presence, whereas for Israel, the IOR represents a vital trade route that may be at risk due to the development of ports in Pakistan (Gwadar) and Iran (Chahbahar), through which these nations could acquire the means to expand their naval presence. Hence, space collaboration between India and Israel, especially in oceanic geo-sensing, is boosted by their mutual interests in space and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This paper evaluates how Pakistan, Iran, and China could form a trilateral alliance to counter the emerging US-supported Indo-Israeli nexus in IOR and outer space.

Keywords

Indo-Israel, space militarization, Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Space Silk Road, Pak-Iran Cooperation, APSCO

Introduction

Considering the ever-evolving nature of warfare, the focus of which has shifted from traditional to non-traditional approaches, various new spheres of confrontation have

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emerged over time. Proxy warfare, cyber-attacks, and growing military footprints in outer space are the few yet prominent arenas that are shaping the future of any armed conflict. While detailed studies have been conducted on proxy warfare and cyber security, the concern over the militarization of outer space is less explored. It is not to neglect any development made in the international arena over the utilization of outer space for military purposes. In December 1966, the UN presented the treaty for the peaceful usage of outer space and other celestial bodies. *Article IV* of this treaty specifically prohibits installing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) into space, preventing space militarization (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1966).

Yet, as the emerging multipolarity gains momentum, many aspiring states are aiming for an increased role in the economic, political, and military affairs of the world. In this sense, the renewed competition amongst the powerful states also instilled the concept of using outer space as a symbol of a state's strength and supremacy in the international system. With this regard, space has transformed it from just being a focused arena of global powers, i.e., the US, Russia, China, and EU, to an ambitious destination for various regional players as well. In light of this, India, from South Asia, and Israel, from the Middle East, are the two aspiring states focused on positioning themselves in the space for their respective security interests.

Indo-Israel space collaboration is an extension of the Indo-Israel defence partnership, which has been consolidating for the past three decades. The Indo-Israel defence partnership is mutually beneficial owing to two key aspects: The diversification of arms supplies that India obtained through Israel. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the major supplier to the Indian defence industry, India required alternative markets from which it could compensate for its defence needs. Israel's sophistication in military equipment is well recognized, so it became the obvious choice for Indian defence purchases after Russia. (Schaffer, 2009) For Israel, supplying arms to India complements its military-industrial complex. Since 1948, Israel's persistent concern for its security and survival has been met with the solution of continuously upgrading the military-industrial sector. Therefore, resources have been poured in to make MIC self-sufficient through high-tech innovation and sales (Adamsky, 2018). Given India's heavy dependence on arms imports, Israel gets commercial profits by selling the arms to the former mentioned state. In this regard, Israel only managed to supply \$715 million worth of arms to India in 2017 (Pant & Sahu, 2019).

More pertinently, the issue of Indo-Israel collaboration is linked with the emerging competition in the Indo-Pacific region, which encompasses both the eastern and western Indian Oceans. Space technology with military aspects entails cutting-edge features primarily used for installing missiles and conducting espionage. In light of this, this paper highlights the growing collaboration between India and Israel in these sectors and, subsequently, analyses the threats and challenges that both Pakistan and Iran could face. The paper will address two principle questions: How will India and Israel cooperate militarily in the maritime and space domains? And what are the alternative possibilities for Pakistan to counter the growing Indo-Israel nexus? To further understand the dimensions of the Indo-Israel strategic partnership, the paper follows a chronological order where, first, the history of the space programs of India and Israel is taken into account, along with their similarities and cooperation in IOR. Finally, the paper investigates the possibilities of collaboration for both Pakistan and Iran to counterbalance the emerging Indo-Israel nexus.

Conceptual Framework

Outer space can be considered the natural arena where no single state can exercise its authority. It is a common environment where state actors coordinate their mechanisms and share their resources. To maintain the natural integrity of outer space, the international system has established certain regimes to avoid future chaos, disruption of power, and potential conflicts. International regimes are the bodies that set out rules and principles of governance and interaction through which power is dispersed amongst different actors like states, global institutions, and multinational organizations (Verbeek, 2011; Moltz, 2019).

Therefore, regimes are labelled as the institutions (formal or informal) that assist in cooperation between the states in the wake of international anarchy. Regimes are generally established when multiple state actors work towards a common goal. Consequently, the need for international regimes becomes inevitable to avoid contradiction and to encourage interdependence in an organized manner. This is not to say that states cooperate out of morality; instead, self-interest and power variables occupy the central stage in states' policies towards joining any international regime. As a result, states enter into international regimes only when their gains outweigh the cost. Further, it is important to note that international regimes ensure the interests of states are not necessarily conflicted but can be achieved through cooperation as well. Hence, the broader regime theory in this regard falls under liberal institutionalism.

However, scholars have argued that, when relating liberal institutionalism to power, international institutions are merely tools that the hegemon uses to assert its authority and are, therefore, vulnerable to manipulation by the great powers. It could further be elaborated by analyzing the functioning of the UN during the Cold War. At that time, the decision-making process of the UN was hindered mainly by the vetoes exercised by the US and USSR for their respective interests. Therefore, Gale subscribed to the notion of 'institutionalized hegemony' through international regimes (Gale, 1998). According to his analysis, there are two types of states: those that subscribe to the hegemonic notion and those that break out of the regime and establish alternative mechanisms. In this article, both types of states are discussed.

During the Cold War, the UN established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS) under the Office for Outer Space Affairs to address the peaceful usage of outer space. Since the fear of a space race had been gaining pace and the nuclear arsenals of both the US and USSR were increasing, it was in the interest of both global powers to enter into such an international regime to avoid the escalation of global competition. However, given the decline of the Soviet Union's power and eventually its dismemberment in 1991, the US entirely dominated the space dimension to the extent that numerous issues and challenges started to emerge regarding the interpretation of 'peaceful purposes'. As US space technology advanced, the fear of its dual usage, i.e., military and civilian, gained momentum. Hence, instead of making outer space a 'non-military' arena, the US prompted the 'non-aggressive' notion, which was duly disagreed with by Russia (Lee & Steele, 2014).

Furthermore, while avoiding violating COPOUS rules, the US also attained the 'property rights' of 'extracted minerals' taken from the lunar surface through its Artemis Program without directly claiming sovereignty over them (Looper, 2022). Russia perceived these steps the US took as strengthening its dominance in outer space through institutional mechanisms.

As mentioned earlier in the context of regime theory, while the US extracts benefits from the space regime setup, Russia and now China consider it to be a US-dominant system and hence seek alternative mechanisms to counter-dominate the US in outer space. Due to this global space competition, the implications at the regional level are inevitable. Since both Israel and India share strong defence partnerships with the US and given India's pivotal position in the US overall strategy of dominating China, these states also benefit from the space regime system.

Regional rivalries are inevitable, considering the global space competition at the regional level. For example, Israel's military space capabilities threaten Iran, while Indian military space ambitions put Pakistan in a security dilemma. In addition to this, since India and Israel take leverage from their association with the US and, therefore, avoid the implications of violations owing to the dominance of the US in the space regime, this paper highlights how Pakistan and Iran could also manage to overcome their security dilemmas by seeking an alternative mechanism by utilizing their respective partnerships with China.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis considered in this study emphasizes that both India and Israel aim to strengthen themselves in their respective regions with the support of the US. Since Israeli military technology complements India's defence needs, the emerging Indo-Israel nexus becomes a natural phenomenon. For Pakistan, cooperation with China and Iran is imperative in the space and maritime domains since Israel is the arch-rival of Iran, while Indian maritime and space modernization is to counterbalance China.

Research Methodology

The paper makes use of a qualitative approach empirically. The qualitative methodology provides an avenue for understanding the underlying causes and factors of the Indo-Israel strategic partnership and its implications in different sectors, including the Indian Ocean and outer space. It further highlights the space race and the overall dynamic forces that impact the relations between the subject countries: India, Israel, China, and Pakistan. Additionally, explanatory and descriptive methodologies and an exploratory approach are utilized to elaborate the Indo-Israel strategic partnership case study and identify plausible solutions for Pakistan in association with its growing issues in the space and maritime sectors. To identify these factors, within the qualitative approach, case study mechanisms are also induced by using the longitudinal typology through observation and subsequent analysis.

Development of the Indian Military Space Program

The space sector evolved in the context of the Cold War rivalry and transformed into a rigorous space race between the US and the erstwhile USSR. Once the rivalry ended after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, many medium powers, like the EU and China, ambitiously pursued their space programs. Similarly, the Indian space program started in the early 1960s to acquire cutting-edge technologies to ensure India's participation in the 'global exclusive political club' (Rajagopalan, 2019). The three main tasks of the Indian space program fell under the domains of (a) satellite channels, television broadcasting, and weather news; (b) remote sensing and earth observation; and (c) developing the capacity for launching payloads in orbit through the development of multiple satellite launch vehicles.

All three of these programs were spearheaded in the 1980s, with subsequent developments in succeeding decades; however, they remained limited to the earth's

lower and geostationary orbits. Nevertheless, with the inception of the new century, the Indian space program under the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) expanded its scope to include space exploration. In this way, India launched its first moon mission in 2008 and its first Mars mission in 2013. Indian-launched satellites in both of these missions completed their orbits around them. However, the outcome of these missions was less tangible in terms of scientific development; instead, the primary aim of these missions was to project India's technological advancement in outer space. Through both these phases of the Indian space program, i.e., the 1980s and 2000s, the analysis that can be drawn is relevant to the global developments in space and India's desire to keep pace with space progress.

Furthermore, it is important to note that China is a major factor in boosting Indian space ambitions. China made substantial gains in the space sector as a next-door neighbour after establishing its own space agency, named the 'China National Space Administration', in 1993. Since then, China embarked on its lunar mission in 2004 and its Mars mission in 2011. Due to the geopolitical rift, the 'Chinese factor' played a vital role in India's space ambitions. Henceforth, the recent tilt of India towards space militarization must be contextualized in the aforementioned two aspects, i.e., the global trend and the impact of China (mentioned here as the 'Chinese factor').

Globally, two major powers, the US and Russia, are contributing to the militarization of space. The former President of the US, Barack Obama, directed \$5 billion for 'space protection capabilities, while the 2020 US Defense Space Strategy labelled Russia and China as the biggest threats to the US in outer space (Defense Space Strategy Summary, 2020). In response, Russia restarted its GLONASS GPS in the early 2000s and merged the space program with the military air force in 2015 (Mortz, 2019). Finally, Russia also conducted the anti-satellite test in 2021, reasserting its space militarization. Given the US-Russia space competition, Chinese military ambitions in space also developed, especially after 2015, when, for the first time, space was considered a military domain in China's defense white paper (Weeden, 2020). China also acquired anti-satellite testing (ASAT) capabilities in 2007, and through its rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), its demonstration of space awareness and inspection of co-orbital ASAT testing is evident.

Traditionally, India opposed the militarization of space during the Cold War because of its non-aligned policy and the quest to acquire commercial gains using space technology. For these purposes, militarization support would negatively impact India's position vis-à-vis the geostrategic environment and economic progress. However, as the global trend shifted towards militarizing space and the threat perception from Pakistan's ballistic missiles and Chinese ASAT technology increased, India shifted from its traditional position to become a leading state in space militarization.

In 2008, India established an Integrated Space Cell within the Ministry of Defense to align the space policy with that military objective. More concretely, India established two new organizations in 2019: the Defense Space Research Agency (DSRA) and the Defense Space Agency (DSA). The first one is tasked with working similarly to that of ISRO and conducting research on utilizing civilian space assets for military purposes. The second one, however, is directly linked with the military command and would be transformed into a separate 'Aerospace Command' in synchronization with the land, air, and naval commands (Giri, 2021). Therefore, what was initiated as a space exploration program gradually transformed into a space

militarization program of India, which, through the projection of advanced technology, has moved further to demonstrate India's emerging great power status in the world.

Development of the Israeli Military Space Program

Unlike India, Israel's space program has always focused on security; in fact, it plays a vital role in Israel's security policy. Being surrounded by hostile states, Israel's motivation is to advance its technology to ensure two things: maintain its Qualitative Military Edge (QME) vis-à-vis its neighbours and use satellite technology for surveillance against its enemies, mainly Egypt (Paikowsky et al., 2015). However, although the initial focus of Israel's space program was centered on the security domain, in the 1990s, Israel, like other medium powers, commercialized its space program. For this, Israel became the service provider for satellite telecommunications, networks, and satellite imagery. Despite vying for commercial and market-driven programs, Israel's space budget is closely associated with its Ministry of Defense and Israel's Aerospace Industries (IAI), evidently reflecting the predominance of military aspects in space policy (Bryce Space and Technology, 2017).

The pivotal reason for Israel going into space is its strategic depth. Israel's ability to thwart any external threat is limited as a small country with a smaller landmass. This is the same reason why Israel has focused on expanding and occupying adjacent territories, i.e., the Golan Heights of Syria, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Sinai Peninsula, in the past, to use them as buffer zones. However, to diffuse the threat, acquiring the latest technology that could surpass the geographical contiguity and help conduct preemptive strikes is essential. Outer space provides that arena for Israel to acquire its desired strategic depth.

The procurement of laser technology and high-resolution imaging technologies to be aware of any hostile military plot and spy over the defense and military installations of the enemy is also associated with the acquisition of strategic depth. For this, Israel launched the OFEK-16 satellite in 2020 to complete the constellation of its observatory satellite network, which also included OFEK-11, OFEK-5, Eros A and B, and Amos communication satellites. The striking aspect is the transfer of operation control of these satellites from the Ministry of Defense to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which validates both the aforementioned points of technological superiority and intelligence gathering for military purposes. Hence, like India, Israel has now actively embarked upon the concept of military space usage for its regional gains.

Indo-Israel Prospective Collaboration in Space

Both the Indian and Israeli space programs complement each other in a variety of ways. First, both programs were initiated in the context of regional and global trends deemed essential to secure the respective advantages of both countries, such that Indian concerns about China and Israel's apprehensions about the hostile neighborhood provided the momentum for their space programs. Second, the indigenization of their space programs also provides an arena for mutual collaboration. Israel manufactures high-tech satellites and specializes in developing micro-satellites weighing 300-400 kilograms (Ben-Israel & Kaplan, 2008). Similarly, Indian space vehicles' launching capabilities are advanced, through which India seeks international space cooperation and has already launched the satellites of 20 nations

(Mukherjee, 2018). Third, both states' space programs are mainly based on geo-sensing and high-resolution imaging capabilities.

By having similar ambitions, space data sharing is another phenomenon through which both these countries can establish a cooperative mechanism. Fourth, ISRO and the Israel Space Agency (ISA) signed the 'Plan of Cooperation on Atomic Clocks' in 2017 to jointly venture into space exploration. Previously, Israel had also helped India develop the RISAT-II imaging satellite, while India assisted Israel in launching the TЕСCAR surveillance satellite.

Finally, transforming civilian space programs into military space programs, i.e., establishing DSA in India and transferring space satellites to the IDF in Israel, also converge their mutual interests in weaponizing space. Collaboration in the space defense sector has already occurred with the transfer of Green Pine Radar from Israel to India, which boosted India's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and eventually assisted it in acquiring ASAT capabilities (Joshi, 2019).

Implications for IOR

IOR is an arena of growing convergence as well as concern for both India and Israel. India is regarded as a pivotal actor in the IOR; meanwhile, a significant amount of Israeli trade also passes through this region. For that reason, India considers the growing Chinese presence in IOR a major threat to its interests, while the development of ports in both Pakistan (Gwadar) and Iran (Chahbahar) will also increase their respective maritime presence, which poses a threat to Israel (Bag, 2020). Furthermore, India and Israel aim to counter the nexus of Pakistan, China, and Iran by having strong footprints in IOR. Therefore, their collaboration in IOR and their own policymaking circles is deemed important, and space technology plays a pivotal role.

Since both India and Israel are keen on optical satellites, their operational scope within the IOR would be expanded. This way, detecting adversarial naval assets would be accessible to both states. Furthermore, any economic development along the coastal line, specifically in the context of Pakistan and Iran, would be within reach of India and Israel, respectively. Furthermore, Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellites (SARsats) and ASAT technology would be detrimental to maintaining the status quo within IOR.

In the specific context of Pakistan and Iran, both states have successfully and sophisticatedly developed their respective missile programs. The A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategy could also be affected by Pakistan's naval modernization strategy. The essential elements of the A2/AD strategy are the anti-ship and cruise missiles, warships, and attack submarines that Pakistan has already inducted into its naval fleet. By upgrading its naval assets, Pakistan has gradually transformed its maritime security policy from defensive to offensive defence to create a buffer zone (Ali, 2021). However, with the Indian acquisition of high-tech imaging satellites, its preemptive capability in operational capacity would be enhanced vis-à-vis Pakistan's naval defense.

On the other hand, in the case of Iran-Israel rivalry in the IOR, it is imperative to understand their mutual maritime hostility in the larger context. Since 2019, Israel has frequently targeted Iranian vessels in the Mediterranean and Red Sea that supposedly carried ammunition and oil to Syria. In response, Iran started to target naval vessels with ties to Israel in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman (Nadimi, 2021). Therefore, Israeli interests and ambition to reach the Indian Ocean are only natural,

and space technology would better provide security and navigation to Israeli-linked vessels. Simultaneously, Iran also launched its military satellite into space, named 'Noor-1', in 2020 and its upgraded version, 'Noor-2', in March 2022. The military component of the Iranian space program has given Iran an intelligence advantage and favored its geopolitical position. As with India and Israel, the Iranian launch of a satellite was conducted by the IRGC Aerospace Force, signaling yet another actor in the race for space militarization. Therefore, where Indo-Pak competition in IOR is speculated to disrupt the power balance, the inception of Israel-Iran competition in the new arena of IOR using space technology would further fuel the competition and affect the peace of IOR.

Emerging Scenarios and a Way Forward

The states are shifting towards high-tech assets in artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and outer space to project and exercise their power and dominance. As elaborated earlier in this paper, great powers (the US, Russia, and China) are competing to attain dominance in outer space, which has also provoked medium powers to participate in the emerging space order. The space programs of India, Iran, and Israel are testimonies to their inclination to expand the scope of their competition. Furthermore, the security concept has also transformed from a land-based to a maritime domain. In this context, the Chinese 'string of pearls' strategy, the US Quad and AUKUS strategies in the Indo-Pacific, and Russia's Arctic Strategy 2035 reflect the growing importance of higher seas.

In this context, Indo-Israeli space collaboration, specifically referencing IOR, is expected to bring two dynamic forces to the region. First, the participation of great powers in this geopolitical competition is likely. Since the Indian space program is a response to establishing the Chinese space program, Sino-Indian competition would intensify further.

Moreover, as the US is already spearheading the Quad Alliance, its involvement in this regard would be inevitable. One notable development that has the potential to happen is the merging of the Indo-Pacific Quad with that of the Middle Eastern Quad, named I2U2, the alliance that includes the US, India, Israel, and the UAE, through the emergence of Israel in the IOR. Second, the disturbance of peace in IOR through the possible attacks on cargo ships and the navigation of Indian and Israeli naval assets in that region. If this happens, the states that would be on the receiving end would be China, Pakistan, and Iran. Chinese stakes in IOR are immense owing to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in which the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is a vital and probably the most crucial segment.

Similarly linked to it are the developments of ports in Pakistan and Iran through Chinese assistance. These ports are expected to play a significant role in the economic growth of these countries. Therefore, any military adventure in IOR would ultimately be consequential for the interests of these three states. Hence, there could be three possible choices to counter and diffuse the threat of the Indo-Israeli nexus.

Reiterating the Space Governance Laws

The reiteration of the commitment to prevent the use of space for military purposes, as mentioned in various UN resolutions and proposals, could be emphasized. As the introduction notes, the UN explicitly prohibits the 'ownership' of space and its military usage. While specifically mentioning the use of nuclear power sources and reactors, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1992 only to allow

nuclear technology in cases of utmost necessity while keeping the radioactive hazard levels below the limit in case of an accident in the future (Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, n.d.). Furthermore, Article XIII of the remote sensing resolution passed in the UN General Assembly in 1986 specifically highlighted and proposed cooperation between the state that is conducting remote sensing and the state whose territory is being sensed to promote inclusiveness and eradicate discrepancies (Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, n.d.). Such laws could be reinforced through multilateral mechanisms to thwart the growing militarization of space. It is also significant for continued cooperation on the International Space Station (ISS).

Regional or global powers' militarisation of space would jeopardize space research for peaceful purposes. Still, given the inability of the UN to intervene in great power competition, this approach is less likely to yield fruitful results, partly because of the renewed space race that has unfolded in the emerging global structure of multipolarity. A prime example of this is the statement by Russia about quitting the ISS after 2024 (Carbonaro, 2022). China is already operating its own Tiangong Space Station (TSS) independently of the ISS. Given these dynamics, a clear divide in space would be inevitable, which could lead to space confrontation by bypassing UN space laws.

Trilateral Cooperation in Space: APSCO and SSR

The cooperation between Pakistan and China in space is not new. Pakistan launched its first satellite in 1990 with Chinese assistance, and both countries had also signed a 2012–2020 roadmap for space cooperation (Amaresh, 2020). In 2017, Pakistan also signed an agreement to replace its reliance on the UN navigation system with the Chinese *Beidou* navigation system (Mohan & Hao, 2018). Similarly, the cooperation between Iran and China in space mainly started in the late 1990s. In 1998, Iran signed agreements with both Russia and China to jointly develop a series of satellites and rockets (Krzyszaniak, 2022). Likewise 2015, Iran's electronics firm Salran signed an agreement with Chinese firms to initiate navigation operations using the Chinese *Beidou* system (Segev, 2021).

Apart from their respective bilateral space cooperation with China, both Pakistan and Iran are also members of the Chinese-led Asia-Pacific Space Research Organization (APSCO). APSCO allows the member states to share space data, organize training and conventions related to space, and collaborate on mutual space objectives like space exploration, space technology, communications, and navigation. In fact, through APSCO, China has provided both Pakistan and Iran, along with Peru, with 15-cm telescopes to keep track of objects in lower earth orbit and geostationary orbits (Guo et al., 2020). In its Development Vision 2030, APSCO laid out the principles of mutual cooperation in space sciences, technology, human resources, finance, data sharing, and mutually developing Small Multi-Mission Satellites (SMMSs) and an earth observatory known as APOSOS II (Development Vision 2030 of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, 2018). From these types of cooperation, both Pakistan and Iran, the emerging states in the space domain, could benefit a lot in terms of resilience against the space assertiveness of their respective adversaries, i.e., India and Israel. Cooperation with China in space is also viable in the context of China's 'Space Silk Road'. At the core of it is the previously mentioned *Beidou* Satellite Navigation System, which is a satellite constellation over Asia and Europe aiming to achieve 'millimeter-level accuracy' in terms of surveillance,

navigation, and positioning (China's BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, 2016). Such a system would yield two advantages for China, Pakistan, and Iran. First, it would be an alternative to the US Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Second, for Pakistan and Iran, the surveillance would help both countries thwart the threats posed by India and Israel. As India contests the development of Gwadar port in Pakistan and Israel is expanding its operational scope into IOR, the security of both Gwadar and Chahbahar is a priority matter for Pakistan and Iran, respectively, as these ports would serve as the lifeline for their respective economies. It has significance for China, too, since Gwadar is the streamlined project for CPEC (one of the six corridors of China's BRI), while in Chahbahar, China has investments as part of a \$400 billion deal with Iran. Therefore, accessing the *Beidou* system and collaborating with China would allow these states to counter the Indo-Israeli nexus in the IOR.

Conclusion

Space militarization has recently gained significant importance since the end of the Cold War. This prominence can be attributed to the developing of new security domains related to emerging technologies and non-traditional security threats. One major aspect that differentiates the militarization of space during the Cold War from the current one is the change in the global structure. As new aspiring states have emerged owing to multipolarity, global competition is no longer limited to great powers or states. As prominent states in their respective regions, India and Israel are aspirants to exploit maximum benefits from their alliance with the US. The partnership between India and Israel further consolidated itself after the official establishment of the multilateral US-led coalition, i.e., I2U2. The only odd inclusion in this alliance was India since India does not share any similarities with the Middle East's political, strategic, and defense dynamics.

However, the inclusion of India by the US clearly indicates the US desire to utilize India's economic potential to counterbalance China's BRI project. Apart from China, I2U2 also holds lateral implications for other states, i.e., Pakistan and Iran. For Iran, Israel's participation in the regional alliance testifies to its legitimacy in the region and would allow Israel to expand its political footprint and military scope. In such circumstances, Iranian security could have adverse effects. For Pakistan, India's encroachment in the Middle East diminishes Pakistan's traditional role in the region, i.e., its legacy through the Baghdad Pact, Arab-Israel Wars, and economic and military cooperation with the Gulf States.

Therefore, I2U2 allows both Israel and India to enhance their cooperation in the military domain, especially in the maritime sector. The reciprocal arrangement could also materialize, allowing Israel's presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly after the attacks on Israel's flag-bearer ships in the Persian Gulf. As discussed in the paper, any maritime-related activity hugely depends on space technology for navigation. This further provides avenues for both Israel and India to take their mutual collaboration into outer space. Considering the threats posed by the military space developments of both China and Iran, the space aspirations of both India and Israel, respectively, could be regarded as an ever-growing phenomenon. Under all these circumstances, Pakistan is the only country lacking maritime and space sectors. Pakistan's navy could be considered a resource-constrained force compared with India's naval technology, including an aircraft carrier, among other arsenals. Regarding space technology, Pakistan's space sector is also largely underdeveloped.

Given Pakistan's historical animosity with India and the steadfast policy of not recognizing Israel, the Indo-Israel nexus in the Indian Ocean and outer space would affect Pakistan the most, particularly in the wake of CPEC, which holds paramount importance for Pakistan.

It is, therefore, recommended that instead of going for bilateral engagements with the rivals, the purposeful solution would be to tackle the nexus jointly. The stakes for both Pakistan and Iran are linked due to their respective ports. Since China has investments in Gwadar and Chahbahar, any disruption in IOR would eventually endanger Chinese investments. Hence, as minilateral alliances are on the rise given I2U2, AUKUS, and QUAD, Pakistan, China, and Iran must also work towards arranging such an alliance. The groundwork has already been laid through APSCO and SSR. BRI, along with its four channels, i.e., the Land Route (traditional Silk Road), the Digital Silk Road, the Maritime Route, and the Space Silk Road, is a perfect platform to counterbalance the Indo-Israel nexus. Further amalgamation could be made by linking ASPCO with the Space Silk Road of the BRI and then navigating the operations of the Maritime Silk Road through ASPCO (or SSR). Since both Pakistan and Iran are members of BRI and both India and Israel, owing to their respective alliances with the US, do not wish to participate in this Chinese venture, a regional approach of offsetting the Indo-Israel nexus through BRI's maritime and space corridors or any other minilateral regional setting featuring China, Pakistan, and Iran is not only imperative but also viable.

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Hybrid Warfare: India's New Policy Instrument

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Abstract

Hybrid warfare has gained significant attention since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Despite numerous definitions, a clear understanding of this phenomenon remains elusive. This study aims to define hybrid warfare by synthesizing expert opinions and organizational viewpoints. It also examines how hybrid warfare has been executed using an analytical framework developed by European nations. Recent claims by Pakistan, China, and others about India's use of hybrid warfare prompt analysis of India's strategic application of this approach for national security objectives. The study concludes with practical recommendations for policymakers to counter Hybrid Warfare challenges effectively. Overall, this study contributes to comprehending, analyzing, and addressing the complexities of Hybrid Warfare in contemporary security contexts.

Keywords

Hybrid warfare, India, Pakistan, Policy, Strategy, Security

Introduction

According to the famous American poet and journalist Ambrose Bierce, "Peace is a period of cheating between one war and the next" (p.143). War has existed throughout human history in various forms. It has been used by individuals, groups, organizations and states as a tool to achieve their 'political' goals. The famous Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz termed war as a "continuation of politics by other means" (Clausewitz, 1918, p. 280), and since politics has been a constant element in human life, war has co-existed with it for all this time.

From the initial form of war to its present-day manifestations, the concept of war has gone through a tremendous transformation, and the factors that have contributed the most towards this transformation include the revolution in military and communication technologies. Besides expanding the ambit and cost, these advancements and developments have made war more lethal, dynamic and complex.

Nonetheless, despite the continual evolution of technology and tactical strategies, warfare's fundamental purpose and objective have endured across history.

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Nevertheless, these advancements have spurred military thinkers and strategists to forge novel and sophisticated tools within the realm of hybrid warfare. These tools aim to exploit and magnify the vulnerabilities of adversaries, thereby facilitating the goals of weakening, destabilizing, and asserting dominance.

With the advent of modern and conventional aerial, naval and atomic weapons systems like guided missiles, radars, drones and nuclear bombs, wars in the 21st century are not conventionally waged but rather provoked and instigated by surreptitious agents using a combination of military and non-military, information operations, cyber instruments, media tools (Wither, 2016), non-government organizations (NGOs), non-state actors, intelligence organizations, economic instruments, propaganda (Hickman et al., 2018), terrorism (extremism and radicalization) (Qureshi, 2020), confusion (Monaghan et al., 2019), in-house insurgencies and separatist movements.

Combining the components mentioned above to achieve a political objective against an adversary is termed hybrid warfare. Although the terminology seems relatively new in the contemporary International Relations jargon, the concept behind it is also consistent with the older forms of conflict. Various examples of this kind of warfare can be found in history, e.g., the effective use of Continental forces combined with sturdy guerrilla forces by George Washington during the American Revolution, and also, the British combination of its regular forces with irregular forces, under its operational control, during conventional operations in the Palestine region (Hoffman, 2007).

However, due to its nature (political), historical roots and profound ramifications for states and individuals, it is highly pertinent to study modern-day hybrid warfare and understand it adequately, and as this study demands, explore how it is being used by countries like India against other countries (particularly Pakistan), what threats such kind of warfare entails, how to identify those threats and most importantly, how to counter or defend against those threats posed by this warfare. Therefore, as stated earlier, the main intention behind conducting this research is to understand the contemporary concept of hybrid warfare, how different actors, particularly India, use it as a policy tool and finally, provide various state policymakers with concrete recommendations to counter hybrid warfare.

This research study comprises five distinct segments. The initial segment is dedicated to comprehending the concept of hybrid warfare, encompassing diverse definitions and elucidating the analytical framework (as a model) for dissecting this form of warfare. The subsequent segment delves into India's multifaceted utilization of hybrid warfare strategies against various adversaries. The third segment presents two illustrative case studies spotlighting India's concrete instances of hybrid warfare implementation. Shifting focus, the fourth segment outlines recommendations tailored for Pakistani policymakers intended to counteract hybrid warfare tactics effectively. Finally, the study culminates with a conclusion underscoring the imperative of formulating a comprehensive strategy to counter hybrid warfare.

Understanding the Concept of Hybrid Warfare

As mentioned in the earlier section of this study, the terminology of hybrid warfare is comparatively new to the International Relations jargon; hence, researchers, academics, policymakers, strategists and practitioners alike are striving to reach some form of agreement on the basic definition of this concept and what it entails.

Multiple definitions of 'globalization' exist today, so numerous definitions of hybrid warfare are used to define this very dynamic concept. The prevailing definitions of hybrid warfare revolve around various key facets, encompassing diverse actors,

adopted tactics, intricacies, multifaceted dynamics, adeptness in perception management, strategic information dissemination, concurrent actions, inherent dynamism, and deliberate ambiguity (Uziębło, 2017). Moreover, these definitions underscore the deliberate endeavors to sidestep clear attribution and mitigate potential retribution (Qureshi, 2020). However, it is essential to note that Hoffman has coined the idea of hybrid warfare (Hoffman, 2007).

Defining Hybrid Warfare

- “[...] spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community” (McCuen, 2008, as cited in Baker, 2015, para. 2).
- “Hybrid warfare is the synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergetic effects” (Monaghan et al., 2019).
- “[...] a combination of military action, covert operations and an aggressive program of disinformation” (Landler & Gordon, 2014).
- “[...] the employment of a full spectrum of tools, tactics, and coercions. Both states and a variety of non-state actors can conduct hybrid wars. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 8). The cited definition encapsulates hybrid warfare as a strategic orchestration involving the coordinated deployment of both military and non-military instruments. This integrated campaign is meticulously crafted to secure surprise, initiative, and psychological elements alongside tangible physical advantages. This intricate approach encompasses a spectrum of tactics, including diplomatic channels, sophisticated and rapid information dissemination, electronic and cyber operations of a complex nature, discrete military and intelligence actions, and judicious application of economic pressures (“Complex Crises Call for Adaptable and Durable Capabilities,” 2015).
- “[...] the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign, designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure” (“Complex Crises Call for Adaptable and Durable Capabilities,” 2015, p. 5).

Upon meticulous examination of the aforementioned diverse definitions, a salient observation emerges: the core aim of hybrid warfare resides in the strategic evasion of confrontation, seeking instead to disrupt and impede the policymaking processes of the target state through a repertoire of clandestine maneuvers. This objective is achieved through diverse covert tactics meticulously orchestrated to sow chaos and ambiguity, cultivating an environment of uncertainty and perplexity. Central to these tactics is the deliberate avoidance of any clear attribution or avenues for retribution against the instigators.

Spanning the entire spectrum of conflict, these concerted endeavors are harmoniously coordinated, with the overarching intent of either orchestrating regime change within the subject state or exerting influence over its policies, all in alignment with the interests of the aggressing state(s). This calculated manipulation encompasses multifarious tools and strategies designed not only to subvert and undermine the target

state's stability but also to shape the trajectory of its governance and decision-making in a manner that advances the strategic objectives of the aggressor(s).

Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war" (Clausewitz, 1918, as cited in Regier, 2009, para. 26). This means that based on existing literature and empirical data, in today's day and age, the definition and execution of war have evolved from the conventional nature of warfare to a more unconventional mode where the fine line between war and peace is blurred, the enemy not clearly defined, and there is no clarity on victory and defeat.

Over an extended period, developments in the domain of warfare resulted in the creation of hybrid warfare. It is the kind of warfare where the strategic dependence on conventional practices and tools has been dramatically reduced. Alternatively, incorporating irregular means of social and psychological combat is ensured. Each segment of a society or a state is encompassed by the 'battlefield' compared to the restriction to military combat and engagement as customary to conventional warfare.


Similarly, the main objective is not associated with a direct and immediate triumph over the nemesis. Instead, the main focus is on softening, isolating, and demoralizing the opponent by capitalizing on their social, political and economic vulnerabilities (Aqdas, 2021).

Moreover, despite a worldwide consensus on hybrid warfare, there is a lack of proper understanding of this concept. It is a problem, nonetheless. And to resolve an issue, conceptual understanding is the first step taken in the right direction. For this purpose, an analytical framework was developed by the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) in its first report out of a series of reports titled 'Understanding Hybrid Warfare' (Monaghan et al., 2019) project. The report enables us to understand, detect, and respond to hybrid warfare. The MCDC's Understanding Hybrid Warfare report defines hybrid warfare as "the synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergetic effects" (Kjennerud & Cullen, 2017, p. 3).

The report further gives the 'Baseline Assessment' (Kjennerud & Cullen, 2017) for the nature of hybrid warfare (asymmetric) and how it uses multiple sources of power at its disposal along different axes (X and Y axis on a graph) to varying degrees (depending on the instigator's creativity and requirements). These elements set hybrid warfare apart from the conventional approach of warfare, which is attrition-based.

Figure 1 explains how an instigator of hybrid warfare can employ different elements of its power, namely 'Military, Political, Economic, Civilian, Informational' (MPECI), to escalate the situation vertically and horizontally (as per its requirements) by targeting vulnerabilities in the target state—Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII)—, to generate desired results. Escalation in this form can be made by intensity adjustment of one specific instrument or by increasing the number of instruments on the horizontal spectrum.


Figure 1. MPECI instruments of power and PMESII target vulnerabilities



Source: Monaghan et al. (2019)

The following Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the synchronization of diverse instruments of power. Nuanced adjustments to escalation levels along both axes aptly accompany this synchronization.

Figure 2. Hybrid War Escalation (MPECI)



Source: Kjennerud and Cullen (2017)

Moreover, in the context of hybrid warfare escalation, a diverse array of instruments of power is strategically employed across various dimensions and levels synchronized. This strategic approach facilitates the orchestrator to execute meticulously customized ‘attack packages’ to exploit the susceptibilities inherent within the targeted state or system. The efficacy of this endeavor hinges upon the capabilities inherent to the initiating state, the perceived vulnerabilities of the target state, and the underlying political objectives driving the instigation of hybrid warfare. This strategic modus operandi, accompanied by a well-defined methodology, is instrumental in realizing the envisioned objectives. It is worth noting that the significance of context cannot be underestimated in this milieu, echoing the importance it holds in all forms of warfare.

Taking from the findings of MCDC's report (Kjennerud & Cullen, 2017), the threat analysis for hybrid warfare is different from that of the enemy-centric traditional threat analysis adopted during conventional warfare for various reasons:

1. Hybrid warfare employs a broader range of MPECI tools to target the adversary.
2. Hybrid warfare targets societal vulnerabilities in ways that are traditionally overlooked in warfare.
3. There is a novelty in synchronizing its means and tools, defeating predictability.
4. Hybrid warfare thrives on creativity, surprise, confusion, and an existing understanding of warfare.
5. Hybrid warfare campaigns can remain undetected after their damaging effects have already manifested themselves, rendering the target state(s) capability to defend itself useless.

The above-discussed framework will be succinctly elucidated in the forthcoming section and subsequently employed in the empirical examination of India's hybrid warfare tactics vis-à-vis Pakistan, aligning with the principal aim of this research endeavor.

Analytical Framework

As per the MCDC's report on Understanding Hybrid Warfare, the analytical framework consists of three interconnected categories elucidated by Kjennerud & Cullen (2017). These categories, though distinct analytically, are inherently interdependent due to the extensive nature of hybrid warfare: (i) critical functions and vulnerabilities, (ii) synchronization of means (horizontal escalation), and (iii) effects and non-linearity.

A comprehensive grasp of UHW necessitates an integrated understanding of these categories, as they collectively capture the multifaceted nature of hybrid warfare. The distributed activities and operations spread across the MPECI+infrastructural (MPECII) spectrum are called critical functions that, if disturbed, can create serious problems for the target state's working system. Due to their innate vulnerabilities, all vital functions provide the instigator of hybrid warfare with opportunities for exploitation against the target state.

Synchronization, within the context of hybrid warfare, refers to the adept capability of the instigator to effectively harmonize instruments of power, precisely timed and strategically positioned, to attain predetermined objectives. This orchestrated finesse ensures a focused alignment of resources within an opportune temporal and spatial framework. Effective synchronization of power instruments gives the instigator more options and the ability to escalate and de-escalate horizontally.

Effects and non-linearity mean the tangible or intangible change in the state of any given entity in the targeted state after the synchronized implementation of power instruments by the instigator of hybrid warfare. Effective synchronization also makes it impossible for the target state to predict the pattern of attacks. With this understanding, the next section will demonstrate, with the help of the analytical framework, how India uses hybrid warfare as a tool against its western neighbour Pakistan.

India's Hybrid Warfare

According to the famous Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, "Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting" (Tzu, 500, as cited in Mott IV & Kim, 2006, p. 15). The approach offers a range of advantageous outcomes, encompassing the conservation of fiscal and material resources that would otherwise have been expended in direct adversarial engagement. Additionally, it shields the instigator from potential attribution or retaliatory actions. Simultaneously, it engenders a state of destabilization within the adversary's domain, compelling a shift towards a defensive posture and concurrently heightening susceptibility to subsequent incursions (Korybko, 2015). This paradigm closely mirrors India's strategic methodology in its interactions with Pakistan.

Since 1998, when Pakistan and India conducted nuclear weapon tests and declared to possess nuclear capabilities, engaging in a total conventional war was no longer an option for the two significantly large countries of South Asia. Besides, the entire financial cost and material expenditure involved in pursuing the course of conventional war are incredibly high for both countries, especially India. For example, India spent approximately US\$ 14 billion on arms imports between 2014 and 2020 (Asthana, 2020); it secured the 36 Rafale fighter jets deal for € 7.85 billion (US\$ 9.4 billion) (Rafale Deal: How much does it cost and other questions govt should answer, 2019); and it plans to spend US\$ 130 billion in the next decade on military modernization (Asthana, 2021).

Furthermore, India stands among the world's foremost arms importers (Wezeman et al., 2021), having secured the top spot in recent years. Despite this, India has encountered challenges in realizing its military (conventional) objectives concerning both internal and external adversaries. These include, among others, Pakistan, China, resistance in the disputed Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) region, and Naxalite separatists in the Red Corridor². As a strategic response, India has initiated an expansive hybrid warfare initiative to destabilize its adversaries.

This approach is driven by the intention to conserve substantial resources that might otherwise be expended through conventional means. In the past, conventional wars between Pakistan and India were fought using conventional military equipment and means such as missiles, submarines, fighter jets, tanks and infantry. However, as indicative of hybrid warfare power instruments (as explained in the previous section), India has used several instruments such as colour revolutions, insurgents, spies, rebels (anti-state), propaganda through all types of media (print, electronic and social); surgical strikes; proxy wars; economic coercion; and diplomatic and political onslaught against Pakistan as part of its hybrid onslaught.

The primary objective of India's hybrid warfare campaign against Pakistan is to isolate Pakistan internationally by depicting it as a pariah state. Additionally, the campaign aims to undermine Pakistan's social, political, and economic systems, leading to destabilization. This approach further seeks to establish a dominant position over Pakistan, exerting coercive influence over its decision-making processes in alignment with India's interests.

Such hybrid warfare tactics have enabled India (the aggressor and/or instigator) to not only use non-military forces against Pakistan without the risk of being held responsible in conformity with the rules of international law, but it has also allowed India to cause considerable instability in Pakistan without spending plenty of

² The red corridor, also called the red zone is the region in the eastern, central and the southern parts of India where the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency has the strongest presence.

resources or attracting the wrath of the international community despite its relentless transgressions over the years. To better explain India's hybrid warfare efforts against Pakistan via the analytical framework model, this section will apply an empirical case study of the EU DisInfo Lab's *Indian Chronicles* (2015-2019) (Alexandre et al., 2020). More short case studies that are a part of the Indian hybrid warfare campaign against Pakistan will follow in this section.

The illustrative example of the *Indian Chronicles* focuses on India's use of the information, political and economic spectrums of the MPECI instruments. In this particular case study, the use of misrepresentation, exaggeration and dissemination of wrong and malicious causes and information against Pakistan via an extensive and elaborate disinformation campaign enabled India to create special synchronized attack packages (as explained in earlier sections) to convince the international community to isolate Pakistan and put diplomatic pressure on the Pakistani government over this entire time and even synchronize these SAPs with other power instruments available to India such as political, economic and ultimately military.

Critical Functions and Vulnerabilities

Nine types of vulnerabilities are identified in this case study, which constitute the enabling factors for promoting the implementation and execution of a special synchronized information (or disinformation) attack package as part of the Indian hybrid warfare campaign against Pakistan.

Vulnerabilities Inherent to Pakistan

- Dwindling economy
- Weak international diplomatic outreach
- Weak structures of governance and other state institutions (internal balancing)
- Societal divisions along ethnic, religious, sectarian, socio-economic and political lines
- Ineffective and inefficient lobbies internationally
- The absence of robust internationally linked media networks
- Non-existent capabilities in the Cyber domain
- Lack of a national narrative and counter-narratives
- Irresolute and feeble political leadership

Vulnerabilities intentionally created by India

- Indian-sponsored terrorism and militancy in Pakistan
- Proxy wars by using Pakistan's neighbouring countries against it
- Spread of chaos, fear and anti-state sentiments via a network of spies
- Constantly elevated tensions on the border (especially in the J&K region)
- Misuse of Indian goodwill and influence with Western powers (US, UK, Russia) and other regional and international organizations such as the European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) against Pakistan
- Attempts to establish the 'new normal' via tactics like surgical strikes.

Synchronization of Power Instruments and Patterns of Escalation

The following table shows the Synchronized Attack Packages (SAPs) that have been identified during the case study analysis:

Table 1: Synchronized Attack Packages (SAPs)

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>SAP-1</i> represents the hostile actions taken by India and its proxies (mainly through terrorist and extremist organizations like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), and operatives like Kulbhushan Jadhav, to spread terrorism, militancy, chaos and uncertainty in Pakistan.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>SAP-2</i> represents the hostile actions taken by India against Pakistan via its malicious media campaign worldwide by creating fake media and bogus website domain names in more than 115 countries around the world, including Brussels and Geneva. It spread fake news and negative content about Pakistan to generate an anti-Pakistan sentiment internationally and get it diplomatically isolated by proving it to be a rouge state.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>SAP-3</i> represents the hostile activities undertaken by India against Pakistan via alleged ‘surgical strikes’ in 2016 and 2019 (namely, one after the Uri incident and the other after Balakot).

During the time leading up to the unveiling of the nefarious Indian designs against Pakistan in the form of the *Indian Chronicles* report in 2019, India used a combination of pressures on Pakistan via cross-border violations: state-sponsored terrorism and militancy, sabotage activities through spies, malicious media campaign (locally and internationally); and political forces in the form of its strife to diplomatically isolate Pakistan and India’s refusal to enter into negotiations with Pakistan on longstanding issues such as the J&K dispute. All this was implemented through the effective use of SAPs by India to drive Pakistan’s decision-making as per its vested interests.

With the change in the strategic environment over time and the evolution of conflict between the two countries, India began to use different MPECI power instruments. It modified the SAPs as per its needs to synchronize its efforts by executing various patterns of horizontal-vertical escalation and de-escalation (See Figure 1) to achieve desired objectives.

By using Indian proxies inside Pakistan, India created chaos and confusion inside Pakistan. It not only helped in deteriorating the law-and-order situation in the country but opened new vulnerabilities in the system for the instigator (in this case, India) to target. Furthermore, using Pakistan’s neighbours against it (such as Afghanistan and Iran), India was also able to destabilize Pakistan’s western border and create regional hostility for the country.

Military escalation along the western borders, especially the Line of Control (LOC), enabled India to maintain vertical escalation with Pakistan, which in turn helped India to justify its military presence in the disputed J&K region, gain popular support at home (especially during election times) and ultimately destroying any chances of entering into any negotiations with Pakistan over pending issues and disputes.

Moreover, India’s disinformation campaign, which consisted of spreading malicious and damaging content about Pakistan with the help of fake media outlets, journalists, bogus NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and internet domains, helped India to paint Pakistan as a notorious, rouge state in front of the international community which ultimately provided India with the opportunity to escalate horizontally and vertically to its great advantage against Pakistan.

India adeptly leveraged the prevailing element of ambiguity within the context of its hybrid warfare endeavors directed towards Pakistan. While the Pakistani leadership remained cognizant of the looming threats emanating from India, their

ability to mount effective responses was constrained. Consequently, a decline in public confidence towards the governing structures ensued, prompting the administration to resort to ad-hoc and occasionally ill-considered measures. This, in turn, culminated in a cycle of strategic entrapment, amplifying the challenges faced by Pakistan (Kjennerud & Cullen, 2017). The intricate situation allowed India to harness its inherent and acquired advantages, employing them with a confrontational and malicious agenda whenever deemed opportune. The calculated use of these advantages further propelled India's ability to exert influence and achieve its strategic objectives, thereby exacerbating Pakistan's vulnerabilities.

Effects

India's effective and efficient use of the hybrid warfare toolkit (synchronized attack packages) against Pakistan's broad spectrum of vulnerabilities had profound adverse effects. The outcome of diplomatic and political pressures that came about due to India's competent use of PMECI's 'informational' power instrument against Pakistan resulted in the latter's negative image in front of the international community.

The international community, especially the major global powers, changed their policy orientation and attitude towards Pakistan. In hindsight, it is safe to say that this strategy initiated a variety of non-linear consequences in all PMESII domains, of which the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) strict conditions and the addition of Pakistan into grey list along with reluctance of the international investors and other countries in joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects or investing in different sectors of Pakistan (such as development, infrastructure, agriculture, medicine and textile to name a few) are part of.

The fascinating aspect of the various non-linear consequences that resulted from Indian actions was that New Delhi displayed tremendous capacity in capitalizing on the incalculable developments that followed the social turmoil, deteriorated law and order situation, dwindling economy and political instability in Pakistan.

India did exploit the tumultuous situation in Pakistan to carry out the 'alleged' surgical strikes against Pakistan and revoke the special status of J&K (Al Jazeera, 2019), changing the regional dynamics between the two countries by trying to establish a 'new normal' along with recalibrating its SAPs to more coercive instruments.

Through careful examination of the period of this case study, it has been deduced that SAPs remained an integral part of the Indian hybrid warfare campaign efforts against Pakistan. India used SAPs to great outturn in an escalating conflict with Pakistan, ultimately affecting its policy orientation and decision-making processes. For example, by applying the SAPs against Pakistan to exert political and economic pressures on the country from the international community, India pushed Pakistan into adopting a more defensive posture and increased its political and economic dependency on other countries.

This posturing ultimately weakened Pakistan's position on several matters, such as the J&K dispute, nuclear arms control proliferation, and political and economic reforms, to name a few. India adopted the strategy of employing proxies like the TTP, BLA and spy agents to create unrest in Pakistan. This allowed India to destabilize Pakistan from within without exhausting many resources and efforts while achieving plausible deniability due to the absence of direct or open involvement.

Likewise, by engaging in military adventurism with Pakistan and creating tensions along the LOC, India could maintain military pressure on Pakistan for an extended period and justify its presence and actions in the J&K region.

In summary, India adeptly maneuvered between escalation and de-escalation strategies across diverse instruments of power within the context of the studied Strategic Action Plans (SAPs 1-3). This proficiency was demonstrated both at tactical and operational levels. Remarkably, India effectively sustained a consistent and elevated level of strategic escalation throughout this case study, optimizing its application according to strategic imperatives. While this section provides a concise overview of an intricate conflict scenario, it serves as an illustrative example of how the analytical framework can be employed across various instances. This framework enhances our comprehension of hybrid warfare campaigns and offers insights into their constituents and strategic deployment methodologies. The case studies mentioned in this section can be summarized as follows:

Table 2: Case Study 1—India in Balochistan (2013-2021)

<i>Overview:</i>	India takes advantage of the turmoil in Balochistan, establishes linkages with local separatist militant groups (BLA/BRA), and creates its network of spy agents in the province. The case study highlights some of India’s actions from 2013 to 2021 to demonstrate hybrid approaches to attain its political objectives via non-state actors.
<i>Vulnerabilities:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Absence of the rule of law in the province• Sectarian and ethnic divisions• Anti-state sentiments owing to socio-political and economic deprivation
<i>Means:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Material, financial, and political support to militant and separatist groups operating in Balochistan• Establishment of training camps for militants (inside the province and abroad, e.g., Afghanistan)• Infiltration of spy agents like Kulbhushan Jadhav
<i>Effects:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Unrest in Balochistan• Attacks against foreigners and state projects, e.g., attacks against Chinese workers and CPEC-related projects• Deteriorated Law and Order situation in the province• Increase in the number of militants and intensity of militancy.• Diplomatic and disinformation campaigns by India and its proxies against Pakistan on different forums via different formats (media, lobbying etc.)

Table 3: Case Study 2—Indian Fake News and DisInfo Campaign against Pakistan 2020-2021

<i>Overview:</i>	India takes advantage of political instability in Pakistan and attempts to launch a fake news and disinformation campaign against Pakistan to create confusion and fear amongst the local population and smear its image in the international community. The case study highlights some of India’s actions over the time period 2020-2021 to demonstrate a <i>hybrid</i> approach to attain its political objectives via non-state actors.
<i>Vulnerabilities:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increasing political instability and absence of political harmony and consensus• Mistrust among state institutions and the political elite• The rise of far-right religious groups in the country and public dissatisfaction

<i>Means:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fake news campaigns through print, electronic and social media by India • Spreading disinformation and exaggerated adverse content dissemination about the situation in Pakistan via fake and bogus NGOs, media outlets and cyber domains
<i>Effects:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tried to instigate large-scale unrest in Pakistan by declaring incidents in Karachi (October 2020 - the alleged arrest of the Police Chief by Pakistan Army) and Lahore (Tehrik-i-Labbaik Pakistan protests in the wake of its Chief's arrest by Law Enforcement Agencies in April 2021) as 'Civil War in Pakistan.' • Fear and confusion among the local population after exposure to media that was rampant with Indian fake news. • Fear in the international community about the deteriorating situation in a nuclear-armed state • Panic among foreigners stationed in Pakistan (embassies instructing their nationals to leave the country) • A diplomatic and media nightmare for Pakistan's Foreign Office and political leadership

Pakistan: Strategies for Mitigation of Hybrid Warfare Challenges

Understanding hybrid warfare holds undeniable significance; however, an equally imperative endeavor entails comprehending the mechanisms for its preparation and subsequent containment. States, the fundamental entities under scrutiny within this research, bear a profound responsibility to grasp and internalize the strategies for countering Hybrid Warfare. This comprehension extends beyond mere awareness and acquiring the requisite capacity and determination essential for the adept execution and successful implementation of counter-hybrid warfare strategies.

Hybrid warfare is a reality and a serious challenge to the global system with profound, disruptive and enduring tendencies. It takes place on a continuum of competition and conflict between international actors. Consequently, countering it requires a strategic approach (Monaghan et al., 2019). And since Pakistan is part of the international community and an actor in the global arena, it has also been a direct victim of hybrid warfare; hence a strategic approach needs to be adopted by it to counter its onslaughts successfully.

In pursuit of these objectives, the 'countering hybrid warfare framework' (Monaghan et al., 2019) will serve as the cornerstone, systematically generating tangible and pragmatic recommendations. Given Pakistan's role as a recipient of hybrid warfare campaigns, prevailing circumstances naturally underscore the imperative for Pakistan to cultivate a comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare dynamics. This understanding offers a pivotal vantage point for Pakistan to deconstruct past instances of attack, thereby elucidating the underlying motives behind prevailing destabilization. Moreover, this analytical insight equips Pakistan with the tools necessary to proactively mitigate potential future onslaughts of hybrid warfare.

Central to this endeavor is Pakistan's pragmatic acknowledgment of its vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, which potential instigator states of hybrid warfare might exploit. This candid self-assessment is a pivotal cornerstone, enabling Pakistan to discern and reinforce its weak points, fostering resilience against hybrid warfare tactics. Pakistan's response to counter-hybrid warfare demands a methodical and systematic approach.

As a target state of hybrid warfare, Pakistan should lay the groundwork by establishing strategic guidelines. These strategic objectives play a pivotal role in

shaping the array of available policy choices to effectively counter the onslaught of hybrid warfare. The continuous evolution of the strategic landscape necessitates a regular review of these objectives, thus ensuring their relevance and adaptability within a dynamic environment. Pakistan's counter-hybrid warfare measures should aim to achieve these strategic goals. Pakistan should formulate the following five all-inclusive strategic guidelines.

Table 4: Strategic Guidelines

1.	Maintain capacity for independent action (Monaghan et al., 2019). The government of Pakistan should develop the ability and maintain the capability for independent activity. The government and the public should be on the same page regarding the threat of hybrid warfare, have vulnerability awareness and develop a coordinated approach to thwart SAPs of the enemy.
2.	Deter an adversary from hybrid aggression (Monaghan et al., 2019). Pakistan should formulate a comprehensive deterrence strategy that can threaten and impose dire costs on the enemy. Such deterrence capability should be established from the beginning and re-constructed if unsuccessful. While deterrence formulation, considering own interests and the adversary's intent and capability should be kept in mind.
3.	The urgency of preempting potential hybrid aggression, as articulated by Monaghan et al. (2019), underscores its significance in the context of Pakistan's vulnerability to such tactics. Beyond conventional deterrence, Pakistan must adopt a multifaceted approach that dissuades further aggression and incapacitates adversaries from future hostile actions. This imperative acknowledges the possibility of renewed aggression without immediate reprisal, necessitating a robust strategy to nullify the adversary's willingness for hybrid warfare.
4.	Pakistan should craft a comprehensive framework, integrating diplomatic, informational, economic, and military strategies. Diplomatically, international discourse must highlight the futility of hybrid aggression and garner global consensus against it. Informational efforts should systematically expose the fallacies of hybrid tactics, delegitimizing them globally.
5.	Economically, fortifying resilience and diversifying trade dependencies would create disincentives for aggressors. Concurrently, bolstering cyber and counter-hybrid capabilities will limit adversary maneuverability. Orchestrating these measures cohesively will reshape the adversary's calculus, deterring prospective aggression and safeguarding Pakistan's interests in the face of hybrid warfare complexities.

However, before the aforementioned Strategic Guidelines can be formulated, Pakistan needs to consider certain principles. Pakistan should set goals at the government level and the multinational level. All decisions and actions taken concerning countering hybrid warfare should strengthen the rule-based international order and not undermine any rules that preserve the strategic environment. Pakistan should be wary of keeping the thresholds for action too low to avoid creating a hostile strategic environment in which the probability for escalation and miscalculation is likely to be high. While countering hybrid warfare campaigns, Pakistan should be ready


for all situations and adapt to changing circumstances. And to this end, strategic guidelines should be revisited and modified (Monaghan et al., 2019).

Upon establishing SGs, Pakistan must promptly define operational thresholds. These benchmarks will delineate acceptable levels of hostility and prescribe requisite responses. Customizing these thresholds in alignment with the PMESII spheres is imperative. Variability across vulnerabilities mandates a holistic evaluation of the threat landscape, moving beyond isolated sectors. Articulating and disseminating these thresholds assumes pivotal importance. This strategic delineation and communication fortify Pakistan's hybrid warfare preparedness, reflecting a nuanced grasp of multidimensional vulnerabilities. The approach enhances resilience against potential adversarial acts within the hybrid aggression spectrum. Ultimately comes the 'Countering Hybrid Warfare Framework', which consists of 3 main steps (as illustrated in Figure 3) (Monaghan et al., 2019):

1. **Detect:** Pakistan's ability to detect hybrid warfare threats and attacks is a paramount priority. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, Pakistan can employ a repertoire of techniques. Establishing robust warning intelligence mechanisms and cultivating early warning systems tailored explicitly for Hybrid Warfare scenarios are pivotal. This proactive approach aims to accumulate crucial intelligence, thus forming the bedrock upon which the nation's comprehensive counterstrategy against instigator-driven hybrid warfare campaigns can be effectively erected.
2. **Deter:** Among the components, deterrence emerges as profoundly consequential. Pakistan's imperatives mandate the development of a robust deterrence strategy grounded in fundamental principles. Credibility, signifying the unequivocal resolve to enact actions; capability, reflecting the tangible capacity for execution; and communication, fostering mutual comprehension of potential gains and costs, constitute the bedrock of this strategy. The nuanced realm of deterrence encompasses two discrete categories warranting Pakistan's strategic consideration.
 - a. The deterrence-in-denial approach impairs the adversary's initial pursuit of objectives. Pakistan should adeptly tailor strategies to erode the enemy's capacity to achieve its goals at the outset. Concurrently, deterrence by punishment entails convincing adversaries of the staggering costs associated with their aspirations. This entails deploying a combination of coercive threats and calculated retaliation, thereby dissuading the adversary through an articulated readiness to undertake aggressive actions.
 - b. Pakistan's deterrence strategies should be meticulously calibrated following its unique exigencies, employing these categories as guiding pillars. This component is perhaps the most important. Pakistan should develop its deterrence strategy, which rests on principles like credibility (will to act), capability (capacity to carry out actions), and communication (understanding and perception that intimate gains and costs to both sides).
 - c. As deterrence strategies come in two distinct categories, Pakistan should also formulate its strategy according to its needs. The two categories are deterrence in denial (undermining the enemy's ability to achieve its goals initially) and deterrence by punishment (convincing the enemy that the cost of their goal achievement will be immense via threats of aggressive action and retaliation).

3. **Respond:** This elucidates how a targeted entity should effectively address Hybrid attacks. Factoring in its vulnerabilities, capacities, and the prevailing Hybrid Warfare threat cycle, Pakistan can judiciously adopt specific actions and measures. These measures encompass both responsive strategies against hybrid attacks and proactive fortifications to safeguard potential vulnerabilities from impending assaults. The responsive approach entails a dynamic amalgamation of the PMESII domains meticulously tailored to align with the instigator's intent and the targeted state's (responder's) resolute capacity and determination. This synergistic fusion aims to craft a comprehensive and multifaceted response, calibrated to effectively thwart Hybrid attacks whilst positioning the targeted state to deter and counter future threats proactively.

Figure 3. Visual illustration of 'Countering Hybrid Warfare Framework'



Finally, besides the above-mentioned systematic approach to counter hybrid warfare campaign attacks, Pakistan should simultaneously develop the institutional machinery required to execute and implement the comprehensive counter-hybrid warfare strategy, involving processes, mechanisms, trained individuals and appropriate skills (Monaghan et al., 2019).

Conclusion

Pakistan has emerged as a principal target, if not the central one, within the ambit of the Indian hybrid warfare campaign. Faced with unmet objectives of coercion, intimidation, and military dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan, India, in alliance with like-minded nations, has resorted to employing hybrid warfare tactics. Employing a comprehensive array of hybrid warfare tools, notably special strategic action plans (SAPs), India has adeptly sought to exploit prevailing vulnerabilities within Pakistan's socio-political fabric, significantly undermining the nation's overarching security paradigm.

While Pakistan has successfully cultivated robust deterrence capacities within the conventional and nuclear spheres, it is undeniable that further strides remain

imperative within the purview of hybrid warfare. The prevailing leadership ethos, prevailing sentiments, and governmental orientation in India, compounded by the evolving dynamics of global power, interdependence amongst states, and accelerated technological progressions, collectively foreshadow a distinct possibility of heightened employment of hybrid warfare by India against other sovereign entities, particularly Pakistan.

Consequently, the imperative of constructing an all-encompassing counter hybrid warfare framework, reinforced by institutional machinery and resolute determination, assumes the utmost significance for Pakistan. The exigency stems from the recognition that the looming specter of hybrid warfare constitutes a palpable and credible existential threat, casting a shadow over the nation's security and sovereignty. In this context, developing a robust and comprehensive counter-hybrid warfare strategy becomes a sine qua non for Pakistan, a pivotal safeguard against this formidable stratagem's encroaching complexities and challenges.

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Nurturing Sustainable Peace: Unveiling the Integral Role of Women in Rwanda's Peacebuilding Endeavors

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Abstract

The salient prominence of women's potential in contributing to peacebuilding initiatives has garnered notable recognition at national, regional, and international echelons. The discernment of pivotal concerns germane to women, peace, and security has equally captivated the focal point of interventions within international development. This resonance emanates from the stark reality that women continue to bear the brunt of conflict's impact, particularly pronounced in the most perilous conflict-ravaged zones. This paper examines the pivotal role women assumed in Rwanda's peacebuilding endeavors, elucidating the profound impact of their engagement on the nation's enduring stability. To comprehensively grasp the challenges confronting women in their pursuit of peacebuilding initiatives, this study accounts for national, regional, and institutional agreements and an extensive array of pertinent reports. It contends that intense conflict, exemplified in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region, has raised women's awareness of the need for decisive conflict resolution and amplified recognition of their key role in fostering enduring peace. The study unearths those barriers that impede women's agency in advancing peace, often manifesting as male counterparts obstructing their participation in peacebuilding. Central to the fabric of this investigation is an underscored emphasis on women's empowerment, positioning them as indispensable stakeholders in the orchestration of peacebuilding endeavors.

Keywords

Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, Women, Peace and Security, Rwanda

Introduction

When conflicts, violence, genocides, and wars occur in any community, women and children are the most exposed and vulnerable majority amongst the populations, even

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though their contribution towards the aggravation or cause of the conflict is minimal. In most cases, women bear the brunt of the violence and societal fragmentation in war-torn countries (Mzvondiwa, 2007). Despite being the primary victims of war, women are rarely recognized as stakeholders in conflict resolution agreements. They rarely participate in peace discussions because it is frequently perceived as a male-gender-dominated task. According to a United Nations assessment, women made up only 2% of conflict mediators and 8% of peace negotiators globally between 1990 and 2017, indicating that when finding ways to resolve disputes amicably, they are put in the background (CFR, 2017). It can be attributed that violent conflicts harm women excessively, and conflict resolution mechanisms unfairly exclude them, thus indicating little to no contribution of women towards peace initiatives (Iloh et al., 2019).

Contrary to popular belief, women have proven their strength in resolving disputes and fostering peace when allowed to contribute. Following the 1991 violent clashes in Wajir, Kenya, Wajir women created the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC), which was important in restoring peace in Kenya. In addition, post-apartheid South Africa witnessed the emergence of the Harambe Women's Forum, which played a crucial role in facilitating transformation despite enduring hardship, trauma, and violence. The forum contributed to reconstructing their devastated communities and actively engaged in peacebuilding efforts. During the Liberian conflict, women from Liberia called for a ceasefire through the 'Mass Action for Peace' campaign as part of their tireless pursuit of peace promotion.

In the context of the Liberian crisis, both the government and the United Nations acknowledged the invaluable contributions made by women to security, development, and peace (Issifu, 2015). The international community's commitment to addressing post-conflict challenges by promoting women's participation in peacebuilding initiatives is emphasized by *United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325* and the Beijing Platform for Action on Women and Armed Conflict (UNSC, 2000; Declaration, 1995). Conflict zones invariably affect both men and women in diverse ways. Women and children constitute the majority (80%) of those compelled to flee their homes due to conflict, while men actively engage in conflicts on various sides (Murungi, 2014).

The 1994 genocide and civil war in Rwanda brought attention to women's role in resolving disputes and promoting peace. That year, Rwanda was the site of one of the most devastating conflicts of the 20th century, marked by what many consider the deadliest genocide in human history. Rwandan women have played a pivotal role in maintaining the peace process and have also been instrumental in ending the conflict. In Rwanda, the resolution of the conflict was achieved through resolute efforts to address the underlying and fundamental causes of grievances rather than relying solely on the military successes or failures of the involved parties (Iloh et al., 2019). This highlights why the nation's peacebuilding initiatives have not faltered despite enduring years of conflict, and the risk of further violence remains minimal. The government, civil society, development partners, friendly nations, local men and women, and other social groups have all contributed significantly to ensuring the sustainability of these peace efforts and continue to do so. Among these contributors, women have emerged as active participants in Rwanda's endeavors to resolve disputes, promote understanding, and propel the nation's long-term peace process.

This study indicates the role of women in Rwanda's peacebuilding initiatives. Under the peacebuilding theory, the paper analyzes the many strides Rwandan women achieved in promoting peace and their difficulties when participating in peacebuilding initiatives. A review has been conducted on documents created by various

organizations, encompassing regional and international treaties and agreements related to women and peacebuilding. It is becoming increasingly evident that women hold crucial roles in conflict resolution and peacebuilding within nations devastated by conflict due to their unique societal positions. In light of this perspective, this study delves into the roles undertaken by Rwandan women in conflict resolution and the restoration of peace within Rwandan society.

With this context in mind, this article aims to explore the involvement of women in post-conflict peacebuilding across Africa, focusing on the experiences of Rwandan women. This study investigates women's experiences in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, aiming to address the question: Why is the promotion of gender equality and women's engagement in peacebuilding of paramount importance?

Research Methodology

The study utilizes secondary research tools, including research papers, journal articles, and other literary pieces centred around peacebuilding. These documents primarily focus on women's roles in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in a general context, specifically in Rwanda's case. Consequently, secondary materials such as textbooks, journal articles, and other written works obtained from libraries were employed.

The study also draws upon internet sources that contain information about the Rwandan civil war, atrocities committed, and efforts to resolve the conflicts. These records are already accessible in the public domain. The writer's approach involved refining, interpreting, evaluating, and analyzing these existing sources. For empirical research, the study adopts a qualitative technique. This methodology facilitates a deeper comprehension of the underlying causes and components of the Rwandan Civil War, along with its far-reaching impacts on society as a whole and, particularly, women.

Furthermore, it aids in highlighting the roles of women in peacebuilding and articulating how their involvement can contribute to achieving gender equality. Moreover, the study employs both explanatory and descriptive approaches to elucidate the case study of Rwandan women and underscore women's experiences as a pivotal element in global peace initiatives.

Conceptualizing Peace Studies and Peacebuilding: A Feminist Perspective

Different departments, organizations, schools, agencies, and researchers have elucidated peacebuilding through diverse perspectives. For instance, according to Galtung, the Roman 'pax' is the dominant peace idea in contemporary peace theory and practice and serves the interest of the powerful in maintaining the status quo in society. Galtung saw a need for a more comprehensive peace concept that reflected the world's social cosmologies to create peaceful conditions. Peace should be attained through peaceful means and ideas (Galtung, 2010). Relating peace to the nonexistence of all forms of structural violent behavior is a long-term objective that is difficult to achieve, particularly in war zones and situations. However, seeing peace as a series of primarily pessimistic and positive events is insufficient. 'Negative peace' refers to the absence of conflict; 'positive peace,' on the other hand, is a broader notion encompassing individual security. In any event, methods for achieving both gender justice and peace must be considered from the beginning (Galtung, 1996).

Conflict resolution still has the option of military involvement in hegemonic discourses, but feminist talks have generated entirely constructive peace models. They begin their discussions with the need for protection and individual experiences of sadism—in what emerges as their classified sphere. Tickner (1992) discussed the

significance of overcoming social relationships based on dominance and subordination, essential for attaining peace, social justice, and ecological sustainability. Security necessitates not just the nonexistence of conflict but also the abolition of inequitable communal connections and gender inequality. The individual urge for society, harmony, and interdependence should be prioritized. Her explanation of security discusses violent connections at all levels of society (Tickner, 1992), which is a dynamic idea that aspires to create justice rather than order. Replacing warrior-patriots with citizen defenders offers more favourable paradigms for women's equal engagement in international politics. *Peace and Security for All* is a prescriptive claim because traditional security strategies rarely recognize the female half of the population.

On the other hand, bringing peace and security to women and men, boys and girls, in their various situations is a huge undertaking. Feminist peace notions seek to face this challenge: Judith Ann Tickner's vision of peace based on gender impartiality urges that the standards of women's privileges and international ruling be strengthened and that the emphasis be shifted from intensification to impediment. Therefore, a transition in philosophy from a rigidly defined security strategy to a peace strategy is necessary. Feminists frequently challenge military concepts and institutions. This has also sparked debates over women serving in the military in feminist discourse (Tickner, 1992).

Feminist peace concepts are founded on the equal participation of men and women at all levels and processes, particularly the integration of gender perspectives across all security, peace, and development policy domains. Since the start of the 1990s, women's advocates have gained increased communal recognition in the West thanks to their demands. The transnational women's movement changed its tactics in response to the World Conferences on Women, which greatly aided this accomplishment. The self-perception of many feminist NGOs has changed from opposing criticism and monitoring to lobbying and impacting international UN conferences. Christa Wichterich, for instance, noted the convergence of topics at NGO and UN debates as a political novelty at the 1994 Cairo UN International Conference on Population. Instead of simply opposing UN policies, most feminist NGOs today work to influence them actively. However, this was not unopposed within feminist organizations.

The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is one of the most comprehensive programs for expanding women's rights and gender equality globally, particularly in peace and security, adopted in 1995 (Declaration, 1995). While there have been significant improvements, inequality still prevails. In critical peace negotiations between 1992 and 2018, women represented only 13% of negotiators, 3% of mediators, and 4% of signings. The Beijing Platform of Action was approved at the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women due to the work of numerous women's NGOs. This platform requires institutional systems to foster women's equality. States were advised to support mainstreaming a gender justice perspective in all policy sectors and levels of government. Consequently, gender mainstreaming was brought into worldwide policymaking to bring gender equality into organizations' activities (UNSC, 2000).

While women are effecting transformative changes in justice, peace, and security, formal peace processes continue to represent their contributions inadequately. Research indicates that peace agreements brokered by women exhibit a 20% higher probability of lasting a minimum of two years and a 35% elevated likelihood of enduring for at least 15 years. These findings stem from a study conducted by the International Peace Institute, which scrutinized the role of women as representatives,

peacekeepers, and stakeholders in 182 ratified peace accords spanning the period from 1989 to 2011 (Iloh et al., 2019)

The commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of *UNSC Resolution 1325* (2000) centered on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) underscores significant progress. Nonetheless, women's rights and leadership in peacebuilding remain insufficiently addressed (Issifu, 2015)—the trajectory of UNSC Resolutions after 1325 culminated in the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Framework. Yet, despite its global recognition, persistent challenges persist. Patriarchy, inequities, militarized masculinities, and discriminatory power structures curtail women's participation in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Approaches to monitoring and evaluating the implementation of gender-centric agendas in post-conflict contexts frequently fall short in integrating women's perspectives. Subsequently, women's representation in peace initiatives remains limited. For instance, a mere 10% of negotiators in the Afghan peace talks were women. Recent peace dialogues in Yemen and Libya lacked women negotiators, with only 20% female participation in political negotiations in Libya (CRF, 2022).

Women in peace processes prioritize economic growth, transitional justice, education, and reconciliation. Their advocacy frequently encompasses marginalized communities and the prerequisites for addressing the root causes of conflict. Women's reach extends to the entire population, unlike men, whose accessibility to combat zones might be hindered by the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence (Fearon, 2021).

History: Understanding the Rwandan Conflict

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebellious group, and the Rwandan Armed Forces, the nation's government, were involved in a prolonged civil war in Rwanda from 1st October 1990 to 18th July 1994 (Iloh et al., 2019). The long-running conflict among the Rwandan people between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes escalated the war. More than 336,000 Tutsis were compelled to pursue refuge in neighboring nations after the 1959-1962 uprising that substituted the Tutsi kingdom with a Hutu-led republic. These expatriates established the RPF in Uganda, and under the direction of Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, it settled into a fully operational army by the late 1980s (Murungi, 2014).

The Rwandan Civil War began in 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group chiefly of Tutsi refugees, stormed northern Rwanda from their stronghold in Uganda. In the ensuing three years, no party could secure a clear edge. On 4th August 1993, the Rwandan government under Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana signed the Arusha Accord with the RPF (Issifu, 2015). Although many historians argue that the extermination of the Tutsis had been planned for several years, the killing of Habyarimana on 6th April 1994, which left a power vacuum and brokered peace agreements, served as the spark. The following day, troops, police, and militia, composed primarily of Hutus, executed senior Tutsi and moderate Hutu military and political leaders. Most academics estimate that between 500,000 and 662,000 Tutsis died during this roughly 100-day period due to armed militias massacring associates of the Tutsi marginal ethnic cluster and approximately reasonable Hutu and Twa (Balikungeri & Ingabire, 2012).

Following the 1994 war and genocide in Rwanda, which claimed a million lives, nearly 3 million people fled to refugee camps in the neighboring DRC, while tens of thousands remained internally displaced. Women were targeted due to both their gender and their ethnic heritage. A third of women between the ages of 13 and 35 who

experienced sexual assault tested positive for HIV, adding to their already existing physical and psychological suffering. According to current estimates, 16,000 female genocide survivors who are HIV-positive have been forced to leave because of gender-based violence (Hamilton, 2000).

Rwanda: Women's Participation in Conflict Resolution & Peacekeeping

In contemporary conflicts, women endure disproportionate physical suffering and property loss and are often subjected to sexual violence perpetrated by militia groups. Despite these realities, their perspectives remain marginalized in peace negotiations. Irrespective of contrary evidence, women are continuously and glaringly excluded from the peacebuilding process despite suffering the most significant harm from conflict and despite evidence to the contrary. The International Peace Institute (IPI) has done research that shows that when women participate in peace processes, the ensuing peace agreement is 35% more likely to last at least 15 years. This research reveals that women prioritize transitional justice, economic growth, reconciliation, and education—all pivotal elements for establishing robust and enduring peace – over the presumed spoils of warfare (O'Reilly et al., 2015).

Women frequently use different strategies and play different roles in promoting peace than would be expected in more formal peace negotiations in high-level state security discussions, such as bridging gaps, serving as trustworthy middlemen, expanding the scope of the peace talk agenda, and supporting post-conflict recovery.

Women are more likely to achieve enduring peace agreements through their ability to broaden the scope of peace processes. When deliberating on the requisites for fostering societal reconciliation and reconstruction, women consistently address more substantial societal challenges than men. Their focus centers on pressing issues such as societal reforms, economic revitalization initiatives, and transitional justice mechanisms instead of merely power-sharing, territorial gains, or military strategies. This emphasis significantly enhances the prospects of establishing sustainable peace. Including women in post-conflict rebuilding contributes to heightened stability within post-conflict regions.

Studies conducted by the IPI highlight the effectiveness of commissions entrusted with executing specific provisions of peace agreements—such as overseeing demobilization and disarmament, instituting truth-and-reconciliation processes, or formulating constitutions—when women assume leadership roles within these processes. The reconstruction of public institutions and the provision of essential services crucial for long-term stability, including healthcare and education programs, as well as necessities like access to food and clean water (all of which women tend to prioritize), culminating in a more resilient post-conflict society (Balikungeri & Ingabire, 2012). In Rwanda, women were initially more involved in domestic matters. Women worked on home farms to provide food for the family while caring for their children, the sick, and the elderly. They were occupied with a range of tasks. Women were entirely dependent on their husbands. They lacked legal rights to the proceeds from the land or had limited independence. They were not permitted to open bank accounts without their husband's consent, and as a result, they could not obtain finance to launch a business without the help of a male relative or their spouse. Being a patriarchal society, Rwanda, like many other countries, did not grant women the ability to possess land or property. Women's rights decreased due to their inability to sustain their families when their husbands passed away (Murungi, 2014).

After 1994, women headed 34% of the homes in Rwanda, and 62.15% of those households—which included over 21.5% of adult women—lived below the poverty line. About 70% of the women in the country were abysmal. In the entire nation, there were reportedly 110,000 child-headed households (CHH). Conversely, many males, including former soldiers, also experienced post-traumatic stress disorder. War and genocide in 1994 left behind psychological wounds that need time and additional care. Families have disintegrated, and a confrontational operating style has damaged the Rwandan people's trust. In a time when prostitution, domestic violence, drunkenness, and drug misuse were on the rise, society experienced trauma and psychosocial degeneration that may still be seen today. Despite the circumstances, women made a significant decision that helped bring peace to one of the world's most vulnerable nations (Murungi, 2014).

The Rwandan genocide and civil war in 1994 highlighted women's contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. One of the worst conflicts of the 20th century occurred in Rwanda in that particular year. It was the scene of the worst genocide in recorded human history. The fundamental task before the new Rwandan administration in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide was to reestablish and preserve security, law, and order and launch the national healing and reconciliation process. Since ignoring any group could cause the process to falter or be undermined, achieving these goals requires the contributions of every section of society.

Realizing peace calls explicitly for the participation of all parties involved in the conflict, whether they are the perpetrators or the victims. All citizens must create a long-term peace supporting post-war financial, partisan, and communal development. Early on, the Rwandan government became aware of this and made a concerted effort to include women in the post-conflict peacebuilding and rebuilding process. The male population also decreased significantly due to the genocide since many males were slaughtered, some were imprisoned, many fled Rwanda to seek asylum in neighboring nations, and others joined the resistance in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The only alternative left to the women was to actively participate in the reconstruction of their nation and the pursuit of long-term peace. Because of the government's strong support, they were present at every phase of the peacebuilding and rebuilding efforts (Iloh et al., 2019).

The Rwandan government also learned that women were the driving force behind the uprising and insurgency after the genocide ended. They communicated intelligence from the woods and trenches to the rebels engaged in combat with the government forces. As a result, the conflict would continue as usual as long as women joined the insurgency. The government recognized that if women were not persuaded to stop supporting the rebels, efforts to end the war would fail. Therefore, attempts were made to educate women about the risks of supporting the rebels and the effects of a long, drawn-out war, particularly on them and their offspring. Women understood that they suffered the most consequences due to being uprooted from their homes and communities each time there was a conflict between government forces and the insurgents. Women gradually started to favor the government instead of the insurgents since it ensured their safety and protection. Once they became convinced that this posture was required to reserve their sanctuary and that of their children, they began a campaign to persuade their husbands and family members to disentangle themselves from the insurgency and return peaceably to their homes. This aided in the early defeat of the uprising. Therefore, the initial steps in involving women in ending the fighting and establishing the peace procedure in Rwanda were to persuade them to support the government (Issifu, 2015).

Facilitating the cessation of hostilities among their spouses and family members marked a pivotal turning point in quelling the insurgency and expediting the peace process. Arguably, the most noteworthy contribution by women in resolving the Rwandan conflict lies herein. This endeavor was undertaken in the face of grave personal peril, as they emerged as primary targets for the insurgents. The insurgents' ranks were gradually thinning due to men aligning themselves with government forces and reuniting with their families. Women adroitly employed diverse strategies, among which collaborating with government forces to broker a peaceful surrender stood out. This negotiation hinged upon the precondition that those who had already surrendered, including husbands and other kin, would be spared punitive measures.

Furthermore, the rebels encountered an arduous challenge in coordinating their actions, as women ceased furnishing them with intelligence on government troops' movements. In a remarkable shift, women transitioned to notifying government soldiers, adept community combatants, and other tactical deployments about the insurgents' whereabouts and optimal moments for engagement. This recalibration substantially streamlined conflict resolution, thus making the peacebuilding process more manageable.

Rwandese Women's Approaches to Conflict Resolution & Reconciliation

Over the past few decades, the field of conflict and peacebuilding has witnessed a growing surge in feminist studies. There have been appeals to incorporate previously marginalized feminist and women's perspectives into peacebuilding efforts and critically examine the mechanisms perpetuating these exclusions. Feminists argue that women's daily struggles and experiences enable them to offer unique insights into peacebuilding, challenging the predominantly male discourse on conflict and peacebuilding. Moreover, black and African feminist scholars advocate exploring the diverse and intricate range of women's experiences, particularly those encountered during and after conflicts. Adequate progress is less likely if peacebuilding processes only involve one gender; thus, including both genders in peacebuilding initiatives is essential for enhanced efficacy (Högberg, 2019).

Hudson employs diverse methodologies to construct the theoretical framework for her research concerning African conflicts, explicitly focusing on African feminist theory. Within this framework, African feminists employ the term 'womanist' to signify the harmonization of the pragmatic reality of African women's lives, their intersecting identities, empowerment dynamics, and strategic emancipatory objectives (Högberg, 2019). The tenets of African feminist theory assert that the feminist peacebuilding approach should encompass both genders throughout all stages. Demonstrated successes of women's involvement in formal and informal processes, including negotiations, support this contention. Nevertheless, despite these positive outcomes, data indicates a persistently low representation of women in formal processes, whereas women's engagement tends to concentrate more on NGOs at the grassroots level.

Rwandese women actively participated in programs to promote national healing and reconciliation alongside men. Cooperatives, where village members work together for communal growth, were among these programs. These people, who were both genocide victims and offenders, now live together and collaborate to speed up the process of healing and reconciliation. The *Ndiumunyarwanda* (I am Rwandan) Program is one of the programs in question. Others include the Umuganda Program and the *Umugorobaw'ababyeyi* (Parents' Evening), where parents from a similar community discuss various themes, including politics and social issues. These events occur once a

month (Herath, 2018). Many people think that Rwanda's cooperative arrangements have helped the country's direct victims and genocide perpetrators come to genuine peace. More significantly, women enthusiastically engaged in these programs, which helped promote national healing and harmony.

The acknowledgement of Rwandan women, who constituted a majority before and during the genocide, is an illustrative case study of the overarching pattern wherein women become victims during periods of violence and conflict while remaining underrepresented in political spheres. This is predominantly a consequence of the systemic utilization of sexual exploitation and violence against the female populace. However, a significant segment of the female population has faced allegations of actively participating in the Rwandan genocide, thereby transgressing entrenched violent patriarchal norms. Moreover, as some argue, Rwandan women have played a substantial role in post-violence endeavors to reconstruct the nation and foster peace.

Women have made inroads into the realm of politics and grassroots activism. Collaborative efforts among women have been instrumental in fostering solidarity and cohesiveness, showcasing gendered insight and leadership capabilities. An example of such endeavors is the Unity Club, which operates as a platform for prominent women leaders and spouses of high-ranking government officials. Its purpose lies in cultivating harmony among its members and spreading the message of unity and reconciliation throughout communities. Through the Unity Club, women from diverse backgrounds have united to identify the necessity for socio-economic reforms, advocate for these causes, and ultimately wield influence over legislation enacting legislation that comprehensively safeguards and propels women's rights.

Breaking Barriers: Women as Leaders and Gender Equality

Women's latent potential, talents, and leadership abilities are increasingly recognized. The percentage of women in national parliaments worldwide has gradually climbed over the past 20 years, from 11.8% in 1998 to 17.8% in 2008 to 23.5% in 2018. In some nations, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, which grew from 11 to 23.6% during the previous 20 years, and the Arab States region, which rose from 3.1% to 17.5%, the proportion of women in parliaments has expanded considerably. In addition to falling short of women's representation as half of the world's population, total global representation is still far below the benchmark of 30% that is frequently cited as the required level of representation to achieve a 'critical mass'—a considerable marginal of all legislators with noteworthy influence rather than a symbolic few people (Pepera, 2018).

The meaningful inclusion of women in leadership roles at the national, local, and community levels is thus a crucial area of focus for international development policy. However, some may question the significance of whether or not women enter politics, civil society, or other leadership positions. Why is it critical that women participate more in politics on a global scale? Women's political participation positively impacts democracy by improving public opinion, fostering cross-party and cross-ethnic collaboration, and ensuring a more sustainable future. Women's involvement in politics advances gender equality and influences the range of policy issues considered and the solutions proposed. A legislator's gender has a considerable impact on their legislative priorities, according to studies. Strong evidence indicates a proportional rise in policies prioritizing the quality of life and taking family, women, and ethnic and racial minorities' priorities into account as more women are elected to office (Kattou, 2013).

Additionally, Rwandan women have demonstrated that they can be admirable leaders at the community and policy levels. The Government of National Unity made

it easier for women to participate actively in post-genocide politics and society by establishing the ministry in charge of Family and Women's Affairs. This was done to acknowledge the change and the crucial role that women have played in Rwandan society. Different Rwandan women in positions of leadership played a vital part in bringing women and the community as a whole together to work together to find answers to their nation's challenges. Their participation in the peacebuilding process has changed their position and opened up new opportunities for them to influence national policy. The international community has acknowledged the sheer number of women in parliament. With 56.3% of its lower house members being female, Rwanda's parliament is the most welcoming to women worldwide, according to the International Parliamentary Union at the end of 2011 (ibid.).

It could be argued that the active participation and presence of Rwandan women in society signify positive changes and advancements toward a more peaceful and gender-equitable societal framework. Their significant contributions underscore the imperative of adopting and solidifying a gender-sensitive approach within peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction contexts. The Rwandan context serves as a compelling case study, exemplifying the constructive role women can play in fostering peace and yielding broader socio-economic impacts on the nation. Rwanda's notable level of female representation and its effective reconciliation process following the 1994 genocide have positioned it as a regional and global 'model' for gender equality and conflict resolution (Madsen, 2020).

However, beneath the veneer of the 'politics of numbers', a predominant framework among men often leaves little to no space for feminist perspectives or women's influence. Rwanda has ratified *UNSC Resolution 1325*, offering policy recommendations for dismantling gender barriers in the historically patriarchal security sector.

Social Transformation and Restorative Justice in the Traditional Gacaca Court

In civilizations transitioning from protracted periods of violence, instability, and persecution and moving toward a post-conflict, more peaceful era, truth-seeking procedures, international criminal law innovations, and other types of transitional justice have become commonplace. Top-down and bottom-up transitional justice methods are being explored legally and informally in South Africa, Liberia, Peru, Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Northern Ireland. These advancements have been the subject of several studies, articles, conferences, and discussions that have generally elaborated on notions linked to transitional justice. However, a feminist perspective has not typically been used to analyze and criticize these processes. Generally speaking, women's positions, particularly their unique victimhood, have not been considered systematically. Rarely do critics expressly consider whether recently developed peace- and reconciliation-promoting measures will truly improve the status of women in a society emerging from oppression or conflict (Fineman & Zinsstag, 2013).

Post-conflict nations are uniquely positioned to establish norms that would permit and guarantee the vigorous contribution of the whole populace, including women, to renovate a more steady, reasonable, and self-governing polity because they must rebuild. This book provides insights into feminist and women's viewpoints on provisional justice, often called 'justice in transition'. By extending the scope and vision of the viable answers, feminism can be introduced into the discussion to increase the potential for a transformative justice method during conflict or uncertainty.

Equally significant is that after the genocide, Rwandese women took on unconventional roles, such as serving as judges in the neighborhood Gacacacourts (outdated conflict settlement courts), which were exclusively male affairs before the genocide. These courts were crucial in deciding cases involving genocide suspects and offenders and addressing disputes among community members. By November 2005, the Gacacacourts' estimated proportion of female judges was 15.7%. 'Aloisea Inyumba' was appointed as the first Executive Secretary of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, which was established in March 1999, likely in acknowledgment of the contributions made by women to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Rwanda, particularly their achievements in the Gacaca courts (Ingelaere, 2008).

Additionally, Rwandese women contributed substantially to the government's rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts by helping build homes in the newly constructed townships. As a result, they assisted in repatriating thousands of displaced persons and offered possibilities for resettlement to those who returned (Issifu, 2015). Additionally, because the genocide and civil war had a detrimental impact on food security and agricultural productivity, women throughout Rwanda resurrected several agricultural enterprises through self-help projects. As a result, women ensured food security by producing food on their farms or through the Food for Work Program for their families and the broader populace. This facilitated national healing because hunger seriously threatened peace and unity in the country.

Conclusion

Women and children emerge as the most vulnerable segments of society, enduring profound suffering before, during, and in the aftermath of conflicts. Paradoxically, they are not the instigators of wars; nevertheless, they bear the brunt of their devastating consequences. In the contemporary era, rebels and conflict instigators have employed tactics against women akin to those employed by terrorists. Consequently, women find themselves targeted and exploited as instruments of war. A glaring example lies in the DRC, where thousands of women fell victim to rape. Additionally, in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, approximately 250,000 Rwandan women and girls became victims of sexual violence, with 66% testing positive for HIV/AIDS.

This paper provides an overview of the role of women in Rwanda's peacebuilding endeavors. The study examines the great strides made by Rwandan women in promoting peace through the perspective of peacebuilding theory and the problems they face when participating in peacebuilding projects. Feminist peace concepts are based on men and women participating equally at all levels and in all processes, emphasizing integrating gender perspectives across all areas of security, peace, and development policy. Discrimination against women increases the risk of a state experiencing internal conflict, and according to this article, gender consideration is an essential aspect of an effective peacebuilding process. Evidence from studies of peacebuilding from a feminist perspective, such as in Rwanda, can be utilized to make the peace agenda more inclusive and ethical. The article contends that a culturally contextual gender analysis is a critical instrument in all peace work, both for the feminist theory of peacebuilding and the practice of adopting a gender perspective.

UNSCR 1325 on WPS recognized the importance of women's conflict experiences to its peace and security mandate. The Council aims to advance women's rights in conflict resolution and peace processes. However, endemic discrimination, marginalization, and sexual violence against women in the face of Resolution 1325 pose serious obstacles to its achievement. Although there is no denying that support for

local women in peacebuilding has grown in the years following *UNSC Resolution 1325's* approval, it is also clear that financing for women's groups and campaigners has decreased over time. Since 2001, international efforts for world peace have changed from supporting women's groups and activists to combating terrorism globally. As a result, support for the global battle against violence against women has drawn very few contributions from women's security movements.

Women possess the potential to actively engage in endeavors aimed at fostering peace. Following numerous conflicts, women consistently constitute the majority of the population, shouldering substantial responsibilities that encompass not only the reconstruction of the nation but also the nurturing of their families. In this capacity, they undertake the complex task of reestablishing community security, ensuring sustenance, and cultivating an atmosphere of peace.

To establish enduring peace, addressing concerns related to women's equitable access to power, education, and resources is paramount at the national and international levels. Governments are tasked with vigilant oversight to ensure the effective execution of these intentions across all sectors and tiers. This approach is the most viable avenue for propelling sustainable development within post-conflict scenarios. Advocacy campaigns centered around education, and awareness are crucial components in this endeavor. When strategically positioned, women can emerge as indispensable pillars in a post-conflict nation's pursuit of peacebuilding initiatives. Their involvement serves as a cornerstone for advancing sustainable development amidst the aftermath of crises.

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Pak-Afghan Border and Regional Stability: A Perspective of Pakistan Military

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Abstract

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border has remained volatile since Pakistan's independence in 1947. Two superpower invasions of Afghanistan have further amplified the significance of the contentious border. Our research focuses on border porosity along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border influencing regional stability. The study involves current serving army personnel as respondents. A total of fifty-two respondents were selected through convenience sampling. We utilized a structured questionnaire to gauge the perceptions of Pakistan Army personnel concerning the border porosity and its impact on regional stability. The data analysis was conducted using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), employing frequency distribution and cross-tabulation techniques. Our empirical findings reveal that the porosity of the Durand Line contributes to the proliferation of terrorism, smuggling, and human trafficking. A notable factor driving illegal migration is the scarcity of official entry points. Most respondents (92.3%) acknowledged using alternative illicit routes to cross the Durand Line. The absence of legal documentation (51.9% of respondents) also emerged as a primary cause of unauthorized entries into Pakistan. Regarding the impediments to sealing the border, 67.3% of respondents affirmed that the Government of Afghanistan plays a significant role. Conversely, 86.5% of respondents agreed that the registration of Afghan refugees has resulted in a decline in terrorism. Nevertheless, implementing

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fencing along Pakistan-Afghanistan positively enhances border security and regional stability.

Keywords

Cross-border, porosity, security, terrorism, border fence, Afghanistan, Pakistan

Introduction

Effective border management consistently enhances a nation's security and economy. However, borders often engender challenges for the indigenous populations on both sides. This issue has remained a point of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Sojasi et al., 2018). Pakistan initially pursued a defensive policy by constructing a border fence; however, in 2017, it transitioned to an offensive policy due to the limited options available to counteract malicious terrorist activities. During this period, the Pakistani government issued 'shoot to kill' orders for individuals using unauthorized methods to cross the border (Oztig, 2020).

The significance of the Pakistan-Afghanistan (referred to as Pak-Afghan hereafter) border stems from the geopolitical importance of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 1893, Afghan ruler Amir Abdulreham entered a treaty with the British government (Payne, 2012). This treaty established the Durand Line, demarcating a boundary between the British subcontinent and Afghanistan. The successors of the Afghan governments subsequently reaffirmed the treaty in 1905, 1919, and 1930 (Yousafzai & Yaqubi, 2017).

In 1947, Pakistan's establishment occurred, prompting Afghanistan to reject the aforementioned treaty and assert its claim over the western side of the Indus River as Afghan territory. Afghanistan also contested the status of the Durand Line as an international border, bringing the matter before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Hoeffler, Ijaz, & Von Billerbeck, 2011; Lambah, 2012). Although the international community recognized it as a legitimate border, successive Afghan regimes, including the Taliban government, refused to acknowledge it (Khan, 2017).

The rejection of the Durand Line as an international border has profoundly impacted the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past seven decades. The failure of both nations to establish effective governance in the border region has created a void that non-governmental actors have exploited. These militants infiltrated the border area, undermining the tribal system (Neill, 2010). If this region continues to serve as a haven for militants, the possibility of another significant attack on the Western world, akin to 9/11, remains a concern (Nawaz & De Borchgrave, 2009).

Pakistan has endeavoured to curb terrorist activities and the influence of non-state actors through various military operations and policies (Manchanda, 2017). The limited control Pakistan exercised over (erstwhile) Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan provided an environment conducive for terrorists to establish training camps, such as those affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Janjua, 2009). While FATA was initially perceived as a 'safe haven' for non-state actors, this insurgency expanded across the border regions of erstwhile FATA and into the southeastern and eastern areas of Afghanistan over time.

The present state of Pashtunistan (encompassing both sides of the Durand Line) is shaped by Islamophobia propagated in Western media and the local population's resentment towards unwarranted and unjust interference in the region. Several challenges have contributed to this scenario, including acknowledging the

Durand Line's legitimacy, India's involvement in the western provinces of Pakistan via Afghanistan, and the lingering refugee issue. These factors have significantly hindered regional stability (Schetter, 2013).

The Durand Line assumed global significance after the post-9/11 war on terror. Pakistan incurred the repercussions of aligning with the United States in this endeavor. The surge in terrorism after 9/11 had detrimental effects on Pakistan's security landscape, inflicting extensive human, infrastructural, property, and economic losses (M. M. Khan, 2015). This situation similarly impacted Afghanistan and Iraq. The toll amounted to approximately 1.3 million lives lost directly or indirectly in Iraq (1 million), Afghanistan (220,000), and Pakistan (80,000) due to the conflict (Seymour, 2015). Although Afghanistan served as the battleground, Pakistan's partnership with the USA in counterterrorism efforts shook the foundations of its society. The porous and treacherous nature of the long border played a facilitating role for terrorists, who traversed into Pakistan, seeking refuge in tribal areas. Some also sought shelter in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, leading to unrest in Sindh and Punjab (Tariq, 2018).

Abdullahi and Gawi (2021) define border porosity as "the leakage or breach of the border allowing illegal and unofficial migration of people, goods, and ammunition between countries" (p. 443). The Pak-Afghan border is one of the world's longest porous borders, characterized by its vast expanse. Its significance as a pivotal commercial and trade route for Pakistan with Afghanistan and other Asian countries is undeniable. However, its porosity has transformed it into a hub for illicit activities. Neo-Taliban, the Al-Qaeda network, and the Haqqani network are attributed to disrupting law and order (Tariq et al., 2020). The prevalence of abandoned kidnapping cases and the proliferation of weaponry underscore the consequences of porous borders, as seen in countries like Ghana, the Republic of Benin, and Nigeria.

To understand the current situation of Pak-Afghan border, there is a need to consider three aspects: (i) there is an ideological gulf between Islamic militants and the Western world, (ii) there are long-term conflicts between states and tribes, (iii) the unresolved issues among Kabul, Islamabad and ethnic nationalists create an adverse condition on the border. Terrorism is also increasing in both countries due to the porosity of the Pak-Afghan border (Khan & Wagner, 2013).

Two provinces of Pakistan- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan are situated along the border of Afghanistan. Pashtun is the major ethnicity found on both sides of the border. Pashtuns share 40% of Afghan's population while 15% to 20% of Pakistan's population (Mazhar & Goraya, 2010). The Baloch community is also vital and is present on both sides of the border. Both ethnic groups gain a large proportion of their income from illegal trade through the porosity of the Pak-Afghan border (Bajoria, 2009).

The influx of Afghan refugees came to Pakistan after the Russian invasion. More than 2.7 million Afghan migrants were living in Pakistan, out of which 74% were born in Pakistan. 80% of Afghan immigrants came to Pakistan before 1985 (Guedes, 2013). The population of registered Afghan refugees decreased over time. Currently, 1.3 Million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan, of which 52% are children and 4% are 60 years or older (Gul, 2022). Migration from Afghanistan is not only due to war; cultural trend is also a fundamental reason behind legal and illegal migration. People also migrated for livelihood and education. People who emigrated from rural areas of Afghanistan settled in urban areas of Pakistan and Iran (Monsutti, 2006). Most Afghans migrate to Peshawar for kinship and to seek education, health and livelihood. The social

networks of Afghanis and politico-religious parties on both sides prompt the people to migrate from Afghanistan to the surroundings of Peshawar (Habibi & Hunte, 2006).

The physiography of the Pak-Afghan border is very complicated. Hindu Kush range, Sufaid Koh, Toba Kakar range and Chaghi hills from north to south are situated on the Pak-Afghan border (Ikram & Anwar, 2018). Khyber Pass, Tochi Pass, Gomal Pass, Khajok Pass, and Mazari Pass are on the border. Kabul River, Kuram River and Gomal River are the important rivers that cross the Pak-Afghan border from Afghanistan to Pakistan (Sheikh et al., 2009).

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan and India are intricately entwined with security concerns and national interests. The specter of external threats has perennially loomed over Pakistan's security landscape. This dilemma has manifested on its eastern and western border—while Pakistan has engaged in three wars on the eastern front, it grappled with post-9/11 challenges on its western border (Tariq, Khan, & Khan, 2019). Pakistan has made vigorous attempts to fortify its borders and curb illicit movements; however, it remains a haven for illegal immigrants, primarily due to Afghanistan's lack of cooperation (Mairaj-ul-Hamid, 2017).

Accusations have been exchanged between Afghanistan and Pakistan concerning internal insurgencies. Pakistan has consistently denied any involvement in Afghanistan and advocated for democratic continuity while suggesting border fencing to mitigate friction. Following the 9/11 incident and the US attack on Afghanistan, the Taliban infiltrated Pakistan through the porous points of the Durand Line (Khan, 2018). The tide of Talibanization swept Pakistan, particularly the tribal areas, breeding armed violence, extremism, and mass mobilization. These outcomes adversely impacted the political, social, and economic fabric of both Pakistan and Afghanistan (Wang, 2010). While the 30 million Pashtuns in Pakistan refrained from joining their 15 million Afghan counterparts, Pakistan remained hesitant to engage in bilateral discussions about Pashtunistan (Ponka et al., 2017).

Terrorism's penetration in both nations owes much to the permeable Durand Line, the scarcity of military checkpoints, and a lack of cooperation from officials on both sides. Border clashes have surged since 2012-13 (Khan, 2017). History underscores that the Pak-Afghan border consistently attracts the attention of international political and strategic players. Pakistan's significance extends to the global community, given its hosting of Afghan refugees and potential role in Afghan stability (Micinski, 2021). With recurrent border clashes involving India and Afghanistan, Pakistan is strategically influential in fostering regional peace. Furthermore, China's involvement in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) augments regional stability.

The international community is responsible for facilitating an agreed-upon border delimitation. If both countries successfully secure their borders, the ripple effect would resonate beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan, fostering global peace. The nexus between regional stability and border security underscores the interconnectedness of neighboring countries and the ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan advocates for border security through fencing, while Afghanistan's concurrence remains elusive (Bano, 2019). Afghanistan, labeled a narcotics-driven state, can transform its image by developing foreign trade through Pakistan, unearthing a solution to its landlocked status. Instead of nurturing an Indo-Afghan nexus, Afghanistan should foster sound political and economic relations with Pakistan, leveraging shared culture and religion. Such a connection would bolster the Islamic bloc and buttress regional stability across the area. Failure to address the tensions between the two states could

catalyze superpower interventions, unsettling both nations and impacting the broader region. In today's global village, the interwoven relationships between countries ripple beyond their borders, influencing allied states that have invested in economic or trading projects.

Pakistan started fencing the Pak-Afghan border in March 2017. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, slow-running economy, complicated physiography and volatile security situation, 85% of fencing has been completed, which stopped cross-border attacks from different militant groups. This double fence is 3.6 meters (11 feet) high from Pakistan's side and 4 meters (13 feet) high from Afghanistan's side. The whole fence is topped with razor wire. One thousand forts and 16 official crossing points are constructed on the Pak-Afghan border, which is expected to cost \$500 Million (Basit, 2021).

Pakistan's military claimed that the construction of the fence on the border had reduced the attacks from Afghanistan's side, stopped the free movement of families, traders and guerilla fighters and reduced smuggling and human trafficking. Military forces also believed the security situation was improving in lawless tribal areas. Local people were unhappy because this fencing divided the families (Bezhan & Khattak, 2021).

Despite the severe reaction from the Afghanistan side and opposition to anti-Pakistan lobbying, Pakistan is still committed to completing the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border. The contentious discourse surrounding the Pak-Afghan border has ensured its persistent coverage in both regional and international media outlets (Alamgirian & Riaz, 2019). The trajectory of relations between the two nations hinges on several pivotal factors: agreements involving the US, the Afghan Government, and the Taliban; progress in intra-Afghan negotiations; the withdrawal of US troops; assurances from the Taliban regarding counterterrorism efforts; and the influence of India on Afghanistan's internal dynamics (Clayton, 2022). This research aims to uncover the role of border porosity along the Pak-Afghan border in the context of regional stability.

Research Methodology


The current research focuses on the Pak-Afghan border depicted in Figure 1. This border area comprises deserts, high mountain ranges, narrow valleys, barren land, and rugged topography. Notably, it is one of the world's most porous and treacherous borders (Ahmed, Khan, & Fayaz, 2022). A structured questionnaire was designed to gather insights from Army personnel regarding Pak-Afghan border porosity and its implications on regional stability. The questionnaire underwent pre-testing and subsequent updates based on requirements. A sample frame was meticulously constructed by compiling a list of Army personnel from official Army records. The targeted population for this research included respondents who had served at the Durand Line or possessed sufficient knowledge of the study area. A systematic approach was employed to establish contact with Army personnel. Initially, convenient sampling techniques were employed, where each Army personnel was contacted through personal connections, and their informed consent was obtained.

Out of 60 Army personnel who initially consented, eight respondents declined to provide information on border management, thus reducing the sample size to 52. Following the scheduling of appointments, interviews were arranged according to respondents' convenience, encompassing methods such as face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews via cellular services, and Skype calls. Ultimately, 52 questionnaires were completed by Army personnel stationed at the Pak-Afghan border.

Among these, 35 respondents participated in detailed face-to-face interviews, while 11 respondents were interviewed through video calls utilizing platforms like Skype and WhatsApp.

Additionally, six respondents engaged in voice interviews via cellular services. The data collection phase spanned four months, reflecting the diverse locations where respondents were stationed. Army personnel's names, ranks, and serving stations were not recorded to uphold respondent privacy. The data collected were subsequently analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), employing frequency distribution and cross-tabulation techniques.

Figure 1. Study Area: Pakistan-Afghanistan Border




Results and Discussion

Figure 2 illustrates the porous points along the Durand Line, reflecting the impact of physiography and climatic conditions on the porous nature of the Pak-Afghan border. Satellite imagery data indicates that Pakistan's KPK province exhibits higher porosity than Baluchistan. Notably, the Pak-Afghan border near Chitral benefits from enhanced security due to its cold climate and rugged mountainous terrain. In this region, only one porous point has been identified. Conversely, significant porosity is observed to the west of Dir and the east of Nuristan, with nearly 14 porous points identified in these areas. Mainly, two primary porous entry points are located in the Badanay region (Kunar province of Afghanistan), where the absence of population settlements and checkpoints contributes to their porous nature.

Additionally, there are 18 porous points situated west of Ajabay and Toor camp on the Pakistan side and east of Asmar and Asadabad on the Afghanistan side. These points are considered porous due to the lack of human settlements and military checkpoints. The harsh climate characterized by severe cold weather further deters

habitation and the establishment of checkpoints in this region. In this aforementioned area, neither water nor other essential commodities are available, leading to the absence of settlements and military checkpoints.

Figure 2. Porous Points on Durand line



Source: Hussain (2017)

Table 1 (see below) illustrates that most respondents (98.1%) spent time in KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan near the Durand Line, while only 1.9% of respondents did not serve in those areas. Respondents who served in the study area had keen observations, as they directly observed these regions with their own eyes. They also possessed knowledge about cross-border traditions. These respondents dedicated considerable time to the Durand Line, thus acquiring comprehensive knowledge about Pakistan's western border physiography.

Variations in time spent in tribal areas, KPK, and Baluchistan, arose due to differences in deployment durations; some army units resided there for extended periods, whereas others had shorter stays. A majority of the respondents were well-acquainted with this region. Based on their experiences, they discerned the intricacies of various border segments and recognized regions with harsh climates. Additionally, respondents were knowledgeable about water availability.

A notable 98.1% of the respondents were informed about the legal entry points on the Durand Line, while 1.9% lacked this information because they did not serve in the tribal areas of KPK and Baluchistan. The Pakistan army deployed numerous units along the border, particularly the Pak-Afghan border, and almost all military officers possessed adequate knowledge of these border regions. The placement of units there was driven by the complexity of the border. Furthermore, these units underwent rotations, allowing every army officer to spend time in border areas and observe the situation firsthand along the borderline.

Table 1. Experiences at the Pak-Afghan border

		<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<i>Experience spending time along the borderline</i>	Yes	51	98.1
	No	1	1.9
<i>Total time spent along the Pak-Afghan border</i>	Less than two years	15	28.8
	2 - 4 years	21	40.4
	4 - 6 years	15	28.8
	6 - 8 years	1	1.9
<i>Knowledge about legal ways on the Pak-Afghan border</i>	Yes	51	98.1
	No	1	1.9

Table 2 illustrates a substantial consensus among respondents (92.3%) in agreement regarding the utilization of illicit routes at porous points by local inhabitants to access territories within Pakistan and Afghanistan. A minor fraction (7.7%) expressed dissent. Respondents point to intrinsic links between individuals residing on either side of the border, attributed to shared ethnicities and tribal associations. Cross-border residents frequently seek medical assistance in Pakistan, circumventing official channels due to hurdles posed by registration prerequisites and the acquisition of daily necessities.

Respondents note variations in illegal entries into Pakistan attributed to a weak border control mechanism, particularly in porous areas. About 40.4% of respondents agree that fewer than 30,000 people use illicit/illegal routes to enter Pakistan every month. A majority (48.1%) agree that 31,000 to 50,000 people cross the Durand Line through porous points. A minority (7.7%) believe that 51,000 to 70,000 people illegally cross the border, and 3.8% concur that a substantial number (over 70,000) do so monthly.

Many respondents, especially those holding the rank of Colonel, assert that population infiltration through porous points has diminished due to a stringent and effective border monitoring system implemented by the Pakistani Government and Pakistan Army. This decline in illegal migration can be attributed to the establishment of numerous checkpoints by the army at short intervals along the border, enabling vigilant monitoring and thorough inspection of local movements.

Illegal border crossings primarily occur due to the absence of proper immigration documents. It is common for individuals to cross the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan for trade purposes and then return to Afghanistan. A substantial 92.3% of respondents agree that those entering Pakistan illegally lack identification, while a mere 7.7% believe that individuals crossing the border often have identification but resort to illegal routes due to limited legal entry points on the Afghan-Pak border.

Table 2 outlines the reasons for illegal entries into Pakistan via the Pak-Afghan border. Approximately 30.8% of respondents indicate that people choose illegal entry points because they are closer and reduce the distance for those entering Pakistan illegally. Another 51.9% concur that illegal entry results from the lack of proper legal documentation. The allure of better healthcare and education facilities in Pakistan also drives regular illegal entries by native individuals from Afghanistan, who often lack legal records and thus employ porous routes.

In contrast to Afghan refugees with legal documentation constraints, the Pakistani government lacks comprehensive information and policy measures for undocumented groups, such as Bangladeshis, Burmese, and other refugees residing in Pakistan. The migration discourse has unrecognized these groups (Shah et al., 2020). About 17.3% of respondents hold diverse opinions regarding illegal entry into Pakistan. According to respondents, a significant factor is terrorism, with those involved in such activities utilizing illegal routes to Pakistan. Rubin (2007) highlights the ongoing activity of Taliban-led insurgent groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Peters and Rassler (2010) underline the involvement of the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Pakistani Taliban with Al-Qaida in terror attacks and illicit activities, including kidnappings. Due to their illicit nature, these smugglers bypass legal border crossings and seek alternative routes into Pakistan. The third reason for illegal border crossings is the shared ethnicity of the native populations on both sides of the Pak-Afghan. While these individuals share social ties and familial relations, limited access to legal entry points necessitates using illegal border routes.

Table 2. Reasons for crossing the border through illegal ways

		Frequency	Percentage
<i>People use any other way rather than the official way on Pak-Afghan</i>	Yes	48	92.3
	No	4	7.7
<i>People use illegal ways</i>	less than 30,000 people/Month	21	40.4
	31,000 to 50,000 peoples	25	48.1
	51,000 to 70,000 people/Month	4	7.7
	more than 70,000 people/Month	2	3.8
<i>People who cross the border through illegal ways</i>	Yes	4	7.7
	No	48	92.3
<i>Reasons for illegal entries</i>	Short distance	16	30.8
	Unavailability of documents	27	51.9
	Others	9	17.3

Table 3 reveals that the vast majority of respondents (98.1%) concur that the rise in terrorism can be attributed to the porous nature of the Durand Line. There is variation in the views of respondents. 9.6% believe that the border's porosity has contributed to a less than 10% increase in terrorism. Similarly, 11.5% of respondents believe that terrorism has escalated from 11% to 30%, while another 9.6% agree on figures spanning from -31% to 50%. A significant number of respondents (27.0%) agree that this threat has surged by 51% to 70% due to infiltration facilitated by the porous Durand Line. Furthermore, 23.7% of respondents assert that the issue of terrorism has intensified from 70% to 90%, with an equal percentage believing that the menace has escalated by more than 90% due to the vulnerabilities at the Pak-Afghan border's porous points.

The Pak-Afghan border, the longest border of Pakistan, boasts a complex physiography. Spanning mountainous terrain throughout its entirety, this border

presents a formidable challenge for sealing due to its rugged geography. The region's rigid mountains and harsh climate render sealing this border formidable. As depicted in Table 3, 88.5% of respondents agree that the border could be sealed. Conversely, only 11.5% of respondents believe that the Afghan-Pak border cannot be sealed due to its intricate physiography, obstacles posed by the Afghan government, and limited financial resources.

Table 3. Role of border porosity in terrorism

		<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<i>Increasing terrorism because of porous points</i>	Yes	51	98.1
	No	1	1.9
<i>Extension of terrorism</i>	Less than 10 %	5	9.6
	11 to 30 %	6	11.5
	31 to 50 %	5	9.6
	51 to 70 %	14	27.0
	70 to 90 %	12	23.7
	More than 90 %	10	19.2
	Total	52	100.0
<i>Possibility of sealing the border</i>	Yes	46	88.5
	No	6	11.5
	Total	52	100.0

Table 4 outlines respondents' perspectives on measures, obstacles, and costs for securing the Pak-Afghan border. A majority of respondents (50%) advocate for the establishment of military checkpoints at short distances. These checkpoints should be positioned closely enough to enable security personnel to maintain visual contact. Given the challenging geography of the border, the option of placing a fence along the borderline does not receive strong support. However, 32.7% of respondents favor sealing the border by constructing a fence. In this scenario, establishing military checkpoints and effective patrolling teams would be essential for safeguarding the border fence.

A mere 3.8% of respondents endorse securing the border by digging a ditch along its line. The complexity of the Hindu Kush and Salman Mountain ranges dissuades 50% of respondents from supporting this method. A past attempt during General Pervez Musharraf's tenure involved digging a 500-kilometre ditch on the Pak-Afghan border, but this endeavor proved unsuccessful due to the accumulation of stones, mud, debris, and other waste materials.

A smaller portion of respondents (13.5%) propose border security by constructing a wall. They also stress the necessity of military checkpoints and armed patrols to ensure border integrity. For 11.5% of respondents, the Afghan and Pakistani governments share responsibility for the unresolved issue. In contrast, 1.9% believe the Government of Pakistan is the primary impediment to border sealing. Most respondents (67.3%) attribute major hindrances to the government of Afghanistan due to historical factors like the 'Pakhtunistan' slogan and Afghanistan's landlocked status. Respondents indicate that Afghanistan's reluctance to resolve the issue stems from its perception of all Pashtuns as an integral part of its territory. Afghanistan's strategic interest in trade routes to the Arabian Sea and Gwadar Port further complicates the

matter. A small percentage (1.9%) identify a lack of capital as the key hurdle to resolution, while 17.3% view the challenging physiography of the tribal areas of KPK and Baluchistan as the primary obstacle.

Concerning the project's cost, 3.8% of respondents estimate it to be between Rs. 21 to 30 billion. Meanwhile, 23.1% believe the cost lies between Rs. 31 to 40 billion. A quarter of respondents (25%) contend that Rs. 41 to 50 billion would cover the expense of sealing the border through fence installation and checkpoint establishment. A majority (48.1%) anticipate that the cost will surpass Rs. 50 billion.

Historically, Afghanistan has responded with tension whenever Pakistan attempted to secure the border. An illustrative incident is the Angoor Ada confrontation. Recently, when Pakistan sought to construct a gate at Angoor Ada on the borderline, Afghan border security forces opened fire. This incident resulted in the loss of soldiers and one Colonel-ranked officer. Such border-sealing efforts can be expected to generate tension and potential loss of life. Respondents' opinions on the loss of human life vary; 23.1% believe it would be under 50 persons, 34.6% expect it to range between 51 to 100 persons, 26.9% anticipate 101 to 150 persons affected, and 15.4% fear the figure could exceed 150 persons.

Table 4. Measures, obstacles and costs to secure Pak-Afghan border

		<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
<i>Measures to secure the border</i>	Establishing military check posts on short-distance	26	50.0
	Setting a fence on the borderline	17	32.7
	Digging ditch on the borderline	2	3.8
	Constructing a Wall on the Border	7	13.5
<i>Major obstacles to sealing the border</i>	Governments of both Countries	6	11.5
	Government of Pakistan	1	1.9
	Government of Afghanistan	35	67.3
	Lack of capital	1	1.9
	Physiography of that area	9	17.3
<i>Cost in capital</i>	21 to 30 Billion	2	3.8
	31 to 40 Billion	12	23.1
	41 to 50 Billion	13	25.0
	More than 50 Billions	25	48.1
<i>Cost in terms of human life</i>	Less than 50 person	12	23.1
	51 to 100 person	18	34.6
	101 to 150 person	14	26.9
	More than 150 person	8	15.4

Table 5 illustrates that Afghan refugees are a significant factor in Pak-Afghan relations and terrorism within Pakistan. An overwhelming 86.5% of respondents advocate for the registration of these illegal immigrants. Historically, the absence of a registration mechanism allowed numerous terrorists to enter Pakistan under the guise of immigrants. Similarly, 86.5% of respondents believe that terrorism could be mitigated by registering these immigrants. However, 13.5% of respondents are skeptical, asserting that terrorist activities will not decrease significantly solely through immigrant registration, necessitating additional measures.

While the majority agrees that terrorism will decrease following the registration of Afghan immigrants, there exists variation in their perceptions regarding the extent of this reduction. About 48.1% of respondents believe that registering these immigrants will yield a marginal effect, resulting in a reduction of less than 10% in terrorism. In contrast, 26.9% argue that registering Afghan immigrants could decrease terrorism by 11% to 20%, while 9.6% contend that it might reduce terrorist activities by 31% to 40%. Only 3.8% of respondents envision a reduction of over 40% in terrorism by registering Afghan refugees.

An overwhelming 86.5% of respondents acknowledge a direct link between illegal immigrants and terrorism. On the other hand, 13.5% of respondents assert that these refugees are not involved in terrorist activities. Among the majority, there is agreement that Afghan immigrants have been implicated in terrorist activities. Specifically, 44.2% of respondents believe less than 10% of Afghan refugees are directly involved in terrorism. Another 23.1% concur that 11% to 30% of immigrants have participated in terrorist activities. For 17.3% of respondents, this involvement spans 31% to 50%. Additionally, 11.5% of respondents agree that 51% to 70% of Afghan refugees might have connections to terrorism, while a mere 3.8% concede that more than 70% of immigrants are involved in such activities.

Table 5. Registration and involvement in terrorist activities among Afghan immigrants

		<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<i>Should Registration of Afghan illegal Immigrants will decrease terrorism</i>	Yes	45	86.5
	No	7	13.5
<i>Decreasing the percentage of terrorism by the registration of Afghan illegal immigrants</i>	less than 10 %	25	48.1
	11% to 20%	14	26.9
	21% to 30%	6	11.5
	31% to 40%	5	9.6
	More than 40%	2	3.8
	Total	52	100.0
	Yes	45	86.5
<i>Afghan Immigrants Directly Participate in terrorist activities in Pakistan</i>	No	7	13.5
	less than 10 %	23	44.2
	11% to 30 %	12	23.1
	31% to 50 %	9	17.3
	51% to 70 %	6	11.5
	More than 70 %	2	3.8

Table 6 shows that most respondents (53.8%) support that the government should continuously monitor Afghan refugees to prevent their involvement in terrorist activities. Only 1.9% of respondents advocate for granting nationality to these refugees. In contrast, 40.4% of respondents perceive Afghan refugees as a serious threat to peace, emphasizing the government's need to repatriate them to their home country to preserve peace within Pakistan. An additional 3.8% of respondents offer a distinct perspective, suggesting that the Government of Pakistan can avert their engagement in terrorist activities through awareness programs and education.

Table 6. The incumbent government keep Afghan refugees away from terrorist activities.

		<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<i>How can the incumbent government keep Afghan refugees away from terrorist activities</i>	watching them permanently and effectively	28	53.8
	Giving them the nationality of Pakistan	1	1.9
	Pushing them back to their home country	21	40.4
	Others	2	3.8
	Total	52	100.0

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a monumental project uniting Pakistan and China. Initiated amidst the deep-seated roots of terrorism within Pakistan, CPEC notably impacts two provinces KPK and Baluchistan. Given their substantial involvement and considering the grave effect of terrorism on both provinces, a pertinent query emerges: is terrorism a threat to this monumental endeavor? Table 7 gauges perspectives on the influence of terrorism on CPEC.

A decisive 94.2% of respondents acknowledge terrorism's threat to CPEC in Baluchistan and KPK, while 5.8% hold dissenting views. With both provinces reeling under the scourge of terrorism, discerning which is more susceptible to CPEC's vulnerability becomes a complex consideration. A fraction (19.2%) concedes that KPK, given its entrenched history of terrorism, maybe more precarious for CPEC. Meanwhile, a larger share (32.7%) contends that Baluchistan's primacy as the starting point of CPEC and its role as a hub for its main routes render it more susceptible. A majority (46.2%) agree that both provinces jeopardize CPEC's security.

Experts' opinions are sought to evaluate the likelihood of non-state actors infiltrating CPEC from Afghanistan. An overwhelming 98.1% of respondents affirm this potential threat. Conversely, a smaller fraction (1.9%) maintains that cross-border terrorism poses no risk to CPEC, citing the establishment of numerous interior checkpoints by Pakistan's armed forces, rendering it implausible for terrorists to breach provinces and impact CPEC routes. Agreement prevails that CPEC routes can be safeguarded against cross-border attacks; however, divergence arises regarding the requisite measures. A minority (15.4%) suggest bolstering CPEC routes through armed security forces. Another subset (11.5%) posits that securing the Pak-Afghan border would neutralize threats to CPEC routes. A significant majority (73.1%) aligns with the imperative of a dual strategy, advocating both reinforcing armed forces' duty and control of the border to ensure the safety of CPEC routes.

Table 7. Impact of Terrorism on CPEC

		Frequency	Percentage
<i>Terrorist activities are harmful to CPEC in KPK and Baluchistan</i>	Yes	49	94.2
	No	3	5.8
<i>Which Province is more vulnerable to CPEC</i>	KPK	10	19.2
	Baluchistan	17	32.7
	Both	24	46.2
	None of them	1	1.9
<i>Cross-border attacks hit the CPEC routes</i>	Yes	51	98.1
	No	1	1.9
<i>CPEC routes can be secured from cross-border attacks</i>	providing armed security	8	15.4
	sealing Pak-Afghan border	6	11.5
	Both	38	73.1

Conclusion

The Pak-Afghan border, also known as the Durand Line, remains porous due to its intricate physiography and the mismanagement of both nations. The porosity of the Durand Line poses a significant threat to regional peace due to the infiltration of terrorists. Moreover, this border porosity fosters illegal migration between Afghanistan and Pakistan, exacerbating issues of smuggling and human trafficking that both countries grapple with. The porous nature of the Durand Line further triggers diplomatic tensions between the two nations. The international community could play a pivotal role in resolving these border-related challenges to promote regional stability.

Establishing fencing along the borderline and positioning military checkpoints at close intervals on both sides is the most effective approach to ensure regional stability and peacekeeping. Additionally, formulating a comprehensive mechanism through mutual agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan to address the settlement of Afghan refugees could alleviate concerns for both governments.

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Pakistan: A Responsible Nuclear State and Commitment to Global Security

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Abstract

This paper delves into the multifaceted factors contributing to the concerns expressed by various global stakeholders concerning the security of nuclear materials, facilities, and installations within Pakistan. The study comprehensively explores the tangible, perceived, and propagandistic elements that have collectively contributed to the prevailing global skepticism surrounding Pakistan's nuclear program. Furthermore, this research elucidates the domestic and international measures Pakistan has undertaken to ensure the secure development, testing, deployment, utilization, and presence of nuclear weapons, employing human expertise and technological resources. Additionally, the paper briefly highlights Pakistan's contributions to global peace, exemplified by its integral role in the global campaign against terrorism and active participation in United Nations Peacekeeping missions. Moreover, the paper provides insight into Pakistan's adherence to international guidelines, notably those set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and overarching international protocols concerning arms control and disarmament. By examining these facets, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of Pakistan's nuclear program and its efforts to align with international norms, thereby fostering a more nuanced comprehension of the nation's stance within the global nuclear landscape.

Keywords

Pakistan, nuclear Pakistan, nuclear safety and security, responsible state, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

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Introduction

Pakistan became a nuclear power on 28th May 1998. However, Pakistan's nuclear project started when President Eisenhower initiated the *Atoms for Peace* program in 1953 (Maddock, 1998). The urgency or necessity to invent nuclear weapons was realized when two major events happened: the fall of East Pakistan and the testing of 'Smiling Budha' by India. 'Smiling Budha' refers to the first successful nuclear bomb test conducted by India in May 1974, which further augmented Pakistan's sense of urgency to work on nuclear power weapons (Reiss, 1995, p. 185). Attributing to the aforementioned events, Pakistan also encountered a security dilemma since it was a nascent state struggling for stability and international alliances at the time (Ahmed, 1999).

Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons in 1998. It is a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was negotiated in the 1960s, signed on 1st January 1967, and entered into force in 1970. According to the NPT, any nation that developed nuclear weapons after 1967 is a non-nuclear state. India and Pakistan are both non-signatory states of the NPT (Mahmood, 1995).

Beyond Pakistan, South Asia is a region ripe for the collapse of strategic stability. The variables responsible for the potential failure are aggravating, including unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border intervention/terrorism, proxy wars, arms race, and nuclear competition (Jones, 2005). Additionally, the status of the disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir remains unresolved between India and Pakistan, spawning hostilities. In the case of Pakistan, it has been a subject of numerous hostilities and conflicts since 1947 from its neighboring countries as well as other countries around the globe. Unfriendly relationships with India, an unstable Afghanistan, a competing Russia now then the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse, and an irredentist Israel instigated an immediate need to strengthen the country's defences (Shaikh, 2002).

Pakistan and India have fought three major wars within South Asia (Can be classified as mini-wars and proxy wars). Instances of cross-border terrorism have also occurred (e.g., the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attack, and interference of India in Baluchistan). Both countries share the same border, further complicating crisis management since ballistic flight times are measured in minutes. Both countries claim to maintain only a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, a highly subjective notion. Even during peacetime, the nations are on a confrontation course in diplomatic circles and engaging in proxy wars in each other's countries and elsewhere in the world.

Also, Afghan soil was used at the disadvantage of Pakistan in the past. Soviet Union's misadventure in the area severely affected Pakistan's interests. The strong diplomatic relationship between India and the USSR developed as a threat to Pakistan's national interests. Hence, a confrontation in Afghanistan occurred between the two countries, increasing regional tensions. The invention of nuclear weapons was necessary for Pakistan to curb the security dilemma and counter its rival—i.e., India's conventional superiority. Pakistan is part of global efforts to curb nuclear terrorism and ensure nuclear safety.

Following the development of nuclear armament by Pakistan, the country has faced various issues and setbacks. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the state has exhibited resolute fortitude and resiliency in its endeavor to effectively regulate, govern, and offset the ramifications of these adversities. Pakistan has been on the frontline in almost every global effort to safeguard against nuclear terrorism or

accidents. Pakistan has successfully protected its nuclear program, i.e., stockpile, facilities, and information at par with international standards.

Hypothesis and Methodology

The hypothesis considered in this study emphasizes the notion that Pakistan's status as a responsible nuclear state provides credible deterrence against external threats, ensuring territorial integrity crucial for guarding its national security. Pakistan's nuclear strategy has established a balance of power among its two nuclear counterparts in South Asia, which is pivotal in establishing regional stability. On a global scale, adherence to non-proliferation principles elevates Pakistan's diplomatic involvement in matters concerning nuclear disarmament. This, subsequently, has the potential to facilitate the establishment of robust international cooperation mechanisms.

This study seeks to generate meaningful insights supported by gathered data from diverse primary and tertiary sources through a qualitative and analytical approach. These sources include official websites and documents, research publications, peer-reviewed papers, and news articles. The obtained dataset is then subjected to content analysis, exploring factors fostering global skepticism alongside assessing Pakistan's initiatives toward nuclear safety assurance.

Factors Responsible for Skepticism

Myriad factors have deliberately and accidentally created doubts and fueled global apprehensions regarding Pakistan's nuclear program's safety and security. Pakistan occupies a strategically significant geographical location on the global map, which has yielded both advantageous and detrimental outcomes for the nation. On the West of Pakistan is Iran, which has strained relations with the waning superpower US, a nuclear-capable state. Afghanistan is northwest of Pakistan, a land of instability, chaos, and insurgencies. Afghanistan has been the breeding and sheltering ground for terrorists for the past few decades. Pakistan's geographical proximity to Afghanistan has also been a cause of concern because of the evidence of the presence of active non-state actors (NSAs) in the region. To the northeast is China, a rising power and a competitor of the superpower US. To the east, Pakistan shares a border with India, its arch-rival with which it fought major wars in 1948, 1965, and 1971. Both states have been through various conflicts and strained relations. Kashmir has been the prime reason for a constant altercation between India and Pakistan.

The attack on the Twin Towers on 11th November 2001 put Pakistan in a challenging situation. President Bush categorically gave Pakistan two options: 'Either you are with us or against us.' However, none of the perpetrators were from Pakistan. Pakistan was put in a spot to make quick decisions at the behest of its future relations with the superpower. The incident caused the US to start the 'Global War on Terror,' in which Pakistan has been the most significant ally of the US. Instead of bringing stability, the war on terror gave rise to perpetual instability in the region. A war that bred more and more non-state actors instead of limiting them. It also added to the fear of the global community regarding the unimaginable actions of non-state actors. The reservations of the international community of such powerful weapons getting into the hands of rogue actors with hate towards the West heightened their skepticism towards Nuclear Pakistan. Such apprehensions of the global community were further solidified by the statements of internationally recognized terrorists such as Osama bin Laden (OBL). In December 1998, Osama bin Laden communicated the plan, willingness, and resolve of Al-Qaeda in an interview with the senior journalist Hamid Mir: "Acquiring

weapons [of mass destruction] for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty” (Yousufzai, 1999, n.d.),

Figure 1. Map of Pakistan (World Atlas, 2021)



In an interview with Dawn in November 2001, Osama bin Laden warned the US of nuclear deterrence in case of using chemical or nuclear weapons against them. He said, “[...] We may retort with chemical or nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as a deterrent.” (Mir, 2001) The interview gave a significant reason to the international community to doubt nuclear Pakistan. The global cynicism was furthered by the Western media’s constant prejudiced portrayal of Pakistan. The Western and Indian media constantly represent Pakistan as a ‘dangerous state’ even though Pakistan has been the major ally of the US and NATO against the War on Terror.

In an op-ed for the Washington Post, Columnist Josh Rogin admitted that the mention of Pakistan in the US media on the Afghanistan crisis has been to the extent that “[...] it is mostly indicted for its alleged support of the Taliban over the years” (Hussain, 2021, para 6). In an article titled *What’s Next for Pakistan? Terror, Nukes and an Uncertain Future*, Pakistan is economically disadvantaged yet possesses nuclear capabilities (Follath et al., 2007). The nation is portrayed as a staunch ally of the US while concurrently serving as a fertile environment for the proliferation of Islamic violence. This duality presents Pakistan as a locale associated with both the administration of President George W. Bush and the presence of Osama bin Laden.

Such statements without concrete evidence played a crucial role in deteriorating the global image of Pakistan.

Pakistan hasn't only served as a crucial ally to the US in the global war on terror and the UN Peacekeeping missions. In the article *Peace Characterization of Pakistan: Corroboration from Pakistan's UN Peacekeeping Missions*, the authors state that "Pakistan's peace characterization remains obscure in the eyes of the world due to lopsided projection" (Shafi & Hashmi, 2020, p. 1). Pakistan has garnered recognition on several occasions for its dedicated contributions to global peacekeeping endeavors, as acknowledged by notable figures such as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (Anka, 2016), Major General Thomas M. Montgomery (Berdal, 1994), the former Deputy Commander of the UN Forces in Somalia, Lakhdar Brahimi (Krishnasamy, 2001), an esteemed Algerian UN diplomat, Zhou Enlai (Garver, 1996), the inaugural Premier of China, and Former UN Transitional Administrator Paul Klein (Krishnasamy, 2002), among other notable individuals.

Pakistan contributed over 25,000 troops to over 15 UN peacekeeping missions worldwide (Shafi & Hashmi, 2020). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon applauded Pakistan's role in UN Peacekeeping in the following words ("UN chief hails Pakistan's leading role in peacekeeping operations," 2013):

"More than 100 countries contribute troops and police for UN peacekeeping missions. Pakistan is Number 1. It is impossible to speak about the history of UN peacekeeping without highlighting the country's contribution."

The affirmation made by Ban Ki-moon underscores Pakistan's role as a responsible nation committed to fostering global harmony and stability. The nation's unwavering dedication to upholding peace within its neighboring countries stands as a commendable and noteworthy contribution to the international community. Trans-state terrorism and support to non-state entities by hostile international actors are also reasons for instability and terrorist activities in the country. Terrorist attacks on sensitive sites such as the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi, Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra, and Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) Mehran further aggravated global skepticism. Political instability is also one of the primary reasons that create room for the state's exploitation, making it vulnerable to hostile factors from within and without.

Another essential contribution to the process has been made by insensitive and under-researched statements by people in key positions. The statements disseminated through various media platforms, whether in the form of broadcasts or publications, hold significant credibility and wield influence over a global audience. Regrettably, some prominent international leaders have propagated opinions that exhibit inadequate research and bias, resulting in a portrayal of Pakistan that neglects the nation's persistent endeavors to combat terrorism.

An illustrative instance is a remark by former US Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, who characterized Pakistan as "the most dangerous country in the world" (Ioanes, 2019, para 2). In his book *Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead*, Mattis and West (2019, para 6) also expressed apprehension regarding the potential scenario of "the fastest-growing arsenal in the world falling into the hands of terrorist breeding in the midst".

Although emanating from prominent figures, these statements exhibit a narrow viewpoint that overlooks Pakistan's steadfast determination to counter terrorism and its sincere dedication to fostering worldwide harmony. Notably, even

President Trump, recognized for his acerbic disposition and propensity to exacerbate situations to the verge of rupture, took to Twitter in 2018 to express the following sentiment:

The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give a safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan with little help. No more! (Riedel, 2018, para 6)

The assertions made by the incumbent president were devoid of merit, as Pakistan had served as a pivotal ally by providing its bases to the US for Afghanistan operations. It not only facilitated training for troops but also stood resolutely on the frontline throughout the entire duration of the conflict. Despite these substantial contributions, Pakistan continues to grapple with the enduring aftermath of its alliance with the US during that period. This spans hosting a significant number of refugees to witnessing a decline in socio-economic indicators—both of which have emerged as significant consequences of the War on Terror. Moreover, the aggregate toll, encompassing both monetary and non-monetary losses, surpassed the compensation offered by the US.

In response to President Trump's tweet, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, articulated a compelling perspective. He highlighted the following key points: (i) Pakistan was not implicated in the events of 9/11; nonetheless, it made a conscientious decision to engage in the US-led War on Terror actively, (ii) Pakistan bore a significant toll of 75,000 casualties as a result of its participation in the conflict, accompanied by a staggering economic loss exceeding \$123 billion. In contrast, the assistance provided by the US amounted to a mere \$20 billion. (iii) Pakistan continued to extend vital support by granting unhindered access to ground and air communications, as manifested in the provision of Ground Lines of Communications (GLOCs) and Air Lines of Communications (ALOCs), (iv) Imran Khan posed a pointed question, asking whether President Trump could identify another ally that had demonstrated comparable sacrifices. This comprehensive response underscores the depth of Pakistan's contributions and sacrifices, highlighting the disparities between the allocated resources and the sacrifices endured (Sajid, 2018).

Former Prime Minister Khan further demanded the US to do a 'serious assessment' (Sajid, 2018) instead of making Pakistan a sacrificial victim for its fiascoes despite spending \$1 trillion on the war in Afghanistan, with 140000 NATO troops plus 250000 Afghan troops on the ground the US left the Taliban stronger than before.

On 14th October 2022, President Joe Biden addressed the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Reception and remarked that Pakistan "may be one of the most dangerous nations in the world: Pakistan. Nuclear weapons without any cohesion" (House, 2022, para 24). This statement was met with discontent in Pakistan, where a secure and meticulously safeguarded nuclear program is in place. Eminent figures in key government positions responded robustly to President Biden's comment.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif contested President Biden's assertion, labeling it as "factually incorrect and misleading". He affirmed that Pakistan maintains a technically proficient and impervious command and control system for its nuclear program, ensuring its safety and reliability (Siddiqui, 2022, para 4).

Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari reiterated Pakistan's status as a responsible nuclear state, asserting its compliance with the stipulations outlined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the non-proliferation regime. He

attributed the misunderstandings to a lack of engagement and alluded to biases within the US, citing India's recent accidental missile launch into Pakistani territory as indicative of nuclear safety concerns (Siddiqui, 2022).

Maleeha Lodhi characterized President Biden's comment as "completely unwarranted and unjustified," highlighting his purported lack of insight into the safety and security measures pertaining to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal (Dawn, 2022, para. 28). Her condemnation emphasized the need for a more informed perspective on the matter. He was also condemned by other notables such as Nawaz Sharif, Shireen Mazari, Imran Khan, Asad Umar, and several others for his reckless comments. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif assured through a tweet that Pakistan's nuclear programme is in no way a 'threat to any country'. He added that Pakistan, a sovereign and independent state, "reserves the right to protect its autonomy, sovereign statehood, and territorial integrity." (Dawn, 2022, para. 14)

PTI Chief Imran Khan commended Pakistan's Nuclear command and control systems for being "one of the most secure ones" (Dawn, 2022, para. 16). He asked if they [the US] remember Pakistan showing undue aggression post-nuclearization, whereas the US has been involved in wars worldwide.

Former Human rights minister Shireen Mazari also condemned the statement by the US President. She further labelled the US as an "irresponsible superpower with nukes", reminding it of the human rights violations in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram. She also cued at the mass killings due to loose licensing laws. Shireen Mazari also reminded the US of its irresponsible behavior in the past, saying: "[The] nuclear US is a threat to the world because you have no control over your nukes. B52 bomber took off with six live nukes in 2007, and no one knows for hours" (Dawn, 2022, para.20).

Pakistan is a region vulnerable to natural disasters. According to a UN estimate, Pakistan contributes less than one percent of global greenhouse gas emissions and is yet 8th on the list of countries most vulnerable to severe weather caused by climate change (APP, 2022). When the last two decades of the region are analyzed, major damages are done by earthquakes, floods, changing rainfall patterns, famines, and crop destruction due to climate change, leading to further socio-economic and socio-political issues.

Internal critics, often categorized as nuclear pessimists, have expressed apprehensions within Pakistan regarding potential calamities from natural disasters affecting nuclear power plants. One such voice is Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a notable Pakistani nuclear physicist, who voiced his reservations during a seminar titled *Impacts of Nuclear Power Projects K-II and K-III along the Coastal Areas*. Dr. Hoodbhoy's skepticism regarding the projects centered on the potential vulnerability of nuclear reactors to operator errors or acts of terrorism, which could result in catastrophic repercussions (Khurshid & Khattak, 2014). Dr. Hoodbhoy underscored the gravity of the situation, highlighting the potentially dire consequences for numerous lives in case of any mishap. In response to these concerns, the Project Director for K-II and K-III addressed the questions raised during the seminar. He emphasized that the project's development spanned six years, involving exhaustive studies and surveys.

The feasibility report for the projects was cited as a testament to their safety and security, further reinforcing the contention that meticulous planning and comprehensive assessments were integral components of the endeavor. This exchange of viewpoints highlights the multifaceted considerations surrounding nuclear power projects and underscores the significance of thorough evaluation and transparent discourse.

The questions raised are rooted in the historical evidence of such mishaps happening in the past, causing short and long-term grave issues. The misadventures caused loss of human life, damaged infrastructure, and also caused environmental pollution, giving rise to lethal diseases such as cancer. The top five nuclear accidents rated by the History Channel have happened in Britain, Japan, Russia, and the US (Cohen, 2011), causing loss of life and creating long-term problems. The prominent amongst them is the Chernobyl accident in 1986, where one small human error led to a chain of blasts that claimed the lives of thousands of people; thousands of others suffered severe burns, radiation poisoning and contamination of millions of acres of farms and forests. The radiation that escaped was reportedly several times that of bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Cohen, 2011). But none of those countries have been demanded to shut down their nuclear programs despite having shown carelessness in handling nuclear operations. They are running their programs successfully for deterrence, countering security dilemmas, and retaining the balance of power.

The global community has harbored significant concerns, with a central focus on the Abdul Qadeer Khan incident. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was implicated in allegedly transferring nuclear technology to Libya, North Korea, and Iran, a matter that drew substantial international scrutiny. Notably, these transfers purportedly occurred without the awareness of the respective state's civilian or military leadership. During this period, officials within the Pakistani government, including then-President Pervez Musharraf, maintained that Khan's actions were carried out independently, without any endorsement or support from the Pakistani state (Dalton & Krepon, 2015). This stance emphasized that Khan's efforts were not conducted under the auspices of official state policy. The incident surrounding Dr. Khan highlights the intricate dynamics between individual actors and the state, underscoring the complexity of nuclear proliferation issues within the global context.

In the assessment presented by Dalton and Krepon (2015), the Khan episode is a pivotal factor contributing to a discernible discriminatory stance adopted by the international community. This disposition manifests in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver granted to India and its integration into the global nuclear commerce network. The authors contend that Pakistan's historical record concerning nuclear proliferation, as exemplified by the activities of Dr Khan, has engendered an atmosphere of skepticism and wariness among states on matters of nuclear security. Dalton and Krepon underscore that Pakistan's past actions, unveiled through the dealings involving Dr Khan, complicate the prospects for extending equitable treatment to Pakistan akin to that bestowed upon India. This perspective reflects how historical incidents can significantly shape perceptions and impact diplomatic considerations within the international arena. (p. 14).

Mark Fitzpatrick wrote a book, *Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers*, saying, "Ten years after Khan's network was shut down, it is fair to ask how long Pakistan must pay the price for that failure" (Fitzpatrick, 2014, p. 161). Moreover, similar unfortunate incidents have also happened (Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents, 2002) with Russia, Germany, France, the US, India, and several others where the government was kept in the dark, and the material or technology, or information was being smuggled to other states for money or alliance. The latest incident by India occurred in 2021 in Jharkhand, where seven smugglers were arrested for smuggling 6.4kgs of Uranium. This was the second time in less than a month that authorities had captured a large quantity of radioactive material from unauthorized persons. (Akmal, 2021) This event occurred after India was bestowed with a discriminatory NSG waiver in 2008, a clear violation of *Article VI* (United Nations, 2015) of the NPT, which

advocates for disarmament. It also violates NSG guidelines such that no state can be a part of it until and unless it is part of NPT, NWFZ, or IAEA safeguards.

Nuclear Safety and Security Measures by Pakistan


The invention of the bomb was a necessity for Pakistan because of its position on the map, the political dynamics, relations with the neighbouring countries, the socio-political conditions of the region, and the invention of the bomb by India. The resolve of Pakistan to counter the security dilemma, maximize its power for survival and retain the balance of power to secure its state sovereignty was inevitably and rightfully intense. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Prime Minister and Minister of Energy in 1965, strictly adhered to the policy of nuclear deterrence, and he was the chief advocator of Pakistan's nuclear programme (Burns & Coyle III, 2015, p. 15):

If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass and leaves for a thousand years, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. The Christians have the bomb, the Jews have the bomb and now the Hindus have the bomb. Why not the Muslims too have the bomb?

Since the invention of the bomb, Pakistan has taken all the measures and fulfilled every guideline by the international watchdogs to protect its stockpiles and programs. Defence Minister Khwaja Asif's statement is proof of this. He said Pakistan has fulfilled all global standards with total commitment, "including those of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) on non-proliferation, safety, and security." He further added, "We have also historically provided military assistance to the very armed forces whose commander in chief erroneously questions our 'cohesion'." (Siddiqui, 2022, Press Release section, para. 12) He made the statement via a tweet after President Biden's tweet expressing concern and suspicion regarding Pakistan being a safe nuclear state.

The state has followed all the national and international obligations in deploying nuclear security systems, and Pakistan has a multi-layered defense system. The state has adopted a 5D approach to respond to and mitigate these threats: 5Ds deter, detect, delay, defend, and destroy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, 2021). The approach is used for physical protection, trafficking, export, import, transport, operations, assembling, and stockpiling according to the need to avoid and manage any accident and mishandling.

Figure 2. 5-D Defence System



Pakistan has established independent regulatory bodies with legal authority to certify assigned responsibility of nuclear security. These include the National Command Authority (NCA), the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), and the Strategic Export Control Regime (SECDIV). All these work in tandem to ensure the safety and security of the nuclear program. They are responsible for issuing licenses, inspecting facilities, monitoring the proper regulation of all the guidelines, nuclear and radiation safety, and protecting all installations.

The National Command Authority (NCA) is the apex civilian-led command that oversees, commands and controls Pakistan's nuclear arsenals. NCA is responsible for employment, exercises, deployment, research and development, policy formulation, arms control, disarmament, and operation of the state's nuclear arsenal. It oversees the operations of the military, air force, and navy. The unified military command aims to give the Prime Minister and cabinet of Pakistan a credible and unified source of information based on mutual understanding and agreement about traditional and non-traditional threats to find the most viable solution. It also helps them do the cost-benefit analysis of the threats and the strategies to mitigate them to minimize the losses as much as possible.

The Chairman of this command is the civilian-led Prime Minister. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Service Chiefs, and DG ISI are the members of NCA, and DG SPD is the ex officio secretary of NCA, with the Strategic Plans Division functioning as the National Command Authorities secretariat. They report directly to the Chairman. The NCA has a three-tiered structure with two committees. The Development Control Committee (DCC) and Employment Control Committee (ECC) make the first tier, and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) makes the second tier.

The third tier is comprised of three services' strategic force commands. All three tiers work in tandem to detect, deter, delay, defend, and destroy any threat to nuclear material and facilities. The Strategic Plans Division is responsible for the routine management of the strategic assets of Pakistan, supervision of the budgetary and administrative aspects, and coordination amongst all these organizations. The prime duty of the SPD is to dissipate and execute technical training(s) and exercise administrative control over the delivery system. However, operational control of the weapons falls under the authority of the NCA. The state has also established an effective organization, the National Nuclear Detection Architecture (NNDA), to keep a check on all the imports and exports to regulate them in an authorized manner. It also aims to curb illicit/unlawful/illegitimate trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material. Furthermore, the Security Division is one of the most important components of the NCA. It comprises trained personnel, and multi-layered electronic systems of defense systems complemented with electronic sensors and counterintelligence teams to ensure the physical protection of all sensitive nuclear sites.

PNRA not only ensures the safety of nuclear material and stockpile, physical protection, protection from harmful radiations, and their transport but also ensures the regulation of safe disposal of nuclear waste. The organizations also actively cooperate and communicate with international institutions to improve their regulatory functions and enhance human resource competence. They also hold workshops and training to keep the personnel and staff aware and updated on the information and systems regarding operation and safety according to international guidelines.

Pakistan is also a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), which provides the state parties with safety rules and guidelines regarding nuclear power plants. CNS is a treaty of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan is also a

party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The state has also set up a Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) to handle issues needing immediate attention. Technical expertise is provided by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) for the purpose. NEMS has various components which enable it to deter, detect, prevent, and combat any attempt at illicit trafficking of nuclear material. It has appropriate systems to curb any accident. They include Radiological Assistance Groups, Hazard Assessment and Advisory Teams, Aerial Survey and Surveillance Teams, and Radiation Medical Assessment Teams to help identify and address any chance of an accident at the earliest to prevent any major accident from happening. National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) provides administrative services for the purpose. The state successfully safeguards all the conditions necessary for the safety and security of nuclear facilities, stockpiles, and information.

Strategic Export Control Division was established in 2007 to formulate and administer export controls to ensure no illicit trafficking of nuclear material domestically or internationally. It also has an Oversight Board to oversee a thorough implementation of the Strategic Export Control Act 2004. According to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime, this division monitors the National Control Lists and their period review and ensures their consistency with international standards.

Pakistan is a party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). It has also ratified the amended CPPNM. The Convention lays out obligations for the protection, prevention, and punishment of offenses committed with regard to nuclear materials and facilities. The Convention covers obligations concerning nuclear material for civilian purposes. The original CPPNM laid the obligation of protecting nuclear material in the international setting as a responsibility of states, whereas the amended CPPNM extended it to the domestic arena. Pakistan, being a party to CPPNM, fully ensures the protection and security of nuclear materials and facilities. However, it hasn't ratified the amended CPPNM owing to its reservations regarding its regulation even in the domestic arena and involvement of ICJ in the dispute settlement as laid out in paragraph 2 of *Article 17* of the Amended CPPNM.

The amendment of CPPNM has been devised in a way to add value to the other organs in the anti-nuclear terrorism network, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).

Pakistan also supports the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. UNSCR 1540 obligates all parties to enact legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. It also compels the parties to safeguard IAEA guidelines, nuclear material security guidelines, and activities. The resolution mainly addresses the issue of non-state actors, which was left unaddressed in the NPT. Furthermore, Pakistan has, as a responsible state, submitted numerous reports to the UN Committee, which monitors the implementation of Resolution 1540.

Conclusion

It has been confirmed and reiterated by Pakistani government officials and international officials on various occasions that Pakistan has successfully fulfilled the necessary obligations regarding the safety and security of the nuclear stockpile, facilities, and information. US Department of Defense Official Lawrence J. Korb penned an article

after he visited Pakistan in 2009, explaining how the world is cynical about its nuclear program of Pakistan. Then he expressed his satisfaction, arguing that “given the strategic location of Pakistan and the fact that it has nuclear weapons, it’s easy to see why some might embrace a worst-case scenario. But based on my visit, I don’t buy it at this time” (Salik & Luongo, 2013, para. 6).

Pakistan is also implementing a Nuclear Security Action Plan in collaboration with the IAEA. Moreover, Pakistan has established state-of-the-art training institutions for national capacity building and even assisting the IAEA. Pakistan is among the states that join the Nuclear Security Summit, which works to protect nuclear material. It is among the few who present reviews and reports to The International Atomic Energy Agency, fulfilling international obligations. These measures have boosted the confidence of the international community.

Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, Admiral Michael Mullen, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, and President Obama supported and reinstated Lawrence J. Korb’s statement. In his interview with Newsweek, Obama said: “We have confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals.” (Korb, 2009, para. 9).

The national and international safeguards ensured by Pakistan make it eligible to be treated as a responsible state. As Mark Fitzpatrick also reinstated in his book *Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers*, “Pakistan should be treated as a normal nuclear country” (Fitzpatrick, 2014, p. 161); featuring China, Pakistan, and Iran is not only imperative but also viable.

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World Peace and How We Can Achieve It

by Alex J. Bellamy

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When George Santayana said, “Only the dead have seen the end of the war,” he was quite clear about the enduring nature of war and its grim realities. Sharing the same sentiment, Herodotus exclaimed, “In peace, sons bury their fathers. In war, fathers bury their sons,” reminding us of the devastating impact of war on human lives. Despite this knowledge, humans across the millennia repeatedly engaged themselves in bloodshed, wars, and conflicts. In this regard, the scholarly work of Alex J. Bellamy in his book *World Peace and How We Can Achieve It*² discusses the survival instinct of humanity that led to wars and further explores how global peace can be attained with the assistance of international institutions. The author correlates mankind’s deeply rooted warmonger nature with the prevailing anarchy, a connection he reinforces by mentioning the Stone Age era, where a constant struggle for mankind’s struggle was evident. This instinct of survival and competition together made the man warlike. In addition to the challenging nature of mankind, Bellamy shed light on how global peace can prevail in contemporary times.

Moreover, it is also evident that warmongering acts aren’t universal, and peace prevails in many parts of the world. The societies and regions where peace prevails are a hope that peace can be achieved globally. The book further entails a detailed historical exploration of variable attitudes of societies towards anarchic inclinations, where societies embraced peaceful practices. The peaceful gestures exhibited by African societies are one fine example, where gifts are exchanged to diffuse tensions and create a constructive environment for dialogues and discussions.

The author then outlines the significant role of international institutions in paving the pathway to peace. The major success of these institutions was the emergence of International Law (IL), which helped in declining the ever-growing mantra of war. By checks and balances, it has ensured that wars can be prevented, and it is also observed that interstate wars have been minimized. This shows that despite human tendencies towards warfare and aggression, they also have the will to advocate for peace and harmony. In this regard, he highlighted the significance of *peacekeeping*. Through peacekeeping, the global community ensured that the dream of peace is alive even in an anarchic world. Although conventional warfare declined with the emergence of global institutions, new challenges erupted in the form of intra-state conflicts. The

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new shift from inter-state to intrastate conflicts opened multifaceted challenges for the global community.

Through his reasoning, Bellamy pointed out three main reasons that address why wars persisted. First, it is how society is structured, where humans divide themselves into factions like groups associations, from families to political parties, and then nation-states, making them influential. Second is personal interests; securing personal interests makes wars beneficial for particular groups, as these groups attain political gains at the cost of war. Lastly, increasing security and military capabilities leads to a *security dilemma* in the anarchic world, raising threats and concerns for others. Accumulating the division in structure, personal gains, and desire for strength ignites the war.

Moreover, the author mentions the involvement of actors that accumulate wealth by spurring conflicts. These affluent groups consider war as a business to gain material gains. He highlights how the war economy benefits the industrial giants that make weapons and supply arms. Thus, for elites' war is a running business and an opportunity to expand their wealth.

The book further depicts the phenomena of the formation of states in relation to waging wars. Historical evidence indicates that states came into existence due to man's way of increasing its sphere of influence. It can be said that the struggle to create a city-state was indeed devastating and ugly in nature. However, the author establishes that states can act as both warmakers and peacemakers. But for most of the period, states were involved in war-making rather than peace-making. Moreover, war for many humans is a passion that has been implanted, and this passion drives individuals to focus on warmongering inclinations. Nevertheless, no one can rationalize the act of waging war and taking innocent lives based on personal emotions or passions.

The book is an exceptional contribution to comprehending the underlying causes of anarchy, conflicts, warfare, and the intricate facets of human nature entwined with the pursuit of power. In addition to this analysis, Bellamy adeptly delves into exploring the elusive aspiration for peace, offering insightful suggestions for its attainment within the context of contemporary society. The proposed path to sustainable peace inherently incorporates the substantial involvement of global institutions and the commensurate responsibility borne by nation-states. Consequently, fostering an optimistic disposition while relinquishing pessimistic paradigms becomes paramount in pursuing global peace and stability.

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