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The NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability (NJIPS) is a peer reviewed, bi-annual academic journal. NJIPS welcomes interdisciplinary manuscripts focusing on issues related to peacekeeping, conflict resolution, peace building, human rights issues, social movements, security, etc. At the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), the Department of UN Peacekeeping and Training (PKT) and the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) have been collaborating for their mission of global peace and stability. NJIPS is one of the milestones in this regard, which will provide knowledge of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building to the academics through the scholarly papers written by national and international authors. To ensure and uphold the quality of scholastic discourse and circulation, the articles in NJIPS are peer-reviewed and edited rigorously. NJIPS is committed to publishing original and timely research from around the world.



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Foreword

It gives me immense pleasure to introduce the readers to the inaugural volume of *NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability* (NJIPS). The peer-refereed academic journal marks another milestone in the life of Centre of International Peace and Stability (CIPS).

The underlying idea to develop and launch NJIPS was to study and analyze the growth of conflict and violence around us. As violent forces coalesce to create chaos and anarchy across the globe; NJIPS endeavors to present a

balanced mix of suggestions and solutions to induce peace and prevent permanent damage to state, society and civilization.



The opening issue of NJIPS covers themes pertinent to global contemporary issues, encompassing the convoluted dynamics of conflict in the Middle East, the swathe and breadth of the international refugee crisis and the consequential humanitarian catastrophe, and the recovery and recuperation of the victims of conflict. It also touches upon Pakistan's foreign policy motivations in participating in UN peacekeeping operations in international conflict zones.

The Editorial Team deserves my felicitations for producing a compendium of interesting articles. These articles provide meaningful insights into the perilous impact of conflict and violence on the developmental and societal essence of the nation and the country's unrelenting resolve to defeat conflict and promote positive ideologies that are so important for the survival and revival of the society in these uncertain times.

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I wish the Journal and its editors all the luck in the future and hope that it will significantly contribute towards the production and dissemination of knowledge. I also sincerely hope that their words find resonance in policy making circles.


Lieutenant General Naweed Zaman, HI (M), (Retired)
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Message of the Principal NIPCONS On the Inaugural Issue of NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability (NJIPS)

It gives me immense pleasure to be part of the launching of the 'NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability (NJIPS)'. This initiative by the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) at NUST shall contribute in informing and educating the larger literary audience regarding the complex issues concerning peace and conflict. More importantly, NJIPS will enrich the on-going academic discourses on the subject. The current global landscape shows that violent conflicts have become rampant in today's world. The protracted and multifaceted conflicts demands new and thoughtful intellectual interventions for the resolution. Therefore, the need for peace efforts in the form of research and inquiry, along with other practical measures, are overwhelming.



In addition, the focus on local perspectives shall inform the global audience about the causes and consequences of violent conflict and peace efforts, and that too through the eyes of those, who are participants in these occurrences, in one way or the other. Pakistan, being at the forefront of the 'global war on terror' and NUST, being the paramount learning hub of the state become the suitable place to generate and lead such debates and discussions. Hence, it is hoped that given the focus of the Journal and the presence of experienced persons on its editorial board; the Journal shall emerge as a unique learning platform for the academia, students, and policy makers in the future.

Maj Gen Mazhar Saleem Khan HI (M) Retired
Principal, NUST Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (NIPCONS)
National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)

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Pakistan's Foreign Policy Motivations in Sending Troops Abroad

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Tughral Yamin¹

Abstract

Ever since the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UNO), international community has resorted to peacekeeping operations to bring about peace in global conflict zones. The UN does not have a standing army and therefore it relies on troop contributions from member states for peacekeeping operations. Pakistan has been sending its troops abroad to participate in UN peacekeeping operations since 1960. The decisions to undertake such dangerous assignments are influenced *inter alia* by factors such as nation's foreign policy, availability of troops, security concerns, public opinion and the sense of fulfilling international obligations. Arguably, foreign policy motivations in most cases dominate the Pakistani state's decision to send its soldiers abroad. The underlying strategic decision making process remains the preserve of the official bureaucracy, both civilian and military. Decision making is easy for military governments; difficult in times of weak political governments and an assertive military; and long winded and chaotic when the matter is referred to the parliament. This paper promulgates Pakistan's foreign policy motivations for providing troops for overseas deployments and reinforces the thesis that states like Pakistan lend their forces for international ventures, when they foresee clear cut strategic advantages.

Keywords

Pakistan, foreign policy motivations, force deployments overseas

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Why Peacekeeping?

International peace and stability is one of the foremost goals enshrined in the UN Charter. Peacekeeping is one way of fulfilling this mandate. Traditionally, the UN requisitions multinational troops for international peacekeeping operations from member states because it does not have a standing army of its own. The idea of a permanent UN force has a long history. Article 43 of the Charter was intended to provide the constitutional authority for standing forces at the disposal of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to protect international peace and security (Woodhouse, 2010). Till the time that UN does not have an army of its own, member states make available to the UNSC troops for peacekeeping in international trouble spots (A United Nations Standing Army). Currently, there are more than 97,000 UN uniformed personnel, soldiers and police, from over 110 countries are serving as peacekeepers. Typically, UN peacekeepers monitor disputed borders and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas; provide security across a conflict zone; protect civilians; assist in-country military personnel with training and support; and assist ex-combatants in implementing peace agreements that they are party to.

Peacekeeping operations in conflict zones began soon after the world body was established at the end of the Second World War. The first peacekeepers were sent to Palestine in 1948 to keep the warring parties apart and to monitor the truce (UNTSO). Pakistan's engagement with UN peacekeeping began in 1949 (Malik, 2013), when the UN Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was first deployed in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan (Wirsing, 2003). Peacekeeping has since then evolved from simply observing ceasefire violations to active enforcement of the peace, sometimes under the new concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Annan, 2012).

A number of actors are involved in the business of peacekeeping. Raising troops for the mission requires considerable 'behind the scene' negotiations for obtaining four kinds of political consents i.e., for the mission, for the mandate, for the force commander, and for the troops to be deployed (Rubenstein, 2008). The warring parties in the conflict zone (Annan, 2012), the countries providing troops and those funds for the operations, and the UN machinery in New York have to be on board. Once the UN is convinced that peacekeepers are needed to prevent a humanitarian

crisis, the UNSC passes a resolution to that effect. A demand for peacekeepers is floated and member states opt for missions that they consider suitable for their forces. Sometimes the host nation may actually refuse peacekeepers from a certain country or a region. An important question is: what motivates the member states to offer their troops for peacekeeping missions?

Peacekeeping as ‘Humanistic’ Approach

Clearly, UN peacekeeping is different from defending one’s own country. A soldier’s basic training differs from his job description as a peacekeeper, wherein he or she has to carry out policing duties, and act as a “negotiator, intelligence gatherer, mediator, observer, listener, humanitarian worker, helper, and social worker” (Jelusic, 2004, p.35). As the nature of peacekeeping has evolved over the years, the peacekeeper is no longer a silent observer in the conflict zone. A peacekeeper is now more actively involved in keeping the lid on the conflict. The emphasis now is to protect civilians by establishing ‘robust’ peacekeeping missions with explicit protection mandates. This transformation can be pegged to the UNSC Resolution 1270 adopted in 1999 to provide the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. Since then, peacekeepers have been regularly tasked to protect civilians from physical harm (Hultman, 2014).

It follows therefore, that the blue helmeted soldier now needs higher motivation to kill or get killed in order to save lives of civilians in a conflict that may have no alignment with his/her country’s national policies (Blocq, 2009). The motivation to serve on UN missions differs from country to country. Quite naturally given the differences in culture and ethos, an Asian soldier may perceive a UN mission in a completely dissimilar manner as compared to a European (Hedlund, 2011). A study identified eight kinds of motivations for soldiers forming part of the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. These include adventure and excitement, acquiring experience, improving career prospects, economic benefits, fulfilling professional commitments, sense of comradeship, feeling of achievement and the elation in doing something good to others (Stabell, 2012). For the German soldiers it is about comradeship, good salary and an endurable length of deployment as worthwhile motivations. The Germans with little exposure to actual war fighting consider a UN deployment as a peacekeeper a ‘rite of passage’ to become a ‘real soldier’. Younger

soldiers from Slovenia find this an international recognition for their small country. For the Italians it is adventure, economic reward and a sense of doing something important in life. The Swedish conscript soldier considers this an opportunity to seek adventure and do something worthwhile in life (Hedlund, 2011). For a number of those opting for UN mission there is always the personal incentive of getting a better pay package, while serving overseas (Malik, 2013). In a random survey conducted by the author none of the veteran Pakistani peacekeepers cited pay as the top motivation. The uppermost choices were sense of duty, loyalty to the country and serving humanity. Only one of them cited a good pay package as an incentive and that too as the least likely temptation.

Ideological appeal has often been used to motivate soldiers for expeditionary missions. During the Middle Ages, Pope Urban II raised a European force to liberate the holy land by launching a series of Crusades. He appealed to the Christian kings to join forces for this noble cause. The Crusades were fought intermittently from 1095 CE through the next two centuries (Asbridge, 2010). During the nineteenth century, Napoleon Bonaparte's Grande Armée (1805-1809) held a transnational appeal for soldiers of multiple nationalities. Among the rank and file were fifty thousand Austrians, Prussians and Germans. 20,000 were Poles, and just thirty five thousand Frenchmen (Zamoyski, 2004). The soldiery was attracted because of better pay prospects and greater share in the war booty that seemed assured in the wake of Napoleon's exorable victory march. Quite naturally these men were motivated by personal gains rather national or ideological inspirations.

In the colonial era, soldiers from the Indian subcontinent served the King Emperor and British crown in distant lands. In the First World War alone, India (including areas that are now part of Pakistan) provided 1.27 million men, effectively one tenth of the entire British war effort. The French also made use of 450,000 troops from their African colonies (Koller, 2014). Many of the Muslim soldiers from Asia and Africa actually fought against the Ottoman Turks, who were their co-religionists, in the Middle East (Fawaz, 2015). During the Great War Gandhi, later the icon of non-violence was in the forefront to recruit Indians to fight for Britain. His effort was largely to bolster the cause of Indian independence (Ghosh, 2013). 75,000 Indian soldiers died in action in various theatres of war. The supreme sacrifice to support the allied effort was made in the hope that it would provide the Indians with a bargaining tool to achieve greater autonomy or self-governance after the War. Unfortunately, the colonial masters treated them as ready and willing cannon fodder and gave few concessions, to

their Indian subjects after the War. This betrayal added impetus for the demand of independence (Khuhro, 2015). The elusive dream for independence would only be fulfilled after the Second World War, when Britain was no longer in a position to hold on to its foreign colonies (Pierce, 2009).

In the post-colonial era it is difficult to justify such devotion for a foreign cause. Those in favor, invoke genuine national interests and foreign policy gains to explain international interventions outside the physical scope of national defense (Williams, 2013). Arguably, a country willingly to send its military for foreign missions that do not correspond to its national aims and objectives risks being labeled a mercenary nation (Chaudhry, 2014). Some countries have learnt bitter lessons from their militarist past and are extremely cautious of foreign deployments. In modern times, two countries with strong pacific sentiments are Germany and Japan. At times their restricted military presence was a requirement that was imposed on them by the victors e.g. for ten years after the Second World War, Germany was not allowed to have an Army. The Bundeswehr or the Federal Army was created in 1955, when NATO wanted reinforcements during the Cold War. German soldiers were deployed abroad for the first time after Second World War in January 1996 (Lantis, 2002). They first established a military hospital in the Croatian port of Split. This was followed by the active deployment of combat troops in Kosovo (Borger, 2012). German soldiers have more recently participated in the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Article 9 of the Japan's post-World War II constitution outlawed war as a means of settling international disputes. This self-imposed restriction has been reinterpreted by the lawmakers to allow the Japanese Self-Defence Forces, to defend its allies in a limited role in conflicts abroad (Ripley, 2015). There has been a lot of internal opposition to this reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution (Gilsinan, 2015).

Usually countries signing up for a UN peacekeeping mission do it for the sake of winning respect and credibility. Sometimes it is a matter of regional politics e.g., Koreans compare themselves with the Japanese and the Chinese, when it comes to calculating their peacekeeping contribution (Ko, 2015). For smaller nations, this is their chance to play a meaningful role in the big league international politics. They willingly contribute troops for UN deployments because richer nations would rather fund such an enterprise instead of sending their own

troops (Monitor, 2013). A thin veneer covers the hard fact that UN forces are only sent, where the UN Security Council (UNSC) with the five powerful permanent members permit them to go. Syria is a classic example of international neglect and apathy to a bloody conflict that has no end in sight and which has triggered a mass international exodus. A UN peacekeeping mission comprising unarmed observers under a Norwegian General was set up in Syria, but did not last longer than a few months (Smith, 2012). A meaningful deployment in Syria would probably require the consent of both USA and the Russian Federation. International acceptance, notwithstanding, whenever a country put its soldiers in harm's way, it takes a calculated risk. This requires serious cost and benefit analysis. In some cases factors such as security, trade and prestige outweigh the others (Gegout, 2009). It also provides soldiers from rival countries like Pakistan and India, the rare opportunity to work together on foreign soil (Sidhu, 2016).

Pakistan's Contribution as Peacekeepers

Pakistan to date remains one of the largest troop contributing countries in the world (Peacekeeping, 2015), and it has paid dearly in terms of human lives. It has so far lost 150 soldiers. This roughly comes to about 10% of troops sent abroad under the UN mandate (PR236/2012-ISP, 2012). 25 of these men lost their lives on one single day on June 5, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia (UN, 2015). There have also been instances of peacekeepers being made hostage in a conflict zone (Mogato, 2015). Human losses on missions that are actually not in the defense of the homeland are difficult to justify. However, there are no known reports of relatives of Pakistani soldiers complaining about deaths in foreign lands. There can be a number of reasons for such stoic attitude. First and foremost, in our country there is an element of fatalism in accepting God's will. Secondly, the effect of the tragedy is often softened by the hefty UN compensation and the army pension; and last but not the least, the feeling that the soldier is duty bound under the official oath to go, wherever his country tells him to go by land, air, or sea, 'even to the peril of his life.' (The Pakistan Army Act, 1952).¹

At the policymaking level, a range of motivations is discernible in case of Pakistan with regards to overseas military deployments. The decision to commit troops abroad is not always an easy choice. Pakistan has been under a lot of pressure from various quarters

¹ See: The Pakistan Army Act 1952, <http://pja.gov.pk/system/files/Army%20Act%201952.pdf>

including the US to become part of the international military coalition against so-called Islamic State (IS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but it has been managing to steer away from this crisis in the Middle East (Gishkori, 2015). It even withstood the exhortation of its long time benefactor Saudi Arabia in this regard (Yousaf, 2015). The Saudis were more stringent in making demands on the Pakistanis to join the fight against the Houthi insurgents in Yemen (Khan, 2015). They were so certain that Pakistan would sign up as a partner that they displayed the Pakistani flag in the initial press briefings by their military spokesman (Baabar, 2015). The domestic public opinion was against such an involvement. The advice from the Pakistani ambassador on ground (interview with Mr. Shami, Pakistan's ambassador to Yemen at the time of the Houthi uprising, April 15th, 2015), the public sentiment, and the parliamentary decision combined forced the government to opt for neutrality (Hussain, 2015). One former foreign minister has stressed that 'impartiality in the inter-Arab disputes' has been the cardinal principle of Pakistan's foreign policy (Kasuri, 2015).

The purpose of this paper is to examine what motivates the policy planners in Pakistan to send its forces abroad and why in certain cases they are reluctant to do so. It further aims to find out if there is a consistent pattern to this thinking process.

Foreign Policy Motivations

Pakistan at the time of its independence was embroiled in a number of teething problems. Not only did the new state lack essential resources and institutions to run the new country, it was swamped by millions of refugees pouring in from India and it was simultaneously being sucked into a war in Kashmir. The Army was in disarray. It needed to be re-organized into new all Muslim units (Arif, 2010). It was woefully short of senior leadership and the arms and equipment that was its due under the terms of the division of assets had been blatantly denied by India (Rizvi, 1969).

Under the pioneering spirit that became the hallmark of the newly independent nation, Pakistan was able to overcome these initial hurdles with a great deal of resourcefulness and aplomb. New institutions and organizations were created literally from a scratch and the existing ones were reorganized as best as they could be under the circumstances. The armed forces of Pakistan, as an organization, was quickly able to find its feet and became a first rate military force in a

very short course of time. So much so that the first time that the young state of Pakistan was tempted to send its troops abroad under the UN flag during the Korean War (1950-53) just a few years after independence. The US had sugar coated the deal by promising to equip a brigade size force with weapons, in case Pakistan became part of the US led UN forces against the North Koreans (Burke, 1973; Amin, 2011). Pakistani leadership decided against becoming involved in the Korean War because they were not able to garner enough security guarantees against arch rival India during the overseas deployment of its troops. India incidentally sent an airborne ambulance unit to participate in the Korean War (Muthiah, 2006). Despite Pakistan's non-participation in the Korean War, it drew close to the US. Both Pakistan and the US found their legitimate security concerns and foreign policy objectives converging at the onset of the Cold War. US wanted an ally in the region to shore up its containment policy against international communist forces and Pakistan wanted to be part of an alliance system to balance the Indian threat (Haqqani, 2015).

American military aid to Pakistan formally began in 1954 (Chhabra, 2011). Pakistan subsequently joined the Baghdad Pact (renamed Central Treaty Organization/CENTO) in 1958 and South East Asian Treaty Organization SEATO (Khan, 1964). Pakistan sent its first peacekeepers to the Congo in 1960 (Findley, 2002). It is ironic indeed that Pakistani troops are still being sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as blue helmets (Nations, 1996). The motivation to send troops in the early days was due to an urge to be counted as a mature and responsible state, one that was willing to pay heed to the call of the international community. In October 1962, Pakistan sent 1500 soldiers as part of the UN Security Force to West Guinea/West Irian (Lall, 1964). This territory was under Dutch control and its fate had remained unresolved after the independence of Indonesia in 1949. India was earlier earmarked for this duty, but Indonesia preferred Pakistan (Wicaksana, 2013). This was the first instance for preference of Pakistani troops by a host country.

Pakistani soldiers have proven themselves trustworthy and dependable in overseas deployments. In 1966, in an abortive assassination attempt, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman was saved by the Pakistani commandant of the Dhufar Gendarme (Peterson, 2004). Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Sakhi Raja, on loan from Pakistan Army was grievously injured, in gunshot wounds caused by a native staff sergeant. A Pakistani second lieutenant died in the failed attack (Reporter, 1966). Brigadier Zia ul Haq (later Chief of Staff Pakistan Army and President), in his capacity as the military adviser to the king

of Jordan, was instrumental in crushing the PLO inspired Black September (1970-71) movement in Jordan (Daudpota, 2013; Ali, 2014).

In times to come, Pakistani soldiers would often be the first choice for UN missions on the basis of their high quality professionalism and demonstrated track record. In the 1990s, it was actually the Pentagon that suggested that Pakistan be included in the peacekeeping mission to Somalia. The participation in the UN mission in Somalia saved Pakistan from being included in US State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism (Nasr, 2014). Pakistan at that time was isolated in the international community because of the alleged nuclear proliferation activities of A.Q. Khan. The decision of the government of Pakistan not to abandon the UN operations in Somalia after it lost 25 peacekeepers on a single day, confirmed its credentials as a dependable nation. Pakistan's participation in the peacekeeping missions from then on expanded in a big way and helped it get rid of the pariah tag.

Pakistan has been very careful in employing its forces outside its borders and does so only when it suits its legitimate national interests. For many years Pakistani trainers and Special Forces were involved in training the Sri Lankan forces to defeat the Tamil insurgents (Sharma, 2011). Sri Lanka has been a vital communication link for Pakistan during the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971. Pakistan needed its influence in the island state after the intervention of the Indian peacekeeping forces (IPKF) from 1987-1990 (Bullion, 1994). This it did by supplying the Sri Lankan military with much needed arms, ammunition and military training.

Ever since its inception, Pakistan followed a policy of friendly relations with fellow Muslim countries. In line with this policy, it signed a number of defence cooperation protocols with several Muslim countries such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and Libya and played a leading role in training their armed force (Kasuri, 2015). Since the 1960s, Pakistani soldiers have been routinely deployed in these countries as trainers, advisers, planners, experts, logisticians and as combat troops. Arab countries needed military training as they began to come of age and they had the money to pay for services rendered. It was within this happy framework of friendship and cooperation that Pakistani soldiers, advisers, trainers and support personnel helped build the Arab militaries as these. Officers from Arab nations were trained in Pakistani military academies to prepare a crop of future leadership. An armored brigade was deployed in the northern Saudi city of Tabuk

during the 1980s (Amin, 2000). Its purpose was to keep a check on the external threat from Israel and to act as a deterrent against internal dissent and avoid the repeat of the 1979 incident. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the Saudis did not want Pakistani Shiite soldiers to serve in the kingdom. There was a strong resentment against such a condition within the army and Government of Pakistan had to prevail upon the Saudi authorities to accept soldiers irrespective of the person's sect (Waheed, 2011). Under the bilateral 1982 Protocol, combined military exercises have become a periodic fixture. From 2004 there have been a series of Al-Samsaam (sharp sword) joint military exercises (Hyder, 2015). In 1968, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, asked President Ayub Khan for assistance in training defense personnel to take over command when British officers left. The first five Air Chiefs were from Pakistan. Defense cooperation with Kuwait began in 1968, with Bahrain in 1971, and formalized with Qatar in the early 1980s (Hyder, 2015). Under the terms of Agreement to buy Gwadar from Oman in 1958, Oman Army was allowed to recruit Baloch soldiers. It still carries out regular recruitment drives in Baluchistan for this purpose (Baloch, 2014).

In the 1973 Arab-Israel War, Pakistani fighter pilots volunteered to take part in combat mission out of a sense of duty to side with their Muslim brothers in their time of need. They flew Syrian jet fighters and actually shot down Israeli airplanes in aerial combat (Alvi, 2015). In the 1979 occupation of the Holy Kaaba, there are reports suggesting that Pakistani Special Forces were deployed to clear the Grand Mosque from the occupiers (Mandaville, 2007). There is apocryphal evidence of the Saudi defense minister Prince Sultan desperately exhorting his soldiers to defend the House of God or else he would 'bring in Pakistanis' to fight in their place (Trofimov, 2007). Pakistanis have been involved in Middle East fighting even before the Arab Israel war. In the first Gulf War in 1991, Pakistan sent its troops to Saudi Arabia to participate in Operation Desert Storm but refrained from actual combat. General Aslam Beg called it strategic defiance (Naseem, 2007). In distancing himself from the policy of his prime minister, Gen Beg earned the ire of the Saudis (Amin, 2011). His independent policy brought to the fore the fact that the military leadership was not always on the same page as the political leadership. At that time, Nawaz Sharif was the prime minister and was the one who had sent the forces to KSA. This was not the first time that Nawaz Sharif and his military commander would not trust each other on a major decision involving the deployment of troops.

The chink in the civil-military relations would become clearly visible during the Kargil conflict in 1998 (Aziz, 2009). Pakistan was conspicuously involved in supporting the Jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan was under an existential threat and it started providing aid to the Afghans even before the US stepped in with their huge resources in money and arms. With the dedicated support of Pakistani planners, advisors and trainers and the material help of the US, the Mujahidin were able to defeat the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Yousaf, 2001). The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan was a major turning point in contemporary history. The US achieved its strategic aim to destroy the Soviet Union but failed to stop the storm that would blow over once they left Afghanistan without ensuring that peace and stability returned to this troubled nation. Pakistan would suffer grievously because of this faulty policy and the US itself would come under attack by Al Qaeda operatives being provided refuge by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has avoided contributing troops to missions, where the public opinion did not support it e.g., it did become part of the war in Iraq that was hugely unpopular at home (Malik, 2013). However, Pakistan resisted Western pressure to send forces to Iraq after the US invasion of that country in March 2003 (Rizvi, 2006). It again avoided becoming part of the forces fighting the IS/ISIS in Syria and Iraq and specified that it would only support multilateral action authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Alexandrova, 2015). The most prominent case of Pakistan actually declining to come to the help of long-time friend and ally Saudi Arabia happened, when the Saudis demanded aircraft, ships and boots on ground against the Houthis (Hourel, 2015). Opinion was divided at home about getting involved in the conflict in Yemen. Caution was advised by the fiercely independent media and politicians echoed the popular sentiment by suggesting recourse to the parliament or an all parties' conference to obtain a consensus on such an important national decision. There were worries about the unending insurgency at home and the possibility of becoming entangled in a Shi'ite-Sunni conflict, which was definitely not in Pakistan's best interests. There was a great deal of support from the religious lobby, who promised to protect the holy places if the army was not sent to Saudi Arab (Reporter, 2015). This in any case was taken as rhetoric by a clergy that receives its funding from KSA and sundry Gulf states.

Table 1: Pakistani Motivations for Foreign Military Deployments

Year	Foreign War /Conflict	Pakistan's Decision	Foreign Policy Objective	Remarks
1950	Korean War	Not to send troops	No security guarantee against India	Pakistan sent consignment of wheat grain to show solidarity with the UN forces
1991	Gulf War I	Forces sent but did not participate in combat action	The Army Chief wanted to show strategic defiance against the US led Operation Desert Storm	Civil and military leadership not on the same page
1992	UN Mission to Somalia	Participate in the mission	To come out of the international isolation and become part of the world community	Pakistan able to re-connect with the rest of the world
2015	Houthi Rebellion in Yemen	Remain neutral. Not become part of the Arab coalition against the Houthis.	The conflict did not concern Pakistan	Saudi Arabia annoyed. Pakistan tries to make amends

The resolution passed by the parliament to remain neutral unless the holy sites were threatened did not go down well with the Arabs and the Pakistani leadership felt the heat of their displeasure. Pakistan is deeply indebted to the desert kingdom for its largesse in bailing it out in difficult economic times. The prime minister himself is in gratitude to the ruling family for the refuge they granted him during his time in the political wilderness. The nation and the political leadership were weighed down by the moral obligation to respond to the Saudi request. Saudi Arabia wanted fellow Sunni-majority Pakistan to provide ships, aircraft and troops for the campaign to counter the Shiite Iran sponsored Houthi rebellion in Yemen. The matter was referred to the national assembly. After a five day debate the parliament decided not to send troops and expressed the desire to maintain neutrality so as to be able to play a proactive diplomatic role to end the crisis (Mukashaf, 2015). The only exception to Pakistan's involvement in conflict, the parliament insisted, should be in case the two holy places in Saudi Arabia were threatened. The Saudis were not pleased by the decision of

the Pakistani parliament. The prime minister wanted to make amends. He flew into Saudi Arabia with his military brass to take stock of the situation. He then instructed his naval chief to enforce the naval arms embargo on the Houthis, under the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) passed 14-0 in April 2015, calling for such an action (Syed, 2015). From the chart, it is clear that four factors have been foremost in influencing the thought processes of the Pakistani decision makers in deciding to send the troops for foreign deployments. These are: national interest, security concerns, public opinion, and international recognition. One or more of these factors were influential in arriving at a decision.

Another aspect that cannot be ignored is the nature and the character of the leadership. It has always been easy for governments during military rule to make such decisions quickly. It has always been convenient for a Chief of the Army, in his capacity as the president of the country, to decide on security related matters on the basis of his operational knowledge and his personal assessment of the worldview. The international actors wanting Pakistan to contribute troops have also found it convenient to engage with the generals rather than the politicians. Once the army is in favor of a deployment, the civilian leadership usually goes along. One notable exception of the decision makers being decisively divided was in case of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and General Aslam Beg on the subject of the Gulf War. The two were not on the same page on taking part in operation Desert Storm in 1991.

This was not the case, when the Saudis demanded that Pakistani troops be sent to fight the Houthi tribal militias in Yemen. This time around both the civil and military leadership had the same opinion. It was strongly felt that there was no meaningful foreign policy advantage in sending troops to Yemen and in fact such an enterprise could become a liability in the future. The Saudis were not amused. They had been bailing Pakistan out from tricky situations by injecting much needed cash into its economy and providing oil on deferred payment when it was sanctioned after the nuclear explosion or when the third time Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif found the treasury empty. The Prime Minister also had a personal debt to repay for being granted refuge by the Saudi monarchy after he was removed from power by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. The UAE foreign minister Ahmed Gargash hurled an innuendo, warning Pakistan that it would be suitably penalized for its ambiguous stand (Haider, 2015).

There are nearly two million Pakistanis living in Saudi Arabia, who alone contribute \$4.73 billion in foreign remittances for the financial year 2014 (Shakil, 2015). A lot of remittances flow in from the Gulf countries. According to conservative estimates, in 2015 the volume of monies sent back from abroad crossed the \$15 billion mark (Sherani, 2015). The Government of Pakistan realized that they had to placate the Arabs so as not to be deprived of the foreign exchange earnings through the expatriates. The leadership both political and military, therefore, made emergency visits to the Kingdom to reiterate Pakistan's fealty. Once the UNSC applied the arms embargo on the Houthis, the Prime Minister immediately ordered Pakistan Navy to join the embargo enforcing forces (Hussain, 2015).

Conclusion

This is not the first or last time that Pakistan has been asked to contribute troops for a foreign mission. Decision making in these matters is likely to vary from case to case. Theoretically, the mechanism to deal with such requests is well laid out. In case of UN deployments, the standard operating procedures have over the years been streamlined. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) sends the demands for requisitioning of troops to the permanent representative at the UN in New York. The envoy in New York, usually a top diplomat, is aware that such kind of request is in the pipeline and seeks prior advice from the Foreign Office (FO). A formal request on receipt is routed through the FO to the GHQ in Rawalpindi. The case for UN deployments is handled by the Military Operations (MO) Directorate, GHQ. Depending on the size and scope of the deployment a chain of actions is initiated, once the demand is acceded to. Troops are earmarked and equipment set aside for UN deployment. Pre-deployment training is carried out locally and the troops are moved by air or sea as per the requirement of the UN. In case of police personnel, the request is sent to the Ministry of Interior. At times the FO is not satisfied with the merits of the case e.g., they were not very keen to accede to the troop request for the AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur in 2007 because Pakistan did not want to spoil its good relations with Sudan, a friendly Muslim country and a fellow member within the framework of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Ultimately, the troops were sent in face of strong international urging. Parliament was not involved in this decision making process. In fact such decisions are rarely routed through the parliament. The two prominent exceptions, where parliamentary debate took place were in

case of Somalia, after the deaths of our soldiers and in case of Iraq, after the US invasion (Malik, 2013).

Spontaneous requests outside the established norms of international peacekeeping are examined on merit. Naturally, clear policy guidelines are needed from the political leadership to respond to such requests by civil and military staffs. These are fleeting opportunities but require in-depth analysis and an unambiguous response. Sometimes it is in the interest of the nation to offer troops unilaterally, but such occasions are remote. The Government of Pakistan has various forums to obtain inputs for such decisions, such as the Cabinet Committee on National Security, the parliament, the parliamentary committees on defense related matters, all parties' conference, and a council of eminent people like veteran statesmen, diplomats and generals. If time permits the opinion of the common citizens can also be obtained through online opinion polls. No matter what is the nature of the advice received from various quarters, the ultimate decision is that of the prime minister. At the end of the day, it is the national interests that count before troops are sent abroad.

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Analysis of Middle Eastern Refugee Kinetics and Concept of Hijrah under Daesh

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Abstract

The theory of Post-structuralism, parts its way from traditional Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberalist theories on the notion of state as a rational actor. The reason for this departure is that this concept discards and marginalizes others, such as non-state and trans-state actors and those persecuted by their own state such as refugees. Turmoil in Middle East has created a crucial situation surrounding refugees' issue. As per UNHCR there are almost 4.8 Million registered Syrian refugees, the total number of refugees around the globe is much higher. Besides others, Islamic State or ISIS has been instrumental in displacing such large swaths of population out of their homes. On one hand ISIS has made the stay of locals untenable creating millions of refugees, and on the other hand, they are inviting foreign fighters to move to Syria through a more traditional Islamic concept of *Hijrah* (literal meanings migration). These two groups (refugees and migrants) crisscross each other on spatiotemporally variable pathways as they embark on a complex and opaque social landscape. There is a need to study the kinetics of these groups based on the 'push' and 'pull' factors as theorized by Kunz in his theory of refugees and through the analysis of identifiable and identical set of discourses in contemporary refugee studies.

Keywords

Post-structuralism, Daesh, refugees, hijrah,

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Introduction

Migration and refugees are two separate phenomena. The United Nations Convention on Refugees (1951) defines a refugee as:

...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

This definition completely disregards the plight of those who, due to multiple reasons, are unable to cross the borders and are displaced within their own borders, such as millions of Syrians and Iraqis. Since the turn of the century, refugee phenomenon has become even more internationalized, and a war byproduct that could rightly be labeled as the sub-system of a larger system of conflicts in the Muslim world. This world of conflict has forced millions into refugee status making the Islamic world home or war and refugees (in Islamic tradition known as *Dar al Harbwa al Muhajirun*). For the purpose of this paper, qualitative analysis includes study of existing literature on Islamic tradition of *Hijrah*. *Dabiq Magazine* issued by ISIS has been the main source of reference for discussions and analysis of the Islamic concept of *Hijrah* under Daesh. Textual analysis has also been based on the usage of concept of *Hijrah* by ISIS.

Theoretical Framework

As per Kunz (1973), theoretically the 'push' factor depends on the old home circumstances of the migrant and becomes the causal motivation for such a step, whereas, the 'pull' factor of the destination country provides with the purpose and drive to move to a particular country. This definition effectively segregates 'migrants' from 'refugees'. Migration is a deliberate and well planned act on behalf of those who, most of the times, are looking for better economic opportunities at another place. There may be absence or short supply of such opportunities in their native land; livelihood might have been adversely affected by climatic condition or by act of God, etc. Migrants usually have enough time at their disposal to weigh and choose between their 'push' and 'pull' factor and settle for a destination. In case of refugees

however, mostly there is a serious imbalance between the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Refugees have tremendous pressure on the ‘push’ side of equation, to abandon their homes in a short span of time, simultaneously little or no motivation and choice on the ‘pull’ end might exist.

Similarly Hansen (2014) argues that the theory of Post Structuralism parts its way from traditional Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberalist theories on the notion of state as a rational actor. The reason for this departure is that this concept discards and marginalizes ‘others’ such as non-state and trans-state actors and those persecuted by their own state such as refugees. Theoretically, refugees can be described and have been studied through multiple discourses and factors impacting the refugee status such as, civil war, religious discourse, economic discourse, Violent-Non-State-Actors (VNSA) etc.

Islamic Doctrine of Hijrah

Hijrah is the concept dating back to the earliest days of Islam. Prophet Mohammad migrated from persecution at Mecca to Yathrib, which later came to be known as Madinah (or Madinah al Nabi). The concept of Hijrah (migration or forced migration) involving Mohajirun (refugees or migrants) takes its roots from Judaism and Christian traditions. The traditions regarding ‘aliens’ and ‘sojourners’ existed in Arabian Peninsula long before the arrival of Islam (Elmadmad, 2008). Incidentally Prophets of the three monotheist Abraham religions; Judaism, Christianity and Islam including Prophets Ibrahim, Moses, Jesus and Mohammad underwent Hijrah (Padilla & Phan, 2014). These pivotal acts of divine obedience took Prophet Ibrahim from Haran to Canaan, Moses from Egypt to Madian, Jesus from Galilee to Jerusalem, and Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina). Even before Prophet Mohammad left Mecca for Madinah, a group of Muslims left Mecca for Abyssinia, a Christian land, to avoid persecution on religious grounds by their fellow countrymen.

The sanctity of Hijrah in Islam is celebrated and is being taken seriously. The date when Prophet Mohammad started his Hijrah gained so much importance that Islamic calendar starts on that day. First year of Hijrah was 622 CE and Prophet started the journey on 12 September 622 CE (Shamsi, 1984).

Hijrah theory provides special protection and rights to asylum seekers and refugees. In its true essence it, arguably could be more advanced and better than the modern age refugee conventions and laws. The word Hijrah is derived from the Arabic word Hajarah which means to part ways, abandon, to break ties with someone, to leave or to

migrate (Alkhuli, 1989; Elmadmad, 2008). In a stark contrast to modern refugee laws, theory of Hijrah grants right to every human being to grant asylum and to seek asylum without explanation of reason, intention or repercussions. In Quran the word Hijrah and its derivatives have been mentioned 27 times and its Shari'ah meanings are to migrate in the path of Allah (Munir, 2011).

There is a serious disagreement amongst the Muslim scholars on the core issue of Hijrah. Some of them argue that Muslims should not opt for Hijrah without a genuine excuse. They further contend that the only genuine reason for a Muslim to perform Hijrah stems from the restrictions and bans imposed on Islamic practices in the lands they abode. This argument also continues to make those Muslims accountable, who prefer to live a luxurious life in countries where they cannot practice Islam in true letter and spirit such as Western countries. This logic has been used as exploitation and a strong argument by ISIS against those who continue to stay in those lands and do not decide to perform Hijrah. Further discussion on this aspect will ensue in later part of this paper. Another set of Islamic scholars declare Hijrah as a human right and leave the decision to the best judgment of individuals, whether they want to stay in such lands or prefer to perform Hijrah to a place where Shari'ah Laws exist.

An important aspect related to Hijrah is its close relevance and connection to the concept of Bay'ah and Jihad. Hijrah was considered a command in earlier days of Islam and everyone was obliged to perform Hijrah. Bay'ah was the process to pledge allegiance on Prophet Mohammad's hands and a promise to undergo Hijrah as a result of this allegiance. These two were delinked after conquest of Mecca, when Prophet said that there is no Hijrah after conquest (Zaman, 2004). Therefore Jihad remained the only obligation under Bay'ah. This gives birth to a new issue, that is, is Jihad a compulsion (especially after Hijrah) and how would it be seen. Jihad has been a collective compulsion in offence and an individual duty during defense (Lewis, 1992). There is a unanimous agreement amongst all Sunni schools of thought including Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Shafi that this delinking is not a *carte blanche* for Muslims. It meant that Bay'ah could be administered without Hijrah and this moderation on the issue of Hijrah gave a much relaxed option on Jihad, making it a collective responsibility during offense yet an individual duty during defense. ISIS, however still sticks to the notion that both Hijrah and Jihad are compulsions and Muslims are duty bound to perform these solemn acts (Dabiq, 2014c, p. 3).

Concept of Dar-al-Islam, Dar-al-Harb and Dar-al-Sulh/Ahd

Many Muslim scholars argue that the truly Islamic way of life is possible in Islamic lands or where Shari'ah Law exists, calling it Dar-al-Islam or land of peace. On the other hand, there is abode of war or Dar-al-Harb, Dar-al-Kufr or Dar-al-Shirk, where Islamic law doesn't exist. This complex linguistic web has been a source of constant debate throughout Islamic history, leaving average Muslim undecided on actually where is it best for Muslims to reside and under what circumstances should they perform Hijrah. This issue continues to be another point of exploitation by ISIL. Consequent to this undecided stance by Muslims, multiple Western authors have argued that through this approach, Muslims tend to retain an insular and exclusive life style and that this situation could easily be challenged through modern international law (Lewis, 1992). Khawarij have all along declared territories where there is no Shari'ah as Dar-ul-Kufr and Daesh has followed the suit. Historically, during and after 12th Century many Muslim areas, especially in the Islamic west went under Christian control. The debate surrounding requirement for Hijrah ensued. Majority of the Islamic scholars called on Muslims from such areas to perform Hijrah, while many others opposed the notion. The logic behind allowing Muslims to stay in Christian lands was that, it was a religious duty to stay behind if it could serve the cause of Islam better (Masud, 1986). It also needs mentioning here that in 12th Century and later, cause of Hijrah was solely connected to the concepts of Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-Harb, and not to the concepts of Jihad and Bay'ah. The concept of Hijrah and Jihad remained interlinked in prior centuries; all those duty bound to undergo Hijrah were also duty bound to conduct Jihad against such lands.

Similarly any land ruled by a Muslim ruler was considered Dar-al-Islam. To prevent any uprising against such rulers and to promote unity, no Hijrah was allowed from such lands, even if the ruler was tyrant and cruel towards the Muslim subjects, thereby effectively barring Muslims to perform a 'reverse Hijrah' from Dar-al-Islam to Dar-al-Harb. This point will be analyzed through the present day discourse generated by Daesh on the issue of Hijrah. They argue that although the living conditions in ISIS lands are not ideal, Muslims residing there should continue to live there, more so others from around the globe should also perform Hijrah to Syria (Dabiq, 2014a, pp. 10-11). However, the classic Muslim historians argued against such Hijrah, under the pretext of the hadith in which Prophet Mohammad


had asked Muslims to stop Hijrah after conquest of Mecca; la hijrataba'd al fat'hi (Zaman, 2004).

The declaration of lands as Dar-al-Islam or Dar-al-Harb includes three types of countries; first those where Muslims are rare and are minorities, they were declared Dar-al-Harb, secondly those countries where Muslims were present in large numbers but rulers were non-Muslims, such countries were also declared Dar-al-Harb; and therefore, the only place that was labeled Dar-al-Islam was the country ruled by a Muslim ruler (Masud, 1986). In present day context, this gives rise to a new debate, as to who all should be considered as (true and practicing) Muslim rulers and how many Islamic countries today would actually fulfill the criteria to be declared as Dar-al-Islam. Referring again to Daesh exploitation, they have given a lineage of their self-avowed caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi linking it to Prophet Mohammad, to prove his nobility (Dabiq, 2015a, 2015b). They have also argued that presently there is only one Dar-al-Islam, the land ruled by the caliph (Dabiq, 2014b).

A further extension of this debate links to some serious questions mentioned above. Such as, what happens if a Muslim ruler is tyrant and lives of Muslims under such ruler become untenable for example as under Hajjaj Bin Yusuf, forcing Muslims to perform reverse Hijrah to non-Muslim lands such as Malabar in India at that time (El Fadl, 1994). Similarly during the reign of al-Mahdi (775-785 CE) and Harun al Rasheed (786-809 CE) and in 11th Century, areas including Sicily and other Muslim lands were lost to Christians. The debate over the Hijrah again had two opposing poles, with one set of scholars and jurists advocating the concept of Islam and Dar-al-Islam as unitary, while others arguing that the dynamism in the concept of Hijrah needed to be seen in the context of infringement upon fulfillment of religious duties. If such duties could be fulfilled in lands other than those ruled by Muslims they could continue residing there. Later argument was also considered a logical solution for newly converts residing in non-Muslim lands. Therefore the concept of a third type Dar-al-Sulh or Dar-al-Ahd (house of truce or house of pact) was formed, and argued under the pretext that Prophet Mohammad allowed some newly convert Muslims to migrate to Ethiopia, which was a Christian land (Lewis, 1992). Within this argument the delinking of Jihad from Hijrah was an inbuilt notion.

Concept of Hijrah under Daesh

Right from its creation, Daesh has laid special emphasis on the theme of Hijrah. As a newly constituted force and a self-avowed state, they needed to gather support both for their legitimacy and for their defense. The foremost desire of the Islamic State visible through their magazine Dabiq was that of Bay'ah or pledge of allegiance and loyalty to their caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. It is important to note here, that in the traditional Islamic concept of Hijrah, Jihad and Bay'ah remained intimately connected in Islamic tradition but the difference of opinion among different Islamic scholars and treatise helped evolve the concepts to suit modern day needs. A brief textual analysis of Dabiq Magazine published by Daesh shows that the word Hijrah and its derivatives appears 286 times in all 15 Issues. Word Bay'ah and its derivatives have appeared 216 times and Jihad has been mentioned 734 times. Ever since the emergence of Islamic State in June 2014, Hijrah as a theme has fluctuated in its appearance and appeal over the past two and half years. The graph below shows variation in appearance of word Hijrah:



Graph 1: Variation in appearance of word Hijrah in Dabiq magazine

As mentioned earlier, Hijrah has also been altered to serve Islamic State's best interest. A desire to create a robust force in the heart of Syria and Iraq motivated Daesh to give an open call to 'all devout believers' (Daesh sympathizers) to perform Hijrah because of the two camps in the world; camp of Islam and camp of Kufr and no third camp (Dabiq, 2014c). This binary world view by Daesh makes it obligatory to perform Hijrah to the land of Islamic State. ISIS has provided multiple legal arguments for this obligation by extensive reference to Quran and Hadith. For example declaration of Islamic State through the Quranic verse, "all lands belong to Allah and he

allows its inheritance to anyone whom He wills” (Quran- Surah Al-A’raf: Verse,128), is enough of a reason to create a new state and own the land, or Hijrah being and Islamic duty undertaken by the father of believers Ibrahim. This discourse exerts ‘pull’, enticing all Muslims, first to perform Bay’ah at the hands of self-avowed caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, to be followed by ‘true’ and ‘last’ Hijrah on footsteps of Prophet Ibrahim to the land of Sham (Dabiq, 2014a, pp. 24-26). Legitimacy of the self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr has also been established and reinforced through the fact that he performed Hijrah followed by Jihad, and therefore he is the legal heir and rightful imam to desire Bay’ah from followers (Dabiq, 2014c, p. 40). Hijrah has also been strengthened through co articulation with concepts of Jama’ah (unity), Sam (listening), Ta’ah (obedience), and Jihad. In same Issue of the magazine, Hijrah has been made enticing, since it culminates at a more aggressive and traditional concept of modern day Khilafah (Dabiq, 2014c, pp. 34-41). The attraction for believers from around the globe through Hijrah has therefore, been created right from Issue 1 of Dabiq. Daesh has taken a reverse approach in linking Jihad to Hijrah by saying that, “Hijrah needs to be practiced towards the lands where Jihad can be conducted without the fear of police state” (Dabiq, 2014c, p. 36). This reverses the traditional Islamic order of preference where Hijrah is the priority if Muslims can’t practice their faith freely and after they migrate they could continue Jihad where needed. In their native lands, a preparatory stage before Hijrah has been mentioned as guideline for all those performing Hijrah) and for those aspiring to do so. They have been advised to recruit others, consolidate themselves, and conduct minor ‘hurt operations’ (Dabiq, 2014c, p. 36):

In short, these phases consist of immigrating to a land with a weak central authority to use as a base where a Jama’ah can form, recruit members, and train them. (If such a land does not exist or Hijrah is not possible), the place can be formed through long campaigns of nikayah attacks carried out by underground Mujahid cells.

Daesh continues to incite believers to rush to the Islamic state with parents, siblings, spouses and children. This is a call to populate the newly declared caliphate. Connected to the theme of Hijrah, is the concept of Bay’ah. That is, under the circumstances when immediate Hijrah is not possible, Daesh sympathizers need to organize a Bay’ah from their home towns. Concept of Bay’ah taking precedence over the

concept of Hijrah shows significance of the need for them to populate lands under their control, giving them a possibility to boost their numbers, and build on their strength. This call was responded enthusiastically and thousands flocked the new caliphate. This created a great degree of panic amongst nations whose citizen, new Muslim converts and even young girls opted for Hijrah (Bennhold, 2017). It is important to note here, that the 'pull factor' for these men, women, girls and families was the 'life of jihad' or the 'death of martyrdom', still they opted for it. Dabiq Magazine focusing on Hijrah says in clear words, that "Islamic State is at war against Kafir states and anyone performing Hijrah should expect to perform Jihad" (Dabiq, 2014a, pp. 34-41). Sequentially, Daesh asked its followers to perform Bay'ah (pledge of allegiance), followed by Hijrah (migration in the cause of Allah to Islamic lands) to culminate at Jihad (fighting in the cause of Allah).

The importance of theme Hijrah has not receded, with trend line reaching the apex at 43, the number of times word Hijrah has been mentioned in Issue 3, and the cover page has been titled as 'A Call to Hijrah' (Dabiq, 2014a). The concept has been signified by linking Prophet Ibrahim's Hijrah to Syria as the real and most desirable Hijrah before the Day of Judgment to be performed by the best of the people and those failing to do so would be the worst of the people. In a contrast to the traditional Hijrah, Daesh desires all believers to perform Hijrah to Syria alone. They also admit that Hijrah to Madinah was discontinued after the conquest of Mecca. Therefore towards the later issues of Dabiq and after they had considerable areas under their control, they changed the call for Hijrah to call for Jihad for all followers (Dabiq, 2016, p. 55). That meant that there is no need for those who have already performed Bay'ah to perform Hijrah, they could rather serve Daesh cause better by conducting attacks in their home countries especially in the West. This had a direct impact on the sincerity of those refugees who were genuinely the target of 'push factor' after the start of Civil War in Syria. Every Middle Eastern refugee who tried to enter Europe was doubted and calls from multiple political and official quarters banning such entries have further deteriorated the situation.

While on one hand Daesh was calling its followers to perform the sacred act of Hijrah to Islamic State, they were also exerting tremendous pressure more precisely 'push' on Syrians and Iraqis. Wide spread brutality, coercive Bay'ah, enforced Jihad through strict implementation of Shari'ah, and a protracted civil war, made the lives of millions in Syria and Iraq untenable, a 'push factor' which forced

million to become refugees. Some of these refugees moved to neighboring Muslim countries such as Jordan and Lebanon and a majority ended up in Turkey. These single vector journeys can be categorized as Hijrah, since the destination lands were also Muslim countries. Subsequently, millions of these refugees moved into or tried to move to Europe performing 'reverse Hijrah'.

In a three pronged strategy, firstly Daesh allured their followers to perform Hijrah en masse with their spouses, children, siblings and parents. Secondly they resisted outwards movement to keep Daesh lands populated and finally in the process they forced millions into refugee status performing 'reverse Hijrah'. There is a clear and visible imbalance between 'push' and 'pull' factors in these movements, Hijrah towards the Islamic State is neither kinetic nor can they be categorized as refugees. They had almost no 'push' from their home countries, but the overwhelming 'pull' factor motivated them to perform this religious duty. Those living in Syria and Iraq were also asked to pledge allegiance, deposit their previously held weapons and present their able bodied men for Jihad (Dabiq, 2014c, pp. 12-15). Daesh did not miss any opportunity to hinder or resist the 'Reverse Hijrah' discourse which can best be understood through the case of Aylan Kurdi the child who was washed ashore dead, mourned by the world yet capitalized by Daesh through an article published in Dabiq Magazine (Dabiq, 2015c, pp. 22-23). In a rather serious policy reversal and to prove their presence around the globe, Daesh asked its followers not to perform Hijrah, stay in the infidel lands, and serve Daesh cause by conducting Daesh sponsored home grown terrorist attacks (Dabiq, 2016, p. 57). Coupled with this was call for 'Reverse Hijrah' to be performed by those who had previously joined Daesh for Jihad. Resultantly, some terrorists moved back to Western lands under the cover of refugee waves. This call acted as the last nail in the coffin of Middle Eastern refugee kinetics. The climax of these two colliding discourses convinced thousands to migrate to Islamic State to take part in Jihad. Scores decided to stay back in Europe and participate in Daesh sponsored and claimed terrorism. But worst of all, millions of those refugees trying to escape war to Europe and other lands were resisted, doubted and even manhandled at almost every vector of their kinetics.

The 'Push' and 'Pull' Factors

As previously mentioned, choices for refugees are dominated by a very hard decision to uproot and move from the country of their residence and give up in face of excessive 'push' factor, and sometimes a meager

hope for his future prospects in settling in the destination country or complete absence of 'pull' factor. In case of forced movements such as those caused by Civil War in Syria and Iraq, the 'push factor' weighs in heavily while the 'pull' factor is generally subsided and is dominated by will for self and family survival.

Kinetics as a refugee terminology has been adopted from Kunz (1973, p. 131) for the same reasons that this, 'branch of dynamics investigates the relations between the motions of the bodies and the forces acting upon them'. The term attains preference to 'dynamics' which suggests the existence of inner self propelling force. This inner force to move is completely absent from the movement of refugees with excessive 'push factor' and minimal or no 'pull factor' at work. Their progress resembles the movement of billiard ball, which is missing inner direction and the path is governed by the kinetic factors of inertia, friction, resistance and the vectors of outside applicable forces.

Moreover, every migration and refugee movement cannot be represented by a single vector (Kunz, 1973). In certain cases such as Afghanistan–Pakistan, the refugee movement could be a one step process connecting an origination and a destination point. However, mostly forced refugee movements are multifaceted and can best be conceptualized as multi-vector movements, with significant forces acting at each step. This necessitates a separate analysis of each step, in spatial and temporal frames. These kinds of multiple step movements can be seen at play in Middle Eastern refugees aspiring to move to Europe. As argued by Murphy (1955, p.11), "Flight and the compulsory displacement of populations engender a considerable amount of contemporary feeling and this had tended to affect both social attitudes and individual objectivity . . . and even when reasonable objectivity might be permitted, it is often difficult for the observer to attain it". Millions of Syrians stuck within the internationally recognized borders of Syria have been trapped between the Assad Regime fighters, rebels, and a plethora of violent non-state actors operating all over Syria. As argued by poststructuralists, choice of certain concepts and absence of some words has a political motivation and far reaching consequences with transnational dimensions. If all those leaving their native lands or internally displaced due to war are declared refugees, just like all those who crossed into Turkey or other countries, international community would be bound to initiate action to fulfill their obligations under international law. In present scenario, it is 'desirable' to stop the civil war in Syria as means to end suffering of those trapped and displaced. International community is certainly trying

to find a solution for internally displaced and trapped; however, they are not bound to take any measures.

Hospitality to Hostility

To find the impact of another ‘push’ factor at play in case of Middle Eastern refugees and to weigh an additional reason for conversion of European refugee hospitality to hostility nine of Trump’s pre-election speeches were textually analyzed. His lexical collection surrounding Syrian and Iraqi refugees had a direct and significant impact on already fledgling European desire to allow refugees. Europeans had made a deal with Turkey to control and possibly stop the movement of these refugees pouring into Europe (O’Brien, 2016). This discourse creates ‘otherness’ in immigrants who have been labeled as evil, job snatching, criminals, who (as per Trump) are also Islamist, radicalized Muslims and include people from Syria, Iraq and ISIS. Table 1 below shows the use of few key words by Trump in each of his speeches on varying domestic and foreign policy issues. Leaving rest of his vocabulary and choice of words out of discussion for this paper, his obsession with radicalized Islamic migrants is alarming if not out of place. He has also effectively misled American public and Europeans on the segregation between the ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’.

Table 1: Trump’s Speeches Textual Analysis

Speech Issue	Immigration	Refugee	Illegal	ISIS	Islam	Muslim	Radical	Syria	Iraq
Foreign Policy	3	1	0	6	10	2	8	2	4
Economy	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	1
Radical Islam	18	14	0	23	17	4	14	5	14
Immigration	70	2	44	1	1	0	3	4	1
RNC Acceptance	13	4	7	4	4	1	4	5	3
Election Stakes	9	4	2	7	3	3	7	3	4
National Security (June)	28	4	0	5	23	6	27	3	0
National Security (September)	1	2	1	7	4	0	5	3	4
Total	143	32	56	53	62	16	69	26	31

As per World Economic Forum, out of 193 countries around the globe, ten of the poorest are hosting half of the world’s entire refugee population with Pakistan being third largest recipient of refugee

population (Thomson, 2016). Trump's presidential speeches have not only dented the already fledgling equation of hosting refugees rather motivated many Europeans to refuse entry to women, elderly, sick and children.

Three Pronged 'Push'

French sociologist Jacques Derrida contended that language is composed of dichotomies (Derrida, 1974), which results in dichotomies in discourse and in social actions. If those Syrians or Iraqis who have been subjected to excessive 'push' factor, and have been forced to leave their homes are referred as 'refugees' it has an action demanding international implication. However, if same people are labeled 'Islamist radicalized Muslims trying to leave Middle East for jobs' as contended by (then) US Presidential candidate Donald Trump, or they are referred as radicalized Muslim youth returning to Europe the impact is completely different, and desired actions would include resisting their movement with all political and physical barricades, walls, fences and use of force. 'Push' factor from three different prongs can thus be seen on Middle Eastern refugees. The most significant 'push' originates from presence of multiple VNSAs in Syria and Iraq especially Daesh, forcing people to perform Bay'ah, flee or die. When they opted for flight from this plight, they were restricted and barricades and fences were erected by Europeans, a second 'push' factor. Final and probably most damaging 'push' was manipulated by Daesh, when they ordered their loyalists to join these refugee waves heading to Europe, go back to their native lands through reverse Hijrah and perform acts of terrorism when they reach there. While this should not have been taken as the only motive by Europeans for refugee refusal, unfortunately this remained a dominant motivating factor.

Impact of European resistance to refugees kinetics can be analyzed in the light of 'danger discourse' applied by USA, imposing entry ban on HIV/AIDS people from 1987 to January 2010 (Hansen, 2014). The intention was to prevent spread of HIV/AIDS among US population. But, what about those HIV/AIDS victims who were disciplined and did not pose danger? Even they were banned alongside the entire group. As per Kunz, 'refugee movements may become a social force, carrying with them individuals who have neither much to fear nor much to lose' (Kunz, 1973, p. 136), which unfortunately is true for Middle Eastern refugees. Presumed radicalized terrorists travelling among refugees (performing reverse Hijrah) have little to fear or lose and definitely pose imminent threat to destination countries, but what about those refugees who do not? The barriers aimed at keeping

terrorists at bay has also kept genuine refugees from taking any further steps (Sharkov, 2016).

Middle Eastern Refugee Kinetics: Way Forward

For those who settle in refugees camps, the UNHCR has identified three 'durable solutions'. The best choice is voluntary repatriation; the second is local integration; and finally, limited opportunity for third country resettlement. More often than not, a situation arises when none of this happens and refugees are warehoused for years if not decades (Smith, 2004). In case of Middle Eastern refugees, many countries had elaborate preparations to warehouse these refugees but due to collective EU decisions the plans have changed (Delman, 2016).

According to UNHCR some governments will not want to give full rights because they fear that if the first 10,000 are allowed in another 30,000 will arrive (Agalawatta, 2004). Middle Eastern refugees have been a product of war, they did not opt for becoming refugee and therefore within the larger conflict discourse, the phenomenological birth of refugees needs to be recognized by the international community. In this case catastrophe has been triggered and hastened by all classic ingredients, civil war, belligerent government, genocidal and violent non state actors, international intervention etc. At collective levels governments around the globe manage the entire population of refugees making selections in whom to take or refuse the refugee status (Canada, 2016). This is helping the overall refugee issue to some extent but much more needs to be done especially by the nations who have the resources but lack will to accommodate these refugees. To begin with, efforts to bring an end to Syrian Civil war might be a good starting point. State level geopolitics has caused immense damage at individual level and this need to end.

Conclusion

This has explained the traditional Islamic concept of Hijrah and multiple discussions with reference to existing differences amongst the Muslims. These differences have been effectively utilized by Daesh to their advantage. 'Push and pull factors' have been linked to the Middle Eastern refugees and an effort has been made to highlight the direct impact on the lives of millions of refugees and those stuck up in the middle of Syrian Civil war and Iraqi turmoil. The 'push factor' has effectively redefined Syrian refugees' ecology involving friends, family and community, even religion and entire struggle for survival. On arrival to borders of a third, fourth or fifth country, they find that the borders have been closed. They effectively find themselves in a no

man's land spiritually, spatially, temporally and emotionally. They feel themselves in state of anarchy and abandonment by international community. They are overwhelmed by the sense of absence of belonging as well as ownership; they belong nowhere and own nothing. Their community, society, status of being a citizen of a state and economic standing are all lost. Living in the high-tech refugee camps they feel unsure of tomorrow, frustrated, life of hopelessness and moral vacuum, a 'pull factor' they had never envisaged nor had hoped for.

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The Security Dilemma of Iraq and Syria and Regional Politics

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Abstract

Middle Eastern dilemma is the corollary of the power vacuum after the Iraq invasion. ‘Replacement of authority’ does not necessarily conform to the objective of democracy and hope. Invade, overthrow, install and roll-back, a Machiavellian scheme, does not serve the goals of democracy. A major power in a hurry disturbs equilibrium. Replacing one autocrat with another will not do any good for the society at hand and the region into consideration. All the regional actors would try to adjust to the changes in equilibrium. As a result, organizations like ISIS exploit the slip-ups of provisional governments and get the backing of other actors, whose interests are at stake. The regional actors, operating in the environment of security dilemma join the conflict to extract as much as possible to keep regional balance in order. History replicates this phenomenon time and again. Middle East (Iraq and Syria) is the contemporary example of this phenomenon. This paper will try to understand the ongoing conflict in the Middle East from the perspective of regional politics operating under the environment of security dilemma, and major powers’ politics operating under the basic logic that regional influence enhance the capabilities of major powers that contribute to state’s hierarchical position internationally, which therefore, makes it difficult to create common grounds for peace process.

Keywords

Middle East, security dilemma, peace process, major powers

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The Dilemma of Middle East

Realism, simplistically, describes the operation of world politics. Peculiarities spaced out, to realism international politics is the operation of the egoist states in the anarchic international system for the attainment of power (in relative terms), which manifest itself in capabilities and is responsible for the international interaction of states. Power is an influence and acts as means (Waltz, 1990) to achieve an end. To major actors, it is the 'influence' they carry in international politics, which counts. Corollary of capabilities, influence ensures their position against the constraints of international system. Shift in the international system, means 'change/shift in the distribution of capabilities'. States respond to shift in the structural distribution of capabilities, either of a system or of a region. It is for this particular attribute that 'peripheral political configuration' becomes vital; it ultimately contributes to the capabilities of major actors and enhances their competitive edge.

Regional configuration, therefore, in a multi-actor arrangement, turns into imperative and thus states, which in a bi-polar system, may possibly be ignored suddenly becomes inevitable for political configuration of influence, particularly, if the region is Middle East. Middle East is a region of vital importance in international politics. Its significance as a region is due to its energy resources, its strategic position and the presence of, what Huntington referred to as fault-lines of different religions and cultures. Middle East's regional politics is shaped by the presence of regional actors alongside international actors, giving birth to Middle Eastern dilemma. The dilemma represents a spiral model of Neo-realism, which depends on two variables, i.e. the offense-defense differentiation and the variance of time and space (Glaser, 2015).

The long term impact of the Iraq war on the stability of Middle East cannot be measured, but it was more costly than the Neo-conservatives have ever imagined. The Neo-conservatives are such war hawks who assume that American foreign policy agenda can best be moved forward with the notion of invading, overthrowing, installing and rolling back. However, a Machiavellian scheme may not serve the purpose every time in operation. It is not the intention but action that matters. The US failed to assess Middle Eastern political configuration. The problems of migration increase in crime rate, ambiguity and uncertainty alongside emergence of ISIS shattered peace of the region, which was already in shackles due to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Arab spring, too, took the toll of major states for example, Egypt, Libya, and

Syria of the Middle East in encountering the trouble, which either collapsed or faced disorder on a large scale. Genesis of the crises lay in conflicting interests of key actors, both at regional level and at international level, who are acting independently on the basis of their cost-benefit analysis. It is argued that with power come responsibility and commitment and that to guard and fulfill these, power plays an important role (Jervis, 1978). Actors involved in Middle East are in the grip of these structural forces. Without understanding the genesis of all these forces it is difficult to comprehend the Syrian crises.

The Crisis in Middle East

The Syrian crisis elongated due to many reasons. It is always iterated that the Middle East is important due to its large reserves of natural resources as compared to other regions of the world. The question arises that Syria is less rich in oil resources, so what was the main reason of the rivalry of the major powers like the US, China and Russia in the particular state? The answer is very simple, i.e. the important strategic location of Syria. Historically, Syria remained troubled due to her rivalry with Israel and her tilt towards Iran and Russia was an issue of concern for the US. Before discussing major power rivalry, it is important to consider Syrian approach to foreign policy. This will provide an opportunity to assess the situation more vibrantly and efficiently. The fundamental constituent of Syrian policy conduct was 'pan-Arab nationalism', very much prevalent in all Arab states. The Syrian case was no different, albeit with a Realpolitik model adopted after Assad came in power. Syrian alignments reflected her balancing against the geopolitical threats, in particular Israel. The ends and means were matched by rational foreign policy model, which shifted with the regional balance.

Pursuing pan-Arab nationalism was to keep the support of Arab states, to have access to resources and to purchase military equipment for establishing a stronger military. There was a normative political element as well, i.e. 'the Israeli animosity,' which was used by the Syrian authorities for Arab-nationalism. Supported by grievances, Syrian authorities eulogized Golan Heights, lost in the war of 1967 to Israel, in her foreign policy pursuit (Drysdale & Hinnebusch, 1991). However, this very idea developed a negative connotation for Syria in major powers, particularly US. American interests in the Middle East are not only confined to natural resources, but also the protection of Israel. Christopher M. Blanchard explains the US goals as; preserving the flow of energy resources and commerce that is vital for US regional and global economies, ensuring transit and access facilities to support

US military operations, countering terrorism, stemming the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons and promoting economic growth, democracy and human rights. Michel Chossudovsky criticizes America by arguing that the Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Iran and Sudan became the targets due to their refusal to play into the hands of US to provide unlimited access to the Anglo-American oil company. Similarly, Syria and Lebanon are targets because of their strategic alliance with resource-rich Iran. Syria is a target due to two fundamental reasons; strategic alliance with Iran; as a prelude to topple the Iranian government.

Neo-realists define it as the corollary of the security dilemma, which is the direct consequence of the pursuit of security for which they assume power as the 'means' (Waltz, 1979). The history of the wars and conflicts depicts the same. The inherently conflicted nature of Middle Eastern political environment and an absence of pivotal regional power have led external powers to act as balancer. Alliance formation, led by key regional actors remained the *modus operandi* of Middle Eastern actors. Security assurances then stabilized small states against the threats posed by anarchic structure. Vulnerable states acquire more and more material capabilities to secure themselves from the threats posed by other actors. The key in Middle Eastern politics is that this particular phenomenon operates at blocks level, where security is defined in terms of allies a particular camp has after any major event. The analogy here can be made that of a 'road accident'. Whenever there is road accident, all other drivers will adjust to the happening. Events of note are, like road accidents in the context of Middle East, which will force the actors to adjust. Therefore, Iraq-war and Arab-Spring triggered massive foreign policy adjustment programmes in Middle Eastern actors, which was the corollary of structural forces.

In international stability, regional balances play a key role. For Waltz, 'Israel's nuclear power is the reason of Iranian desire for nukes not the contrary. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the end result of that will be a peaceful region, more secure due to the newly created deterrence and no other state will try to acquire the nuclear weapons (Waltz, 2012). Waltz argued the system compels states to take bigger decisions, to protect their specific interests. Specific interests are defined by actors, which in the context of Middle East are global and regional, differently. This particular definition generates conflict among the actors, not only at global but also at regional level. For example, it was inevitable for the United States, to over-throw Saddam to protect the petro-dollar alliance (Engdahl, 2010). Alongside, the neo-

conservative slogan of ‘democratize Middle East’ too acted as a bump on the road, which disturbed the smooth flow. After 9/11, America streamlined states as ‘an axis of evil’ and ‘rogue states’. Her approach towards the Middle East was that of isolation (Katouff, 2012). The toppling of Saddam’s government was a conservative move and not a realist one, as the realist tendency does not take morality into consideration. Charles Krauthammer suggested that the democracy once established in Iraq and Afghanistan will proliferate to Middle East (Krauthammer, 2013). The Neo-conservatives during Bush administration used democratic peace theory to justify their actions against Iraq and other Arab countries. The underlying assumption was to remove the threat of terrorism. They believed that masses under autocratic regimes do not have the opportunity to express their feelings peacefully, thus they are more prone to violent means, which is the root cause of terrorism. A former US ambassador, Theodore Kattouf, claimed that Bush administration did not hesitate to let people know that perhaps all Arab states were next. It is also speculated that during Hezbollah-Israel War, Elliott Abram encouraged Israel to extend the war in Syria (Lobe, 2007).

The consequence of this was the overall disturbance of Middle Eastern balance. Global actors take into account their analysis of balances disregarding that of regional actors. Regional actors try to adjust to the challenges posed by the moves of global actors. Most of the times, these challenges are against the status quo, for example, US invasion in Iraq in 2003. In the context of Middle East, balance is the achievement of parity in influence, usually sectarian in nature. Replacing Saddam, a Sunni Ba’athist, with Al-Malaki, a Shiite representative, was not only a change in personality but a change in the overall balance of the region. Furthermore, democratic drive in Egypt led Muslim Brotherhood to the throne, which posed a threat to the social fabric of the Saudi Kingdom and that of Gulf countries. Structural forces shape the behavior of the actors. Thus, regional constraints shape policy preferences. The kingdom adjusted by supporting Al-Sisi against Morsi in Egypt. At the same time it launched a massive international movement against Assad to install a government that could disturb the famous nexus in the region of Iran-Syria-Lebanon. Harmony of interest developed at this point between global actors and regional actors. As Katusa (2015) observed, Syria is a clearinghouse for Mideast strife. Every Mideast player has a proxy or a natural ally or a natural enemy in Syria, so what happens there influences the security of every country, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and its fellow Persian Gulf Oil producers (pp. 173-174).

Distribution of capabilities is the hallmark of Neo-realist understanding of international stability. This is measured by the number of powers existing in the system. All the states are equal in the pursuance of their foreign policy objectives, determined by structural forces. States thus do not want to subordinate their interests to the benefits of others. Hence, survival is the foremost goal of a state, which determines their behavior and compels it to build its capacities for the same goal and increase its relative power. Relativity makes states positionist as maintenance of the status-quo and enhancing its capabilities are relative in nature. Thus, security dilemma is relative advancement in the capabilities or position of one state against other. Middle East depicts no different picture. This is the positional placement of states in the system, limiting the cooperation among states with fear of relative gains made by other states.

Two structures are used by states' to balance power; the internal balancing and external balancing. Internal balancing involves the enhancement of capabilities with economic growth and military spending. Syrian government, for example, for internal balancing focused continuously, on the military spending alongside, enhancing capability to cope up with external balancing. External balancing, on the other hand, is alliance formation in which states take benefit from muscle of more powerful states. Who then supports the head of the camp will automatically nurture support of the rest of camp. Therefore, actors like United States and Russia are important in the overall picture of Middle East, alongside regional actors capable of influencing regional politics. Syria aligned with Iran can be grouped in this category. Despite pan-Arabism, Syria remained an ally of Iran, due to convergences of interests as well as sectarian similarity of the both states (at the Alevite level in Syria). It can be contended that bi-polar system, as compared to uni-polar and multi-polar system, is more suitable for peace and stability at the systemic level. The reason for this stability is that states focus on 'internal capabilities enhancement'. The distribution of power capabilities in actual determines the international outcomes (Frankel, 1996). Regional context is not that different, it can be termed as mini-international system.

Whether the context is regional or international, foreign policy is approached with pragmatic considerations of power rather than morality and ethics (Genest, 2004). Obama showed realist orientation, throughout his tenure. He resisted intervening militarily in Syria. He embraced pivot towards Asia and appointed John Kerry and Chuck Hagel to lead foreign office. Realist tendency was prominent during the

Cold War too. President Ronald Reagan also took a realist stance on Syria. He saw the conflict in Levant as a major vulnerability in the region's stability and the augmentation of the USSR threat (Leverett, 2005). Reagan also preferred engagement instead of intervention in the region. This framework continued influencing foreign policy until 1991. Syria was an important part of the balance of power strategy of the US in the region. The states use the domestic powers as their muscles to enhance their role and exert more pressure and influence. US also used Syria as a balancer. James Baker recognized the necessity of Syria in an alliance and adopted a more realist approach to deal with her instead of an ideological approach (Fields, 2007). This is a constant part of the realist tradition, where states take decisions in response to their self-interests and not the international norms or institutions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, the ardent exponent of balance of power, bound to act in response to structural forces. Revisionist in his approach to international politics, under the influence of systemic and reacted in a manner he should. In her pursuit of national interest the United States over-emphasized her ability and regional commitments. Russia lost her strong hold in the region, after the disintegration of Soviet Union. The removal of Ba'athist party from government left Russia with only sanctuary in Syria and Iran. Russia put all her stakes on Assad and Iran in the context, sustained and still is sustaining international pressure in the shape of sanction and prices of natural resources, which the United States and the Kingdom agreed to lower oil prices to hit their adversaries, Russia and Iran respectively. Why Russia is so adamantly supporting Assad?

Carr (1946) considers that the art of Persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader. Hence, leadership of a state has the task of understanding; characteristics of ordering principle, the differentiation and distribution of capabilities among the equals, and be considerate of domestic variables, which form part of the structural variables in shaping foreign policy responses of the state¹. Statesmen are important for power projection in international affairs, a phenomenon explained by Carr in Spanish Civil War of 1936, where ideological influences indulged both communist and fascist in civil war, on mere assumption that ideological statesmen will pursue interest in harmony to parent nation, from where the ideology is generating (Carr, 1946). Assad, thus, holds the key in this context. Russia needs someone who could ensure her interest in the region. Middle East is important for its geo-strategic significance.

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz characteristics of the international system

Similarly, Russia needs dependence of European actors' dependence on her resources, through Ukraine. After installing a pro-Western government in Iraq, the western allies are trying to export Middle Eastern oil through Syria, which will hit Russia hard in her control over the Western Europe energy demands. Furthermore, Russia wants to sell her arms so instability in Syria provides her with a market too. Access to Mediterranean Sea too will provide her an option to monitor international waters. The Sunni-Shiite conflict is a chronic issue in the region. Despite being identical in culture, language and norms, the Arab world always remained troubled due to its sectarian differences. Overall, Sunnis are the majority sect comprising of 85-90% population of Muslims, while Shiite consist of 10-15% of the adherents. The Shiite majority countries are the Iraq, Azerbaijan, Iran and Bahrain. The conflict on sect basis saw different clashes in Middle East. One of the most notable was the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq. Although it was a border dispute but the underlying cause was sectarian. The Sunni leader of Iraq was apprehensive of the Shiite majority of Iraq, where the spill-over effect of Iranian revolution was feared.

The Arab-Israel Conflict is another conflict dating back to the post World War I. The quest for power to dominate region is the factor creating security dilemma. The turmoil in Middle East has been taken as an advantage by the Western powers, to fulfil their needs of energy resources. The absence of balance of power for neo-realists is the cause of conflict in Middle East. International organization, to impose power or solve the issues of the states miserably failed. The UN started the R2P or 'the right to protect' in 2005, which failed to deliver since its emergence. For instance, it failed to tackle with crimes against humanity in Darfur, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Gaza and Congo etc, (Ballamy, 2010). The options are hurdle in prospects for peace. Syrian case is the best example of major power rivalry on the measures taken for a particular belligerent state. Russia and China viewed negotiation as the best solution for the strife, while US seemed eager to intervene militarily and punish the regime for mass atrocities. This created a deadlock in the international environment. Disregarding regional complexities destroys stability and ensures destructions. Threats like ISIS are the product of slip-ups from disregarding. Major power in a hurry disturbs equilibrium. Replacing one autocrat with another would not do any good for the society at hand and region in consideration. All major actors would try to adjust to the changes in equilibrium. Organisations like ISIS exploit the slip-ups of provisional governments and get backing of other actors, whose interests are at-stake. The

superseded faction probably would try to get their own back, which increases the chances of conflicts. History replicates this phenomenon time and again. Foreign policy under the influence of an ideology requires tactful assessment on the part of its practitioners (Kissinger, 2015). Social make-up of a state alongside regional political configuration, are the components to be taken care of in to formulate sound policy options (Rose, 1998).

American foreign policy's hawks, neo-conservatives had a fantasy of creating democracy with guns and barrels. There was a clash of interests between them and the realists to contemplate over the best options to tackle the Arab world. Obama administration vowed to use all measures to tackle with issues; using diplomacy, as is evident from the Iran and P5 nuclear deal. America has still been unable to tackle the Middle East problem. New crises challenged old ideas. The challenge of ISIS is the recent one among the challenges of Middle East that forced the US to reassess her policy for the region and chart out new ideas and institutions to establish regional peace and stability. Western democratic societies exist on the principle of dual relations, i.e. the contractual basis of their political culture, where public opinion holds key. Middle Eastern politics works on strong tribal arrangements which factor is important in understanding Middle Eastern dilemma. The options are a hurdle in prospects for peace. Syrian case is the best example of how major power rivalry on measures taken for a particular belligerent state. Russia and China viewed negotiation as the best solution, while US seemed eager to intervene militarily and punish the regime for mass atrocities. The end result is a deadlock.

Interests of Regional Actors

To keep the regional balance in order, regional actors operating in an environment of security dilemma join the conflict to extract benefit. It is operating on the basis of zero-sum game. Middle Eastern politics has its own dynamics. It operates as a block, the Shiite block led by Iran and the Sunni Block led by Saudi and in case of Syrian strife Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Alongside, Israel maintains a central role in overall picture. Schism in blocks disturbs the equilibrium. Israel shifts its alliance at the time of need. Groups have to take animosity factor, the Israeli card, at the level that it does not create a massive outcry from public. Israel supports Saudi stance against the Shiite axis and consider it a threat to overall stability in the region. The Russian-Shiite-Alawite alliance, led by Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is threatening the security apparatus of the region. The gains of this

group are automatic loss of the other. Iran if lost Syria then she will not be in a position to work out her nexus. Thus far, Iran is supporting Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite militia groups fighting inside Syria. Turkey (Erdogan joined the fight) is fighting against ISIS, who in reality is bombing the Kurds population. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is facing problems. Her adamant response against Assad has high stakes. The kingdom is open in opposition. The problem kingdom is facing is its 'dwindling economy' due to low oil price; its engagement in Yemen crises; increased oil production from Iraq and a sanction free Iran will cut Saudi's influence in the region. Now, non-state actors are important for Saudi to carry out attacks in Iraq and Syria. However, one important critical question is how the kingdom would react to ISIS threats within its own territory.

The Humanitarian Aspect of the International Politics

Why humanitarian intervention is not justified in the conflict prone area? The history quotes numerous examples where interventions had worsened the situation even more. It is though justified when there is a need to protect the states against an oppressive and tyrant state, committing mass atrocities. The humanitarian intervention under the current law is technically not possible. There are a number of considerations, for example, legal, economic and moral. The UN article 2(4) states that the state sovereignty cannot be challenged by the use of force or threat of use of force, except two conditions, i.e., first the individual self defense or the collective self defense in response to the armed attack and second is the use of force authorized by the UNSC under chapter VII of the charter. The article 24 of the UN charter grants the responsibility of maintaining peace to the UNSC. The definition of war and peace and the ultimate decisions are taken by the UNSC. It also deals with the means and ways to deal with a particular threat which includes either to intervene militarily or impose the economic sanctions or to punish the state with a limited intervention. Economic sanctions are seen in the case of North Korea or the Iran, after the alleged nuclear proliferation. These threats also vary in nature and capacity as well as the response from the UNSC. For instance, the current wave of imbalances in the Middle Eastern region has different dimensions for every state. Humanitarian interventions are subject to the ground realities and the observers, which of course view it in their own national interest. This is the case of Syrian Crisis, where Russia and China vetoed the resolution four times, to intervene militarily. This was the use of the humanitarian card in under self interest. The Russian

interest was preserving the Assad regime in order to keep its only ally in the region. In China it was the economic interest and the non-intervention doctrine, to keep the safety measures. Apart from that the states also intervene in their self interest, for instance the intervention in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, without the approval of UNSC by the US and NATO members (Oudrat, 2000).

Finding Common Grounds for Peace Process

The peace process in the Middle East is costly and difficult due to the political environment and the vested interests of the major powers. The politics on the extraction of maximum resources, in the guise of humanitarian aid are tarnishing the situation even worse. The prospects of peace in the region are very much dependent on the great power politics. The peace in Syria can be sought by Russian mediation and a pressure over Assad to come to the negotiating table. Since the time of his father, Hafiz Assad, Syria has shown a realist model of foreign policy and diplomacy, in that it always tried to turn the tables in its favour, or wait for the right time. Here the regime is also entangled in a bloody war, but it's not giving up. This is causing the whole dilemma to multiply in its intensity and make the war more and more costly. Besides, Russian meddling in Syrian conundrum is making the situation more complex. Russian role in political settlement can provide Russia, and edge of having more influence and increase its reputation in the region as well as internationally. The collapse of talks in Geneva depicts that the right moment has not arrived (Saunders, 2016).

The Russian intervention has placed US on a brink of losing its face in Syrian war. The military resurgence of Russia is showing its zeal to get back to the political influence in the world politics. In realist terms, it's the resurgence of Russia. The strategy of US and Russia is different upside down. Russia is more decisive, while US is more uncertain and dispersed. Russia, claiming to attack ISIS is hunting down the enemies of Bashar, while America on the other hand is also bombing ISIS (Ackerman, 2015). The cooperation of both states in the conflict is a difficult task due to the divergence of interests. Russia wants to hold Iran and Syria as its strongest allies in the region, while US wants to break the spell by hunting down Bashar and clear the troika power.

Increasing Regionalism in the Arab World

The Arab world, despite having common culture, religion and economic resources, remains the least integrated state of the world with a trouble of coexistence. This is the result of the lack of vision of the

monarchical states with no expertise in the international politics for that matter. The Arab states never tried to compete with the West, to improve their status, instead they pursued for making alliances with the West. They lack the resources of stability, like military sophistication and technological innovation as well as political farsightedness. There is a lack of strong regional institutions for the coordination of the regional collaboration. The three dynamics that have always troubled the Middle East is the unresolved Middle East, the disparity between the oil rich countries and those they are not, as well as the authoritarian role of the US. In the backdrop of these three dynamics, the regional integration cannot be fulfilled.

Regional Influence to Enhance the Capabilities of Major Powers

The bid to exert more and more influence is the reason of the security dilemma. The league of Arab states has always acted as the scapegoat in case of the complaints of the regional actors. It remained inactive. The silence in response to the interventions in the region was out of the desire to prefer the international intervention by that of the UN or the US. The Arab states have a defensive posture due to the US policy towards the Middle East. That is the neo-conservative policy of intervention to bring democracy and fulfill their realist goals. The regional actors will try to adjust to the changes in the equilibrium which occurred due to the disturbance in the equilibrium after the Iraqi invasion.

Conclusion

Russian goal in Syria is to push the US and the regional actors into choosing between Bashar al Assad and violent extremism of ISIS and others. Russia's air strikes aim at weakening the rebel forces and make it a two prong conflict. Considering this case, the air strikes of US against ISIS are an aid towards Assad's regime (Saunders, 2016). The problem here is that the interests of Syria and Russia differ from each other in that Russia wants a negotiated peace, while Syria wants a peace won in battle field. The Chinese interests also converge that of Russia. This is a new era of Chinese diplomacy. China wants to maintain its non interference policy, but it also wants the political solution of Syria. It announced to provide humanitarian aid to Syria as well as a personnel aid training program for Syrian regime (Ramani, 2016). China has maintained a long bred security and economic partnership with Syria. This is an opportunity for China to forward its agenda in the Middle East, a vital region for Chinese flow of energy

resources for its bulging economy. China also defies the Western agenda of regime change in Syria. Syrian war would be decisive for the future of Middle Eastern politics in that it is a formidable player of the regional power struggle. The punch above its weight has caused Bashar to lose his strangle hold in the territory, inviting the external powers to meddle in the region for their vested self interests in the guise of humanitarian politics and the cause of serving the liberal goals of spreading democracy.

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The Role of Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) in Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: Lessons from Liberia

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the violent conflict in Liberia, the issue of post-conflict rehabilitation took center stage, with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deeply involved in an elaborate post-conflict rehabilitation program in the country. Through the use of content analysis, this paper explores the involvement of ECOWAS in post-conflict rehabilitation in Liberia in the context of the devastating consequences of violent conflicts that the country experienced. In specific terms, it highlights key lessons learnt from the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, as part of its mandate for peace, security and stability in the region.

Keywords

ECOWAS, Liberia, post-conflict, rehabilitation, conflict

Introduction

The Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) was established as a regional initiative to facilitate economic growth and development in the West Africa (Adetula, 2009). As captured in the 1975 Treaty, the main aim of ECOWAS was:

To promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural

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matters for the purpose of raising the standard of its people, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

In this effect, though there has been an argument that the issues of peace and security might not have been directly taken up in the treaty that gave birth to ECOWAS, yet it did not mean that such issues were altogether ignored by the founders of ECOWAS (Sessay, 2002). As the adoption of an ECOWAS Protocol on non-aggression underlines this fact, according to the Article 1 of the Protocol, member states were to refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States.

The early 1990s witnessed an upsurge in violent conflicts, instability and state failure in West Africa. Countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone were the adversely affected. The intensity and devastating consequences of the situation led to a major shift in the focus of ECOWAS from economic development to peace, security and stability. The intervention of ECOWAS in these countries opened a new vista for the organization as a critical vehicle for achieving regional security (Golwa, 2009).

From the standpoint of ECOWAS involvement in Liberia, the notion of post-conflict rehabilitation in this paper attributes to the economic, social and economic transformation of the Liberian society. Wherein, the emphasis is placed on laying the foundation for durable peace, security, stability and development as a basis for averting a relapse to conflict. In most cases, ECOWAS took the lead in facilitating the implementation of policies and programmes supported by its member states, development partners, donors, civil society among others. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in August 2003 laid the foundation for the involvement of ECOWAS in post-conflict Liberia. Prior to the CPA, ECOWAS played a significant and strategic role in containing the Liberian conflict through the establishment and deployment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).

Background of the Liberian Conflict

Freed African American slaves founded Liberia, with a population of over three million people in 1847. The country experienced years of

violent conflicts from 1989 to 2003, resulting in the devastation and the destruction of the security sector in the country, as well as the killing of more than 200,000 people, with about 1.2 million people displaced (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). With the breakdown of law and order, and blatant abuse of human rights by armed combatants, social relationships were disrupted and destroyed (Jaye, 2008). A major source of Liberia's security deficits in the period preceding the violent conflict can be traced to the history of the Liberian security sector. And the fact the security sector functioned as instruments for the protection of the interest of the regime, as opposed to the interests of the people. This accounted for the wide gap between the interest of the regime and the interest of the people, particularly the indigenous ethnic groups. The structure of the Liberian security sector, which functioned as the Frontier Force was such that the security sector earned reputation as tools for state repression against the indigenous ethnic groups. The Frontier Force later changed its name to the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in 1962. Despite the change of name and efforts made towards the professionalization of the security sector, the officer corps continued to be heavily dominated by the Americo-Liberians, while the rank and file was mainly the indigenous ethnic groups (International Crisis Group, 2009).

The root causes of the Liberian conflict could be traced to the political and economic mismanagement of the state by decades of corrupt patrimonial rule of the dominant Americo-Liberian ruling and governing elites. Despite constituting about 5 % of the population, they established an oligarchy that excluded and oppressed the indigenous inhabitants, creating a regime of marginalization that became one of the roots of criminality and violence in Liberia. This ethnic character is also linked to Liberia's political economy that was built on a weak foundation concomitant with the deficits in its governance framework.

Historically, from its establishment in 1846 as an independent state, the Liberian society was built on a deep distinction between Americo-Liberians, who had total control of the Liberian state and the economy on one hand, and the indigenous ethnic groups who were largely marginalized. The latter was not eligible for election and voting, laying the foundation for entrenched alienation between the different ethnic groups and the Americo-Liberians (Boas, 2009). Under such structural boundaries of alienation, the fault lines of conflicts along identity were drawn.

This marginalization led to the divisions along social, political and economic lines. In return it led to the impoverishment of the people, particularly, the indigenous ethnic groups, which also led to

revolts by junior officers of the armed forces led by Sgt. Samuel Doe, who ascended to power as Head of State through a coup d'état in 1980. The United Nations Common Country Assessment that was conducted in 2006 identified some key conflict dynamics in terms of factors that accounted for the violent conflict. They included the misuse of power, weak justice system, lack of a shared national vision, poverty and food insecurity, mismanagement of natural resources, as well as regional dynamics, which had to do with the dynamics of conflicts in the Manu River Union. The structural causes of the conflict were deeply rooted in the country's history that was characterized by gross inequities in the distribution of power and resources, as well as the reliance on violence to realize economic and political objectives (Busia, 2004). This led to the outbreak of a civil war on Christmas Eve in 1989 (Adebajo, 2002; Francis, 2006). During the conflict period, the legitimacy of the rebel forces in the eyes of their people was based on the extent to which they were able to mobilize support along political and ethnic lines (Adebajo, 2006).

The United Nations Peace Building Fund (UNPBF), Priority Plan for Peace Building Fund revealed that seven interrelated drivers reinforce Liberia's legacy of violent conflict. These included poor leadership and the misuse of power, weak justice system, lack of shared vision, poverty and food insecurity, mismanagement of natural resources, pressure of reintegration/lack of absorption capacity in areas of return, as well as regional dimensions that are exacerbated by instability in neighboring countries such as Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire (UNPBF, 2008). The violent conflict affected all aspects of life in Liberia, especially when the state became a major source of threat to the security of the people (Ayoob, 1995). This was also evident in the emergence, fictionalization and splintering of the political elites, rebel groups, weak internal security, destruction of the justice system, the polarization of economic and social relations and cohesion, social decay, poverty, political instability, destruction of infrastructure such as communication, transport and other basic social services.

The conflict in Liberia impacted the security sector to the extent that the security architecture of the country became weak. The security sector involves the Armed Forces of Liberia (ALF), the Liberia National Police (LNP), National Security Agency (NSA), Ministry of National Security (MNS), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Special Security Services (SSS), Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), Bureau of Customs and Excise (BCE), National Fire Service (NFS), and Monrovia City

Police (Ebo, 2005; Jaye, 2006; Jallah-Scott, 2008). Prior to the violent conflict, Liberia's security sector was heavily politicized by the state. Its personnel survived on patronage along ethnic lines to the extent that the security sector became highly unpopular for its lack of professionalism, corruption and wanton abuse of citizens' rights. The ruthlessness of Liberia's security sector became more visible during the violent conflict. The collapse of security sector led to the emergence of rebel groups. In fact, it was the deliberate politicization of the armed forces by authoritarian regimes, which gave way to the de-professionalization of the security sector (Fayemi, 2005; Nyei, 2010).

Overview of ECOWAS and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation in Liberia

The reluctance of the United Nations and other western countries to show a strong concern and commitment towards the situation in Liberia created a situation and condition ECOWAS had to resort to West Africa solution to a West African problem. This was experimented using ECOMOG as a launching pad. The fact that ECOWAS undertook such initiative represented a significant shift in the involvement of regional organizations in peace and security issues. This was underscored by an earlier call by Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, to the effect that regional organizations should reduce the pressure faced by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in peacekeeping. He argued that:

Regional action, however, could lighten the burden of the Council and contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs. Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it¹.

At a time, when the international community demonstrated little or no concern over the situation in Liberia, ECOWAS rose to the challenge. Hence, a peace enforcement force under the auspices of the

¹ An Agenda for Peace was a report written by Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations and presented to the United Nations Security Council in 1992.

ECOMOG was established. It was the Liberian conflict that led to the establishment of ECOMOG as the first peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission set up a regional economic body in the world (Galadima, 2006; Golwa, 2009). Amidst the devastating effect of the violent conflict in Liberia, the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia was designed, which called for the establishment of ECOMOG in Liberia (Adibe, 1998). In August 1990, an ECOMOG force with membership drawn from Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were put in place, thereby making it a primary source of security and stability in Liberia (Aning, 1994).

The emergence of ECOMOG as a regional mechanism for responding to the complex emergency in Liberia was premised on the notion that regional stability, unity, mutual trust and good neighborliness were necessary for achieving the ultimate goal of ECOWAS. This had to do with a harmonious and united West African region (Nwankwo, 2010). The establishment of ECOMOG laid the foundation for peace, stabilization, reconciliation and rehabilitation in Liberia, which in turn led to the design of other post-conflict initiatives by ECOWAS. The mandate of ECOMOG in Liberia included:

1. Creation of a 30 kilometre free zone around Monrovia, the capital of Liberia;
2. Enforcement of ceasefire among the factions and ensure compliance;
3. Reporting of violations to the ECOWAS Secretariat;
4. Separation of the warring factions by creating buffer zones between them; and
5. Disarming and encampment of the warring factions to facilitate peaceful resolution of the crisis.

At the initial stage, ECOMOG was confronted with challenges that bothered on funding, human resource and differences in strategies by member states on how to best to respond to the complex emergency in Liberia. Despite these challenges, the successes recorded in this light was underscored by the strong consensus among member states that their sovereign interests were best protected and promoted through a common security mechanism. The successes of ECOWAS in this light were attributed to several factors, which Hutchful (1999) identified as:

- a. The ability of the organization to shift the mandate of its force from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and peace-making as developments on the ground dictated, to and to turn to regional

(OAU) and international (UN) initiatives as its own sub-regional initiatives flagged;

- b. The growing consensus among states in the region that conflict was self-defeating and those sovereign interests were best served by a credible common security mechanism.

ECOWAS as a Catalyst for the ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ (CPA)

After series of consultations and failed agreements between the government of Liberia and rebel groups, a CPA was signed in August, 2003, which brought to end, over a decade of violent conflict in the country. Prior to the CPA of 2003, ECOWAS played a leading role in crafting about fourteen different agreements between 1990 and 2003, which were not adhered to by the parties (Hayner, 2007). The successes recorded as evident in the signing of a CPA in 2003, laid the foundation for ECOWAS involvement in post-conflict rehabilitation in Liberia. The situation in Liberia was one that ECOWAS played a more visible and prominent role in terms of facilitating dialogue, exploring ways that the United Nations and other external actors could assist in bringing peace, security and stability to Liberia. All these were done from a perspective that viewed ECOWAS as a mediator in the region.

The CPA represented an opportunity for the transition of Liberia from one that severed serious dislocation to one that is peaceful and stable. Here, issues such as the reform of the security sector, electoral reform, strengthening of governance and political institutions, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration among others. On the whole, the CPA provided clear-cut direction on the responsibilities of ECOWAS in defining the future of Liberia in the aftermath of years of violent conflicts.

Also, Resolution 1509 of the United Nations Security Council, which was passed in September 2003, provided the legal and political framework for the design and implementation of SSR as a core component of the CPA in Liberia. Within this context, the Resolution empowered the UNMIL to assist the transitional government of Liberia in terms of monitoring and restructuring the police and the armed forces of Liberia. A point of note here is the fact that the Resolution recognized the strategic role of ECOWAS towards the success of the SSR process in the country, in the light of the leading role ECOWAS played, which led to the cessation of hostility and the signing of the CPA.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Part four, Article VII of the CPA which dealt with SSR, called for the disbandment of irregular forces, reforming and restructuring of the armed forces by putting in place a new command structure. The CPA also called upon the parties to the conflict (the government of Liberia and rebel forces), to allow ECOWAS, the United Nations, and the African Union to provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics and experienced trainers for the SSR effort.

SSR in Liberia was a critical component of conflict transformation and effective provision of security for both the state and its citizens. This was in line with ECOWAS Vision 2020, which places more emphasis on the people rather than the states. It encouraged a departure from the repressive traditions of the Liberian state, which was characterized by gross violation of the rights of citizens by the security agents. Emphasis here was premised on the reform of the military, police and other para-military agencies, so as to make them more professional, transparent and accountable, as well as strengthening of civil oversight mechanisms on the security sector respectively.

The Organization and Monitoring of Democratic Elections

The aftermath of the agreement between the former government of Liberia, and the two rebel groups, Liberia United for Reconstruction and Development (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) as enshrined in the CPA of 2003, laid the foundation for the conduct of the first election in post-conflict Liberia, in October 2005². The commitment of ECOWAS towards the CPA of 2003 and the political stability in post-conflict Liberia was evident in its support for the building of credible institutions in the country, as one of the priority plans for post-conflict Liberia. It was hinged on the philosophy that prospect of peace building in Liberia, must start with the conduct of elections, which ECOWAS must spearhead, in concert with other development partners (Adebajo, 2004). This led to the conduct of elections that were celebrated as free, fair and transparent. The ECOWAS support for a peaceful resolution of the political crisis in Liberia was hinged on its earlier decision not to recognize any

² See the Election Observation Mission Final Report of the International Republican Institute on the Republic of Liberia National Elections, October 11th and November 8th 2005.

government that came to power through the use of force or violence³. This was driven by the assumption that the conduct of credible elections can play a significant role in stabilizing a society such as Liberia, which has just come out of over a decade of violent conflict. From a political standpoint, for ECOWAS, its post-conflict rehabilitation programme for Liberia was underscored by the significant relationship that exists between the conduct of elections and the stabilization of post-conflict Liberia.

There is no doubt that ECOWAS was able to galvanize the support of civil society and the international community in ending dictatorship and opening up the democratic space in Liberia, with the conduct of elections. These actors were united in their goal of promoting democracy through the conduct of credible elections. The expertise of ECOWAS in conflict management became a useful tool in managing the tensions that arose in the aftermath of the presidential elections in October 2010. To underscore this fact, the prompt intervention of ECOWAS in managing the tension between the National Electoral Commission (NEC) of Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) over their roles in Liberia's electoral process contributed in a significant manner in providing clear cut direction on the role of each of this actor. For instance, while NEC was to conduct the elections, UNMIL was charged with the responsibility of mobilizing international assistance and technical support to NEC respectively.

Partnership with Civil Society for Peace, Security and Governance

Partnership with civil society organizations has been a core component of the ECOWAS strategy for post-conflict rehabilitation. The critical role played by civil society during and in the aftermath of the violent conflict in Liberia, laid the foundation for a strategic partnership between ECOWAS and civil society on issues related to peace, security and stability in Liberia. Some of them included the West African Network for Peace building (WANEP), West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA), as well as the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOFF). The establishment of Elections Unit by ECOWAS created an opportunity for more robust partnership

³ See Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Sixty-Fourth Ordinary Session in Yaounde, Cameroon from 1 to 5 July, 1996.

between ECOWAS and civil societies in the region, through the WACSOF.

In concert with ECOWAS, WACSOF played a critical role in post-conflict Liberia with respect to election observation, conflict management and peace building, as well as democracy and good governance. The partnership between ECOWAS and civil society was anchored on the fact that civil society possesses the ability and capacity to make informed input into ECOWAS peace building initiatives in Liberia and the West African region (Opoku, 2007).

The UN and ECOWAS Inter-Agency Task Force on West Africa

In May 2001, the UN established the UN Inter-Agency Task Force as a mechanism for strengthening ECOWAS/UN cooperation, with ECOWAS as its epicenter. The focus was to support the efforts of ECOWAS in the area of peacekeeping, peace building, conflict prevention, elections, as well as its work with civil societies across the West African region. The appointment of a Special Representative of the United Nations was meant to help coordinate strategies, monitor and report on the activities of ECOWAS so as to ensure its harmonized were harmonized with that of the UN (Abebajo, 2002). With the setting up of the secretariat of the UN office in Dakar, Senegal, in 2002, the Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for West Africa came into existence. Collaboration between ECOWAS and the UN with respect to the situation in Liberia was enhanced through the office.

The core task of the inter agency task force was to take stock of sub-regional priority needs in peace and security; humanitarian affairs and economic and social development; to consult with governments and with ECOWAS on enhancing cooperation with the United Nations in addressing those needs; to recommend elements of a sub-regional strategy to help address the challenges identified; and to make recommendations on mobilizing international support and assistance for the proposed strategy. This was the cornerstone of the strategic partnership between ECOWAS and the UN in their efforts towards crafting an integrated approach to insecurity and instability in Liberia and other countries within the Manu River Area.

The ECOWAS Early Warning System

In a bid to ensure a robust response to emergencies as a key lesson from the involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia's conflict, an early warning system was established in the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja.

It was established in line with Article 58 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty and the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. It comprises the Observation and Monitoring Centre at the ECOWAS Commission, which is located in Abuja, Nigeria, as well as four Zonal observatories located in Banjul (The Gambia), Cotonou (Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Monrovia (Liberia). The whole idea was to ensure that the response capacity of ECOWAS to emerging or imminent threats at both the national and regional levels.

The early warning system known as ECOWARN was meant to provide an effective communication system for the region as a framework for conflict prevention and management (Adebajo, 2004). Despite the successes recorded so far, with respect to the establishment of the ECOWAS observatories for early and responses, concerns have been raised about the ability and capacity of the system to gather the needed early warning information, as a basis for bridging the gap that exist between early warning and the design and implementation of early response strategies in the region (Opoku, 2007).

The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The huge devastation that characterized the violent conflict that was witnessed in Liberia was fuelled largely by the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). The challenge posed by the illicit production and sale of arms was given serious attention by ECOWAS, which provided the basis for discussion around how to checkmate it. With support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a Programme for the Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was designed in order to provide ECOWAS with the needed assistance for the implementation of a moratorium on arms (Adebajo, 2007).

The imposition of United Nations sanctions on the warring factions in Liberia was spearheaded by ECOWAS in the light of the rising threats posed by the movement of arms into the country, which was linked to the violation of the provisions of the Yamoussoukro IV Agreement (Holtom, 2007). Resolution 788 (1992) of the United Nations Security Council called for the implementation of a general and complete embargo on the supply of arms and military equipment to Liberia, subject to a decision of the Security Council. Though, it exempted the peacekeepers of ECOWAS in Liberia.

The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa,

which came into effect in 1998, also laid the foundation for an arms embargo against Liberia. United Nations Security Resolution on arms embargo against Liberia through Resolution 1343 of 2001. The ECOWAS Moratorium sought to control the spread of SALWs and mercenary activities in Liberia, as well as contain the activities of rebel groups and arms proliferation within the Manu River Area (MRA), which is made up of Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Badmus (2009) identified three interrelated objectives that informed the Moratorium, which had to do with the fact that: First, it aimed at preventing conflicts. Second is post-conflict reconstruction. The logic behind these goals is that in post-conflict reconstruction, a major task is to avoid the process sliding back into armed conflict. Another goal is to stem the increasing wave of crime and banditry in the region. This is based on the strong conviction that the availability and easy access to SALWs may invite violent solutions to problems and consequently, acquisition of SALWs for self-defense since there may be no effective police to rely upon.

In line with Article 24 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of 2006⁴, which called for the establishment of national frameworks in addressing the menace posed by the proliferation of SALWs, the Transitional Working Group (TWG) on Small Arms and Light Weapons was transformed into the Liberian National Commission on Small Arms (LiNCSA) in 2006. The core mandate of LiNCSA had to do with the formulation and implementation of policies that were aimed at addressing the problems associated with small arms proliferation and illicit trafficking, as well as coordinating and monitoring efforts by the private sector in preventing, combating and eradicating the proliferation and illicit trade in SALWs within and across the borders of Liberia. One of the objectives of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons was the consolidation of the gains of the Declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of small arms and its Code of Conduct.

ECOWAS and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation in Liberia: The Key Lessons

The involvement of ECOWAS in post-conflict rehabilitation in Liberia, laid the foundation for the restoration of peace, security and stability in

⁴ ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2006, available at <http://www.poaiss.org/RegionalOrganizations/ECOWAS/ECOWAS%20Convention%202006.pdf>

the country, with several lessons for ECOWAS, its member states and the international community. These lessons are meant to serve as reference points for future engagements by supra-national organizations and regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. Indeed, these lessons have contributed in no small way in redefining and repositioning ECOWAS for a more effective and efficient role as a regional mechanism for West Africa in its pursuit of a more secured and prosperous region.

ECOWAS as a Test Case for Regional Security Mechanism

The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia represented the first attempt by a regional organization to establish a mechanism for responding to complex emergency on its own. ECOWAS relied solely on its own human and material resources in its intervention in Liberia. It was also the first time in the history of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) that the United Nations deployed a military observer mission to support a regional force that was already on the ground (Adebajo, 2002). This was in line with the call by the former Secretary General of the United Nations that the heavy burden posed by the involvement of the United Nations as a result of its involvement in peacekeeping can be reduced through regional security arrangement (Ghali, 1992).

ECOMOG as a Model for Stabilization

The successes associated with the emergence of ECOMOG and the stabilization role it played in Liberia, made it to be considered a model for conflict management and stabilization in the West African region and beyond. It was used to contain conflicts in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire among others. Hence, ECOWAS decided to make it a permanent feature of its conflict management and resolution framework, as contained in the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

The ECOWAS experience with the establishment of ECOMOG as a tool for stabilization was quite significant against the backdrop of the fact that the decision to establish ECOMOG was a rational one in the light of the growing refusal or reluctance by the international community to get involve in peacekeeping activities in the African continent. On their part, Member states of ECOWAS viewed ECOMOG more as a vehicle for defining their security apparatus (Ero, 2000), which can also serve as a model for other regional organizations.

Shared Commitment of Supra and Regional Organisations

The involvement of ECOWAS and the United Nations in Liberia represented the first joint partnership in peacekeeping and peace building undertaken by the United Nations in concert with another organization. Under the arrangement, ECOWAS through ECOMOG was charged with the task of ensuring ceasefire, disarmament, as well as ensuring the safety of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) observer and staff. The UNOMIL was to monitor the activities of ECOMOG. It has been argued that a common ECOWAS framework on SSR at the regional level is imperative, in view of the fact that it would contribute positively to on-going dialogue on a common understanding of SSR, as well as bridging the gaps associated with the practice of public security provision that are characterized by operational and governance deficits at the level of ECOWAS, AU and the UN (Ebo, 2007).

In the spirit of the strategic partnership between ECOWAS and the UN, prior to the establishment of ECOMOG, ECOWAS made a request to the UN for technical assistance towards the setting up of a peacekeeping force in Liberia (Jonah, 2004). Such cooperation between ECOWAS and the UN gave credibility and legitimacy to its efforts in Liberia. Above all, it inspired and renewed confidence from the majority of Liberians.

Successful Reconciliation

One of the challenges faced by ECOWAS over the establishment of ECOMOG and its deployment to Liberia was the divided position of the member states over intervening in Liberia. While for some of the countries from the franco-phone side, there was no basis for such an intervention. Moreover, such an intervention was seen as been at variance with the UN and OAU Charters that abhorred interference in the internal affairs of member states, as well as the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression. Nigeria led the other countries in setting up ECOMOG based on the philosophy that the situation in Liberia constituted a serious security threat to the West African region, which made intervention a practical necessity. Though, the leading role played by Nigeria became a source of rivalry and disagreement among Member States of ECOWAS. As a result of deep seated suspicion, member states sometimes refuses to participate actively in, or even oppose ECOMOG operations because a rival member state played a prominent role in the decision to send troops or seen to be taking credit for the initial start-up of the operation (Khobe, 2000). In other cases,

statement giving prominence to the role of a particular country can trigger resistance and refusal to send troops from others. There was also the fear by smaller countries of the dominant role of Nigeria in ECOMOG. Some feared that ECOMOG was a kind of imperial excuse by Nigeria to interfere in the internal politics of smaller states.

Regional Cooperation as a Foundation for Peace, Security and Stability

The experience of ECOWAS in Liberia shows that in crafting a proactive response to complex emergencies, countries can achieve certain objectives more effectively through collective, as against their individual efforts. The intervention by ECOWAS also highlighted the linkage between regional security and regional economic development. Hence, in advancing its goal of integrating the West African region economically, the issue of peace and security had to be placed on the front burner of the ECOWAS agenda. This is underscored by the fact that in the absence of peace and security, the goal of economic growth and development cannot be easily actualized.

Beyond the issue of post-conflict rehabilitation, the main task of reconstruction constitutes a major challenge for ECOWAS in view of the paucity of funds, which has often hampered the activities of ECOWAS on matters related to peace and security. As an organization whose membership is made up of developing economies, reliance on external support constitutes a significant part of its funding. This reality has often made it difficult for ECOWAS to fully realize its objective of achieving socio-economic growth and development through its involvement in reconstruction as part of a wider post-conflict rehabilitation programme (Badmus, 2009).

The situation in Liberia highlighted the fact that the absence of peace and security will halt development. This point was underscored by the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which laid the foundation for its recovery from long years of violent conflict. Liberia's President, Sirleaf Johnson argued that the governments' aim was to use the PRS as a road map for implementing mutually reinforcing policies that were aimed towards political stability, inclusive economic recovery and the restoration of basic services. It identified four interrelated pillars, namely-peace and security, the economy, rule of law, as well as infrastructure and delivery of basic services. Based on the foregoing, an ECOWAS initiative that captures the imperativeness of integrating reconstruction as a core component of its rehabilitation programme would have fast-tracked Liberia's recovery process.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the prospects for peace, security and stability in Liberia was facilitated by ECOWAS through its proactive response to complex emergency in the country. In the case of Liberia, the consolidation of peace through governance and regional cooperation represented the pillar upon which the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was built. Without the intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia during and in the aftermath of the violent conflict experienced in the country, the Liberian state would have collapsed beyond imagination.

From the ECOWAS experience, responding to complex emergencies as evident in Liberia, posed a very serious challenge, in terms of its ability and capacity to implement its action plans as a platform for the attainment of economic development and security in the region. Hence, the strengthening of the response capacity of ECOWAS would be achieved more through collective rather than individual actions. Despite the success recorded by ECOWAS in terms of its involvement in Liberia, there were several challenges that hampered its successes, which had to do with inadequate capacity to protect civilians, poor human rights record, lack of neutrality and complicity in exploiting Liberia's natural resources, funding and logistical constraints, as well as rivalry and lack of cooperation between the Franco-phone and Anglo-phone speaking West Africa (Olonisakin, 2008; Kabia, 2011).

Now and in the future, the challenges, success and prospects of ECOWAS will be heavily dependent upon the attitude of Member states, in terms of the extent to which they observe or respect the principles of collective security, mutuality and burden sharing in their response to emergencies in the West African. ECOWAS as a regional platform remain the foundation for inter dependence that can engender the spirit of togetherness in achieving peace and security in the region. In the absence of all these, regional peace and security will be hampered, thereby, reviving and aggravating violent conflicts more than the ones experienced in the past.

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Between Humanitarian and Political Realism: Anthropological Perspective on the Refugee Crisis in Germany

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Abstract

The article historicizes the German ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 in the context of post-World War II politics of migration and asylum in the country, focusing particularly on the reactions to the ‘crisis’ of 1992. That time, government reacted to more than 400,000 refugees from the Balkan wars with severe restrictions of the right to asylum, framed also within the ‘Dublin Regulation’ of the European Union. It is argued that German politics of immigration was mostly a kind of Realpolitik that subordinated humanitarian considerations to closed-border politics geared at keeping migrants out. Summer 2015, however, saw elements of humanitarianism in German refugee politics, understood, following Didier Fassin, as the introduction of moral sentiments into politics. This ‘humanitarianism’ was mostly accredited to Chancellor Angela Merkel. Yet the commitment of thousands of members of the German public ensured the sustainability of a ‘welcome culture’ intended to accommodate refugees, government politics quickly reverted to new restrictions that keep immigrants for many months or even years in a limbo of waiting. While to some extent government’s humanitarian discourse continues it becomes apparent that humanitarian politics is often a cover up for ulterior political motives. It is concluded that marking the events of 2015 as a refugee crisis enables in the first place the legitimization of politics of restriction like the externalization of EU borders into North African countries.

Keywords

Realpolitik, refugee crisis, humanitarianism

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Introduction: What's in a Crisis?

In conventional understanding, a crisis is a turning point, a difficult phase and a decisive moment between periods of 'normalcy'. At present, however, 'crises' abound; for instance, we have the financial crisis, or more specifically in Europe, the Euro crisis, and we have economic crises around the globe. The current temporality of crises is not just a moment but rather a protracted and dynamic state of affairs, the end of which is not in sight. In contrast to the conventional understanding of the term, crises have become normal. Thus, the 'refugee crisis' in Europe, which, according to popular discourse, began in 2015, goes on. Migrants still attempt to enter Europe, and European states take ever-increasing measures to fend them off. Discussing a 'refugee crisis' rather obscures the fact that these events are lined up in a longer historical chain of developments that include other 'crises' and which are in fact rather a state of normality for migration politics and policies in Germany. In spite of their normalcy, however, placing the 'crisis' label on such events invokes a semantic of danger, of emergency, a state of affairs that requires unprecedented steps to be taken. The marking of events as crisis enables to do things that would otherwise be largely impossible. Strasser (2016) speaks about 'crisis effects' and requires us to consider the consequences of marking a particular time as a crisis. We need to consider, then, which political measures are enabled and legitimised by flagging recent events as a 'refugee crises'?

Politics of Migration in Germany

Since the 1970s, the debate about immigration (migrants as refugees included) has been a field pivotal to the self-understanding of German society. Until very recently, the dominant political discourse on migration in Germany insisted that the country was *not* an immigration destination, a perspective linked closely to German ideas of citizenship based on 'iussanguinis' (the right of blood), that is, dependent upon descent and not on 'iussolis' (the right of the soil), i.e. not depending on birth on a territory and participation in the body politic. The dominant perspective was and continues to be that immigration is a problem for German society, notwithstanding a few reforms to citizenship legislation. This in contradiction of the fact that after WWII, migrants travelled and were even invited to Germany as solution to a problem, namely the lack of a workforce in the nation's fast-growing post-war economy. These migrants were called 'guest workers', a designation that strictly implied temporary work and residence in Germany only and precluded their 'integration' today's buzzword into

society. This was a fiction, of course, but a very persistent one that for decades the dominant political stakeholders refused to give up. In addition, the insistence that Germany was not a country of immigration was the expression of a normative idea, namely that it must not be a country that was open in this regard, which was never an apt description of the empirical situation. It has to be noted, however, that in the context of the Cold War Germany always welcomed refugees from the socialist countries. These were not conceptualised as immigrants. ‘Refugee’ was a positively connoted category at that time and these refugees were considered as fully deserving admission and protection in the country.

Post-war immigration started in the late 1950s as labour migration, but during the 1970s, most immigrants arrived in Germany via family unification, and later, after 1980, as refugees, i.e. as migrants applying for political asylum. Certainly, not all asylum seekers were entitled to political asylum according to the strict letter of the law, which requires proof of personal political persecution, but almost no other avenue was open for migration to the country. Originally, German law on asylum was intended to cater for refugees from the ‘communist bloc’. Yet, from the 1980s onward, and especially after the end of the Cold War, people set in motion by all kinds of conflicts across the globe arrived as asylum seekers. The spectre of the ‘economic refugee’ became a notorious figure of German (anti) immigration discourse and legislation, invented to accommodate all migrants that could not prove individual political persecution and who therefore did not qualify for political asylum according to German law.

The ‘Refugee Crisis’ of 1990s and its Effects

The early 1990s saw a major rise in the numbers of refugees arriving in Germany, mainly as a result of the Balkan wars and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The figure reached more than 430,000 incoming refugees in 1992, a doubling of numbers within one year. This development was met with conflicting responses from the German population: on the one hand, an increase in deadly racist violence against all sorts of migrants in Germany, not only recent asylum seekers and on the other hand, strong expressions of solidarity with the refugees. The German government reacted by thoroughly restricting the law on asylum, because the governing parties feared the rise of xenophobic factions on the extreme right. Thereafter, numbers of refugees receded substantially, mainly as a consequence of the Dublin regulation coming into force in the European Union in 1997. The

regulation is an EU law decreeing that those EU member states whose territories refugees enter into are responsible for the examination of their asylum applications. While outwardly the Dublin regulation was intended to preclude multiple applications of asylum in the European Union, it actually served as a bulwark for the economically strong EU member states, including Germany, to get rid of the ‘refugee problem’. The responsibility for the asylum procedure was ‘deported’ to EU frontier states bordering the Mediterranean, i.e. Spain, Italy and Greece, because these countries were the refugees’ major entry points to Europe. Refugees that moved on to other EU states while their asylum application was still in process in these countries were pushed back. Until 2012, this enabled Germany a quite comfortable situation with low numbers of refugees, i.e. fewer than 100,000 applications per year. The situation changed in 2013, however, especially due to refugees and migrants travelling from the West Balkan states, mostly Albania and Kosovo. Numbers crossed the line of 200,000 applications in 2014, reaching almost 500,000 in 2015 and around 750,000 in 2016 (figures include both new and successive applications)¹, the bulk of whom came from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Humanitarianism

The concept of humanitarianism figures prominently in the title of this article, but according to my brief résumé, German migration politics do not have much linkage with humanitarianism. Didier Fassin presents humanitarianism as the introduction of moral sentiments into contemporary politics. In his book *Humanitarian Reason*, Fassin (2012) writes:

Moral sentiments have become an essential force in contemporary politics: they nourish its discourses and legitimize its practices, particularly where these discourses and practices are focused on the disadvantaged and the dominated, whether at home (the poor, immigrants, the homeless) or farther away (the victims of famine, epidemics, or war). By ‘moral sentiments’ are meant the emotions that direct our attention to the suffering of others and make us want to remedy them.

¹While many more refugees entered Germany in 2015 than in 2016, for administrative reasons many of them could only submit their application for asylum in 2016.

We cannot find much of this in German politics of migration, although there was of course much humanitarian commitment by non-state actors in the country; actors that often voiced their concerns about the non or even anti-humanitarian politics of the state. As mentioned, German politics of migration was dominated by the idea that Germany was not an immigration country and that migrants largely needed to be kept out. More precisely, and here moral sentiments come to the fore, asylum politics was dominated by the idea that asylum needs to be limited strictly to those who are really ‘deserving’, that is, to those who meet the narrow criteria for political asylum, and that therefore all others need to be fenced off. In a strange twist of reasoning, the strict politics of keeping those out who are considered as undeserving, or of deporting them, was presented as a precondition for offering the humanitarian right of asylum to those who were deemed as deserving.

Humanitarian reasoning also left its mark on the reasons for suspending the deportation of rejected asylum seekers. In principle, medical reasons figure strongly in this regard, for instance if a person is unable to travel due to illness, or if he or she suffers from an illness that cannot be treated adequately in the country of deportation. Here too, though, criteria were narrowly defined, and today, very few people actually qualify for the suspension of deportation due to medical reasons.

Thus, as a whole, German politics of immigration was mostly a kind of ‘Realpolitik’ that subordinated humanitarian considerations to closed-border politics geared at keeping migrants out. The German concept ‘Realpolitik’ is imperfectly translated into English as ‘political realism’, but what it actually involves is giving unequivocal priority to ‘hard’ political (and economic) interests; as they are conceived from particular vantage points, of course. The strict limitation of the refugee influx, in order not to overburden the German welfare system, to steal the thunder of xenophobic forces and, ultimately, to remain in power are such interests. Pointedly, one could say that the opposition of Realpolitik versus humanitarianism equals an opposition of interests versus (moral) values, but of course, interests are linked with values, too, and moral values define and justify their own interests.

Intrusions of Humanitarianism

While German politics of migration was clearly dominated by ‘Realpolitik’, there were also ruptures and intrusions made by humanitarian rhetoric. Shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, in which hundreds of refugees died during the last decade, often made political

actors pause and express their concern that this ‘humanitarian tragedy’ must not continue. In mid-April 2015, for instance, 1200 people drowned in the Mediterranean within a few days.² Nevertheless, such concerns did not have many practical consequences, as after every such tragic event, this distress lasted for a few days only. After several catastrophic shipwrecks in which many hundreds of people lost their lives, the Italian government, in October 2013, started the naval operation ‘Mare Nostrum’, intended to save the lives of refugees experiencing distress on their way across the Mediterranean in unfit vessels. When the Italian government proposed that the EU take over, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, proclaimed that the EU lacked the funds to do so and that the Italian operation had in fact boosted trafficking across the sea because of the increased chances of being saved. According to her, the Italian mission was more or less responsible for further shipwrecks.³ Mare Nostrum was then replaced by the EU mission ‘Triton’, which focused far more on controlling the maritime border than on saving the lives of refugees in desperate need of help.

Nonetheless, let us move the focus back to Germany. German politicians of the ruling parties generally showed the same reactions to the calamities in the Mediterranean, expressing concerns and demanding that such things must not go on, albeit without taking serious steps to prevent such disasters beyond repeating the demand that trafficking had to be controlled and migrants stopped. However, there was a marked change of discourse or rather, an additional thread of discourse in 2015, which was where humanitarian reasoning came in. The recent development of German refugee politics is generally attributed to Chancellor Angela Merkel. This is, no doubt, too narrow a perspective, but there was a tangible change in her statements that led to this opinion. In mid-July 2015, Merkel took part in a televised discussion with high school students in the German city of Rostock. On this occasion, she was addressed by Reem, a 15-year-old Palestinian girl from Lebanon, who had been living in Germany for four years together with her family as asylum seekers. Recently, her family had been threatened with deportation, and Reem expressed her worries about her own future. Not knowing whether she would be allowed to

²See the report “Death by rescue,” <https://deathbyrescue.org/> (accessed 1 July, 2017)

³“Meer der Hoffnung, Meer des Todes” (Sea of Hope, Sea of Death). Spiegel Online, 15 September 2014. Available online at <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/fluechtlinge-sterben-im-meer-vor-malta-und-libyen-a-991772.html> (accessed 9 September 2017).

stay in Germany, she felt distressed, as she was unable to plan her further education. She said that she does not know what her future will be. Merkel responded to Reem with a classical ‘real political’ statement, explaining German politics of asylum and emphasising that not all refugees would or could be allowed to stay in Germany. She said that politics is sometimes hard, highlighting that ‘we cannot do that’, i.e. welcome all potential refugees to the country. Here she used almost the same notorious words as in her press conference six weeks later, only in a negative way. Responding to Reem, she said, ‘Dannschaffenwir das nicht’ (Then we will *not* be able to do this), in contrast to her later, notorious phrase ‘Wirschaffen das!’ (We will be able to do this!), i.e., accommodate the incoming refugees.

After this brief exchange, Reem burst into tears. Merkel was visibly touched and moved. She paused a few moments, which is rather unusual behaviour for a politician live on TV, and then she went over to Reem to cuddle her, trying to console the girl.⁴ This scene can be interpreted as the intrusion of a humanitarian gesture into real politics. Merkel did not give up her real political perspective, but she tried to provide some ‘humanitarian comfort’ rather than a helpless gesture of embracing Reem. The moral sentiment urging for the accommodation of all refugees in search and need of a better life was met by the real political objection that this was a political and practical impossibility. Subsequently, Merkel was highly criticised in the (social) media for how she acted towards Reem. Merkel’s encounter with Reem can be interpreted as a ‘critical event’ in Veena Das’ sense, that is, as an event that enables new ways of action (Das, 1995).

Welcoming Refugees to Germany

There were more catastrophic capsizing tragedies in the Mediterranean, but then, in the second half of August, the ‘humanitarian crisis’ came much closer to the borders of Germany. Large numbers of refugees that had taken the so-called ‘Balkan route’ towards central Europe, after crossing the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands, were collecting at Budapest’s Keleti station. While all other countries along the route had kept their borders open, to enable the smooth transit of the refugees, the Hungarian government closed its border to Austria and, insisting on the Dublin regulation, did not allow the refugees’ passage. On August 21, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) issued a tweet that in Germany the Dublin regulation would

⁴The scene can be viewed on YouTube:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWPZuZU5t44>

not be applied to refugees from Syria, because of the war and the aggravated humanitarian crisis in that country. While this was not an official, formally published statement, the tweet rapidly circulated among Syrians and other refugees in Hungary and was taken as an invitation to travel to Germany. On August 27, an international governmental conference on the refugee issue took place in Vienna, Austria. On the same day, an abandoned van was found on an Austrian motorway close to the Hungarian border in which 71 refugees had died from suffocation. The participants at the conference, Chancellor Merkel included, expressed their utter horror at this incident (Holmes & Heide, 2016).

A few days later, on August 31, Merkel gave a press conference in Berlin. In her statement she gave top priority to the topic of peoples 'from all over the world' seeking refuge in Germany.⁵ She emphasised the many tragedies and atrocities that had set the people in motion in the first instance and referred also to the people who had suffocated in the van. Merkel stated that many organisational issues had to be tackled in order to deal with this situation, but that first of all, two principle elements needed to be emphasised that should guide all actions in relation to the refugees. The first principle was the right to asylum, while the second was the dignity of every human being as enshrined in the first article of the German constitution. This was a clear humanitarian statement, which referred to moral values that should guide political and administrative action. Merkel felt compelled to underline these values, not only because of the sheer number of refugees coming toward Germany, but also, probably more importantly, because for months Germany had been haunted by hate crimes and right-wing attacks on refugee accommodation centres, arson included. While such crimes were committed by a minority of the population only, they aroused great concern, as they evoked the deadly racist violence of the 1990s and, of course, of Nazism. There was widespread fear that anti-immigrant and anti-refugee attitudes were on the rise and that new movements and organisations of the extreme right, like PEGIDA or the AfD⁶, could capitalise on such affects and attitudes and

⁵The full text of Merkel's statement is available online at the Federal Chancellor's website:

<https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-merkel.html> (accessed 8 September 2017).

⁶PEGIDA is the acronym for "Patriotische-Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes" (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident), a right-wing movement against immigration that came into being in October 2014. The AfD ("Alternative für Deutschland", Alternative for Germany) is an originally EU-skeptic

ultimately threaten the parties currently in government. Thus, Merkel's invocation of these (moral) principles was meant to preserve the moral integrity of German society and encourage a positive attitude toward the refugees. In this press conference, Merkel uttered the notorious phrase 'Wir schaffen das!' i.e., that 'we' (the German people) will be able to handle the difficult situation in a positive way. When these words spread via social media, refugees waiting at Budapest's station joyously celebrated Merkel, which gave them strong encouragement to no longer comply with the orders of the Hungarian police to stay where they were but to take their destiny into their own hands—or rather, on their own feet. As a result, they started marching on a motorway toward the Hungarian-Austrian border. Under this pressure, on 1st September 2015, Victor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister, allowed the refugees to cross the Austrian border, while at the same time measures were taken to seal the Hungarian-Serbian border, in order to prevent the influx of further refugees.

On 2nd September, a photo of Alan Kurdi, a two-year-old Kurdish boy from the Syrian town of Kobane, who had drowned on the passage from Turkey to Greece and was subsequently washed up on the beach near the Turkish tourism centre of Bodrum, circulated in the press. While hundreds of migrants had drowned previously, Alan Kurdi now became the symbol of the inhumanity of the current attitudes to migration. Again, European and German politicians expressed their horror and vowed that such occurrences must be prevented.

On 4th September, a huge number of refugees approached the Austrian-German border. Many of them expressed their wish to reach Germany, while others wanted to continue toward the northern countries. Merkel and the then Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann decided not to close the border and to allow the influx into Germany. The next day, therefore, the more or less uncontrolled influx of unregistered refugees in Germany began. Crowds of Germans greeted them, for instance at Munich's central station, but also in many other cities, holding placards saying 'Refugees welcome' and distributing gifts. In Munich alone, 20,000 refugees were welcomed on September 5th and 6th. The German 'welcome culture' was born in a marked contrast to what government officials generally expected, namely, that anti-refugee sentiments would prevail and that such resentments needed to be prevented and contained by restrictive politics of migration.

party established in 2013, which, since 2015, has taken a strict rightist-populist outlook and mainly advocates anti-immigrant positions.

Although the right-wing groups were able to muster support and created a great clamour, a positive attitude still prevailed, resulting in an unbelievable number of people volunteering to support the newly arrived refugees in many different respects. In fact, in many places, the number of volunteers greatly exceeded the needs of the refugees.

Realpolitik enters the Scene Again: Restrictive Politics of Asylum

The subsequent politics of migration and asylum in Germany need a much more detailed and differentiated analysis, for which the observation on the surface humanitarian politics largely continued, vowing to welcome and accommodate the refugees and to enable their 'integration' in Germany, at the practical, politics largely reverted to the 'real politics' of restricting asylum. While, for instance, Syrians initially had been promised generous terms and the speedy granting of asylum, the level of protection was subsequently limited in most cases to temporary 'subsidiary protection' only, which, significantly, excluded family reunification. Furthermore, living conditions in refugee accommodation centres were made difficult, restricting, for instance, in many cases the refugees' right to prepare their own food according to their personal habits (Roitman, 2013).

The opposition of 'Realpolitik' and humanitarian politics helps in understanding the politics of asylum in Germany, albeit not in a straightforward manner which does not necessarily imply that real politics is (morally) 'bad' and that humanitarianism is intrinsically 'good'. In her analysis of French politics on the (non) accommodation of immigrants, Miriam Ticktin points out that humanitarian politics based on compassion and the urge to alleviate individual suffering is in fact a politics of inequality that solidifies hierarchies and largely precludes equal rights (Ticktin, 2011). Humanitarian state politics is sometimes more concerned with appearing to alleviate suffering than with actually 'doing well' to people in distress. Humanitarian politics is then in the first place a politics of representation that serves to cover up real politics. In Germany, for instance, sometimes the suspicion was voiced that, after the circulation of the image of Alan Kurdi on the Turkish beach, the open border policy of late summer 2015 was also intended, in order to prevent 'ugly images' possibly emanating from the border between Austria and Germany, namely images of police and

border patrols forcefully and violently preventing refugees from crossing the totally unfenced border.⁷

It is safe to assume that many different and often contradictory motivations and intentions govern political decisions, the politics of migration and asylum included. In Germany, following the ‘summer of migration’ of 2015, there is a marked contradiction between the continuously voiced insistence that refugees need to ‘integrate’ quickly into German society, and the recent packages of asylum law. These packages largely preclude integration, by restricting refugees’ right to work and education, by requiring them to live in crowded asylum centres often situated on the periphery of towns and cities, i.e. far away from infrastructures, and by the limitation of resources for German language courses. The contradiction between the discourse of integration and the practical politics of keeping refugees for years, waiting in a limbo of uncertainty, could not be more marked.

Unsurprisingly, politics is dominated by strategies and considerations of power: the restrictive politics of asylum intends to placate possible supporters of right-wing groups, taking over some of their demands in a slightly softened manner. It is also meant as a form of deterrent to people across the globe that might consider travelling to Germany as refugees, thereby delivering them the message that living as a refugee in this country is not a walk in the park and that deportation is most likely. In the politically intended urge to decide on asylum applications as quickly as possible, in order to reduce the number of asylum seekers swiftly, decisions on asylum are made as if on a conveyor belt, producing many mistakes and often utterly inhumane outcomes. In many cases, for instance, people have been deported that were indeed already well integrated, and in some cases families were separated by deportation. Official discourse on asylum and refugees is currently dominated by two aspects. On the one hand, there is the emphasis that ‘deserving’ refugees need to be accommodated and integrated, while on the other hand, there is insistence on the strict deportation of the ‘undeserving’ (Holmes and Castaneda 2016). What this discourse ignores, though, is the fact that in many cases it is very difficult, if not outright impossible, to neatly tell the deserving from the undeserving. In most cases, human destinies do not fit neatly into either of these categories.

⁷In his account of the events journalist Robin Alexander insinuates that the border remained open only because nobody in government wanted to take the responsibility for such images (Alexander, 2017, p. 23).

Conclusion: Crisis Effects

In my interpretation, Chancellor Merkel's encounter with Reem can be regarded as a 'critical event' in the sense of Veena Das, namely as an event that enabled new ways of taking action (Das, 1995). Of course, this encounter did not stand alone; it was suspended in a series of events in which the problematic humanitarian aspects of current refugee policies in Europe became most obvious. Nonetheless, this particular encounter touched Merkel directly and she was visibly moved, while at the same time, she was defending the realist rationale of German politics in relation to refugees and asylum. Maintaining this realist position became much more difficult, considering the 'humanitarian intrusion'. Asylum politics in Germany was subsequently dominated by the tension between real politics and humanitarianism. While 'realism' mostly prevailed over practical politics, humanitarianism was increasingly becoming a matter of rhetoric only. Both modes of politics, however, flagged the events in question as a 'crisis'.

In conclusion, the effects of this particular crisis can be illustrated. After 2015, through a number of legislative changes, politics of asylum in Germany became much more rigid and in some aspects even repressive. This effect is amplified by the increasing securitisation of related policies after several attacks committed by men who entered Germany as refugees. Here, two 'crises' converge, namely the 'refugee crisis' and the 'terrorism crisis', enabling in the first place a highly increased level of control and surveillance. At the European level, the refugee crisis enables a new kind of 'externalisation policy' that shifts the EU's borders to Turkey and to Northern Africa and turns countries like Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt or even Libya into extra-territorial European border posts. While this is seemingly also meant to reduce the number of calamities in the Mediterranean, the externalisation of borders in fact does not save any lives. According to Giuseppe Loprete, the IOM Chief of Mission in Niger, probably more migrants die while attempting to cross the Sahara than on the passage across the Mediterranean, and yet these deaths are hardly recorded. One significant effect of externalisation is that humanitarian issues are largely pushed out of sight in Europe, while at the same time NGOs running sea rescue operations in the Mediterranean are criminalised as collaborating in human smuggling. The Italian government even termed these rescue operations 'pull factors' endangering the lives of migrants. This was not the first time that on a humanitarian pretext the heightened control of maritime borders had forced migrants to take

even more dangerous courses. A decade ago, for example, the EU's border security agency Frontex's mission Hera forced back migrants that intended to reach the Canary Islands and compelled them to take the hazardous Sahara route instead migrants that often had to move because EU fishery policies destroyed their sources of income in West African states. Gregory Feldman quotes an EU official who, in 2008, had already justified such moves as efforts toward saving lives (Feldman, 2011).

Humanitarianism is often understood as the urge to alleviate the suffering of strangers (Calhoun, 2008), as a 'politics of compassion' (Fassin, 2012). However, those in plight must first become visible as humans that deserve compassion and not suffer beyond the sight of those that can alleviate their suffering. Nevertheless, German and European refugee policies ensure that in future, such suffering will not come too close to Europe again. The ordeal of migrants on their way to Europe is hidden behind the smokescreen of the humanitarian rhetoric of saving lives in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, humanitarianism is about compassion and charity; it is not about justice and rights. The humanitarian motive totally ignores the global inequities that, besides political repression, put migrants on the move in search of a future for themselves and their families. In the last instance, then, the humanitarian rhetoric serves to cover-up the effects of an unjust liberal global economic order.

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**Book Review: Fighting to the
End: The Pakistan Army's
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Carol Christine Fair, PhD., one of the leading experts on South Asia, has made Pakistan army the subject of her book: *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. The overarching theme, resonating in all eleven chapters in the book, depicts the Pakistan Army as central to all the misfortunes befalling the country. Fair accentuates the overbearing presence and consequent ruinous decisiveness of the Pakistan army in military, economic, political and diplomatic arenas. Furthermore, the writer contends, that the contestation between India and Pakistan has been predominantly orchestrated by the Pakistani Army. In a nutshell, Fair delineates that most countries have armies; however, the Pakistan army retains a country to carry out its injunctions.

The book highlights some striking conclusions drawn from the Pakistan Army Green Books containing the works of Pakistani military personnel, reflecting the official thinking of the country's army. Based on these resources, Fair argues that Pakistan will persistently be subjected to multiple defeats in its efforts to oppose India, *but it would not acquiesce to India*. Through this argument the writer reiterates the *revisionist* orientation of Pakistan. For her, *Pakistan's apprehensions about India are more ideological than security driven*, essentially, the Pakistan Army is the defender of its ideological frontier i.e. the *Islamic* identity of Pakistan versus the *Hindu* India. Furthermore, the writer suggests that the Pakistan Army is convinced of being a victim

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as it re-interprets history to portray itself as a sufferer of injustices perpetrated by outside forces. Fair supports her *revisionist* stance about the *strategic culture* of Pakistan by dwelling into themes like the founding of the state, the concomitant role of Islam with Pakistan and the country's relations with its immediate neighbors and United States. The writer also highlights the security dynamics of the region by shedding light on Pakistan's use of its nuclear status.

Commenting on the genesis and evolution of the state, Fair contends that Pakistan *felt cheated by the partition of 1947*. Therefore, since its inception, Pakistan has indulged in various ways to engage its neighbors and become a persistent fighting force in the region. The writer argues that it's the recalling of the injustices at the time of partition that have hindered the Pakistan army from denouncing the efforts to relinquish Kashmir and normalize relations with India. While articulating Pakistan army's incessant obsession with India, she asserts that Pakistan has been the principal instigator of all military conflicts with India. According to Fair, the confrontation between India and Pakistan has mutated into a *civilizational* crisis, essentially highlighting that Pakistan would vehemently oppose any restraint to strike India. The book suggests that Pakistan army interprets and gauges its success by its continued efforts to be able to resist India.

The book reviewed Pakistan's use of *militant proxies* in Afghanistan and India in rigorous detail, emphasizing Pakistan's indispensable dependency on these actors. According to the writer, Pakistan has used the tactics of militant proxies and asymmetrical warfare from the beginning, so it's highly unlikely that it would abandon them in the future. Pakistan employed these proxies to help invade Kashmir in 1947 to accelerate its accession to Pakistan and continues to practice irregular means of warfare to gain ascendancy in Kashmir. Fair further reiterates this argument by insisting that Pakistan frequented the art of using insurgents to generate rebellion and perfected such means by its relationship with United States in the 1980s.

One of the key chapters in the book; *Born an Insecure State* traces the origin of the Pakistan Army and emphasizes on the significance of its structural growth. The writer argues that the areas allotted to Pakistan were the agitated and rebellious areas under the British rule in subcontinent. As a consequence, the British governed by authoritarianism, hence giving considerably less leeway to democracy to flourish in this area. Therefore, Fair asserts that authoritarian military regimes have burgeoned in the region of Pakistan. Another intriguing

argument made by the writer revolves around on the *changing composition* of the Pakistan Army. Conventionally, Pakistan Army had been dominated by few districts in the provinces of Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. However, Fair's research in the book contends that by mid of 2000, participation in the army was pouring from all over Pakistan, making it a robust national institution.

Considerable part of the book is dedicated to the analysis of the Pakistani military throughout. Fair outlines the concept of *strategic depth* and Pakistan's relation with Afghanistan. The writer asserts that Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan were patterned on colonial considerations, essentially about using Afghanistan as a buffer state. Moreover, Pakistan's support for the development of Afghan mujahedeen pre-dated the 1979 Soviet invasion, as she points out that training camps were established by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to train Afghan mujahedeen as early as 1973.

Fair is of the opinion that Pakistan's perceptions of interminable insecurity have led to military alliances with United States, Saudi Arab and China. These military alliances have given Pakistan the leeway to sustain a massive armed force and carry out its incessant persecution of India. The writer explicitly discusses the military alliances of Pakistan in light of its relation with United States, contending that US pursued these alliances over various geo-strategic concerns, whereas, Pakistan has persistently urged the US to support it against India. The author reprimands Pakistan's criticism for the lack of US aid it received during the wars with India under military alliances like Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Fair countered Pakistan's criticism of the lack of US aid by comparing the refusal of Pakistani assistance during the US war with Vietnam. The writer has sighted that anti-US rhetoric and grievances in Pakistan are due to the dissatisfaction of the Pakistan army with US.

Fair is also critical of the jihad Pakistan has carried out under the nuclear umbrella employed to deter its adversaries. The writer asserts that through its overt Nuclearization in 1998; Pakistan has carried out terrorist activities across the border in India and undermined strategic interests of US in the region. She believes that the ambiguous nuclear doctrine of Pakistan gives it effective deterrence against India and also internationalizes the issues faced by Pakistan, bringing international actors to mediate and de-escalate conflicts in the region. Furthermore, the writer also deliberates that the possession of nuclear power by Pakistan, hinders the US to abandon it completely.

The book unabashedly lambasts the Pakistan Army; the author characterizes Pakistan as a *purely greedy state*, aggravating problems in the region. Fair is pessimistic about democracy strengthening in Pakistan; she also argues that even in case of a democratic transition, the masses of Pakistan would oppose abandoning the anti-India rhetoric. The writer is unchallengeably convinced of Pakistan's nefarious propaganda always in play against India. For instance, under the dictatorship of Musharraf, India and Pakistan purportedly came close to finding a final settlement on Kashmir issue, however, the book depicts that as Pakistan's way of waging war through peace, denying Pakistan's capacity to bargain rationally. Furthermore, Fair admits herself that Pakistan purposed a joint defense agreement with India which India immediately rejected, but this argument goes against the exhaustively discussed aggressive military mind-set within Pakistan army. Regarding the recruitment of army officers from all over the country, she dismisses the moderating effect brought on by this change towards the security needs of Pakistan. She believes that the strategic culture of army is so deeply enriched within Pakistani society that all Pakistani soldiers will eventually subscribe to anti-Indian stance. This rigid stance of Fair is contestable as the Pakistan army is not only incontrovertibly engrossed in countering foreign threats from all dimensions, but checking the internal stability of Pakistan.

Fair condemns Pakistan for its criticism of US about abandoning it to deal with drugs, guns and jihad culture after 1980s, but she does not give a more convincing argument about the departure of US from Afghanistan than the lack of US interests in the region after 1980s. Furthermore, she also completely denies any role of US in proliferating radicalization in the region which is entirely fallacious. The book recommends that it is only through *containment* that the threats from Pakistan to the international community can be controlled and managed. The writer is prejudiced while discussing the strategic culture of Pakistan and channels the hegemonic stance of US towards Pakistan, while unrecognizing the western imperialistic tendencies towards the region and jeopardizing Pakistan's sovereignty.

Furthermore, the writer maintains a menacing silence over Indian aggression with its neighbors like Nepal, China and Sri Lanka while promulgating Indian *inevitable ascendancy* in the region and beyond. Pakistan's insecurities concocted or otherwise, as suggested by Fair, are insufferable to her sensibilities that she has divulged in producing a volume about them. In this view, the contrast in the treatment of both the states, trying to secure their national interests by

any means necessary, evidence unabashed partiality in favor of India while rendering Pakistan a threat to the region and international security.

The tunnel vision of the writer concerning the role of army in Pakistan diminishes the robust appropriacy exhibited by the Pakistan Army in securing the sovereignty and integrity of the country. The themes of the book need to be appraised by a contradistinction lens; the formidable role of army in securing Pakistan since its inception while also focusing on the recurring and expanding interests of US in South Asia.

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