

Mapping Political (In)Tolerance in the Pakhtun Youth of Pakistan

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Abstract

Political tolerance is deemed crucial for political progress as well as the maturity of any society. The present study, therefore, focuses on mapping the political tolerance in the Pakhtun society of Pakistan. In addition to presenting the political history of the Pakhtuns in brief, this article also attempts to locate the foundations of (political) tolerance in Islam (the religion followed by Pakhtuns in Pakistan); by delving into the Holy Book (i.e., Quran) and the life of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The research was conducted employing a quantitative approach to identify the factors that significantly contribute to the levels of political tolerance in the society under study. The research tool developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979) — after appropriate modifications considering the contextual dynamics — was used for collecting data from 400 young residents of the district Kohat in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan. The respondents varied with respect to gender, area of residence, acquisition of formal or religious education, party affiliation, and political process participation. This research lays out different aspects pertaining to the respondents' depicted tolerant, neutral, or intolerant attitudes. Based on the research findings, all variables — except gender — have played a significant role in impacting the level of tolerance in the Pakhtun youth. However, this research has its limitations which may be catered to in future studies.

Keywords

Political tolerance, Pakhtun society, youth, political participation, political affiliation, disliked political party

Introduction

The unwillingness to extend the fundamental rights and civil liberties to the political opponents is referred to as political intolerance. It is reported that certain levels of

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intolerance exist even in the most well-established democracies, particularly during times of crisis or threat (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009). The situation is expected to be somewhat more unpleasant in developing countries such as Pakistan. Political tolerance has been envisaged as vital for societal progress, and hence has received much attention in recent years (see, e.g., Gerber et al., 2010; Oskarsson & Widmalm, 2016; Saleem, 2016; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993) due to its much-needed importance for peaceful co-existence (Heyd, 2003) specifically in the multicultural and pluralist societies making up the global village. Political tolerance may be defined in terms of the willingness to express those ideas and thoughts that an individual not only dislikes but opposes. In other words, it refers to permitting ideas that potentially challenge one's way of life (Crick, 1973; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979; Vujčić, 1995). It has many possible contributions in democracy and has also been investigated as a potential personality trait (Knutson, 1972; Sullivan et al., 1981). Furthermore, political tolerance has also been observed to be productive for the societal progress and development on social, economic, and political parameters (see, e.g., Chzhen, 2013; Saleem, 2016; Sumon, 2015; Yusuf, 2013).

Several factors — contributing to the level of political tolerance — have been explored by scholars, and their role has been critically analyzed in this regard. These factors include the curriculum taught in educational institutions (Lawrence, 1976; Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978; Sumon, 2015; Vujčić, 1995; Yusuf, 2013) and social institutions (Ehman, 1980; Mutz, 2001; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Stouffer, 1955; Vujčić, 1995). Researchers have found the potential contribution of democratic principles in citizens' tolerance level (see, e.g., Chzhen, 2013; Ehman, 1980; Sullivan et al., 1981; Vujčić, 1995). Although much is talked about the importance of tolerance in societies and studies have investigated the ways to improve its level among citizens especially in developed countries, little attention has been paid to the selection of an appropriate mechanism of measuring political tolerance of developing states particularly the ones engulfed, chained, and driven in conflicts since decades. This contribution aims to fill this literature gap by focusing on the Pakhtun community residing in Pakistan. The study aims to measure youth's political tolerance in the Pakhtun society while considering the role the different social and political factors, such as gender, level and nature of education, political affiliation, and political participation, play in this regard.

To facilitate conceptualizing political tolerance in the context of the Pakhtun society, this article first sheds light on the political history of Pakhtuns. It then elaborates the discourse on tolerance in Islam, which is the religion that the community under study practises. Next, it lays down the method employed for this particular study which is followed by the results and analysis section.

Historical Background

Pakhtuns are generally considered as one of the largest tribal ethnic nations of the world (Barfield, 2010), mainly residing in Pakistan (majorly KP, including the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA], and Balochistan) and Afghanistan across the 'controversial' Durand Line from centuries (Caroe 1958; Spain, 1963; Taj & Ali, 2018). Their population in Pakistan is estimated to be over 30 million (Government of Pakistan, 2017). They are primarily divided into four core tribes: Yousafzai, Ghilzai, Kerlanri, and Durrani (Hussain, 2000). On the question of their origin, both the indigenous and foreign scholars disagree. The popular theories

describe Pakhtun as Semitic, Greek, or Arian (see, e.g., Aafreedi, 2009; Kakahhel, 1981; Khan, 2000; Khan, 2001; Lines, 1988).

Keeping in view the political history of Pakhtuns, it can be organized into three exclusive phases. The first phase comprises the pre and early colonial (British) time that is marked by their suppression by the British as well as the division in the tribal factions and feuds embedded in *Pakhtunwali*, which is an unwritten code of life (also known as *Pakhtu*). Its elements that are considered to contribute to intolerance and violence in the Pakhtun society, to name a few, include *Toora* (bravery), *Badal* (often understood as ‘revenge’ but literally means ‘reciprocity’), *Badhi* (vendetta), *Paighor* (taunt), and *Tarboorwali* (enmity within cousins). Therefore, Pakhtuns have remained famous, rather notorious, for their violent cultural traits (Schofield, 2003). The divisions and conflicts among the Pakhtun tribes mainly did not let them be politically united (Naz, 2009; Shah, 1999). However, scholars such as Khan (2016) and Shakoor (2013) present a just criticism to this notion by stating that exertion of violence or intolerant attitudes among tribes do not occur without logical and reasonable proof. Similarly, Taj (2011) criticizes the literature that reduces *Pakhtunwali* to some of its constituents that (could) project a wild impression of the Pakhtuns. Nevertheless, the negative implications posed by the aforementioned components of *Pakhtunwali* to the community’s political tolerance cannot be denied.

In the Pakhtun political history, the second phase entails the organized non-violent social and political struggle for their awakening through reformatory socio-political movements, notably the Khodaie Khidmatgar Movement (KKM) of Bacha Khan. Attempts were made to inculcate love and respect for education and get rid of social evils (such as gambling and lavish expenditure on marriages) in addition to resolving enmity among families (Ahmad, 1980; Durpee, 1978; Khan, 2018; Naz, 2009; Taj & Ali, 2018). This ultimately led to the establishment of a politically tolerant and non-violent society as people from different tribes, religious ideologies, and political affiliations were not only living peacefully but also actively participating in politics of the Pakhtun dominated region(s). Unlike the first phase, this mentioned movement was not characterized by religiosity (in the Pakhtun dominant part of the sub-continent; Shah, 1999). However, this period did not last for long spanning from 1920 to 1945.

The third phase of the political history of the Pakhtuns is primarily concerned with the Afghan war and its (on-going) aftermath. Various scholars believe that the Pakhtun society was radicalized through decades-long social engineering by the national as well as the international actors (Dick, 2002; Khan, 2016; Nojumi, 2002; Roy, 2002). This led to the blemished or stigmatized presentation or ‘pashtunization’ of terrorism (as a phenomenon) both at national and international level (Beg, 2015; Edwards, 2002; Kartha, 1997; Rana & Gunaratna, 2007; Roy, 2004; Taj, 2011; Taj & Ali, 2018). For instance, a manifestation of this is Mulla Umar, the former Afghan Taliban leader (died in 2013) with a Pakhtun ethnic background, who has remained a symbol of terrorism in the global village (Crile, 2007; Haqqani, 2005; Roy, 2002). He paved the way for a fierce and mass killing of certain, in addition to uncertain, opponents from Pakhtun and other ethnic groups along with foreigners (Jalali, 2002).

With this in its recent past, the Pakhtun society has reached a stage where the intelligentsia has either disappeared or silenced. These issues usually pertain to the criticism over Taliban and certain religio-politico violent (armed/organized). However, it is essential to mention here that the study of religious discourse, regarded

as a primary influencer in the Pakhtun context, is also crucial to understanding its role in the community's politically (in)tolerant attitude.

Political Tolerance and Islam

Pakhtuns are popularly referred to have embraced Islam after a collective decision in a *Jarga* (council of elders; Naz, 2009; Naz & Rehman, 2011). Since then, their (individual and collective) socio-political lives have largely come under its influence (Naz & Rehman, 2011; Shah, 1999). Although divergent opinions exist on if the Pakhtuns prefer the Islamic way of life or *Pakhtunwali* (see, e.g., Glatzer, 1998; Naz & Rehman, 2011), there is no disagreement concerning the influence of Islam on their personal and social lives (see, e.g., Glatzer, 1998; Naz, 2009; Naz & Rehman, 2011; Shah, 1999). Taj (2011) has rightly claimed that “despite the introduction of Islam in Pakhtun territories, the Pakhtuns have never given up *Pakhtunwali*” (p. 1). However, in no way, this means that Islam has no role to play in the lives of Pakhtuns. This is evident from how the religion was used, particularly after the subcontinent partition, and during and after the Cold War. It has significantly contributed to dividing the Pakhtuns along the lines and basis of (relative) religiosity. Most of the ones regarded as most religious declared the Afghan war as *Jihad* and took part in it by promulgating this narrative at the minimum. In contrast, it was considered as ‘fasaad’ (strife) by the ones (considered to be) relatively less inclined towards religion. This section, therefore, aims to explore the Islamic discourse on (political) tolerance briefly.

The Islamic discourse incorporates the doctrine and principles providing a philosophical and theoretical base for tolerance, forgiveness, and peaceful co-existence. Islamic literature, which is mainly based on Quran and Sunnah, has discussed intra and inter-faith tolerance. Before delving into the injunctions in Islamic sharia' that entail the concept and philosophy of tolerance and describing the current picture of the Muslim world in this regard, the words or phrases used in Quran, demonstrating the meaning of tolerance, are presented here.

In the Quran, the terms *sabr* and *hilm* are used to demonstrate the need for a situation which demands patience, tolerance, keeping calm and steady, not to be reactive and repressive. The term *tahammul* is also used for *sabr*; both are synonymous in meaning. Therefore, in Islamic literature, these terms can be regarded as the alternate to tolerance or toleration.

Islam stresses upon patience, forbearance, and tolerance in any unwanted and challenging situation. Moreover, for people who show tolerant attitude and behavior, the Quran promises them the Companionship of Allah as its reward (2:153). Furthermore, Islam not only teaches but also stresses upon forgiveness. It appreciates the aggrieved victim to forgive the aggressor as this would indeed be an affair of great resolution (Quran 42:43).

Furthermore, as per the Quran, the rationale of dividing humans into different tribes is to identify each other, and such a division carries no inbuilt distinction among tribes or peoples (Quran 49:13). Another similar verse of the Holy Quran addressed to Muslims, declares them to be created as a balance nation (Quran 2:143). Therefore, it can be interpreted that Muslims are not to be on either extreme of the polity; they are always to try to come up with a middle way out for any societal issue, either profane or sacred. Hence, Muslims have to adhere to a balanced path in their (collective and individual) lives.

Likewise, concerning inter-faith harmony, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) has been directed to ask the people of the Book (Ahl-e-Kitaab: Followers of any divine Book) to come to the table on those points that show some degree of confluence of idea between them (Christians and Jews) and the Muslims (Quran 3:63). This entails one of the principles of toleration and democracy taught by Islamic literature. In addition, another verse of the Quran states, "There shall be no coercion in matters of faith" (Quran 2:256). This principle, presented in the Islamic Code of life indicates that all individuals are allowed to practice their faith the way they like, and no one is allowed to compel the others against their chosen way of life.

Similarly, there are numerous examples in Prophet Muhammad's life (PBUH) that can be quoted as evidence of teaching and enjoining toleration to others. His life exhibits multiple examples of the respect and dignity he gave to the people of other religions. One such instance is when a group of Christians arrived at the Masjid-an-Nabawi (Mosque of the Prophet) in the city of Madina. their (Christians') prayer time approached during the discussion, and Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) allowed them to pray in the mosque (Hamidullah, 1941; Wahid, n.d.).

These, along with the similar other verses and principles, can provide a significant base for a tolerant Muslim society. However, it may be argued that many of the Muslim countries present a rather different — and often bleak — picture of tolerance. The division of the Muslim community in 'sects' and 'sub-sects' is not the diversity about which the Prophet (PBUH) stated, "differences of and/or diversity in opinion in my community (*umma*) is mercy" (Annawavee, 1637). It instead establishes itself as a fierce conflicting division where every means of 'otherization', through deeds and actions, is ensured as part of one's belief. It can further be argued that many of these sects and sub-sects are not only declaring each other as *Kafir* (non-believer) but are also raising (militant) groups for targeting the other (Hussain, 2005). The contributory factors for generating such an expulsive and otherizational milieu within the Muslim society can have roots both within and outside of their society. However, the discussion on such factors is beyond the scope of the present study.

Purpose and Significance of the Research

Limiting the discussion to political tolerance in the context of the Pakhtun community residing in Pakistan, this research situates itself in the backdrop where Pakhtun nationalism has become a 'target'.⁴ Some political parties also face restrictions while operating in different areas, especially where they are not well supported. Propaganda tools, such as violent literature, hate materials, and fabricated cases, are utilized for the purpose; to mobilize the masses against the targeted political parties (Khan, 2016).

It may be argued that the society under investigation is (relatively) less stable in political terms⁵ and is, at the same time, significantly affected by terrorism (Hussain, 2005; Khan, 2016; Taj, 2011; Taj & Ali, 2018). Both these characteristics might have potentially contradictory effects on the political tolerance of the youth. It is a known fact that the society under consideration has been hit by terrorism for decades (Khan, 2016; Taj, 2011). There is a possibility that such a bleak experience might have positively affected its attitude and behavior, leading to a tolerant approach

⁴ The attacks on Army Public School Peshawar (December 2014), Bacha Khan University Charsadda (January 2016), and Agricultural Training Institute Peshawar (November 2017) serve as a few examples in this regard.

⁵ Political stability, here, refers to the freedom for political participation and transparency and accountability in the political process.

to end the atrocities. In this context, the present study attempts to measure political tolerance among the Pakhtun youth of Pakistan; by utilizing the tool developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979),⁶ adapted as per the contextual understanding researchers' localized experience and observation. This has helped the researchers to analyze the level of political tolerance in conjunction with factors such as gender, level of education, and political affiliation and participation, and therefore, this research is expected to produce new scientific knowledge in the field of political sociology about the society that has not considerably been explored sociologically.

Data and Methods

The present study, employing a quantitative approach, was conducted in the Kohat district of Pakistan. It is situated in the Southern part of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and is linked with the former FATA and frontier region. with a population close to one million (comprising both major sects — Shia and Sunni; GoP, 2017), the district hosts a military base in addition to a cadet college and Kohat University of Science and Technology as well as several shrines.

Sample

The data was collected from the youth population (with their respective ages between 18 and 30 years) of the locality. A total of 400 respondents were surveyed; this included 310 males and 90 females. 44 of the respondents had never been to any educational institution. Furthermore, 173 respondents resided in rural settings, while 227 were urban residents. The participants of the research varied in terms of their political inclination; supporting or being affiliated with different (national) political parties, namely Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Awami National Party (ANP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Pakistan Muslim League N (PML-N), and Pakistan Muslim League Q (PML-Q).

Tool of Data Collection

The data was collected through a close-ended questionnaire based on the tool used for measuring political tolerance by Sullivan and colleagues (1979). The instrument was modified, and additions were made in line with the researchers' localized experience and observation. As per the procedure recommended by Sullivan and colleagues (1979) for the computation of the level of political tolerance through their questionnaire, respondents were first asked to select or mention their dislike political party and then report on the level of acceptability for that particular political group in different contexts. All the instrument's eleven items could be responded on a five-point Likert scale with options ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The scale was scored from 1 to 5, with strongly agree=1, neutral=3, and strongly disagree=5.

The scale sum scores ranged from 11 to 55. For bivariate analysis, the Likert scale responses were dichotomized into the categories of 'tolerant' and 'intolerant'. For this purpose, strongly agree, agree, and neutral were merged into the category of 'tolerant' while disagree and strongly disagree were taken as 'intolerant'. Therefore, the sum scores of 33 and less were taken as tolerant and coded as 1 while the scores

⁶ This tool is regarded as the appropriate technique for measuring political tolerance and is confirmed as statistically proven and a well specified model. Another instrument, introduced by Stouffer (1955) for the same purpose, had methodological and conceptual limitations as it restricted the respondents' tolerance to a few pre-mentioned groups and thereby ignored the societal tolerance levels.

above 33 were regarded as intolerant and thus coded as 2. The neutral category was merged into tolerance because neutral, as such, exhibited no negative attitude regarding acceptability for the ones affiliated with the disliked political group. Therefore, within this study's domain, neutral has been termed unconcerned and is perceived under the broader understanding of tolerance towards the disliked group.

Reliability Statistics and Data Analysis

For internal consistency, the political tolerance scale comprising 11 items was checked through Cronbach's Alpha reliability test. The result confirmed that the scale was reliable as the value of the test is .824.

The collected data was analyzed by applying simple frequency distribution at univariate and bivariate levels. To further measure the identified variables' contribution to the level of political tolerance, cross-tabulation and binary logistic regression was carried out. The analysis based on the summary statistics and regression is presented in the following section.

Results and Discussion

The political tolerance level was gaged by considering the youth acceptance or denial of the political opponents or politically disliked groups in certain political roles or tasks. These included holding a public office, delivering a speech, arranging a rally, placing and publishing a book and article in public library and newspaper respectively, participation in cultural and religious activities and ceremonies, and teaching in school or college.

It was found that most of the respondents (78.3 per cent) showed disagreement with the statement that a member of their disliked political party should be allowed to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It shows that most young individuals are perhaps not ready to accept a prime minister associated with the political party they dislike. However, in a democratic and tolerant society, every citizen (not expressly forbidden by the state law) has the right to contest for a political office. If such a large proportion of the youth deny the right to its political opponent to be the PM of their country, it certainly reflects a trait of intolerant citizenship. This corresponds to Hiskey and colleagues (2013) findings who have reported that, in many countries, the intolerant citizens outnumber the tolerant individual, which is undoubtedly alarming news for the world.

Furthermore, on a question regarding the willingness to allow a leader of the disliked political party to deliver a speech in the area of the respondents, a significant segment of the population surveyed — i.e., 49.2 per cent — were not willing to do so (with 26 per cent of the responses as disagree and 23.2 per cent strongly disagree). In comparison, 39 per cent of the total respondents showed willingness (11.8 per cent strongly agree and 27.2 per cent agree). Considering the definition of political tolerance presented by Sullivan and colleagues (1979), according to whom one is tolerant to the extent one is prepared to accommodate those whose ideas one rejects, it may be argued that the majority of the Pakhtun youth is not ready to accept the democratic rights of the disliked political group. This certainly is an indication of a high level of intolerant behavior.

Moreover, free speech and freedom of expression are fundamental rights of citizenship in a democratic society, which is also protected in the 1973 constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. However, it was noted that only 33 per cent of the youth surveyed is ready to accept the (availability of) books written by the disliked

group members in the public libraries while a significant portion of the youth (42.3 per cent) is not ready to allow such books to be displayed in public libraries. This exhibits a high level of intolerance and unacceptability towards the political opponents' point of view to be presented in public. Such a prevalence of intolerant behavior is common in (relatively) struggling democratic societies as that of Pakistan. With regards, Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) have argued that citizens living in high-quality democratic regimes are more tolerant than their counterparts in authoritarian regimes and non-liberal democracies.

In a society that protects its citizens' rights, it is expected that there will almost be negligible approval for the government to record the individuals' phone calls as it is often termed as interference in their privacy. Nevertheless, this research found that most of the individuals surveyed (72.7 per cent) have shown their agreement on recording the phone calls of the ones associated with their disliked political party; revealing their political intolerance in this regard. On the other hand, a small proportion of the respondents (21.6 per cent) have expressed their disagreement with recording the phone calls; hence, exhibiting tolerance towards their disliked political group members. In their study on youth radicalization, Yusuf and Jawaid (2014) have already reported the signs of increasingly exclusionary and intolerant belief systems among Pakistan's youth. A large proportion of the surveyed youth's willingness to record the opponents' phone calls shows that the youth is perhaps inclined to exclude the disliked political group/party from the normal competition or are considering them as the 'other'.

Moreover, contrary to the above, 71.3 per cent of the youth was found tolerant on accepting the opponent group member to teach in the respective community schools or colleges while a scant percentage, i.e., 23.5, was found intolerant to it. This indicates that most Pakhtun youth is ready to accept the opponent political party members as teachers. Likewise, the majority (i.e., 65.7 per cent) of the youth surveyed accepted the opponent group member's participation in religious ceremonies in their respective mosques or other holy places. However, still, 26.8 per cent of the respondents are against such accommodation. Furthermore, a majority (equivalent to that observed in the previous case), i.e., 64 per cent, was found tolerant of allowing the opponent political party members for a job in their area. In addition, 53.4 per cent of the total respondents consented to allow their political opponents to publish an article in newspapers, but 32.6 per cent disagreed with the idea.

Another manifestation of (political) intolerance is denying the out-groups (minorities or other ethnic groups) the right of demonstration. Among the Pakhtun youth surveyed, the majority (46.2 per cent) was found accepting the right of their (political/ideological) opponents to a demonstration. However, a noted portion (36.2 per cent) has shown disagreement over such public demonstrations. The importance of political and civic participation in producing more tolerant individuals has, however, been highlighted in literature; as such activities expose the individuals to a greater variety of political viewpoints and motivate them to work towards compromise in order to resolve differences in opinions (Hiskey et al., 2013).

In response to another item in the questionnaire, the Pakhtun youth were found to have a closely divided opinion on the issue of friendship with the individuals affiliated with the disliked political groups; 45.3 per cent respondents showed their willingness to befriend them while 42.6 per cent expressed unwillingness.

Similarly, every member of a society has the right to participate in cultural activities, and denial of such rights fall under the purview of intolerance. In this study,

majority of the youth surveyed (51.8 per cent) were found to agree on extending this right to the members of the dislike political groups while 32.3 per cent of the participants were inclined to deny this right.

Table 1: Political Tolerance

	<i>Statements</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly Disagree</i>
1	A member of (this political party) should be allowed to become Prime Minister of Pakistan.	20 (5.0%)	32 (8.0%)	35 (8.8%)	102 (25.5%)	211 (52.8%)
2	A leader of (this political party) should be allowed to deliver speeches in your area.	47 (11.8%)	109 (27.2%)	47 (11.8%)	104 (26.0%)	93 (23.2%)
3	Books written by members of (this political party) should be allowed in the local library.	40 (10.0%)	92 (23.0%)	99 (24.8%)	87 (21.8%)	82 (20.5%)
4	The Government should record telephone data of (this party).	141 (35.2%)	150 (37.5%)	23 (5.8%)	47 (11.8%)	39 (9.8%)
5	(This political party) should be allowed to demonstrate or arrange rallies in your area.	49 (12.2%)	144 (36.0%)	62 (15.5%)	85 (21.2%)	60 (15.0%)
6	I would like to be friend of any member of (this political party).	46 (11.5%)	135 (33.8%)	49 (12.2%)	91 (22.8%)	79 (19.8%)
7	(This political party) should be allowed to take part in cultural activities.	75 (18.8%)	132 (33.0%)	64 (16.0%)	67 (16.8%)	62 (15.5%)
8	A member of (this political party) should be allowed to teach in school or college.	82 (20.5%)	203 (50.8%)	21 (5.2%)	42 (10.5%)	52 (13.0%)
9	A member of (this political party) should be allowed to attend any religious ceremony in your mosque.	89 (22.2%)	174 (43.5%)	30 (7.5%)	43 (10.8%)	64 (16.0%)
10	A member of (this political party) should be allowed for a job in your area.	68 (17.0%)	188 (47.0%)	45 (11.2%)	58 (14.5%)	41 (10.2%)
11	(This political party) should be allowed to publish their articles in the newspaper etc.	69 (17.2%)	145 (36.2%)	56 (14.0%)	55 (13.8%)	75 (18.8%)

The results (see Table 1) demonstrate a distinction between the political and personal life choices of the Pakhtun youth. It is evident that they are, somehow, able to manage the influence of political affiliation over personal social life. This can serve as one of the (potential) factors that provide an open opportunity to all the parties for establishing their political bases in the province. The party affiliations show that the people have, to an extent, accepted all the political parties of Pakistan. However, the division along the party lines is not found to have hindered the social and cultural activities, and networking; in the current circumstances. In the spheres of social and cultural life, the Pakhtun youth show a tolerant attitude. On the other hand, in the different political groups, this division can serve as a potential inherent threat that can be exploited at any time for intra-Pakhtun conflicts. The history of Pakhtun society presents multiple examples of micro and macro-conflicts based on politics.

Exploring Factors Contributing to Political Tolerance

In table 2, the simple frequency distribution of the level of political tolerance is presented on the bases of gender, education, residence, party affiliation, and political participation. The data shows that 59 per cent of the male respondents and 46.7 per cent of the female belong to the tolerant category while 41 per cent of the male and 53.3 per cent of the female belong to the intolerant category. Though the level of tolerance is apparently higher for the male respondents, it is important to consider that the numbers of female participants were much less than the male respondents. The frequency distribution also exhibits the rural residents to be more tolerant than the urban dwellers (i.e., 65.3 per cent versus 41.9 per cent).

Similarly, the respondents were categorized based on education into educated and uneducated. Educated respondents are those who had received formal schooling while uneducated had never been to a formal educational institution. The collected data indicated that educated people being more tolerant than those uneducated (i.e., 53.4 per cent versus 40.9 per cent). However, it is pertinent to mention here that the educated and uneducated segments of the population have not been proportionally represented in the sample and, therefore, require consideration of future research; as a study conducted in Sweden concludes no difference in the level of tolerance based on education (Hjerm et al., 2020).

Moreover, the distribution also depicts that 50.2 and 65.2 per cent individuals with and without religious education respectively belong to the tolerant category. As far as the political affiliation is concerned, the frequency distribution revealed that the percentage of individuals with a higher tolerance level was greater for the ones affiliated with PTI and ANP/PPP, but JI/JUI present an entirely different case. The data also indicates a higher level of tolerance for individuals with a higher level of political participation. However, the (in) significance of each variable will be established (in the next section) based on the binary logistic regression.

Table 2: Socio-political Factors and Political Tolerance

<i>Background Variables</i>		<i>Political Tolerance</i>		<i>Total</i>
		<i>Tolerant</i>	<i>Intolerant</i>	
<i>Gender</i>	Male	183 (59.0%)	127 (41.0%)	310 (100%)
	Female	42 (46.7%)	48 (53.3%)	90 (100%)
<i>Residence</i>	Rural	113 (65.3%)	60 (34.7%)	173 (100%)
	Urban	112 (49.3%)	115 (50.7%)	227 (100%)
<i>Literacy</i>	Literate	207 (58.1%)	149 (41.9%)	356 (100%)
	Illiterate	18 (40.9%)	26 (59.1%)	44 (100%)
<i>Religious Education</i>	Yes	120 (50.2%)	119 (49.8%)	239 (100%)
	No	105 (65.2%)	56 (34.8%)	161 (100%)
		151(61.6%)	94 (38.4%)	245 (100%)
<i>Political Affiliation</i>	PTI			
	Jl/JUI	30(39.0%)	47 (61.0%)	77 (100%)
	ANP/PPP	18 (66.7%)	9 (33.3%)	27 (100%)
	PML-N/Q	26 (51.0%)	25 (49.0%)	51 (100%)
<i>Political Participation</i>	Low	99 (48.8%)	104 (51.2%)	203 (100%)
	High	126 (64.0%)	71(36.0%)	197 (100%)

Regression Analysis

A binary logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of gender, residence, formal and religious education, party affiliation, and political participation on the participants’ likelihood to be tolerant. Table 3 represents the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients results; a general test of how well the model performs. The model was found out to be significant with $X^2 = 54.668$, $df = 12$, and $p = .000$; in other words, it means that the model is an appropriate one.

Table 3: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficient

	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Step	54.668	12	.000
Block	54.668	12	.000
Model	54.668	12	.000

In addition, Table 4 shows the model summary; giving the values for the Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square which give an approximation of how much variance in the dependent variable can be explained through the variation in the independent variables. It shows that the independent variables considered for this study explain between 12 and 17 per cent of the variation in political tolerance of the Pakhtun youth.

Table 4: Model Summary

<i>-2 Log likelihood</i>	<i>Cox & Snell R Square</i>	<i>Nagelkerke R Square</i>
493.583 ^a	.128	.171

Moreover, from Table 5 that presents the classification, it is evident that 183 and 93 respondents having a politically tolerant and intolerant attitude (respectively) were predicted correctly. A total of 124 respondents were misclassified; 42 with political tolerant and 82 with intolerant political attitude. This depicts that 81.3 and 53.1 per cent of the politically tolerant and intolerant respondents (respectively) were correctly classified. In sum, 69.0 per cent of the total respondents were correctly classified.

Table 5: Classification Table

<i>Observed</i>	<i>Predicted</i>		<i>Percentage Correct</i>
	<i>Political Tolerance</i>		
	<i>Tolerant</i>	<i>Intolerant</i>	
<i>Tolerant</i>	183	42	81.3
<i>Intolerant</i>	82	93	53.1
<i>Overall Percentage</i>			69.0

The cut value is .500

Lastly, Table 6 presents the results of the binary logistic regression. The Wald test was used to determine the significance of each of the independent variables' association with the dependent variable. Gender is the only independent variable that was insignificantly associated ($p = 0.214$) with political tolerance. The rest of the independent variables, which include residence ($p = .001$), formal education ($p = .039$), religious (seminary) education ($p = .040$), political affiliation ($p = .002$), and political participation ($p = .017$), were found to be significantly associated with political tolerance. The association's effect is further explained with the help of odds ratio/Exp(B). Based on this, it is estimated that the urban Pakhtuns are 46 per cent more likely to be intolerant than the rural Pakhtuns. This contrasts with the findings reported by Stouffer (1955): urbanity in American society has a significant and positive effect on political tolerance. The regression analysis also exhibits that formal education contributes to increasing the level of tolerance by 60per cent. This supports the findings of other scholars such as Stouffer (1955) and Bobo and Licari (1989), who reported an increase in tolerance level with increased education. A justification for this trend is that educated people are often exposed to more diversity and learned both practically and mentally to understand their views outside their comfort zone (Peck, 2016).

Furthermore, the analysis reveals that people with having not attended religious seminaries are 1.6 times more tolerant than who attended religious seminaries. This can also be used to understand the higher levels of intolerance for the individuals who associated themselves with the religious-political parties. Moreover, it was found out that a .5 times increase in political participation results in the 1.7 times increases in political tolerance. Thus, affiliation with a political party and

participation in the political process influence the level of political tolerance of the Pakhtun youth.

Table 6: Binary Logistic Regression (Variables in the Equation)

<i>Variable(s)</i>	β	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Exp (β)</i>
Gender	-.347	.280	1.541	1	.214	.707
Residence	-.777	.235	10.944	1	.001	.460
Education	-.878	.425	4.260	1	.039	.416
Madrasa Education	.527	.257	4.206	1	.040	1.694
Political Party Affiliation	-.402	.129	9.707	1	.002	.669
Political Participation	.560	.235	5.660	1	.017	1.750
Constant	2.839	1.031	7.582	1	.006	17.106

Conclusion

It is observed that a political system can only function better if the people it serves are politically mature and tolerant of the political activities of the parties whose doctrines and ideas are contradictory and opposing. Political maturity and tolerance of any society are subject to the influence of historical legacy and events it has experienced. This study portrayed the level of political tolerance of a segment of the Pakhtun youth. In certain respects, the level of intolerance is alarming; overall, the attitude is almost neutral pertaining to some other characteristics; and concerning some others, a tolerant attitude is demonstrated, such as socio-political (in)equality. This research argues that any non-accommodative attitude (or sanctioned inequalities) can impact the process of political learning and maturity adversely. Intolerant citizenship may have a potential temperament for supporting repressive state policies that may further the conflicting environment and not only cause but also sustain political instability.

The study’s overall results show the respondents’ tolerant attitude and their supportive proclivity for civil liberties. The political parties have contributed to improving this climate of tolerant attitude and respect for civil liberties. Although systematic social engineering of the Pakhtun society has been carried out, the youth surveyed does demonstrate a tolerant attitude that could be attributed to the favourable structural features of *Pakhtunwali* that can engage conflicting competing narratives. However, this dimension has not been explored in this study and demands scholars’ attention to future research. Nevertheless, this study has highlighted certain variables, such as formal and religious education, and political affiliation and participation that significantly contribute to the level of political tolerance of the population under study.

Nevertheless, this study has certain limitations; it depicts only the youth of the Pakhtun society, which is further limited to only one region where the Pakhtuns reside in majority. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized to the entire Pakhtun population. It is suggested that a future study may collect data from different areas to explore and present a holistic picture of political tolerance in the Pakhtuns. It is also suggested that future studies may consider political tolerance on the part of both mass public and elites of the society. The present study is also not embarking on the etiology of political tolerance in the Pakhtun society. Therefore, scholars may design

a study to explore the causes and consequences of the political intolerance in the Pakhtun society.

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