Sustainability of the UN Nation-Building Measures in Post-Mandate Countries

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Abstract
The first UN peacekeeping mission was authorized in 1948, during the first Arab-Israeli War. Since then, the peacekeeping missions have been established in many countries, with varying mandates. The existing literature on the subject focuses primarily on the changing nature of the UN missions, over the past 70 years. Moreover, there is considerable literature on the factors that pertain to the gaining of a peacekeeping mandate and how the UN resources are utilized to complete the overall objectives. However, the literature is quite limited in the evaluation criteria and frameworks for peacekeeping and nation-building. Furthermore, the minimal existing literature focuses on evaluating the present-time effectiveness of UN missions, based on their mandated objectives. This paper, therefore, aims to address a prevailing gap in the literature by focusing on evaluating the sustainability of the UN missions. The Diehl and Druckman’s Framework of peace operations evaluation is used to measure the sustainability of the UN nation-building missions. The cases of UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL), El Salvador (ONUSAL), and Timor-Leste (UNMIT) are considered for this purpose. These countries provide some resemblance with their assigned UN mandate, yet differences exist in their cultures, historical backgrounds, and economic situation. This paper concludes by providing retrospective lessons and potential areas of improvements for future UN missions.

Keywords
Sustainability, Evaluation Framework, United Nations, nation-building, peacekeeping

Introduction
With the failure of the League of Nations to prevent, mitigate, and resolve global conflicts, the establishment of the United Nations Organization, with a much broader mandate, was illustrative of universal longing for peaceful and diplomatic settlements of prevailing global conflicts. The UN peacekeeping missions, since then, have served in some of the most war-torn and volatile regions of the world. During the past seven decades, the scope and complexity of UN peacekeeping missions have grown in size. The history of the UN peacekeeping missions could be traced back to that of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), founded on May 29, 1948.

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This paper, therefore, aims to provide a brief historical context of the UN peacekeeping missions and how their mandate has evolved, over the decades to address contemporary complexities. The primary focus of this paper is on understanding the sustainability of UN nation-building measures.

However, the term ‘nation-building’ has been used in varying contexts, by different sources, ranging from the UN itself to think tanks and the media. To address this, the author has used only the official UN definitions and scope of the ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘nation-building’, whereas the historical buildup of the UN mandates will help the reader further understand the scope and evolution of these terms. Later in the paper, the nation-building measures are examined, concerning the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which served from 2003-2018. Liberia is regarded as one of the more prominent success stories of UN peacekeeping and nation-building programs. Before the UN intervention in 2003, the West African country experienced two of the bloodiest and economically draining civil wars. The UN and the international community generally attribute the relative peace and stability observed today to a collective effort. There seems to be a significant contrast in Liberia’s internal security situation, before and after the UN involvement. Therefore, this case will be placed central to addressing the fundamental questions in this paper.

To provide the reader with a comparative framework, this paper further examines the UN missions in Liberia, El Salvador, and East Timor. The rationale for focusing on these three particular cases includes the prevailing social and political differences in all of these countries. This will provide an understanding of how the variation of the above-mentioned factors may affect our results. Diehl and Druckman’s Framework for peace operations evaluation is used to measure the sustainability of the UN efforts in cases of UNMIL, ONUSAL, and UNMIT. Although ‘sustainability’ is not a defined objective for these UN missions, it is still important to understand how the peacekeeping and nation-building measures taken by UN so fare when it is no longer there to enforce them.

The paper uses empirical research, using both primary and secondary data. For any statistical references, with regards to the cases of Liberia, El Salvador, and East Timor, the author has used primarily the official sources of the UN, Human Rights Watch, and other NGOs that were present in the area. These are the focal entities that have carried out primary research and data collection in the above-mentioned countries. Another possible limitation is the lack of strict definitions of our term ‘sustainability’. This creates more room for subjective interpretations of the results. Therefore, this study measures the sustainability of the UN nation-building, in terms of the primary objectives defined by the UN missions of the respective countries. Diehl and Druckman’s Framework has remained relevant; for others, the key questions and progress measures are defined based on the official mandate for their UN missions.

**Literature Review**

The UN peacekeeping operations began in 1948, during the first Arab-Israel War, resulting in the establishment of UNTSO. Since then, the UN has had more than 70 peacekeeping operations, which have varied considerably in terms of their assigned mandates (United Nations, 2020). For more than seven decades, the implicit understanding of the term ‘peacekeeping’ has varied and been used rather loosely. UN peacekeeping is predicated upon the principles of “consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except to protect the assigned mandate.” Consent, for a majority of the
UN missions, has been acquired primarily from the recognized authority of a particular country. Therefore, ‘consent’ is defined as the host government’s acceptance and facilitation of the peacekeeping force as well as that of the UN peacekeeping mandate for that country (Sebastián & Gorur, 2018). The second aspect, ‘impartiality’, may be defined as conscious behaviour and actions to remain bipartisan and not to favour any of the conflicting factions, inside the area of the UN mandate. This also implies not to favour any particular interest group or to deviate from the assigned mandate of the UN to further one’s national or personal interests (Rhoades, 2016). Johan Galtung first discussed the term ‘peacebuilding in 1976 (Galtung, 1976). The UN defines peacebuilding as an action to solidify peace and avoid a relapse into conflict. The UN Secretary General’s Policy Committee describes peacebuilding as “a range of activities targeted to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels, for conflict management and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development” (U.N. Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010). From this, one can infer that the peacekeeping activities are a part of peacebuilding, as defined by the UN (Dobbins et al., 2007).

Nevertheless, the term nation-building itself has had varying interpretations among International Organizations (IOs), such as NATO and the European Union (EU). NATO defines nation-building as the involvement of a legally sanctioned party to suppress conflict, stabilize, and alleviate the country’s governance and political process of transitions (Dobbins, 2005). This definition, however, may not entirely encapsulate nation-building, in the modern UN context, as it fails to recognize the internal aspect of lessening societal fragmentation, providing people with a sense of identity, and a national cause. These aspects of nation-building are highlighted by Alesina and Reich (2015), as she provides the historical context of nation-building measures, in France and Italy in the context of the post-Napoleonic eras where the countries rulers made deliberate efforts to inculcate a sense of unified culture, language, and national identity among their citizenry. This study defines nation-building as a process in which the inhabitants of a country feel a significant level of homogeneity of interest, perspectives, and goals, giving them a sense of identity and nationalism.

Similarly, Talentino (2010) identifies two primary forms of nation-building measures, internal and external, where state-building and identity-building are the two different areas of focus. Another important point highlighted by the author is the need for a functioning state to achieve durable success. The expansion of the scope of UN peacekeeping missions and its increasing mandate in restricting and kick-starting the political economies of their respective countries is examined by Juergenliemk (2012). The author also provides a contextual understanding of the UN Charter (Chapters 6 and 7) and how they mandate different roles for a UN peacekeeping mission.

The contemporary understanding of nation-building cannot be developed without first understanding what constitutes a state-failure. State failure is defined as a legitimate governing authority’s failure or severe inability to deliver the essential level of security, functioning economic framework, and some kind of public welfare to its citizenry (Bogdandy, 2005). Grotenhuis (2016), has discussed the examples of fragile states of Afghanistan, D.R. Congo, Iraq, and others, making the case that the nation-building measures taken by the third party have either not been able to produce any significant results, or have proved to be completely counter-productive. He further argues that fundamental to institutional-building and, consequentially, nation-building is the cultural, ethnic, and religious identities of any concerned diaspora. The world community has, thus far, failed to provide adequate considerations of these
factors, that, none the less, from the very psyche and ways of life of people. It is, therefore, pertinent to revisit the current nation-building strategies and acquiesce to the fact that without cultivating a sense of shared identity, be it along the cultural, ethnic, or religious lines, people will have no incentive to believe in the newly-created government and to cooperate with it.

Nevertheless, how the UN itself defines and implements peacekeeping and nation-building is another question. To understand this, we need to consider four primary documents that have helped shape the UN outlook on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and nation-building since 1945: The UN Charter, the Agenda for Peace (1992), the Brahimi Report (2000), and Capstone Doctrine (2008). The UN Charter Chapter 6 outlines the guidelines for dispute resolution and the role of The Security Council in it, while Chapter 7 defines the mandate and the jurisdiction of the Security Council, in case of a conflict, breach of peace, and acts of aggression.

The UN outlook of peacekeeping witnessed a significant change after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, this was manifested in the landmark 1992 report called, The UN Agenda for Peace. It recognized the changing nature of political and militant stakeholders, the role of increased global connectivity and commercialism, a shift from an immediate threat of nuclear war to more tacit and decentralized types of war, which could deteriorate established infrastructure from within. Furthermore, the evolving nature of global threats, such as rise in income disparity, refugee settlements, environmental degradation, and rise in localized terrorism, along ethnic and religious lines was conceded as worthy of a rethink in original forms of dialogue engagement, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and most importantly nation-building (United Nations, 1992). This report significantly broadens the scope of what would later be known as nation-building, by defining preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, confident building measures (CBMs), and creation of demilitarized zones as parts of the UN peacemaking process. The Brahimi Report, published in 2000, concluded with providing recommendations, such as capacity-building of the peacebuilding missions, to make war-to-peace transitions more accessible, more focus on the use of UN police cognizant of the aspirations of the local community, and more resources on ground intelligence and the defensive capacities of the UN forces. One issue identified in this report is the inability of the UN missions to develop long-term peace without their active involvement. Almost all of the measures suggested point to a much broader and incisive role of the UN, in conflict-areas, which is essentially an indication of a shift from a mere conflict-prevention to building sustainable communities, infrastructure, and political machinery. The Brahimi report was a landmark shift in redefining the scope of future UN missions.

The Brahimi Report reiterated increased expectation from the UN, since the early 1990s, where the UN peacekeepers were not merely entrusted to maintain peace, but also establish peace, negotiate settlements, establish demilitarized zones — all while keeping in regard the wrested interests of the signing parties. The breakout of conflict in Central Africa and the Rwandan genocide was highlighted as examples of how the pre-cold war strategies of peacekeeping were proving to be counter-productive. In the context of this paper, perhaps the most important facet of this report is the introduction of a new term, called ‘peacebuilding’, which by the very definition closely resembles that of the modern nation-building measures of today (Brahimi, 2000). It is this report that justifies the expanded mandate of the UN missions, which is evident in UNMIL, ONUSAL, and UNMIT.
The 2008 Capstone Report was the first effort to codify the UN peacekeeping efforts, in the context of the contemporary complexities. The report was primarily focused on the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). The Capstone Report enlists new initiatives capable of leading and ensuring that all national and international peacekeeping actors work in coordination with each other, providing a suitable and peaceful environment to a legally recognized state. Thereby allowing it to provide its citizenry security and fundamental human rights, and supporting the political process, reconciliation, and peace process to achieve peace and establish a government in that country. It mentions the existing limitations of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), due to their inability to entertain any sustainable, long term objectives.

Furthermore, The Capstone Report also emphasizes the need to include economic development and prosperity as an essential part of the UN peacebuilding efforts. Mainly, most of the recommendations of this report illustrate what we now regard as the role of a nation-building process. This further built upon the Brahimi report, by characterizing the political and administrative involvement as not only acceptable but an essential part of the UN nation-building missions.

The UN peacekeeping efforts in Liberia have been subject to many examinations. The Liberia Peacebuilding Plan and the Capacity Mapping Exercises (CMEs) were both aimed at understanding the priority UN work during the political transitions and measurement of the extent to which the UN, in its limited capacity could undertake those responsibilities post-UNMIL (Forti & Connolly, 2018). The role of the Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO), after the withdrawal in 2018, was mentioned in this report as well. This, however, is being done after more than a decade of active UN involvement in the country. The fact that even in post-war Liberia, the UN needed to provide financial and political support to the government raises concerns about the nation-building activities carried from 2003-2018 (Ibid). It is argued that the UNMIL was assigned a mandate of preventing conflicts among the local warring factions, providing humanitarian aid to the people, strengthening the democratic government, and conducting fair elections to kick start the process of political transition. Therefore, by virtue of having significant success in those aspects, the UNMIL could be branded as a success story (Howard, 2018). The fundamental role of UNMIL in the Liberian elections of 2005, and the development of economic revival led by The World Bank and the EU, was classified as a success.

However, a key point highlighted was the act that this plan also created distress in Liberia, and many saw it as a violation of their sovereignty (Wiharta, 2006). This brought about the controversial Governance and Economic Assistance Management Program (GEMAP), proposed by the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The effectiveness of Diehl and Druckman's Peace Evaluation Framework is questioned by (Farrall, 2012). McCandless addresses the primary sources of conflict in Liberia and the initiatives taken by the government and UNO (2008). She highlights critical conflict drivers like food insecurity, the weak justice system, poor leadership, identity-based divisions, and a lack of national identity, among others. Serious concerns were raised about the sustainability of the UN initiatives and a need for an Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBS) and integrating it with the existing policy frameworks. These references illustrate that the UN mandate is often issued unilaterally; the measures are often not durable due to a lack of local involvement, and conflict between the UN goals and those of the local population.
The available literature lacks retrospective analysis of the UN mission in Liberia, and the success of its nation-building measures, across the board. The post-2018 literature, on this subject, is primarily that of the UN reports, which has to be viewed with caution. Similarly, the prevailing narrative of ‘the Liberian success story’ seems to be dominant, where the actual progress made by Liberia is often exceedingly attributed solely to the UN. Therefore, caution also needs to be exercised in entirely attributing the Liberian transitions from a war-torn country to a peaceful, politically functioning state. Moreover, there are examples of countries where considerable progress was made, without any substantial involvement of the UN. Perhaps the biggest impediment to most the studies done on this subject is the dearth of available data, especially concerning economic, human well-being, and security indicators, which could be used to draw any substantial conclusions on the impact of the UN nation-building in concerned countries. Another critical aspect to consider is the disparity in the assigned mandate of the UN blue helmets, in various countries, which is why the criteria to measure the efficacy of nation-building may vary from country to country.

Evaluation Framework for UN Nation-building Success

We have identified in the literature review that the traditional understanding of the term ‘peacekeeping’ forms merely a part of ‘peacebuilding’. Peacekeeping constitutes only a small part of the overall mandate assigned to the UN missions of UNMIL, OUNSAL, and UNMIT. Among the most widely used peace operations evaluation frameworks is the one designed by Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman, in their book Evaluating Peace Operations (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). Before this, Diehl created another peacekeeping evaluation parameter, based primarily on two main factors; the extent to which these operations limit armed conflicts and the extent to which they promote conflict resolution (Diehl, 1993).

The Evaluation Framework, presented by Diehl and Druckman, considers the peace operations evaluation as a series of interrelated steps. It starts by identifying the primary goals and objectives of a peacekeeping mission. Therefore, it automatically creates flexibility in the framework to apply to all the countries and areas where the UN has had to operate under different sets of objectives. The second step is the formation of an evaluation question. Moreover, the key indicators are then derived from the main objectives and the overall mandate. Each main generic objectives and part of the mandate may have multiple qualitative or quantitative indicators. For example, in the case of UNMIL, the crucial part of the assigned mandate was to stop conflict and start the democratization process. According to the Framework, the key indicators could be the number of terror attacks in a given timeframe, number of armed militia members, public participation in the general elections, and human rights indicators in the country (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). The next dimension of this framework is to identify measures of success or failure to answer the questions stated in the previous step. After that, the framework mentions the limitations and benefits of choosing the success measures as identified in step three. The final step of the Diehl and Druckman’s Framework is to ascertain the extent to which primary goals have been accomplished. The above-mentioned measures were used by Diehl and Druckman to evaluate the success of the UN missions. The sustainability will be examined using the same framework; however, the effectiveness of the UN efforts will be measured in the post-mandate times. This is not to imply that sustainability was or could have been an objective of those
missions. Instead, it did understand the longevity of the efforts of UN missions beyond completion.

**Sustainability Evaluation Framework for UNMIL**

To apply the Diehl and Druckman’s framework, we first analyze the core objectives of any UN mission. In the case of UNMIL, the objectives are ‘conflict prevention’, ‘resolution’, and ‘peacebuilding’. The second step is to identify critical questions that may help us evaluate the success of failure of the UMIL. With this regard, the second step of the framework would be to identify the relevant key question. Diehl (2013) identifies the question as:

1) Is violence still present?
2) Have the violence levels decreased?
3) Has the number of armed combatants decreased?
4) How has the inter-group fighting casualty rate changed?

The next step is to establish measures of progress. For violence reduction and conflict prevention in Liberia, these would be the time without war, the number of new crimes and shooting, terror incidents registered in Liberia, and the change in the number of child soldiers. The Peace Operations Evaluation defines the final step as the recognition of certain benefits and drawbacks of our chosen progress measures. In the context of Liberia, we have limited or lack of quantitative data available and a lack of quantitative, first-hand data about other variables.

**Analysis**

To evaluate the overall success of the UN efforts in Liberia, under Diehl and Druckman’s Framework, we need to address the above-mentioned indicators separately. Since the UNMIL mandate ended in March 2018, the indicators and statistics will be compared both during and after the departure of the UN mission.

The UNMIL mandate ended officially on March 30, 2018. In that year, the rate of both violent and non-violent crimes increased, compared to the previous year. Liberia 2019 Crime & Safety Report implies an overall increase in all the constituent crimes in these categories, including sexual assaults, ‘snatch and grab’, carjacking, and rape. The second key indicator for Liberia is to identify how the crime level has varied post-UNMIL. From the available data of the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), US Department of State, one can observe a steady increase in violent and non-violent crimes. In terms of the number of armed combatants, their reintegration in the society, and the level of inter-group fighting, the only available source is of the UN. The progress experienced by Liberia during the time of UNMIL is well-recognized. However, there is a dearth of reliable post-2018 figures, and the only measurable factor that we do have is that Liberia, despite its weak governance, is not facing any significant increase in internal armed conflicts (Council, 2018).

This paper considers the standards, key indicators, and initially identified questions, under the Diehl and Druckman’s Framework, for the sustainability of the UNMIL. It may be concluded that although during the time between 2003–2018, Liberia made considerable strides in terms of democratization, human rights protection, and overall security situation, the post-mandate indicators show only partial sustainability (Council, 2018). In terms of crimes, security situation, Liberia has faced a decline since 2018. However, concerning democratization steps and human rights protection measures, there has not been any significant decline. One aspect that we need to consider in the case of Liberia is that the country still has a
newly established democratic government, police force, and bureaucracy. Therefore, some level of decline, in the sustainability of the nation-buildings factors, could be attributed to the void felt by the absence of UNMIL and the prevailing lack of capacity in the Liberian state.

**El Salvador**

The United Nations has had two major missions in El Salvador. El Salvador was ravished with civil war, in the 1980s, when the United Nations established its first observer group for Central America (i.e., ONUCA). It was one of the lowest involvement missions of the UN history, with its assigned mandate only limited to reporting inter-state rebel movement and support logistics for the insurgent groups in the Central American region (Montgomery, 1995). ONUCA was initially able to achieve success with its original mandate. Many contra fighters were disarmed, and weapons caches were taken into custody.

However, during the early 1990s, a new wave of intense civil war in El Salvador exacerbated a need for international intervention. In May 1991, under the UNSC resolution 693, the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established (Defence, 2018). The mandate was inclusive of many aspects of nation-building such as reinforcement of the terms of the peace agreement between the government and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). Furthermore, the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1995) shows the Security Council mandating OUNSAL to create a new police force, reforms in the judicial and electoral systems, and to ensure human rights protection. Here the Diehl and Druckman’s Framework might be applied under different parameters. According to the Framework, the main objectives are; ensure peace agreement reinforcement, build and reform the national police force, observe and promote human rights, and introduce electoral and judicial reforms. The key questions could be:

1) Did the parties practice the terms of the agreement?
2) Did ONUSAL help to create a national police force?
3) Did the human rights situation improve in El Salvador?
4) Were the judicial and electoral reforms introduced?

The second step would be to identify the key indicators, which, in case of ONUSAL include the number of casualties and violent acts committed by members of FMLN and the government, police force members, their training, and SOPs, before and after the ONUSAL initiative, human rights indicators, such as the number of crimes, quality of life, and acts of violence. The number of war-related casualties is quantifiable and can be compared over time. However, police reforms may not be empirically qualified due to their subjectivity and the limited availability of the literature. Similarly, human rights indicators will include judicial reforms, human rights, and socioeconomic goals.

**Analysis**

The ONUSAL was officially present in El Salvador from 1991-1995. During that time, a few of the mission-related steps taken included disarmament and demobilization of the FMLN combatants and the creation of special disarmament zones for the of FMLN combatants inside the country. However, their reintegration proved to be much more difficult. Due to the lack of infrastructure and economic resources, the goal of disarmament and reintegration was only partially achieved.
Although the demobilization of FMLN combatants was fulfilled, the structural barriers present in the Salvadoran land laws, lack of government machinery, and the inability of the judiciary to resolve prevailing land disputes made reintegration of the former combatants especially difficult (Stein, 2012). The UN partly mediated the 1992 Peace Accord. The Chapultepec Accord opened the way for FMLN for political integration (Negroponte, 2012). Even today, FMLN is a major political party and has been in power up until recently (Renteria & Torres, 2019). Therefore, by our first measure of progress, we may attribute the ONUSAL initiatives to be not only fulfilling the initially assigned mandate of that time but also being sustainable, more than two decades after the end of the mission.

Before the civil war, the armed forces controlled most of the internal security inside El Salvador. The Chapultepec Accord of 1992 allowed for the creation of a new police force under the supervision of OUNSAL (Montgomery, 1995). By the time OUNSAL was leaving in 1995, the structural and operational weaknesses of the National Civil Police Force (PNC) were evident. As the primary authority over the civil law and order of El Salvador, the creation and functioning of PNC, along with the sustainability of its makeup and operational capacity can be assessed by measuring the crime rate and other related indicators in the country. Today, the country has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, along with that of extrajudicial killings, and many types of other violent crimes. The PNC proved inefficient to control these threats. However, in the past three years, the Salvadoran government has taken several policy reforms, such as ‘Model Police Precinct’ (MPP) that provides the PNC equipment and intelligence to focus on targeted operations. The MPP reforms did help bring down the homicide rate to some extent (Affairs, 2019). Thus far, the MPP reforms have been instituted in 19 departments and more than 50 local stations. The caveat is that the high crime rates and instability are not unique to El Salvador. Most of the Central American countries face a similar situation.

El Salvador also introduced judicial reforms, indicating many of its former leaders under the changes of corruption and misuse of power. This has, however, only been done in recent years, and is opposite to the principles of the amnesty granted to the combatants in the 1990s. Moreover, many of the suggestions of the UN Truth Commission, with regards to the judicial reforms, were never realized. Many of the judges that were identified as partisan are still in office, while neither a specialized criminal justice system nor a prosecutorial system was implemented to allow for easy investigation of the human rights violations (Arteaga, 2016). By evaluating the progress measures and the key indicators for sustainability, we may conclude that despite the progress made in El Salvador during the mandate of ONUSAL in from 1991-1995, these measures have proved to be only partially sustainable, with diminishing success over time. This could be attributed to the inability and lack of willingness of the local government to follow-up on the ONUSAL efforts. The establishment of a police force, the reintegration of the combatants in the mainstream, and the restart of the political process are the areas where the ONUSAL measures have proved to be durable and sustainable. However, the lack of police reforms, creation of political factions inside PNA, rising crime rate, and the inability of the local judiciary to protect the human rights and prosecute the war criminals, raise serious concerns about the unsustainability of the ONUSAL measures, in this regard. Even the very few police and judicial reforms that have been made in the past few years have been in direct disparity to the guidelines and suggestions present either by ONUSAL or the UN Truth Commission. With the use of Diehl and Druckman’s Framework in the context of ONUSAL, we may conclude that
the mission proved to be partially sustainable, with the most successfully achieved in the short-term objectives of the ONUSAL mandate.

**Timor-Leste**

The UN involvement in East Timor started in 1975, when the UNSC condemned the Indonesian invasion of the territory, although it had been on the UN agenda before that. To maintain brevity and to follow the same method as our previous cases, we will skim through the history of the conflict and focus only on the latest UN mission in the territory, i.e. United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT), lasting from 2006-2012 (Smith, 2010). East Timor was administered by Portugal, with significant autonomy for the locals. The conflict started in 1973 when Portugal intended to make East Timor one of its provinces. This led to a pushback by the Indonesian government, which invaded the territory and annexed it as its 27th province. The UN did not recognize Timor-Leste as an Indonesian Province. In June 1998, Indonesia proposed a limited autonomy plan for East Timor, which was signed in 1999. Resultantly, the first UN mission, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), was set to ascertain the reaction of the local population to the proposed Indonesian plan. Since then various missions have been sent, with different mandates: The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), from 1999-2002, and the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), from May 2002-2005.

On August 25, 2006, the UNSC Resolution 1704 established the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). It was given the mandate to assist in furthering capacity for monitoring, protecting, and promoting of human rights, provide support to the national police, support Timor-Leste in all aspects of the presidential and parliamentary election in the country, and cooperate and coordinate with UN and other NGOs to assist in capacity-building and post-conflict peacebuilding. These were also the main objectives of UNMIT, as per Diehl and Druckman’s Framework. Therefore, the critical questions for the UNMIT mandate could be as follows:

1) Do the existing institutions in East Timor help protect human rights?
2) Did the police force receive any funding, equipment, or other forms of support from UNMIT?
3) Did UNMIT provide any financial, technical, logistical, or other types of support to further the democratic process in the country?
4) Did UNMIT and INGOs help in conflict-prevention, peace sustenance, or institutional capacity of the East Timor government?

For East Timor, we have to rely on key questions from the cases of other UN missions, with similar mandates. In the existing literature on the subject, there seems to be a dearth of reliable application of the Diehl and Druckman’s Framework for UNMIT. The critical progress measures for assessment question could be the human rights index, the number of violent and non-violent crimes, size and strength of the police force, funding, experts, logistics, or volunteers provided to East Timor, by the UN to conduct elections, and training, funding, or any other form of capacity-building offered to the peacekeeping institutions. The benefits and limitations of these
measures could be human rights indicators, which are present in all three cases. The second factor, too, is a consistent theme across all three cases. The third measure, size, and strength are easily quantifiable, and any increase in that could be attributed to the efforts of UNMIT, as it was the only entity in East Timor at that time with this mandate. Finally, the last two factors may not offer observable trends over the years and need to be compared to other sources.

**Analysis**

The UNMIT worked closely with the government of Timor-Leste and other relevant state institutions, during 2006-2012. The UN human rights workers were free to examine the detention centers of the country. Since 2008, the government publishes annual National Priorities and Developmental Sectoral Plan (UNESCO Office Jakarta and Regional Bureau for Science in Asia and the Pacific, 2013). The NP. listed several crucial areas as the government’s intent to deliver goods to the people. A few of the top priorities, according to these documents, were good-governance, public safety, access to justice, and gender equality. The government penalized violence against women and adopted the Law Against Domestic Violence (LADV), in 2010.

An Asian Development Bank report in 2014 recognized the bridging gender gap in education, politics, and employment. At that time, Timor Leste had the highest rate of female parliamentarians in Asia and the Pacific, at 38%. (Asian Development Bank, 2014). Similarly, the economic indicators of Timor-Leste indicate a steady GDP growth, a trend that continued even after the departure of UNMIT (Asian Development Bank, 2014). However, the country continues to rank very high in corruption index and has an increasing crime rate in the past few years (Macro Trends, n.d.). The yearly health spending has increased annually as a total % of the GDP. As of 2016, the country spends more than 4.02% of its GDP on healthcare.

The number of violent and non-violent crimes peaked in 2007, followed by a steadily declining trend ever since. A similar trend was observed in the homicide trend, which peaked in 2007 at 5.82 per 100,000 and reached the lowest level in 2009 at 2.93. However, since then, the rate has increased steadily and was observed at 3.95 in 2015 (Macro Trends, n.d.; Atlas, 2015).

As mandated, the UNMIT undertook several measures to build and train national police for Timor-Leste. The first batch of 25 members of the *Policia Nacional de Timor Leste* (PNTL) was sent on field duty, under the supervision and the mentoring of the UN Police. Pakistan was one of the most active contributors to the UN police in the country, with over 900 members serving under the UNMIT mandate (UNMIT, 2012). The UN forces primarily supervised the elections of 2012. In the parliamentary elections of 2012, the UNMIT assisted on many fronts, such as policing (UNPOL assisting PNTL to provide security), Secretariado Tecnico de Administracao Eleitoral (STAE) and Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE) with voter registration, voter education, and information technology, as well as logistical support (UN, 2012). The subsequent elections conducted were mostly without any international support (U.S. Department of State, 2017).

To understand the sustainability of the UNMIT measures, we have considered data and reports both from 2006-2012 and after the departure of UNMIT in 2012 (ADB, 2014; Atlas, 2015; World Bank, 2018). In terms of human rights progress measures, the country continues to make strides in terms of education, political inclusivity, and gender equality. There has been, however, an increase in the crime rate in recent years. The creation and training of the police force was another key objective of the UNMIT. Since the 2012 elections, PNTL has taken control of the
internal security of the country. The PNTL forces alone, without the assistance of any international policing force, supported the 2016 elections. In this regard, the nation-building measures seem to prove sustainable. Another critical mandate was to help kick-start the political democratic process in the country. The 2012 elections were heavily reliant on the support of UNPOL and technical support of UNMIT.

However, the elections afterward have been carried out using the resources of the local government. Despite a few instances of political violence, there seems to be a sense of confidence in the public over the democratic process. Hence, we may conclude that under Diehl and Druckman’s Framework, the UNMIT was largely successful. By accessing the relevant indicators post-2012, we may ascertain that the measures taken by UNMIT have generally proven to be sustainable.

Conclusion
The reason for evaluating three different UN missions was to provide overall conclusions and results in a holistic frame of reference. UNMIL, OUNSAL, and UNMIT were all created under different political and security situations of Liberia, El Salvador, and Timor-Leste, respectively. Nevertheless, we also observe that the UN mandates in these missions had a considerable similarity. This helped us use Diehl and Druckman’s Framework for evaluation to develop a better understanding of the factors that impact the sustainability of the nation-building measures when the mandate of the UN missions has considerable similarities. We find that the UN often becomes too ambitious in terms of defining missions’ mandate. The use of loose and subjective terms, such as ‘democratization’, ‘community-building’, and ‘civil liberties’ are often not limited and defined by quantitative parameters. Therefore, it becomes rather tricky to use these objectives, to measure the sustainability of the UN missions. In the case of ONUSAL, we find that with time, the mandate of the mission may change, which may result in infarction between the UN peacekeepers and the local population. This also implies that, while evaluating any UN mission, one must be open to the possibility of the said mission members having their vested interests, which may sometimes contradict those determined by the UN headquarter. The example of UNMIL is quite relevant, where the locals accused a few UN officials of extortions and sexual misconduct.

Any unilateral action of the part of the UN often proves to be counter-productive, especially if the objectives are long-term, such as the civil transition of power and creation of a self-sustaining police force. Whether or not a specific mandate is fulfilled depends mainly upon the cooperation of the local community. In the case of ONUSAL, the UN faced significant obstacles in establishing a peace force, while the same was achieved with great success, in UNMIT. It is concluded that the reason for this disparity was the fact that the former was done unilaterally, without including the local stakeholders, while the latter was achieved after a national consensus and the will of the warring factions to cooperate with the UN.

The originally assigned mandate to the UN forces is generally vague, highly optimistic, and often not quantitatively measurable. It, therefore, leaves much room for subjectivity, speculative opinion, and even conflicting political interests to gauge and interpret the UN performance in any particular country, according to one’s political and national interests. Building upon the previous point, it may be more reliable to define mandate focusing on small objective goals, such as ‘disarmament of the combatants’, ‘brokering a peace deal’, or providing ‘professional training to the local police’, compared to rather broad goals of ‘political inclusiveness’ or ‘democratization. The departure of the UN forces led to the resumption of violence, a
rise in crime, and the resurgence of militant factions, in all of the three countries. For a newly instituted government, there seems to be a lack of capacity to completely overcome these threats, as observed in the case of rising crime in Timor-Leste after 2012. It is, therefore, worth considering to end a peacekeeping mission, in two stages: peacekeeping and nation-building (capacity building as a mandatory component of the latter). The UN priorities in the beginning and the end of a mission may change completely. It is, therefore, advisable to update the mandate of the UN forces. For example, in 1992 and amnesty was granted by the UN to the combatants of the El Salvadoran civil war. The UN Truth Commission reiterated the same. However, after the departure of ONUSAL, these war criminals started militancy again and could not be prosecuted due to the amnesty granted to them. In the case of a peacekeeping mandate, the UN forces must remain non-partisan and aware of the violence and human rights atrocities committed by the government. A certain level of flexibility must be maintained as long as negotiations are being carried out. However, any inadvertent proclivity towards the government’s side might result in post-UN-mission violence, as was witnessed in El Salvador after the end of the ONUSAL mandate.

In all three cases, it was observed that the overall sustainability of the UN nation-building measures relies primarily on the police and judicial systems. Therefore, in a post-peacekeeping stage, the UN mission priorities should include human rights metrics, economic prosperity, and gender equality, and improvements in police and judicial system. Political integration and economic incentives may halt the on-going trend of resurging violence. The window between Disarmament, Demobilization Reforms (DDRs) and Security Sector Reforms (SSRs) are often very short. The chances of conflict relapse increase if the transition phase is prolonged. It is, therefore, necessary to keep these elements in the loop and allow them to absorb the progress made during that time so that there is more incentive for them to work with the UN forces for the next phases of the missions.

References


