UN Peacekeeping Operations and Successful Military Diplomacy: A Case Study of Pakistan

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Abstract
Few years following its creation, the United Nations (UN) with the blessing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to establish the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), as a multilateral mechanism geared at fulfilling the Chapter VII of the UN Charter which empowered the Security Council to enforce measurement to maintain or restore international peace and security. Since its creation, the multilateral mechanism has recorded several successes and failures to its credit. While it is essentially not like traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping operations have evolved over the years and have emerged as a new form of diplomacy. Besides, theoretically underscoring the differences between diplomacy and foreign policy, which often appear as conflated, the paper demonstrates how diplomacy is an expression of foreign policy. Meanwhile, putting in context the change and transformation in global politics, particularly global conflict, the paper argues that traditional diplomacy has ceased to be the preoccupation and exclusive business of the foreign ministry and career diplomats, it now involves foot soldiers who are not necessarily diplomats but act as diplomats in terms of peacekeeping, negotiating between warring parties, carrying their countries’ emblems and representing the latter in resolving global conflict, and increasingly becoming the representation of their countries’ foreign policy objective, hence peacekeeping military diplomacy. The paper uses decades of Pakistan’s peacekeeping missions as a reference point to establish how a nation’s peacekeeping efforts represent and qualifies as military diplomacy. It also presented the lessons and good practices Pakistan can sell to the rest of the world vis-à-vis peacekeeping and lastly how well Pakistan can consolidate its peacekeeping diplomacy.

Keywords
Military diplomacy, UN peacekeeping operation, diplomacy, Pakistan’s peacekeeping, foreign policy

Introduction
One of the first lessons of International Relations lies in the introduction of realism as the traditional theoretical underpinning which explains and also shapes nation-state’s behavior. Through the optics of realism, the state’s survival is not merely fundamental, but a defining principle of inter-state relations and foreign policy formulation. Within the changing anarchic global system, the survival and prestige of a state are construed, understood, analyzed and connected with the success and failure of its diplomacy. In

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an evolving global system, the act of diplomacy is not spared from the evolution and hence, the reason why today’s diplomacy transcends the preoccupation of a few selected diplomats. Part of the evolution is the changing nature of war and conflict, the type which traditional diplomats cannot practically put an end to.

Traditional or public diplomacy is an art by which the state employs and deploys all resources available at its disposal to convincing, persuading and coercing other states to take particular actions, which they might necessarily be indisposed to doing (Aron, 1966). In the traditional sense of the term, ‘diplomacy’ functions up to a certain degree between allies, but hardly any longer among enemies, or even between the blocs and the neutral nations’ (Aron, 1966). Yet it is the conduct of international relations through negotiation, between states and other entities – through peaceful means by official agents, adroit to ‘making policy understood and if possible, accepted by other nations. Interests aims and concepts of foreign policy may change, while in diplomacy what usually changes are only the methods of implementation and the repertoire of persuasion’ (Bull, 1977, pp.: 162-163, Sofer, 1988, Jönsson, 2011, p.:188). For Watson (1982), diplomacy is not just about negotiation, but it entails a process of dialogue within a given system, through which states pursue their purposes (national interest) by means short of war (Watson, 1982, p.:11). Traditionally, what is incontestable is that the practice of diplomacy enjoins the state to ensure the fulfilment of national interest through a form of foreign policy that is peaceful.

The fact that diplomacy is not foreign policy, but only one of the elements through which the objective(s) of foreign policy are accomplished, remains indisputable. Hence, it is a tool in the hand of the state, geared at achieving sets of national objectives – in both the short and long term. Invariably, the traditional construct of diplomacy is not simply tailored at strengthening the position of a state; it is equally a calibrated and well-calculated measure – the process of making an impression on another state. If the impressionist argument of diplomacy, should be considered tenable, thus, diplomatic norms typically embodied by professional diplomats (Wiseman, 2011) adroit in creating an impression and maximizing the state’s advantages without the risk and expense.

Even though the conduct of diplomacy has a long history, as far back as the creation of empires and state-system and owing to the transnational and transcontinental intercourse, yet most scholars of diplomacy seem to believe that the present structure and institutionalized diplomatic practices are the products of the modern world system. Since the birth of the Westphalian state system, the conduct of diplomacy has primarily remained state-centric and hence Martin Wright’s delineation of the diplomatic system as the ‘master-institution’ of international relations and the ‘communication system of the international society’ (Jönsson, 2011). From both systemic and structuralist standpoints, diplomatic culture (Bull 2002) amongst states is by itself a form of international socialization, ritualistic and institutionalized process (Bjola & Kornprobst, 2018, Jönsson & Hall, 2005, p. 39, Watson, 1984). And from a postcolonial and realist point of view, such socialization might be intrinsically and characteristically coercive, embedded in power relations – weak states are co-opted forcefully and otherwise into the global system (Mitzen, 2103, Jentleson, 2006, Wiseman, 2011, p. 701).

Back in 1969, the American Society of International Law invited Ambassador Carl Schurmann to its annual meeting in Washington. During the academic summit, Ambassador Schurmann offered an insightful analysis of diplomacy. From his lens,
 [...] diplomats are no more overwhelmingly controlling the art of diplomacy, the growing dynamics of today’s world has significantly changed the complexion of diplomacy (Schurmann, 1969).

Schurmann’s assertion is as true today, as it was in 1969. Contemporarily, diplomacy is far beyond the preoccupation of the designated or professional diplomats, particularly in an ever-changing world and global affairs; if the world is susceptible to change, diplomacy cannot be insulated and therefore must also adapt itself to the growing change (Bjola & Kornprobst, 2018).

Conceptualizing Diplomacy and Peacekeeping

Like traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping operations involve the use of carrots and sticks to dealing with the unknown enemy (Hocking, 2008, p.63). While peacekeepers are technically mandated to create, a transitory environment – from conflict to a post-conflict situation, doing so would be rationally plausible through both soft and hard measures.

To conceptualize peacekeeping as a form of diplomacy, it is important to establish the intersection of diplomacy and foreign policy as two distinct ideas. The said distinction can be drawn using Brian Hocking’s differentiation conception of the two ideas. Unlike foreign policy which focuses on actors, diplomacy explores the interactions between actors (Hocking, 2016, p. 67). This explains the true essence of peacekeeping missions, directed not at the actors in the conflict, but at the interactions between them.

Similar to traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping carries the element of negotiation and/or mediation among the main protagonists in conflict. Aside from being a country representative, professional diplomats also act as agents of conflict containment. In the same token, peacekeeping is not confined to conflict containment, but also includes preventive peacekeeping, war limitation, constraining fighting geography, mitigation and eventual alleviation of conflict intensity and post-ceasefire peacekeeping (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p.14).

Secondly, arbitration in the shape of third party intervention is an integral part of diplomacy, which becomes necessarily important in the event of two parties reacting to each other’s actions which sometimes culminates into hostility. Like diplomacy, peacekeeping efforts are no less than a third party intervention tailored at dampening hostility. Yet, it is safe to say that unlike the traditional nature of diplomacy which could be bilateral or multilateral (i.e. between two more states), peacekeeping does not involve the compromise and give and take which shapes traditional diplomacy. Nonetheless, a peacekeeping mission is akin to the customary mediation and third-party involvement within the art of diplomacy. However, in contrast to the traditional diplomatic processes, peacekeeping as a form of diplomacy differs in methods of implementation and the repertoire of persuasion (Sofer, 1988). While traditional diplomacy can be characteristically non-coercive, the methods and implementation of peacekeeping can be otherwise coercive. Figure 1 and Table 1 demonstrate the said variation.

Thirdly, while peacekeeping does not qualify as traditional diplomacy between or among states, it nevertheless bears a certain degree of semblance of what traditional diplomacy is. The UN peacekeeping soldiers have over the years demonstrated their capacity to act as buffer force meant to keep the peace between two warring parties and to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Being a buffer and mediator between two consenting warring parties epitomises diplomacy (Coulon et al.,
1988). Buttressing the notion of ‘consent — diplomacy’, the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, asserted that peacekeeping is not just a technique to preserve peace in fragile and conflicted regions, but a mechanism which involves ‘the consent of all parties concerned’; an important and uncompromising element of diplomacy. Prior to venturing into the complicated and muddy processes of conflict resolution, the mandate of any UN peacekeeping mission is directly dependent on the consent of the hostile parties — particularly the state actor.

Fourthly, peacekeeping missions are dubbed as ‘preventive diplomacy,’ - a pre-emptive measure to mitigate against conflict escalation and a way of exercising good offices and mediation between two or more conflicting parties from resuming fighting and ensuring ceasefire agreement and more importantly, confidence and consensus-building process between the parties. As a ‘preventive diplomacy’ peacekeeping should be in a position to transform from waiting for the conflict to break out before sending peacekeepers, the later (and senior UN mediators) can always be deployed as countermeasures and mitigation strategy against possible conflict escalation. Besides, such preventive measures open the doors for mediation, negotiation and third party role play that can re-channel conflict energy towards the direction of peace. Beardsley and colleagues (2016) demonstrate how the nexus of diplomacy and peacekeeping can effectively achieve the objective of diplomatic venture that includes, acting as the third party; arbitrating, resolution of conflict, incentivising conflicting parties and the facilitation and settlement of conflict on systematic bases and thus reducing huge death tolls and battlefield fatalities and preventing conflict escalation.

Fifthly, peacekeeping missions over the years have acted with the intent of conducting diplomacy between warring parties. Besides being ‘a small protective force essentially different from an attacking force’ (Lie, 1969), they have shown the proclivity of ‘overseeing the implementation of agreements on the borders and assisting UN troops stationed in the region’, and subsequently reinforcing the liberal paradigmatic view by which ‘dialogue replaces confrontation’ (Masuda, 2011). This is true for the Dayton agreement, Rwanda, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and other UN peacekeeping mandates such as:

- UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999 was a sign of new policy development;
- UN Transition Assistance Group for Namibia (UNTAG);
- UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH);
- UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL);
- UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC);
- The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); in charge of the civilian sector;
- Kosovo Force (KFOR) in charge of the military sector was established based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, (Yugoslavia)
Today’s formula and structure of peacekeeping force is the product of evolving circumstances, primarily the careful initiative of Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General anticipates the presence of peacekeeping forces as the fulfilment of Article 33- Chapter 6 of the UN charter. The fact that warring parties might either be less willing or incapacitated to seek a peaceful resolution to a dispute could eventually necessitate the diplomatic role of the peacekeeping force, which is not merely a neutral party, but charged to work towards ceasing the conflict. Peacekeeping diplomacy does not necessarily have to be the sole responsibility of men in boots, who might or not necessarily be skilled in the language of the mission area. Hence for some practical and cogent reasons, elements of diplomacy which require negotiations and mediation and understanding of the language of the conflicting parties evidently requires the indulgence of a seasoned UN-diplomat, whose linguistic proficiency will play an instrumental role in achieving the set goals and elements of diplomacy (Druckman & Stern, 1997).

Making an argument for the potential success of peacekeeping as a diplomatic effort, the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen during the 45th UN General Assembly, September 1990, opined that peacekeeping is certain to be a failed
diplomatic project, unless ‘normalization of international relations can only be realized by universally respecting the five principles: mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence’ (Masuda, 2011). However, Ling (2007) argues that if peacekeeping tends to embrace diplomatic posture, it might turn out to be detrimental as the missions will be selective and encouraged only when ‘payoffs to national interests, hence the huge impact on collective interest and international security that peacekeeping operations are mainly meant to serve’.

Case of Pakistan

Being one of the largest and oldest troop-contributing countries gives Pakistan a unique niche within the community of peacekeepers. Besides, being an important constituent, Pakistan is a major contributor to both boots and brains on the ground (Moon, 2013). Such a display of commitment towards international peace and security invariably carries the potential of improving and adding to the international image and status of Pakistan. In the past 70 years of UN peacekeeping, Pakistan has participated in a total of 46 UN peacekeeping missions, deployed troops in 28 countries and in total contributed over 200,000 soldiers in different capacities and conflict zones. This is not to mention, 156 brave men who sacrificed their lives for global peace and security. Presently, Pakistan ranks as the 6th largest troop-contributing country to the UN.2

If diplomacy is how a country conducts its international relations and makes a positive image of itself within the comity of nations; Pakistan’s peacekeeping ventures should no less be considered as a form of diplomacy. For almost six decades of indelible contribution, Pakistan has been able to mark a niche in peacekeeping and particularly made an impression to an extent that the UN has come to reciprocate with a gesture of trust in the capability of Pakistani military and non-military officers (who had served the UN in different capacities and aspects of peacekeeping). The visit of the Under-Secretary-General, UNDPKO, Jean Pierre Lacroix to Pakistan in recent past and most especially his visit to the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) at the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, a citadel that offers peacekeeping training to local and international potential peacekeepers, uproariously underscores the aforementioned recognition (The Nations, 2018).

The appreciation of her years of active participation and sacrifice in UN peacekeeping missions is also a common knowledge within the peacekeeping countries. While several countries are now using peacekeeping participation to advance their foreign and economic policy (Armstrong 2010), Pakistan should be no exemption in promoting her diplomatic and foreign policy agenda through peacekeeping. Interestingly, China, having a long-standing non-interference foreign policy has joined the bandwagon of peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, where pundits argue that Beijing must protect her increasing economic interests (Ukeje & Tariku, 2018, p. 301). Thus, for China, peacekeeping transcends ensuring peace in a foreign land but is of cardinal importance to the growing expansionist Chinese economic agenda and project. Even if Pakistan considers her years of peacekeeping engagement as an act of diplomacy and an integral part of her foreign policy instrument, the question arises, how well this instrument has yielded dividends, in both short and long terms and how successful has it been. Answer(s) to such pertinent questions might not necessarily require hard logic, yet it is a puzzle that demands some degree of conceptual dissection.

2 Based on the data gathered from the Department of Peacekeeping Training, the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad.
The notion of success and failure might be debatable, yet conventional wisdom will agree that the relativity of success and failure does not hinder objective analysis of marking what implicit success and failure are. To evade such contentious waters, it is imperative to set a benchmark for success and failure, if both cannot be quantified, thus a nation like Pakistan needs a qualitative instrument to gauge the overall success and failure of its peacekeeping missions. Hence, policymakers should be able to proffer answers to these questions, what favourable policy outcomes have been accrued over the years, vis-à-vis peacekeeping. Does mere demonstration to the UN that Pakistan can offer and send troops anywhere in the world to quench uprising and conflict, constitute success? Or does maintain short term prestige or building a strategic socio-political and economic diplomatic relations with the concerned country qualify as a representation of success? Policymakers in Pakistan critically need to discern, where the country stands.

Druckman and Stern (1997) in their research debate on the success of international peacekeeping operations, focusing on the implication(s) of peacekeeping missions on conflict situation and environment, but the question that remains unanswered is that does the same foreign policy instrument roll back any significant diplomatic advantage, strengthen relations between the troop-contributing country and the affected country?

If peacekeeping diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy, it behoves every contributing state to carefully understand its level of success and failure (Baldwin, 2000). Foreign policy should not and is not a mere policy formulation process, but a process that culminates by the output that stems from the input and throughput. The success and failure of a policy are arguably associated with the output in both the short and long term and hence a conscious and pragmatic policymaker should be cognizant of the fact that policy output is as important as the level of policy input. Addressing this Lacuna, Cohen and Scott (1975) argued that policymakers often muster great strength to making policy, but they often fall short to defining and ascertaining its output. In addition to ascertaining the success and failure of a particular foreign policy, policymakers should not simply be concerned about the output but the feedbacks generated by the policy. It is most plausible to measure success and failure through the nature of feedback, a state received upon the implementation of any policy. In the backdrop of the above, arise fundamental questions such as:

i) As a peacekeeping nation, what output (success or failure) has Pakistan derived from years of numerous missions?

ii) Do the missions translate into good relations with the conflict-affected countries?

iii) As an instrument of foreign policy, has peacekeeping diplomacy actually translated into national prestige, or an avenue to generate enormous diplomatic dividends for Pakistan? And finally,

iv) How well and deep has peacekeeping goodwill managed to outlive the peacekeeping missions?

To place the preceding questions and discussion in perspective, the following discussion explores three different but important peacekeeping missions as a tool to explicate and generate a perspective as to how peacekeeping diplomacy can either become scorn or prestige for the participating country. There is no denying that UN peacekeeping missions are always a multilateral collection of nations, hence it is uneasy
to bestow all the goodwill of maintaining and keeping peace on a single country. Yet, what remains important is how participating and contributing countries conduct themselves with the local population during and following the conflict. Hence, peacekeeping diplomacy is not a one-way traffic, but a continuous process and based on such continuity, contributing countries can ascertain whether or not its contribution is a success or failure or if it has accrued prestige or scorn from the concerned country. In addition to representing the UN, peacekeepers are also the bearers of their countries’ flags, emblem, and dignity and in the event of any mishap or unforeseen circumstances or display of bravery; the soldiers bearing a particular country’s emblem will be either directly or otherwise held responsible.

Case One: The Rwanda Genocide
While the post-genocide report was highly critical of the conduct of the UN and two principal UNSC members (the U.S and Britain) over their lackadaisical and nonchalant responses to the prescient warning of a looming genocide is a glaring case in point. The inaction of the Belgian soldiers to salvage thousands of Tutsis from the genocide will/might ever remain an indelible stain on both the conscience of the commanding officer and his troops. According to Colonel Luc Marchal - the Belgian commanding officer in Rwanda, the instruction of the UN to desert the country, but to save the white UN workers was an act of cowardice. 'We were perfectly aware of what was about to happen. Our mission was a tragic failure. Everyone considered it a form of desertion. Pulling out under such circumstances was an act of total cowardice,' admitted Colonel Luc Marchal in the times that followed (Guardian, 1999).

Case Two: The Srebrenica Genocide
Another important case is the Srebrenica genocide. Their mandate as UN peacekeeping force was to keep and maintain peace amongst the warring parties in Bosnia, but the action of the Dutch soldiers underpinned their complicity in the Srebrenica genocide. Since 1995, the memory of wearing the Dutch military badge and allowing the Bosnian Serbs led by Ratko Mladic to slaughter Muslim men and boys will remain an undeletable stigma for the Dutch military. Of recent, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) affirmed that the Dutch soldiers were 10% liable for the massacre of hundreds of Muslim men in Srebrenica – Bosnia perpetrated by the Serbian soldiers in 1995 (Khan, 2019).

Case Three: Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia
Following her ill-fated civil war and the consequent international intervention, Somalia became yet another politically unstable nation that sought help to return to the path of political civility. The mishandling of the Somalian conflict, the failure of the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) under the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751, informed the 1992 US humanitarian campaign in Somalia. The campaign was considered a political goal-scoring mission for President George H.W Bush amidst election year (Yamin, 2019, p. 54). The humanitarian campaign under US troops in Somalia turned into a nightmare for the US Marine and the infamous black hawk down the incident. Like Afghanistan, Somalia turned out to be a dead hole for the foreign troops, but not solely true for Pakistani peacekeepers, whose help was formally solicited by Washington (Yamin, 2019, p. 61).

Even as it lost 24 brave soldiers, the Pakistani peacekeepers demonstrated unwavering gallantry, whilst bravely saving the Americans from their nemesis, stabilising the country for other foreign troops (French and Belgian to mention a few) and equally boosting the position of UNOSOM. Sadly on one hand, while the like of
Belgian and Canadian soldiers were found wanting in the violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Yamin, 2019, pp. 80-81) on the other hand, the action(s) of Pakistani soldiers reflected an epitome of professionalism, fulfilment of the UN mandate accorded to them and simultaneously a representation and implementation of Pakistan’s peacekeeping foreign policy in a foreign land. Interestingly, there was momentary positive feedback for Pakistan over its professional conduct and bravery during the UNOSOM. The entire episode translated into the success of military diplomacy for Pakistan; it made many Somalis consider Pakistan as a country worthy of extending a hand for help. At the peak of war during the 1990s, Pakistan hosted thousands of Somali refugees. Though the Somali conflict has matured and entered a new phase, the question remains; Is Pakistan still revered for its heyday gallantry in that country and why Islamabad could not sustain the ovation for much too long?

In all three cases cited above, while the two other countries’ (Belgian and The Netherlands) troops have stains on their national emblems - failing to save lives and eventually causing the unforgettable genocidal events, the disposition of Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia is a plausible representation of successful peacekeeping diplomacy. Though Pakistan suffered a considerable casualty, the output of the mission underscored Pakistan’s renewed emphasis on UN peacekeeping. As Yamin (2019) rightly puts it, the Somali mission was a calculated foreign policy, carefully tailored to provide Islamabad a chance to regain its niche in global politics, which indeed was actualized. Diplomatically, the Somali mission added both credibility and capability to Pakistan’s peacekeeping pedigree, showcasing the courage and professionalism of Pakistani soldiers, saving the fallen black hawk, an effort that paid off and earned appreciation from Washington and hence the renewal of Pakistan-US relations, following post-Cold War disparagement.

Consolidation of Peacekeeping Diplomacy

Pakistan’s foreign ministry and the military establishment responsible for the management and coordination of peacekeeping missions must be cognizant of appraising peacekeeping beyond the mandate of the UN, not to violate or undermine the mandate, but to re-construe and ensure how Pakistan can turn its peacekeeping adventures into a pragmatic diplomatic tool through which state’s national interest and foreign policy objective(s) gets actualized. Diplomatically, peacekeeping should be consolidated through professional, structural and infrastructural engagement with the war-affected area.

Without being incognizant of Pakistan’s socio-political and economic worries, it is less prudent to ask the country to bite off more than it can chew, such doing, would resultanty produce less promising success, though asking the country not to try is never an insinuation to cub its ability to progress. Nevertheless, it is always prudent that states wisely engage in formulating rational yet plausible policies capable of producing pragmatic outcomes. Over ambitiousness might result in foreign policy disasters. The fact that China or other nations are engaged in Africa other than peacekeeping does suggest that Pakistan too can do the same. The success and failure of any foreign policy are shaped and determined by the capability of the state itself.

To achieve success through the peacekeeping foreign policy, Pakistan foreign policymakers should be goal-oriented to the extent of being particular as to what is expected from each peacekeeping mission sent abroad. In addition to ensuring the UN mandate and keeping its neutrality, Pakistan's foreign policymakers should be specifically focused on the role of its troops in the conflicted area. In addition, the relevant stakeholders close to the policymaking circles in the country need to consider
the following when crafting a viable and simultaneously productive peacekeeping policy;

i) What areas of development and infrastructural manoeuvring, can Pakistan be instrumental in?
ii) What aspect of the country’s economy can Pakistan invest in?
iii) What areas of the people’s life, can Pakistan be helpful with?
iv) Should Pakistan’s presence in conflict areas be closed upon the culmination of the peacekeeping mission?

Areas where Pakistan can improve its Military Diplomacy
Like every form of achievement, the civil-military institution in charge of peacekeeping should not merely celebrate but must also promote Pakistan’s peacekeeping achievements in terms of boots contribution and brain development. The performance of Pakistani peacekeepers on the ground must be carefully and strategically promoted. In the world of commoditization of everything, the act of diplomatic peacekeeping should be seen by Pakistani policymakers as a worthy commodity that must be well packaged, branded and considered as worthy of being advertised. Following are a set of workable recommendations which Pakistan can play to its strengths and benefits whilst shedding light on its role in carrying out military diplomacy;

1. promoting achievements in terms of boot contribution and brain development;
2. through peacekeeping and opening market and resources opportunity through development of formal and informal relationships (hence peacekeeping for diplomatic and national interest purpose should not end and when boots are off from the conflict zone);
3. international exchange in international peacekeeping operations in order to share Pakistan’s experience and learn from the experiences of the armies of other countries to enhance cooperation in international peacekeeping operations;
4. holding ‘seminars’ or ‘symposiums’ (individual and in collaboration with other peacekeeping nations) under the theme of international peacekeeping operations by hosting Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense);
5. Enhancing military exchange through robust coordination, engagement, and interaction amongst the major countries and countries in the region;
6. Crisscrossing intellectual and practical military exercise (the synergy of theoretical and practical studies);
7. Peacekeeping training should accelerate its effort to enticing more participation in her peacekeeping durational courses;
8. Pakistani peacekeeping forces should bolster their level of transparency and accountability not as professional
peacekeepers representing the UN, but figuratively representing Islam.

Conclusion
In an evolving global system, the act of diplomacy is not spared from the altering contextualities. Hence, today’s diplomacy transcends the preoccupation of a few selected rather cherry-picked diplomats. Part of the evolution is the changing nature of war and conflict, the type of which traditional diplomats cannot practically put an end to. In the backdrop of the aforesaid evolution, peacekeeping too became an institutionalized process under the UNSC, which accords capable and willing states to demonstrate their determination and commitment for international peace and order. Like diplomacy, peacekeeping mission is always geared at mediating between warring parties and a process aimed at ending the conflict.

Since its first peacekeeping venture in 1960, Pakistan has marked a niche and become a household name amongst the troop-contributing countries. It has maintained the credibility of contributing and participating diligently in UN peacekeeping missions. While peacekeeping has become an integral element of Pakistan’s foreign policy, it is important for Islamabad to capitalize on how well her peacekeeping diplomacy can outlive the timed tenure of the peacekeeping mission. Islamabad must seek to actualize national prestige and interest through peacekeeping diplomacy. Pakistan might not be financially potent to influence the global decision and thought, but its peacekeeping diplomacy should be instrumentalized and considered as an essential foreign policy tool within the foreign policy toolkit.

References


