The Securitization of Refugee Movements in Contemporary Politics

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Abstract

Securitization implies moving a situation up the security agenda of a state, so as to perceive it as a potential existential threat to national security. This article attempts to analyze the post-cold war refugee situations in context of the securitization concerns they raised for states hosting them. Here both the traditional and non-traditional contours of security are highlighted, including incidents of direct armed conflict between sending and receiving dyad, external intervention, infiltration or facilitation of trans-national movements across international borders and compromise of territorial integrity in the wake of these movements. The current narrative of persecution and accusation around refugee movements has led to unnecessary bias, directed towards those fleeing conflict zones. There is a need for a delicate balance between concerns of state and human security in the wake of these movements. This can help to understand why these seemingly humanitarian disasters have lately been identified as a securitization concern for host states in international politics. The analysis also uses social constructivism to establish the host state's challenges; which may account for as an incremental threat to the integrity of host state's ethnic, demographic and social constructs. The primary question that the paper seeks to address is to why and how these movements were able to raise security concerns, though they are usually associated with destitution and marginalization, yet lately have been associated with diffusing negative externalities of violent conflict zones across international borders.

Keywords

Refugee movements, trans-national rebel movements, ethnic conflict, insurgency, terrorism, social constructivism

Introduction

The post-cold war conflicts have been identified with the presence of ethnic violence, intrastate nature of conflict, involvement of non-state actors, strong external intervention, protraction of conflict, and mass refugee movements across international

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borders. With the dilution of traditional borders and increased mobility in general across regions, the diffusion of crime, rebellion, and arms from inside an active violent conflict zone, has become twice as challenging for the states hosting refugees. Though refugees in general may not be perpetrators of violence and crime, neither are all refugee movements a source of diffusing violence across borders, nevertheless the political and social construct of these movements is so intricately adjoined with the legal and humanitarian status of their stay, that the host states find themselves in a tricky situation where concerns of state security and human security of refugees is difficult to balance (SR, 2017) The Standing Committee on Protracted Refugee situations stated in 2004:

> "A consequence of protracted refugee situations is that they can serve as incubators for future problems… Large, disaffected and alienated populations relying on subsistence-level handouts are prime targets for recruitment into armed groups. And the frustration of being a refugee- of living in squalor and obscurity, and of feeling that injustice continues in one's homeland-can lead persons to commit dramatic actions that draw attention to a cause" (Mogire, 2011, p. 139).

Refugees, Mobility Across Borders and Security as a Construct

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) protocol 1965 and 1971 defines a refugee as someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence (Betts et al., 2012). Academics on the other hand take a holistic view of this issue with the *de facto* definition defining 'refugee' as people that flee conditions of general violence such as civil or international wars and the breakdown of political regimes, in addition those escaping direct government persecution, are also considered to be refugees. It is further important to differentiate between the term 'refugee' and the phenomena of 'refugee movements', using these interchangeably can result in incorrect beliefs, narratives, and resulting misplaced sense of fear and persecution around an otherwise neutral group of people (Zolberg et al., 1989).

The phenomenon of 'refugee movement' refers to masses crossing international borders in destitution and plight fleeing persecution or fear of persecution, rendering border controls and normal security procedures useless. These populations also enjoy a globally recognized and usually a communally facilitated status which allows special legal, political, and at times social and diplomatic rights of stay, and settle in a host state. This gives rise to an evolved environment inside host states leaving the state itself and refugee community's security paradigm, their identity, interest placement, and political balance vulnerable to actors. This might result in the refugee community considering the arrangement(s) as an opportunity to become mobile, operative and influential across international borders.

The UNHCR reported that there are around 25.4 million refugees worldwide in 2018 (UNHCR, 2018). It is important to note that the destitution and restricted political, economic, and social life in which refugees are deemed to survive (inside or outside refugee camps) can push them to take dangerous measures. On the other hand, their diluted power status in international politics leaves them exposed to violence and exploitation inside and outside the violent conflict zone. Any security concerns emerging from these migrations must be viewed as both: conditions triggered or highlighted due to refugee contact or migration patterns inside host state. The host

state here, along with the refugees that it hosts, could thus become both the victim and the culprit of any unrest caused by these movements (Cohen, 2002).

To approach refugee situations from a potentially securitized perspective, the understanding of term security also needs to be broadened from its normative and/or traditional interpretation. That is to say, the whole idea of security must be seen as a social construct, inter-subjective in nature (i.e. depending on the perceptions arising as a result of interactions and negotiations between actors in international system). The growing interest of academics and policy makers from moving security away from purely objective notions onto a more subjective level of analysis points to the evolving need to define security in a way where it may be relevant to a sound political stance and a representative of scientific research. This is fundamentally about the difference between the absences of threat versus the absence of fear from a threat. Human security for example, can be seen as an expression of state security though not a direct causal measure of it at all times. This though has happened in direct correlation with an actual rise in violent domestic conflict, rise of asymmetric warfare and terrorism, as an expression of power and influence across the world ever since the end of cold-war (Bladwin, 2002).

This evolved nature of threats in post-cold war politics has resulted in rise of non-traditional security agendas which at times come under strong critique on accounts of being overtly subjective rather than responsive. The issue of mobility of immigrants towards Europe in this regard, has been discouraged from being approached from a securitized position, as it might encourage persecution and building up of fear against certain communities and groups, particularly at hands of the polity. The Copenhagen School of Security though endorses societal values and basis of national cohesion to be a worthy referent to security, yet it strongly discourages the concentration of policy making on communal issues at hands of elites for fear of exploitation and negative popularization for political purposes (Sulovic, 2010). This can be observed during the recent American presidential campaign also in Europe's (societal) reaction to the possibility of opening its borders for Syrian refugees.

This paper aims to analyze *why* refugee movements have moved from being a normative humanitarian concern for states hosting them to a potential securitization concern in both academic and political rhetoric. The analysis views Post-cold war refugee situations in context of the subsequent issues of security breaches inside host states as well as the related international trends like trans-nationalism, terrorism, and rise in ethnic conflict. Reassessing the socio-political costs and indirect contribution of these movements to induce unrest and conflict in communities that host refugees, could help to rationalize the reservation shown towards hosting refugees; to be either based on material facts or not.

Social Constructivism and Refugee Migrations

Refugee movements can be of serious consequences to the host state given their influence and potential to capitalize upon the socio-political and ethno-cultural constructs of the state. Social constructivism considers the mass social contact resulting from this movement to be significantly consequential to the perceptions of ethnicity and nationalism. It further argues that both of these do not qualify to be given conditions for a group to define identity and interest basis (Esman, 2007). Instead, these are social and political constructions depending on the room for

instrumentalization and interest of either the polity or the group elites. This implies that refugees induced on basis of ethnic linkages or political gains could have significant impact on mobilization and organization inside host state by capitalizing on conducive socio-political environment, which they may alter or politicize significantly for causes and ideologies being fought for inside the conflict zone or state of origin (Brass, 1991).

Here refugee management protocols and refugee management policy must also come into discussion. It must be noted that two of the most significant post-cold war refugee movements hail from Afghanistan and Syria; 70 to 80% of this influx is being hosted by Pakistan and Turkey. It is important to consider that the mentioned countries are either not party to or else maintain the geographical limitations under *1951 Convention*.[2] This means that the ground reality for managing stay and mobility of refugees falls largely at the hands of host government and UNHCR, however have limited capacity to manage, finance or administer the settlement. The politics of refugee situation is thus inevitable to come into play. Sometimes this politics overrides the legal obligations attached to this status, especially for developing states where these movements continue to remain subject to manipulation or else ends up manipulating host state environment to their favor.

Refugees and Diffusion of Violence across Borders

Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) observed a positive correlation between presence of civil war and subsequent conflict in neighboring states and associate the movement and stay of refugees with these phenomena. The trends of trans-nationalism, mobility, and exchange of arms, rebels and ideologies which take place in disguise or under facilitation of these movements results in the negative externalities of civil strife to move across international borders. Here the closing of borders for refugees may result in dire ethical and political costs for states, meanwhile the negligent handling of the issue can result in security issues for host states as well (Salehyan, & Gleditsch, 2006). Consequences of violent conflicts thus become globalized: through internationalization and diffusion of violence via transfer of weaponry, military strategies, political unrest and cultural frustration. Refugees are consequentially identified as one of the carriers of these negative externalities across international boundaries.

Salehyan (2007, 2008, 2009) further identified the probability of direct military confrontation between the sending and receiving dyad of refugees, mostly due to trans-national rebel and militant movements that move across borders in the wake of a violent conflict and sometimes take refuge and recruits from inside refugee camps of host states (see also Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2011). This could either be a government or a group invited organization, thus facilitating recruitment and operations of rebel groups from amongst refugees. Social Constructivism views the presence of ethnic kin, sympathizers of ideology in the form of religious, social or cultural similarities, and host state's ethno-political or geo-strategic interests, as a few major facilitators, when it comes to refugee's choice of host state as well as host state's decision to accept them. This entails that the social constructs are not only

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[2]For further information: UNHCR Archives on Refugees and Asylum seekers in Turkey and Pakistan. http://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey, https://unhcrpk.org/asylum-system-in-pakistan/

decisive in granting asylum to refugees but also how much their stay will affect the subsequent construction of violence and rebellion inside their potential host state.

In the contemporary politics, another complication is the rise of trans-national organizations in conflict zones. The patterns of mobilization, networking, financing, and information flow which these organizations thrive upon across borders, can heavily capitalize on the refugee situations; to operate, commute and take refuge in host state in disguise or under facilitation of these refugee movements (Salehyan, 2009). Cross border rebellion and insurgency by Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) and Tehreek-e-Taliban is complimented by extensive mobility of ethnic diasporas across international borders in the wake of protracted conflict and ethnic violence in the Middle-East and Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaraguan Civil War and the situation from the rebel sanctuaries in Zaire after the Rwandan genocide further portray how ethnic conflict and transnational rebellion thrives on refugee situations and the mobility from refugee migrations (Staniland, 2010). Refugees are more likely to contribute to rebellion if they are located in weak and/or rival states. The 'refugee warrior' phenomenon is documented in a large number of case studies, supporting the notion that conflict and refugees are mutually reinforcing (Salehyan, 2007).

Another concerning trend is the rise of 'refugee warrior' communities from inside the refugee camps in host states which has resulted not only in organized insurgency and rebellion against state of origin, but certain groups inside state of origin or even resistance towards host state governments in post-cold war conflicts. Examples are of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Jordan, Cubans in the United States and Tutsis in Uganda, as politicized refugee groups mobilized against governments back home. PLO had also been operating against Jordanian government and alleged involvement of Tamil refugee in assassination of Rajiv Gandhi or Tutsi refugees organized against Ugandan regime are further examples of refugees organizing against host polity (Gerdes, 2006).

More alarming in fact is to observe how under some circumstances the host government and organized rebel groups have used and instrumentalized the refugees against rival governments and groups in refugee's state of origin by raising and supporting refugee militia and warriors to launch attacks against political rivals (Stedman & Tanner, 2004). Here refugees become an active resource for waging war, refugee populations. For instance, refugee populations from Central and Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central America have been actively reported to be engaged in military activities that were either intended to oust or else to destabilize the government in their countries of origin. The tricky equilibrium that a host state may have to achieve in the wake of refugee movements is the need to balance its state security needs along with humanitarian or human security needs of the refugees. This entails state's structural, cultural and regime capacity to contain and sustain the refugee population, which in case of developing states is a challenging task.

The restriction of refugees to camps and attaching stigma of terrorism and violence to them encourages recruitment and identification of refugees with extremist, separatist and combatant elements. The demographic, political and social balance, if tips in opposition to the government, the state may find itself slowly embracing the crisis from across borders. Refugees conditioned from a sectarian or ethnic revolution

are more likely to organize from refugee camps as militants to gain back influence in home state (Milton, Spencer, & Findley, 2013).

The host state in this case becomes trapped in an extremely devious situation where overly securitized refugee management policy can result in relative deprivation and alternative incentives for the refugee to seek validation and assistance from trans-national crime and terror nexus active across borders. A refugee's marginalized and frustrated profile in such cases make for an ideal recruit. One such example is of the policy adopted by Pakistan in managing the Afghans for over three decades. It was complimented by negligent and unstable administration or government at centre and ended up in permeation of borders, rising of rebels and militants from camps and an overall culture of violence and crime thriving in areas where mixing of refugees and militants from across borders with local groups (Edwards, 1986).

Refugees from economically weak states have increased vulnerability to fall victim to organized crime or indulge in rebel activities for financial gains. Activities of terrorists and organized criminals frequently reinforce each other. Terrorists engage, either directly or indirectly, in organized criminal activities (such as, trafficking, smuggling, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and the illicit trade of natural resources) for financial and/or material benefits. Such benefits contribute to undermining state security, stability and social and economic development, which in turn may create or maintain the conditions for organized criminal groups to flourish. On the other hand, organized crime groups may employ terrorist tactics, including the strategic use of violence, to enable their objectives (Ekey, 2008).

Factors facilitating Diffusion of Violence from Refugee Movements

However, refugees alone cannot be solely held responsible for diffusing violence across international borders or spillover of conflict in neighboring states without certain conduciveness and facilitation. The factors, facilitating this diffusion, can be identified as geographical overlapping of ethnic groups, moral or ethical linkages, and strategic incentives for states exploiting refugees (De Silva & May, 1991; Howard, 2010).

Realists and neo-liberalists may not be able to see the refugee situations as consequential enough to be perceived as a potential state security threat. This is primarily because the relative resilience which states are able to show in front of instances of full blown wars or ongoing insurgency shows why securitization of refugee movements does not fall into the normative premise of security studies. Nevertheless, the surge in ethnic violence, ideological instruments of strategic depth and the ability of trans-national movements, to permeate and operate across international borders, is something which has given the states significant challenge to maintain peace and stability inside their territory. In Middle-East for example, the Arab-spring movement, the trans-national rebel and terrorist networks operative (in particular) across Levant and the continuous external intervention via means of non-state actors and ethnic politicization in that region is complimented by various factors; such as, regime changes, coups, collapse of states and rise of new borders with the merging of old borders in the shadows of conflict and mobility. During this time, Middle-East was able to exchange largest number of refugees (especially since 2015), across fellow region states or ensue masses fleeing persecution from political or direct violence to other regions as well (Ahsan, 2016). This is yet another case of proximity

of refugees' mobilization with rising trends of trans-nationalization and externalization of crime, terror, and insurgency within and outside state borders.

The insecurities of Europe regarding Syrian refugees happened with the ISIS attacks across European hemisphere in 2015, although the fear was misplaced, yet its premise cannot be ignored on the basis of being rather misplaced or misconstrued at least in context of social constructivism; which see mobility and social contact to be of potential consequence to the long term societal and political security of states. Security here is not only the issue of identity and nationalism but also the threat of transnationalism to hijack and reconstruct grouping, identity, and interest placement for individuals or communities inside a host state, in order to reinforce foreign ideologies which may be belligerent in nature. The ability of ISIS and Al-Qaeda to recruit and mobilize their assets from across regional boundaries comes relevant here.

Loescher & Milner (2005) insist refugees to be a source of international conflict particularly in case of protracted stay. The authors have further identified the greatest risk of spillover of conflict in host state via 'refugee warriors'. Factors effecting the incentive and opportunity in this case can vary from strategic intervention from regional states in the conflict zone, misuse of humanitarian aid by refugees, and an under-scrutinized and securitized refugee management policy (in general) on behalf of host state.

Zolberg (1989) coined the term 'refugee warrior' identifying refugee communities with political leadership and armed sections engaged in warfare for political ends. The probability of mobilization inside host state for causes being fought inside the conflict zone increases significantly when the refugees have ethnic or identity based cushion(s) inside host environment. This can be in the form of sympathetic diaspora, favorable form of government, or affinity linkages which transcend across borders, and help such actors to operate and remain disguised (as refugees) inside host states. Instrumentalists also see ethnic and communal facilitation as a potent force in politicizing a groups as soon as an opportunity arises, which can vary for rebel groups; from gaining recognition and power inside conflict zone, financers in the form of sympathizing states having strategic stakes inside the conflict or else aspirant leadership which aims to challenge a government or group by organizing and mobilizing against it, which could be inside conflict zone or even inside host state.

It is very interesting to note the rather slow built up of narrative around the potential and actual security threats which refugees have been able to pose for host states. The academia seems fixated on the traditional security notions and over-estimates the ability of states to survive repetitive and incremental attacks on its security paradigm. Although refugees have not been able to completely disintegrate a state or transcend international borders by means of force, yet the growing trend of refugee situations posing an array of security situations for host states is a challenge which needs to be taken into due account. In case of developing countries facing the issue of refugees, significant over burdening of their institutional capacity because of the influx can cause negligence towards its own population; thus becoming vulnerable (Howard, 2010).

In case the securitization of refugee movements is manifested in the form of barring them from seeking asylum, instead of designing a responsive and proactive policy to manage them and any threats associated, then that is mere perversion of current level of data and analysis on the instances of unrest and violence as a result of

these refugee movements. Such an analysis is by no mean extrapolated on all refugee populations. In case of Kenya, for example, the refugee policies moved from being friendly in 1970s, to tolerant in 1980s, and eventually turned aggressive to the point of forced repatriation and eventually barring entry at borders in 1990s. This however happened as a reaction to the presence of rebel and armament and instances of launching rebel attacks from Kenyan soil that hosted refugees from various states in conflict across the region. Nevertheless, it is an example of a reactionary securitization policy directing persecution on a larger community which was not involved *per se* in security breaches or criminal activities against host state - as an organized entity (Nduati, 2015).

The preconditions to refugee movement's ability to instill unrest and violence across borders can be result of marginalization, destitution, political vacuum, identity crisis, ethno-nationalist movements, diluted state writ or fragile institutions. In the context of international borders, the bargain and mobility of refugees between states and the management of these movements, if considered a political and social construct rather than a purely humanitarian or legal issue can help to understand some hidden costs associated with hosting refugees. From a constructivist approach, particularly social constructivism, these factors facilitate ethno-identity based conflicts in host state to be instilled from mass social contact in the wake of refugee movements, inside a particular host state (De Silva, 1991). Hence the presence of weak government institutions and ungoverned territory in areas near refugee settlements and transit points further invite political forces to exploit this vacuum of power and extend spheres of influence (often trans-national in nature) and thrive on criminal and terrorist activities. Such conditions invite hot pursuit and belligerence between regional states and puts territorial and political sovereignty of host in direct distress.

Many of these pre-conditions are not in the control of refugees and any gaps in policy or fault lines in ethno-political paradigms of host state are merely an instrument to be exploited by violent actors; 'actors' disguised as refugees. States have ultimately all the power in international system and any power which non-state actors enjoy are often delegated or tolerated by states for strategic and political gains and can be further conceptualized as an attempt to use security as an instrument for political ends (Salehyan et. al., 2011).

These preconditions are based on a holistic experience from refugee migrations in post-cold war scenario which is marked by a rapidly changing geo-strategic and socio-political environment. If handled negligently, the rising number of refugees and potential statelessness and destitution which may arise as a result of these movements eventually can give a challenge to international community. Refugee management processes are inherently embedded within complex political, economic, social and cultural imperatives. Policy making in this regard is bound to be complicated with conflicting interests at community, state or organizational levels. The international refugee regime has failed to help host states and international community in general, to achieve dichotomy between purely humanitarian aspects of such movements with those of potential security risks.

Established threats from refugee movements can be summed as 'spill-over' effect of arms, rebels and ideologies across borders, diffusion of conflict and ethnic unrest in host state, and intervention from other states. Also, dispute between sending-receiving dyad, societal and political unrest from demographic and cultural changes,

rise of warrior refugees inside host state, instigation of insurgency, and separatism are found to be in direct correlation with protracted refugee states in developing states (WDR, 2010).

The insistence of current narrative and rhetoric regarding refugee movements for being purely securitized or else humanitarian in nature simply adds to the confusion around this issue. The refugee becomes a voiceless community in this scenario and thus becomes subject to further alienation and persecution. In addition, the refugees become unable to tell their story and defend their rights against the state that seeks to secure itself. Non-state actors exploit them as instruments of asymmetric warfare between international powers. With regards, international refugee regime is sometimes reduced to a watchdog status and local community becomes bound to suffer exhaustion and frustration due to overstay of these uninvited guests. Meanwhile the demands of Geneva Convention relating the status of these people go un-noticed or ignored, and the destitution which refugees suffer from, pushes them to take drastic measures and opens doors to be used as scape goats for blames of terrorism, insurgency and criminal activity.

Conclusion

This article attempted to identify the instances and their pre-conditions where the refugee movements in post-cold war politics moved from being purely humanitarian to a security concern for host states. The socio-political consequences from these movements can be seen as a major facilitator to these movements, introducing negative externalities of conflict across international borders. The direct security breaches reported and observed in the wake of refugee movements cannot be seen independent of the pre-conditions (ethnic, social, cultural, political and diplomatic in nature) which encourage negative externalities of conflict zones to be diffused and transferred in disguise of under facilitation of these movements across international borders. This calls for looking at many issues as socio-political constructs, such as; international borders, refugee-asylum agreements, international refugee regime's intervention in host state's refugee management policy and duration, financing as well as location of refugees. These constructs are often subject to power plays and attempts from various international actors to gain influence over the refugee population, the host state or non-state actors for strategic gains inside violent conflict zone. In case the securitization of refugee movements in contemporary politics is poorly managed, the emergent security related issues could be used as an excuse to persecute millions of people seeking asylum. An utterly biased and unjust rhetoric on academic and political level could be encouraged around this issue, leading to further persecution of this fleeing violence already. Instead, due responsibility and accountability should be attached to the financing and stay, management and mobility of refugees. In addition, the focus should also be on the methods of intervention inside conflict zones that have been able to cost substantially on the human capital and infrastructure.

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Addressing Gender Imbalance in United Nations' Peacekeeping

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Introduction

The Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) is the backbone of United Nations' Peacekeeping operations worldwide. The history of United Nations Peacekeeping operations can be traced back to1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East (ME). Since then its presence has been recognized and appreciated by all those affected by armed conflict and/or to humanitarian crises. Men in uniform have been at the forefront of its face in difficult and violent situations regardless of the areas being remote or urban in nature. As with many 'traditional' aspects of Peacekeeping operations (such as force application), the continuously changing environment has also influenced the 'face' itself to be changed, *albeit* at a slower pace. For instance, the need for incorporating women into this so far purely 'men in uniform' domain is being considered in all facets of its operations. Women with their natural affinity to Peace-making, and their ability to access gender restrictive societies is continuously being recognized as a necessary resource for UN operations.

It must be noted that given the inherent diversity within the UN framework, the troop contributing countries (TCCs) too, largely vary in their religious, ethnic, and social backgrounds. And whereas some countries are ready to be in a position to comply with this need, i.e. to integrate more female peacekeepers in their contingents, other countries still appear to be making an effort to come to terms with the idea. Fact of the matter is that, despite the urgency and realization, there is still a vast gender imbalance in UN's human resources committed to various tasks in different missions.

The aforementioned gender imbalance was identified by UN in October 2000, and resultantly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved *Resolution 1325* on 'Women, Peace and Security' (reference please). It was for the first time that the UNSC recognized that women and girls are also adversely affected by (violent) armed conflicts and therefore should have an essential role in peace support processes and Peacekeeping operations. Since its passage, the *Resolution* has served as a milestone towards better integration of women's perspectives in peace processes. Following the passage of the Resolution, various UN requirements continued to pour in (see; resolutions: 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, and 2242), stressing the significance of the role that women can potentially play in societies ridden with violent conflict and/or an evident absence of peace (Promoting Women, Peace and Security, n.d.). Consequently, as per the current

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directives under practice, all TCCs are obliged to comply with at least 15 % of females in all categories of their manpower including military, police, Staff Officers (SOs), observers, or as part of contingent. Some member states of the UN have willingly contributed women peacekeepers in missions; however, the ratio compared to men still remains visibly low. Evidently, in 2017 it was observed that, women's representation among military troops and police officers in UN peace operations remained low at 4 % and 10 % respectively (UN Women, 2018).

Since its inception, Pakistan has been one of the top few contributors to UN Peacekeeping efforts worldwide and has willingly taken part in various kinds of operations. In fact, Pakistan stood among the top five countries of the world with largest troop contribution to UN in 2018 (Statista, 2019): the list includes Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Rwanda and India. Despite an honest desire to address the previously identified gender imbalance by the TCCs, the societal norms and traditional patriarchal culture has majorly obstructed the road towards a total fulfilment of UN requirement—i.e. addressing gender imbalance. Although Pakistan's military and police force(s) have substantially promoted the idea of gender balance in UN operations, the country still falls short of being fully compliant status, fulfilling all the requirements of the UN.

One of the main arguments for under-representation of women in the UN Peacekeeping missions surrounds around the 'conditions' related to mission operating environments; often frugal and living conditions rated as 'tough'. Moreover, any posts and consequent roles of UN peacekeepers are isolated and characterized by 'Spartan' living conditions, implying their inability to survive such rough field conditions. In some cases, handful members of UN Peacekeeping missions live in fairly close proximity of each other (primarily in make-shift or rented accommodation) with often limited access to water, thus making living conditions more difficult for women as Peacekeepers. Adding to these conditions, physical dangers of abduction, sexual harassment and threat to life make it further discouraging for those TCCs who are already plagued by their societal norms, yet working to ensure the gender balance. In this backdrop, it becomes imperative to critically examine the underlying issues and involved multifaceted factors, particularly in the context of Pakistan.

UN Policy on Addressing the Gender Imbalance

Since the conception of Peacekeeping, it has been a male-dominated field employing soldiers from diverse backgrounds and cultures contributing towards peace and stability in troubled and war-torn societies. While considering the multifaceted nature of conflicts and natural calamities, the roles entrusted to UN peacekeepers have constantly been evolving. Similarly, critical focus on combatants has also witnessed a dramatic shift towards more inclusive approach. Consequently, contemporary peacekeepers are increasingly finding themselves communicating and interacting with local communities; large percentage of which comprises women and children. Accordingly, inclusion of women UN peacekeepers helps to reduce conflict and confrontation and provide a greater sense of security to local populations, particularly while dealing with women and children. It has been well observed that, the induction of women members in various missions has significantly improved access and support for local women, apart from providing role models for women in the community. Above all it has broadened the skill set available within a peacekeeping

mission, which in itself is a significant contribution. The UN believes that increased recruitment of women is critical for (cited from, Karim, 2017, p. 825):

- Empowering women in the host community;
- Addressing specific needs of female ex-combatants during the process of demobilizing and reintegration into civilian life;
- Helping make the peacekeeping force approachable to women in the community;
- Interviewing survivors of gender-based violence;
- Mentoring female cadets at police and military academies;
- Interacting with women in societies where women are prohibited from speaking to men.

In view of the above, the Security Council adopted *Resolution (S/RES/1325)* on Women, Peace and Security on 31 October 2000. The resolution reaffirms the significant role of women in the realm of peacekeeping. The said role necessarily stretches from their on-field presence as trained peace keepers, their efficacy as peace-builders and negotiators and their character in advancing humanitarian responses during and following conflict situations. Their effective presence also points towards the emancipated role of women and the prevalent norm of gender equality within the UN framework. In this regard the Resolution 1325 directs all actor states to ensure increased women participation from their respective countries in various UN peacekeeping and security missions. Alongside ensuring their involvement, the Resolution also meaningfully attends to the task of warranting a safe working environment for these women peacekeepers. In this regard, the Resolution upholds the need to guarantee a working environment that is free from all sorts of gender -based violence, particularly, rape and other forms of sexual abuses. It must be noted, that when on field, the intensity of these threatening elements multiplies by leaps and bounds. The resolution provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for Member States and the entities of the UN system (OSAGI, n.d.).

In 2006, DPKO adopted the UN Policy Directive on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations. This initiative added an additional mandate to the credentials of the DPKO, entitling it to add a gender balanced work force at all operational levels; be it at ground level or on managerial/ administrative basis (Luchetti, 2017). The policies chalked out in this framework further laid down minimum requirements for female deployments; and a report monitoring the progress of efforts by member states to improve the gender balance situation with a keen attention to issues pertaining to the deployments apart from practical propositions concerning the security and safety of conflict fields. An additional component of these guidelines was their insistence on the fact that the missions should maintain gender based data on the numbers of male and female military personnel within their respective national armed forces alongside the appointment of a Gender Focal Point within each military group with clear description of designated tasks; and assessing the operational impact of the deployment of female personnel. These efforts came coupled with the appointments of Military Gender Advisers and Military Gender Focal Points entrusted with the responsibility of supporting the integration of a gender perspective into the work of the military component during a peacekeeping mission

(DPKO/DFS Guidelines, 2010, p. 39; see also, "Gender Responsive United Nations", 2018)".

As per rules laid down in the directive, these personnel were to be placed in the military chain of command within a mission on duty. Contrastingly, the mission's Gender Adviser who had to be a civilian, (as laid down in the framework) was to provide an overall strategic guidance and direction to support the integration of a gender perspective into the work of various components of a peacekeeping mission (DPKO/DFS Guidelines, 2010, p. 39). It was further expressed that the duties of the Military Gender Adviser and the Mission Gender Adviser meant to be coordinated throughout the mission.

Since 2009, the UN has stressed upon contributing world states to make sure that the contribution of female peacekeepers from their respective countries is substantial and that it continues to rise. In order to make the inductions and then the role of women peacekeepers more formal from its own end, the UN, decided in 2011 that a Gender Focal Point be appointed before a full-time dedicated Military Gender Adviser became available. In a similar vein, the UN now also requests national contingents to appoint Gender Focal Points, and several missions have them. However, no Military Gender Advisers have been appointed at the operational level.

The above detailed discussion explicates that, TCCs are still struggling to comply with UN instructions in addressing the gender imbalance and major reason for the lack of policy implementation seems to be non-understanding of various resolution, rules, and instructions. Sahana Dharampuri in her study very aptly captures this dilemma for the TCCs as she argues that: "UN member states are aware of Resolution 1325 but most do not understand its full implications for UN peacekeeping beyond increasing women's presence in missions. During many interviews conducted for this study there was a general sense of fatigue and lack of clarity about Resolution 1325" (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 12). It thus becomes imperative that TCCs should constitute a board at appropriate levels of their decision making to critically analyse *Resolution 1325* and all its subsequent forms for meaningful adoption of strategies for effective compliance.

Issues Causing Gender Imbalance

Major portion of worlds' uniformed services and especially the militaries consider soldiering an area where females cannot cope with even the routine life demands. Extra resources to accommodate women in field locations, is another military recurring concern by the relevant authorities. For instance, former Indian army chief, General VP Malik stated that, "The Indian armed forces cannot do something socially unacceptable. Would you want your wife or sister to share a bunker with five other men like they do in Siachen?" (Nair, 2010, n.d.). Apart from traditional disdain for perceived so called 'weaknesses' of opposite sex, it is inherent male protective reflex which is likely to cloud his judgment during crisis time. Apart from male dominated military mind-set there are a host of other issues which hinder integration of women in armed forces and thus constitute a problem for TCCs to comply with UN policies on the issue.

Patriarchal culture spread around most parts of the world has further egged on the issue of gender imbalance. Female (as 'self') is considered as weak, fragile and inviolate, thus requiring protection by males. Even though the concept has been successfully challenged and reversed to an extent among more advanced nations of

the world, the idea still has to be defeated to provide an even playing field for all. The dogma is so deeply rooted that in some parts of the world women themselves subscribe to it and are reluctant to breach limits laid down for them. Men on the other hand assume the role of 'protector' and 'provider' and therefore are reluctant to witness females among them coming into harm's way. Even their professional judgement is assumed to be marred when confronted with a situation where women under their care or company come to be threatened. All this needs to change if we are to benefit from equal participation of almost half of world's population in all fields. After all women have proved themselves equal to men in most challenging fields so far reserved for men by becoming successful astronauts, race car drivers, deep sea divers, mountaineers etc.. Armed forces are likely to be one of the beneficiaries of such change in line with other workplaces in society.

Largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions belong to third world and have their unique problems which may also be visible among more affluent nations of the world. First among many are societal and ethical taboos against female mainstreaming in the society. Culture, and in some cases even religion becomes a hurdle in path of women becoming equal partners with men, at a societal level. Upbringing of female child in such societies is steeped in favouritism towards males even to an extent where female embryos are terminated for want of male heirs. Discrimination during feeding times, opportunities to education and later lower wages for females in the job market, all contribute towards women's suppression. Women when allowed to access education are reduced to selected subjects, which are traditionally accepted for female jobs in society. All this loads the dice against females and consequently, few high achievers in traditionally male dominated fields become apparent. Female segregation in various institutions and work place further contribute towards breeding gender based taboos. To this end, greater and more wholesome opportunities towards female education can gradually reverse this trend.

Isolated observer outposts are often physically cut off from rest of the force and may have to depend on meagre local resources sometimes augmented by UN. Living conditions in some cases are devoid of space, availability of running water, climate control under severe weather conditions, and provision of medical help. Patrolling duties in the field often expose peacekeepers to dangers of violence, abduction and/or rape. For a small number of male peacekeepers, the isolated conditions may result in moral depredation and may in certain cases become a threat for their female colleagues whose number is bound to be minimal. Certainly, cases of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers, is not an unheard phenomenon. Whereas these conditions can be ameliorated to an extent within formed military or police units and within large headquarters, the issue cannot be overlooked where individual or small numbers of female peacekeepers are active at isolated posts. Further safeguards can be ensured during pre-deployment training in mixed teams where female members are sufficiently trained to take care of themselves in case of a violent encounter. Similarly, exposure to working with opposite sex during training would also go a long way towards reducing male curiosity resulting into greater confidence and mutual respect.

With the availability of more emancipated women ready to take on fields (so far reserved for men), armed forces would also emerge as beneficiary and be able to bridge this gender gap within its rank and file. Societal and ethical norms, however take long time to be established, therefore mainstreaming the women participation in

society should be a long-term strategy. For the time being, existing female presence in the armed forces of various nations can be harnessed and volunteers can be inducted through an extensive basic military training for UN peacekeeping assignments and subsequent deployment. This being a stop gap arrangement would go a long way towards opening up greater female participation from a bigger pool still, as and when it becomes available.

Way Forward

Intricacies involved in gender imbalance are varied and complicated. These can neither be wished away nor overcome in a short while. A sustained and focused approach is needed at national and Service level to be able to address the situation. Following are some recommendations with long and short term results to get out of this controversy and be able to become useful members of UN peacekeepers' team. Even though these recommendations are focussed towards Pakistan military, some can also be useful for others when suitably modified.

Short Term Measures

- Immediate constitution of a dedicated team at army headquarters for analysis of various UN resolutions and DPKO's instructions on the subject for a systematic and effortless compliance.
- Look for suitable candidates from among the female officer corps to fill officer cadres required in categories of Military Observers, Staff Officers and contingents as is being presently done. Vacancies among lower ranks can be picked up from amongst very large pool available in Armed Forces Nursing Service. These when suitably trained in basic military fields and where possible equipped with required language training can prove extremely useful as medics and mediators with UN patrols, Observers as well as in field units.
- Fresh recruitment as officers of suitably qualified women in fields of Negotiation, Women and Child protection, Sexual Exploitation against Women and Children etc., and their rotational employment with our Peacekeeping effort.
- Extensive pre-deployment training of female participants along with their male counterparts without any gender deference and thus reduce misgivings about each other and to build mutual confidence.

Long Term Measures

- Gradually remove gender segregation from playgrounds to work place by providing safe and encouraging environment.
- Provide equal educational and professional opportunities to females.
- Abolish gender specific wages.
- Create newer opportunities for females within armed forces and police.

Conclusion

UN's desire to bridge the gender gap among its peacekeepers is necessitated by a considered opinion arrived at jointly with the member states in the past and later supplemented by useful role that female peacekeepers have already demonstrated in

some field missions. Consequently genuine desire of TCCs to comply with the policy is marred firstly by lack of understanding the requirement, and secondly by non-availability of sufficiently trained female members in their armed forces and police. Gender discrimination and lack of opportunities for women in third world societies make it further complicated for the armed forces to pick, choose and equip their contingents with correct gender balance. Risks and difficult living conditions in mission areas further discourage the employer as well as the participants, it is therefore imperative not only to initiate necessary steps towards improving these conditions but also to prepare intending participants through intensive training. Above all it must be remembered that only longer term measures would result into long-term benefits and therefore all efforts must be concentrated towards mainstreaming of females into society through equal opportunities in fields of education, job parity and gradual shift away from patriarchal culture.

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Understanding Evolution of China's Peacekeeping Policy in the 21st Century

Fahad Nabeel[1]

In recent years, China has enhanced its personnel and financial contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). According to UN statistics, China is the largest personnel contributor among the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and 11th largest contributor among UN member states. In terms of financial contribution, China is the 2nd largest contributor, next to the USA, to the UNPKOs in 2018 (Gebrehiwot & Demissie, 2018).

The normative posture on state sovereignty and non-intervention hindered Chinese participation in UNPKOs during the 1970s. However, Chinese attitude towards UN peacekeeping witnessed gradual adjustment from the 1980s to the 1990s. The shift in Beijing's attitude was witnessed so that its economic development-oriented reform and opening up strategy could benefit by having a favorable international environment. During the 1990s, China fielded only 532 personnel and its financial contribution constituted a mere one percent of the UN peacekeeping budget.

In the 21st century, cultivating an image of being a responsive power, reinforcing the United Nations, and sharing shared apprehensions for peace and security are the major objectives which have contributed in enhancing Chinese participation in UNPKOs. Changes in Chinese national identity have been identified by Yin He as the main driving force behind changing the attitude of China towards UNPKOs (He, 2018).

At the start of the millennium, China contributed the least number of personnel among P5. From the early 2000s, China has evolved its peacekeeping policy by increasing its personnel and financial contributions. In 2013, China was only contributing roughly three percent to the total financial contributions for UN peacekeeping. But since then, it has upped its contribution which now constitutes 10.25 percent of the total UN peacekeeping budget (Pauley, 2018).

Coupled with financial support, China has dispatched 2,519 personnel as of June 2018. Apart from personnel and financial contributions, China has also contributed in improving the overall capacity of peacekeeping personnel training by opening China Peacekeeping Police Training Center in 2000 for police personnel training and the Ministry of Defense Peacekeeping Center in 2009 for the exercise of military personnel.

Apart from participating and learning through various peacekeeping-related international activities, China has emerged as an active organizer of UN peacekeeping training by hosting academic exchange activities and international training courses at its police and military peacekeeping training institutions. It now maintains

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peacekeeping reserve force consisting of 8,000 People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops for UNPKOs. Consequently, UN Secretary General António Guterres remarked that China has become a "bridge-builder" and "honest broker" in global conflicts (Zhihao, 2018).

The emergence of China's leading role in peacekeeping missions' aims to foster favorable relations especially in Africa, the continent which hosts the most UNPKO missions. Over the past 15 years, China deployed more than 30,000 personnel to the continent as part of various UNPKOs (Gebrehiwot & Demissie, 2018). The underlying principle behind Chinese involvement in Africa-based UNPKOs is the aspiration to become a great power in international affairs is seen as the underlying principle behind Chinese involvement in Africa-based UNPKOs.

Strengthening of the Chinese military is another objective of China's leading role in peacekeeping missions. PLA is able to improve its "military operations other than war" (MOOTW) and modernize its security forces through the deployment of troops abroad. The peacekeeping missions help PLA by improving its mobility and supportability, gaining operational experience, assisting the purchase of progressive weapon systems and expertise and access to practices, operational doctrine and training methods of foreign militaries. These engagements also offer PLA with opportunities to improve their capabilities in counter terrorism, mobility operations, and logistics (Annual report to Congress, 2018).

Similarly, Logan Pauley argues that China can play a greater role in peacekeeping missions by supplying its own defense equipment to other states (Pauley, 2018). UNPKOs is a great forum through which China can modernize its military capacity by gaining benefit in the form of joint collaboration and knowledge transfer with other states. China burnishes its image as a concerned international stakeholder by appearing as more interested in the peace and reconstruction of fragile states.

Apart from strengthening the military, China's enhanced role in peacekeeping missions is viewed as a national image building mechanism which strives to improve its reputation abroad. Coupled with its increased efforts and diminishing leadership role of the USA, China is projecting its image to the international community as a "teacher of peace, civilization, and might" by assuming the leadership role in UN peacekeeping. Chinese state media also remains abuzz with Beijing's achievements in UNPKOs by attributing success to "China's quality" and "China's standard".

A number of factors have been identified which helps in understanding when and why China decides to deploy its troops for peacekeeping missions. While studying 18 cases of China's participation/non-participations in UKPKO from 2003-2017, Sunghee Cho concluded that the significance of host states as export markets proved to be a better predictor to understand whether China will or will not participate in a peacekeeping mission (Cho, 2018). For example, Sudan ranked as the sixth largest importer of Chinese goods in Africa before the start of the United Nations Mission in Sudan in March 2005. Prior to the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire in April 2004, the country ranked as Africa's 11th largest importer of Chinese goods.

Contrary to prevalent assumptions, the significance of host states as exporters of resource-related materials did not factor as good predictor to understand pattern of China's involvement in UNPKOs. A case in point is Chad, which hosted

the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, which ranked 45th largest importer of Chinese goods in Africa but ranked as Africa's 15th largest exporter to China.

Sovereignty-related concerns constitute another key factor which helps in understanding China's participation/non-participation. In the 18 UNPKOs from 2003 to 2017, concerns regarding sovereignty issues factored in two-thirds of the total peacekeeping missions during this period. Over the years, China has shown openness regarding UNPKOs by making its understanding more flexible to "use of force" and "impartiality" conditions but still firmly stick to obtaining consent from host states. For example, China sent its personnel to Lebanon in March 2006 for UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which operated since March 1978, after UN Security Council resolution 1655 mentioned that Lebanese government undertook actions to reinforce connection amongst its armed forces and UNIFIL.

While studying non-participation of China in some UNPKOs, Marisa Mori compared China's participation in United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and its non-participation in United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). She concluded that an important motivating factor to send Chinese personnel to Mali and to not participate in MINUSCA was the state's aspiration to be perceived as an equivalent to France, UK and US.

In Mali, all four countries faced a collective security concern of violent Islamist groups. However, further research needs to be done to strengthen this argument (Mori, 2018).

Like its national identity, China's peacekeeping guidelines have also evolved in the 21st century. China believes that the core doctrines of UN peacekeeping; impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence, consent and in defence of mandate are the keys to win the confidence and support for UNPKOs and ensure the smooth conduct of these operations. Although, China still believes in the upholding of these principles, its approach to and application of these principles have evolved.
According to China, the approval of the host country is required for the establishment of any peacekeeping operation (PKO). However, it also acknowledges that sometimes efforts of the international community are needed for achieving consent. In recent years, China joined the global community in urging Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syria to approve the UN peacekeeping and collaborate with the international body.

Despite insisting on non-interference of external forces in internal affairs of a state, China's practice of "impartiality" principle has evolved to accommodate the involvement of the international community in peace efforts for conflict-affected countries. Over the years, Chinese officials have met opposition parties of Libya, Syria and Afghanistan to actively participate in the peace processes of disputed countries (He, 2018).

Beijing, which still expresses concerns regarding the coercive actions, now engages in such actions in PKO provided that the peacekeeping operation is authorized by UNSC and the ground situation reasons it as indispensable to use force. In recent years, China refrained its long held attitude of not contributing security troops to PKOs by deploying a security company for the first time to MINUSMA in December 2013. In 2015, 700-person infantry battalion was also contributed to UN Mission in South Sudan.

Despite continued support to UN peacekeeping missions and international security governance, China faces certain challenges with respect to its part in UN peacekeeping regime. The two main challenges China currently faces are lack of leadership roles for China in UN peacekeeping regime and a dearth of Chinese input in the formulation of agendas and ideas about UNPKO activities.

Despite having significant influence in UN peacekeeping affairs, China remains under-represented in UN peacekeeping regime. Beijing ranks 14th in the ranking of most civilian employees by any country in the UN Secretariat. Only 11 Chinese nationals are posted on D1 or above senior level posts in the UN Secretariat. China was invited in two out of six UN-nominated important expert panels to analyze and advice on UN peacekeeping activities since 2000.

To some extent, China itself is to be blamed for its under-representation by not having enough experienced personnel to staff high-level positions in UNPKOs. But the trend is changing. Four Chinese officers have commanded UNPKOs since 2007. On the other hand, China has failed to present its perceptive with respect to post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding. The waning presence of Washington due to cutbacks to personnel and financial contributions to UN peacekeeping engagement has provided Beijing with the opportunity to assume leadership role in UNPKOs. If China is to assume the leadership role in UN peacekeeping, it has to address the challenges discussed above.

The capacity building of its military and civilian personnel needs to be enhanced so that they can be considered for top level positions at United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Similarly, it needs to train its peacekeepers by imparting them with necessary skills to interact with local communities, NGOs and gather intelligence to safeguard peacekeepers and workers. By doing so, this will help China to present an alternative perspective of promoting reconciliation and development in post-conflict societies. China also needs to work with regional organizations like African Union by enhancing their financial and training support and to intervene in humanitarian cases in accordance with the mandates of regional organizations. This will help China in resolving the dilemma between its non-interference policy and the UN mandate of protecting civilians.

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Book Review: Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: A Story of Defiance, Deterrence and Deviance by Hassan Abbas

Minahil Riaz Toor[1]

Dr. Hassan Abbas is a Pakistani-American academic whose interest area lies in South and Central Asia. He is presently a Professor and Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at National Defense University, Washington, DC. Similar to his previous books, Hassan Abbas has taken up yet another topic that revolves around the statehood of Pakistan.

The book is a nine chapters long comprehensive case around Pakistan's road to becoming a nuclear state. He starts by a focused spot light on Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. The author has framed his questions around Dr. Khan and his critical role in developing the nuclear weapons programme, links of military and bureaucracy to the nuclear network, strategic and monetary motives surrounding it and finally juggling the blame game among the parties involved. In addition, he bases his arguments around a theoretical understanding to authenticate his claims academically.

The structure of Chapter II assists the reader to contextualize the reasons for Pakistan to become a nuclear state. He invites the reader to visualize the strategic culture that pushed Pakistan towards this option. He establishes a case that starts from the beginning of Pakistan's formation, the induction of religion in state affairs, the pivotal role of Kashmir dispute to exacerbate the conflict between India and Pakistan, showcase of a headstrong military that led Pakistan towards a national security state, and the socio-political challenges that led to the disintegration of East Pakistan.

The author mostly focuses the discussion on Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons technology in Chapter III. He derives reason from the work of *Bhumitra Chakma* and *Willaim Epstein* to explain that security concerns, national prestige, technological boost and domestic politics has pushed the country towards such a critical goal. The writer has subjected Pakistan's nuclear aspirations to be driven by a security dilemma in the region, which is essentially created by India. He narrates that the nuclear programme was first conceived at a civilian research stage during 1954-1965.

Later, from 1965 to 1971, Pakistan went through a 'push' and 'pull' in its nuclear policy and nurtured a Pakistani bomb lobby. However, between 1972 and 1984 marks the critical time when Bhutto reoriented Pakistan's nuclear policy and started the nuclear weapons programme. This chapter not only brings into attention the individual as well as organizational communications but also defines the interplay of United States, Britain and China on the nuclear project.

The series of chapters IV, V and VI explains the relations and linkages of Pakistan with Iran, North Korea and Libya respectively. The writer visibly attempts to

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expose the alleged primary role of Dr. Khan, and covert role of some civil and military officials, in nuclear proliferation by assisting these countries in terms of technical consultancy, manufacturing components and shipment of related equipment. Allegedly this aided the efforts of Iran and North Korea to enrich uranium for their nuclear projects. While the controversy around Pakistan and Libya is hinged upon transnational nuclear technology sales enterprise. The author indicates that it was after the Libyan case, that the wide-range possibility of non-state actors to accrue advantage out of nuclear proliferation came into the limelight around the world.

Chapter VII carries a thorough approach assessment of Dr. Khan and other officials who were involved in nuclear proliferation activities in Pakistan. He has streamlined the driving forces for this attempt in terms of personal interests, religious motivations at the state level and anti-western attitude at the international level. While in the next chapter, the writer states that Pakistan's decision making is affected by civil-military rivalry and protracted political instability. He claims that these prominent factors distracted the government from keeping an eye on the back channels that possibly facilitated nuclear proliferation efforts. He also ascertains that due to poor command and control structures, monitoring and accountability mechanisms, Dr. Khan and his helping hands were protected from any direct government intervention regarding nuclear proliferation activities, since the government's official stance denies any state involvement in the matter.

The concluding chapter IX suggests that nuclear proliferation occurred in three stages and with three different countries. With Iran, Dr. Khan was working on behalf of Pakistan. While with North Korea, Dr. Khan was instrumental as a representative of Pakistan as North Korea was providing ballistic missiles to Pakistan's government in exchange for their nuclear assistance. As for the Libyan case, Dr. Khan was working independently with his close associates and was compelled by his self-fulfilling personal and monetary motives.

According to the author, the Pakistan nuclear web of associates was well camouflaged in the system in which no irregularities could be determined, despite the evidence that suggest any peculiarity. He further touched upon the 'see-saw' nature of a possible Saudi-Pakistan nuclear collaboration. Finally, the writer carefully converged the contents of his book, deliberated on strategic deterrence and nuclear postures of both the countries. He also suggests Pakistan to take concrete steps for the safety and security of its nuclear weapons programme.

In the light of these accounts, this book undoubtedly covers the subject at hand from all its nooks and corners. It indulges in an in-depth analysis of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and the debate surrounding it. I would commend the author for digging deep into the case, and painting an elaborate picture from a vast array of sources. However, the aims of the book that the author highlights lack novelty (pg. 3). The speculative debate over Pakistan's nuclear program, its legality and proliferation activities was hyped by the West since 2003 disclosures. After fifteen years, a reader expects a book on this matter to bring a new dimension to the existing case. Not only was this aspect unattended, rather the book turns out to be another reinforcement of western view.

The write up also embroils into a repetitive attempt to instill a rogue, deceptive and emotionally aggressive identity of Pakistan. Right from its title, the author has established a perception that the reader should be expecting *defiance, deterrence and deviance* in Pakistan's behavior during its nuclear journey to

destination. In addition, the contents of the book and its arrangement suggest a case of representing Pakistan through internationally frowned upon motivations. The buzzwords used pre-establish what the reader should anticipate in the book, with respect to Pakistan, before giving the reader a chance to develop his/her own assessment and point of view.

This also displays how the discourse in the contemporary day and age works on the demand and supply model. The research grant awarded by a US based foundation and an Indian publishing house would naturally have a demand for Pakistan's anti-military and establishment write up, which the author has provided to them on a platter. Moreover, as *Hussein Alatas* explains the Intellectual Imperialism in *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, in order to be acknowledged internationally, one needs to produce a narrative that is in line with what is being produced by countries who dominate knowledge and its circulation around the world. This is why, the writer, being a Pakistani had the advantage of accessing raw data and processed it on the terms of who dominates knowledge in the South Asian region directly and indirectly. As a result, the book was deemed to be tilted towards the Indian narrative of Pakistan's nuclear bomb.

In addition, most of the sources and quotations cited in this book are denting Pakistan's struggle to develop the nuclear bomb. For example, the author cites western scholar Jim Walsh's remark on Pakistan being 'the biggest and most important illicit exporter of nuclear technology in the history of nuclear age'. Such sources are accompanied by Pervez Hoodbhoy, Stephen Waltz, Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins among many others. Therefore, it may also be noted that the for-to-against ratio regarding Pakistan's nuclear bomb in terms of references, is likely to be visibly disproportionate.

In this context, it can be observed that the author very astutely introduces an allegation against Pakistan, hammers it through works of dissident authors and implies the allegation to be virtually true to the reader. The writer has also used theoretical evidence to substantiate his view against the Pakistan's nuclear bomb in Chapter II. He mentions Scott Sagan's (a proliferation pessimist) line of argument that 'Pakistan lacks institutional mechanisms for civilian control over nuclear decision making, and their militaries are also inward looking' (p. 11). He strengthens his theoretical arguments by indicating that 'nuclear nationalism' in nuclear myth makers can pave way for nuclear proliferation and implicitly relating it to induce violence in Pakistan's nationalist behavior.

Later in his book, the author grounds the development of the nuclear bomb under religious motivations. He penetrates this argument in Chapter III by showcasing that Pakistan being developed in the name of Islam is a home ground for religious militant groups and religious political parties who influence politics and policies in Pakistan. Also, in Chapter VIII, the author reiterates the infiltration of religion in state structure by expressing that officials at Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) were routinely inspired by religious slogans and ideology. He substantiates this by claiming that Ummah Tameer e Nau (UTN) was formed by two senior nuclear engineers who were working at KRL. UTN had maintained links with not only Al-Qaeda, but was also affiliated with Al-Rasheed Trust (which is listed as a terrorist organization by US). In doing so, the author positions Pakistan as a religiously extremist country unable to handle the responsibility of being a nuclear state. However, it is imperative to understand that it

was imminent for Pakistan to preemptively prepare for the forthcoming strategic culture, primarily influenced by nuclear weapons.

The author, in Chapter VII, has also linked Dr. Khan's nuclear proliferation activities as means to assist the Muslim World in developing the bomb and personal financial motivations. In this manner, Chapter VIII indicates lose control and monitoring of the state over nuclear sites. The writer makes a point in signifying Dr. Khan's personal motivations that led towards nuclear proliferation, since he needed the financial aid to maintain his public relations exercise and fuel his intent to become the next President, which overshadowed his responsibility ethic. But this certainly does not give the author a free pass to allege against the statehood of Pakistan and direct the reader to question Pakistan as a responsible nuclear weapon state.

Even when religion is taken out of the equation, the writer makes his case through the words of Pervez Hoodbhoy (one of the opponents of Pakistan's nuclear bomb), who believes that Pakistan's nuclear bomb was driven by its aspiration for pride and confidence. In explaining so, he blames the state failures to work as a push towards developing nuclear weapons, since according to Hoodbhoy that was the only 'sense of achievement' Pakistan had. In this way, the author has instrumentally used word play to define the identity of Pakistan. He has crafted a low capacity building, subjugated policy making and institutionally corrupt expression of Pakistan that lacks an indigenous ability to be virtuous. The author has represented Pakistan's preemptive efforts to be Indian obsessed and concurred that Pakistan's policies are shaped to counter India alone.

The anti-western lens of Pakistan has also been brought under the limelight. The author working in America and acknowledging the support of universities and centers based in US for his research work, naturally positions Pakistan as the 'other' to establish a better stature of United States in the process. He has depicted it as a responsibility of US to manage the strategic environment of South Asian region in Chapter II. While the writer drafts a case that displays a nuisance that may emerge due to nuclear weapons in the region, Chapter III gives evidence that US herself introduced the nuclear option to Pakistan in 1954 at Bahawalpur. But when Pakistan built up her nuclear weapons program, and refused to adhere to United States domestic anti-proliferation laws, it was again US who imposed sanctions on Pakistan. Even though later in 2008, the author writes that US had financially and technologically assisted Pakistan to secure its nuclear arsenal and declared it protected. These contradictory plays of practices by US, mentioned in the book, must put the spot light on her, rather than asserting Pakistan's worldview to be anti-western and reflecting deceit in Pakistan's international behavior.

The above samples that take shape of a discourse movement where the author has implicitly and explicitly played with the language expression to construct a frivolous and radical identity of Pakistan. This book, therefore, may be considered as a set of textual representational practice to define the social reality of Pakistan; its military, incompetent decision making power, wavering institutional controls, and a state image as a whole. Religious motivations, anti-western view, Indian inspired actions and reactions, indifferent state management etc. are the key words that highlight the nature of the book. Although the writer quotes Amartya Sen, who says that the divisive power of classification places people in separate unique boxes and therefore must not be adopted as a scale, but still the author himself indulges in a practice of labeling and identity construction through language manipulation. As a

scholar, one must realize the importance of neutrality in discourse and honor his responsibility as an academic to develop a discourse that does not confine an identity to a state. It is advised to the reader that his exemplified piece must not be mistaken as factual since it is an amalgamation of opinions and statements, and not the official version. The bent of mind that the author displays is strengthened with such scholarly evidence, which shows how history can be articulated and represented according to the eyes of the beholder.

This book is a must read for Pakistani nuclear strategists and thinkers to examine different point of views that may be against national interest. This book may create inspiration for nuclear experts and policy makers in Pakistan to respond on the veracity of the contents and their reservations.

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