Analysis of Middle Eastern Refugee Kinetics and Concept of Hijrah under Daesh

Waseem Iftikhar

Abstract
The theory of Post-structuralism, parts its way from traditional Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberalist theories on the notion of state as a rational actor. The reason for this departure is that this concept discards and marginalizes others, such as non-state and trans-state actors and those persecuted by their own state such as refugees. Turmoil in Middle East has created a crucial situation surrounding refugees’ issue. As per UNHCR there are almost 4.8 Million registered Syrian refugees, the total number of refugees around the globe is much higher. Besides others, Islamic State or ISIS has been instrumental in displacing such large swaths of population out of their homes. On one hand ISIS has made the stay of locals untenable creating millions of refugees, and on the other hand, they are inviting foreign fighters to move to Syria through a more traditional Islamic concept of Hijrah (literal meanings migration). These two groups (refugees and migrants) crisscross each other on spatiotemporally variable pathways as they embark on a complex and opaque social landscape. There is a need to study the kinetics of these groups based on the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors as theorized by Kunz in his theory of refugees and through the analysis of identifiable and identical set of discourses in contemporary refugee studies.

Keywords
Post-structuralism, Daesh, refugees, hijrah,

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Introduction

Migration and refugees are two separate phenomena. The United Nations Convention on Refugees (1951) defines a refugee as:

...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

This definition completely disregards the plight of those who, due to multiple reasons, are unable to cross the borders and are displaced within their own borders, such as millions of Syrians and Iraqis. Since the turn of the century, refugee phenomenon has become even more internationalized, and a war byproduct that could rightly be labeled as the sub-system of a larger system of conflicts in the Muslim world. This world of conflict has forced millions into refugee status making the Islamic world home or war and refugees (in Islamic tradition known as Dar al Harbwa al Muhajirun). For the purpose of this paper, qualitative analysis includes study of existing literature on Islamic tradition of Hijrah. Dabiq Magazine issued by ISIS has been the main source of reference for discussions and analysis of the Islamic concept of Hijrah under Daesh. Textual analysis has also been based on the usage of concept of Hijrah by ISIS.

Theoretical Framework

As per Kunz (1973), theoretically the ‘push’ factor depends on the old home circumstances of the migrant and becomes the causal motivation for such a step, whereas, the ‘pull’ factor of the destination country provides with the purpose and drive to move to a particular country. This definition effectively segregates ‘migrants’ from ‘refugees’. Migration is a deliberate and well planned act on behalf of those who, most of the times, are looking for better economic opportunities at another place. There may be absence or short supply of such opportunities in their native land; livelihood might have been adversely affected by climatic condition or by act of God, etc. Migrants usually have enough time at their disposal to weigh and choose between their ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factor and settle for a destination. In case of refugees
however, mostly there is a serious imbalance between the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Refugees have tremendous pressure on the ‘push’ side of equation, to abandon their homes in a short span of time, simultaneously little or no motivation and choice on the ‘pull’ end might exist.

Similarly Hansen (2014) argues that the theory of Post Structuralism parts its way from traditional Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberalist theories on the notion of state as a rational actor. The reason for this departure is that this concept discards and marginalizes ‘others’ such as non-state and trans-state actors and those persecuted by their own state such as refugees. Theoretically, refugees can be described and have been studied through multiple discourses and factors impacting the refugee status such as, civil war, religious discourse, economic discourse, Violent-Non-State-Actors (VNSA) etc.

Islamic Doctrine of Hijrah
Hijrah is the concept dating back to the earliest days of Islam. Prophet Mohammad migrated from persecution at Mecca to Yathrib, which later came to be known as Madinah (or Madinah al Nabi). The concept of Hijrah (migration or forced migration) involving Mohajirun (refugees or migrants) takes it roots from Judaism and Christian traditions. The traditions regarding ‘aliens’ and ‘sojourners’ existed in Arabian Peninsula long before the arrival of Islam (Elmadmad, 2008). Incidentally Prophets of the three monotheist Abraham religions; Judaism, Christianity and Islam including Prophets Ibrahim, Moses, Jesus and Mohammad underwent Hijrah (Padilla & Phan, 2014). These pivotal acts of divine obedience took Prophet Ibrahim from Haran to Canaan, Moses from Egypt to Madian, Jesus from Galilee to Jerusalem, and Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina). Even before Prophet Mohammad left Mecca for Madinah, a group of Muslims left Mecca for Abyssinia, a Christian land, to avoid persecution on religious grounds by their fellow countrymen.

The sanctity of Hijrah in Islam is celebrated and is being taken seriously. The date when Prophet Mohammad started his Hijrah gained so much importance that Islamic calendar starts on that day. First year of Hijrah was 622 CE and Prophet started the journey on 12 September 622 CE (Shamsi, 1984).

Hijrah theory provides special protection and rights to asylum seekers and refugees. In its true essence it, arguably could be more advanced and better than the modern age refugee conventions and laws. The word Hijrah is derived from the Arabic word Hajarah which means to part ways, abandon, to break ties with someone, to leave or to
migrate (Alkhuli, 1989; Elmadmad, 2008). In a stark contrast to modern refugee laws, theory of Hijrah grants right to every human being to grant asylum and to seek asylum without explanation of reason, intention or repercussions. In Quran the word Hijrah and its derivatives have been mentioned 27 times and its Shari’ah meanings are to migrate in the path of Allah (Munir, 2011).

There is a serious disagreement amongst the Muslim scholars on the core issue of Hijrah. Some of them argue that Muslims should not opt for Hijrah without a genuine excuse. They further contend that the only genuine reason for a Muslim to perform Hijrah stems from the restrictions and bans imposed on Islamic practices in the lands they abode. This argument also continues to make those Muslims accountable, who prefer to live a luxurious life in countries where they cannot practice Islam in true letter and spirit such as Western countries. This logic has been used as exploitation and a strong argument by ISIS against those who continue to stay in those lands and do not decide to perform Hijrah. Further discussion on this aspect will ensue in later part of this paper. Another set of Islamic scholars declare Hijrah as a human right and leave the decision to the best judgment of individuals, whether they want to stay in such lands or prefer to perform Hijrah to a place where Shari’ah Laws exist.

An important aspect related to Hijrah is its close relevance and connection to the concept of Bay’ah and Jihad. Hijrah was considered a command in earlier days of Islam and everyone was obliged to perform Hijrah. Bay’ah was the process to pledge allegiance on Prophet Mohammad’s hands and a promise to undergo Hijrah as a result of this allegiance. These two were delinked after conquest of Mecca, when Prophet said that there is no Hijrah after conquest (Zaman, 2004). Therefore Jihad remained the only obligation under Bay’ah. This gives birth to a new issue, that is, is Jihad a compulsion (especially after Hijrah) and how would it be seen. Jihad has been a collective compulsion in offence and an individual duty during defense (Lewis, 1992). There is a unanimous agreement amongst all Sunni schools of thought including Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Shafi that this delinking is not a carte blanche for Muslims. It meant that Bay’ah could be administered without Hijrah and this moderation on the issue of Hijrah gave a much relaxed option on Jihad, making it a collective responsibility during offense yet an individual duty during defense. ISIS, however still sticks to the notion that both Hijrah and Jihad are compulsions and Muslims are duty bound to perform these solemn acts (Dabiq, 2014c, p. 3).
Concept of Dar-al-Islam, Dar-al-Harb and Dar-al-Sulh/Ahd

Many Muslim scholars argue that the truly Islamic way of life is possible in Islamic lands or where Shari’ah Law exists, calling it Dar-al-Islam or land of peace. On the other hand, there is abode of war or Dar-al-Harb, Dar-al-Kufr or Dar-al-Shirk, where Islamic law doesn’t exist. This complex linguistic web has been a source of constant debate throughout Islamic history, leaving average Muslim undecided on actually where is it best for Muslims to reside and under what circumstances should they perform Hijrah. This issue continues to be another point of exploitation by ISIL. Consequent to this undecided stance by Muslims, multiple Western authors have argued that through this approach, Muslims tend to retain an insular and exclusive life style and that this situation could easily be challenged through modern international law (Lewis, 1992). Khawarij have all along declared territories where there is no Shari’ah as Dar-ul-Kufr and Daesh has followed the suit. Historically, during and after 12th Century many Muslim areas, especially in the Islamic west went under Christian control. The debate surrounding requirement for Hijrah ensued. Majority of the Islamic scholars called on Muslims from such areas to perform Hijrah, while many others opposed the notion. The logic behind allowing Muslims to stay in Christian lands was that, it was a religious duty to stay behind if it could serve the cause of Islam better (Masud, 1986). It also needs mentioning here that in 12th Century and later, cause of Hijrah was solely connected to the concepts of Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-Harb, and not to the concepts of Jihad and Bay’ah. The concept of Hijrah and Jihad remained interlinked in prior centuries; all those duty bound to undergo Hijrah were also duty bound to conduct Jihad against such lands.

Similarly any land ruled by a Muslim ruler was considered Dar-al-Islam. To prevent any uprising against such rulers and to promote unity, no Hijrah was allowed from such lands, even if the ruler was tyrant and cruel towards the Muslim subjects, thereby effectively barring Muslims to perform a ‘reverse Hijrah’ from Dar-al-Islam to Dar-al-Harb. This point will be analyzed through the present day discourse generated by Daesh on the issue of Hijrah. They argue that although the living conditions in ISIS lands are not ideal, Muslims residing there should continue to live there, more so others from around the globe should also perform Hijrah to Syria (Dabiq, 2014a, pp. 10-11). However, the classic Muslim historians argued against such Hijrah, under the pretext of the hadith in which Prophet Mohammad
had asked Muslims to stop Hijrah after conquest of Mecca; la hijrataba’d al fat’hi (Zaman, 2004).

The declaration of lands as Dar-al-Islam or Dar-al-Harb includes three types of countries; first those where Muslims are rare and are minorities, they were declared Dar-al-Harb, secondly those countries where Muslims were present in large numbers but rulers were non-Muslims, such countries were also declared Dar-al-Harb; and therefore, the only place that was labeled Dar-al-Islam was the country ruled by a Muslim ruler (Masud, 1986). In present day context, this gives rise to a new debate, as to who all should be considered as (true and practicing) Muslim rulers and how many Islamic countries today would actually fulfill the criteria to be declared as Dar-al-Islam. Referring again to Daesh exploitation, they have given a lineage of their self-avowed caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi linking it to Prophet Mohammad, to prove his nobility (Dabiq, 2015a, 2015b). They have also argued that presently there is only one Dar-al-Islam, the land ruled by the caliph (Dabiq, 2014b).

A further extension of this debate links to some serious questions mentioned above. Such as, what happens if a Muslim ruler is tyrant and lives of Muslims under such ruler become untenable for example as under Hajjaj Bin Yusuf, forcing Muslims to perform reverse Hijrah to non-Muslim lands such as Malabar in India at that time (El Fadl, 1994). Similarly during the reign of al-Mahdi (775-785 CE) and Harun al Rasheed (786–809 CE) and in 11th Century, areas including Sicily and other Muslim lands were lost to Christians. The debate over the Hijrah again had two opposing poles, with one set of scholars and jurists advocating the concept of Islam and Dar-al-Islam as unitary, while others arguing that the dynamism in the concept of Hijrah needed to be seen in the context of infringement upon fulfillment of religious duties. If such duties could be fulfilled in lands other than those ruled by Muslims they could continue residing there. Later argument was also considered a logical solution for newly converts residing in non-Muslim lands. Therefore the concept of a third type Dar-al-Sulh or Dar-al-Ahd (house of truce or house of pact) was formed, and argued under the pretext that Prophet Mohammad allowed some newly convert Muslims to migrate to Ethiopia, which was a Christian land (Lewis, 1992). Within this argument the delinking of Jihad from Hijrah was an inbuilt notion.
Concept of Hijrah under Daesh
Right from its creation, Daesh has laid special emphasis on the theme of Hijrah. As a newly constituted force and a self-avowed state, they needed to gather support both for their legitimacy and for their defense. The foremost desire of the Islamic State visible through their magazine Dabiq was that of Bay’ah or pledge of allegiance and loyalty to their caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. It is important to note here, that in the traditional Islamic concept of Hijrah, Jihad and Bay’ah remained intimately connected in Islamic tradition but the difference of opinion among different Islamic scholars and treatise helped evolve the concepts to suit modern day needs. A brief textual analysis of Dabiq Magazine published by Daesh shows that the word Hijrah and its derivatives appears 286 times in all 15 Issues. Word Bay’ah and its derivatives have appeared 216 times and Jihad has been mentioned 734 times. Ever since the emergence of Islamic State in June 2014, Hijrah as a theme has fluctuated in its appearance and appeal over the past two and half years. The graph below shows variation in appearance of word Hijrah:

Graph 1: Variation in appearance of word Hijrah in Dabiq magazine

As mentioned earlier, Hijrah has also been altered to serve Islamic State’s best interest. A desire to create a robust force in the heart of Syria and Iraq motivated Daesh to give an open call to ‘all devout believers’ (Daesh sympathizers) to perform Hijrah because of the two camps in the world; camp of Islam and camp of Kufr and no third camp (Dabiq, 2014c). This binary world view by Daesh makes it obligatory to perform Hijrah to the land of Islamic State. ISIS has provided multiple legal arguments for this obligation by extensive reference to Quran and Hadith. For example declaration of Islamic State through the Quranic verse, “all lands belong to Allah and he
allows its inheritance to anyone whom He wills” (Quran- Surah Al-A’raf: Verse,128), is enough of a reason to create a new state and own the land, or Hijrah being and Islamic duty undertaken by the father of believers Ibrahim. This discourse exerts ‘pull’, enticing all Muslims, first to perform Bay’ah at the hands of self-avowed caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, to be followed by ‘true’ and ‘last’ Hijrah on footsteps of Prophet Ibrahim to the land of Sham (Dabiq, 2014a, pp. 24-26). Legitimacy of the self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr has also been established and reinforced through the fact that he performed Hijrah followed by Jihad, and therefore he is the legal heir and rightful imam to desire Bay’ah from followers (Dabiq, 2014c, p. 40). Hijrah has also been strengthened through co articulation with concepts of Jama’ah (unity), Sam (listening), Ta’ah (obedience), and Jihad. In same Issue of the magazine, Hijrhah has been made enticing, since it culminates at a more aggressive and traditional concept of modern day Khilafah (Dabiq, 2014c, pp. 34-41). The attraction for believers from around the globe through Hijrah has therefore, been created right from Issue 1 of Dabiq. Daesh has taken a reverse approach in linking Jihad to Hijrah by saying that, “Hijrah needs to be practiced towards the lands where Jihad can be conducted without the fear of police state” (Dabiq, 2014c, p. 36). This reverses the traditional Islamic order of preference where Hijrah is the priority if Muslims can’t practice their faith freely and after they migrate they could continue Jihad where needed. In their native lands, a preparatory stage before Hijrah has been mentioned as guideline for all those performing Hijrah) and for those aspiring to do so. They have been advised to recruit others, consolidate themselves, and conduct minor ‘hurt operations’ (Dabiq, 2014c, p. 36):

In short, these phases consist of immigrating to a land with a weak central authority to use as a base where a Jama’ah can form, recruit members, and train them. (If such a land does not exist or Hijrah is not possible), the place can be formed through long campaigns of nikayah attacks carried out by underground Mujahid cells.

Daesh continues to incite believers to rush to the Islamic state with parents, siblings, spouses and children. This is a call to populate the newly declared caliphate. Connected to the theme of Hijrah, is the concept of Bay’ah. That is, under the circumstances when immediate Hijrah is not possible, Daesh sympathizers need to organize a Bay’ah from their home towns. Concept of Bay’ah taking precedence over the
concept of Hijrah shows significance of the need for them to populate lands under their control, giving them a possibility to boost their numbers, and build on their strength. This call was responded enthusiastically and thousands flocked the new caliphate. This created a great degree of panic amongst nations whose citizen, new Muslim converts and even young girls opted for Hijrah (Bennhold, 2017). It is important to note here, that the ‘pull factor’ for these men, women, girls and families was the ‘life of jihad’ or the ‘death of martyrdom’, still they opted for it. Dabiq Magazine focusing on Hijrah says in clear words, that “Islamic State is at war against Kafir states and anyone performing Hijrah should expect to perform Jihad” (Dabiq, 2014a, pp. 34-41). Sequentially, Daesh asked its followers to perform Bay’ah (pledge of allegiance), followed by Hijrah (migration in the cause of Allah to Islamic lands) to culminate at Jihad (fighting in the cause of Allah).

The importance of theme Hijrah has not receded, with trend line reaching the apex at 43, the number of times word Hijrah has been mentioned in Issue 3, and the cover page has been titled as ‘A Call to Hijrah’ (Dabiq, 2014a). The concept has been signified by linking Prophet Ibrahim’s Hijrah to Syria as the real and most desirable Hijrah before the Day of Judgment to be performed by the best of the people and those failing to do so would be the worst of the people. In a contrast to the traditional Hijrah, Daesh desires all believers to perform Hijrah to Syria alone. They also admit that Hijrah to Madinah was discontinued after the conquest of Mecca. Therefore towards the later issues of Dabiq and after they had considerable areas under their control, they changed the call for Hijrah to call for Jihad for all followers (Dabiq, 2016, p. 55). That meant that there is no need for those who have already performed Bay’ah to perform Hijrah, they could rather serve Daesh cause better by conducting attacks in their home countries especially in the West. This had a direct impact on the sincerity of those refugees who were genuinely the target of ‘push factor’ after the start of Civil War in Syria. Every Middle Eastern refugee who tried to enter Europe was doubted and calls from multiple political and official quarters banning such entries have further deteriorated the situation.

While on one hand Daesh was calling its followers to perform the sacred act of Hijrah to Islamic State, they were also exerting tremendous pressure more precisely ‘push’ on Syrians and Iraqis. Wide spread brutality, coercive Bay’ah, enforced Jihad through strict implementation of Shari’ah, and a protracted civil war, made the lives of millions in Syria and Iraq untenable, a ‘push factor’ which forced
million to become refugees. Some of these refugees moved to neighboring Muslim countries such as Jordan and Lebanon and a majority ended up in Turkey. These single vector journeys can be categorized as Hijrah, since the destination lands were also Muslim countries. Subsequently, millions of these refugees moved into or tried to move to Europe performing ‘reverse Hijrah’.

In a three pronged strategy, firstly Daesh allured their followers to perform Hijrah en masse with their spouses, children, siblings and parents. Secondly they resisted outwards movement to keep Daesh lands populated and finally in the process they forced millions into refugee status performing ‘reverse Hijrah’. There is a clear and visible imbalance between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in these movements, Hijrah towards the Islamic State is neither kinetic nor can they categorized as refugees. They had almost no ‘push’ from their home countries, but the overwhelming ‘pull’ factor motivated them to perform this religious duty. Those living in Syria and Iraq were also asked to pledge allegiance, deposit their previously held weapons and present their able bodied men for Jihad (Dabiq, 2014c, pp. 12-15). Daesh did not miss any opportunity to hinder or resist the ‘Reverse Hijrah’ discourse which can best be understood through the case of Aylan Kurdi the child who was washed ashore dead, mourned by the world yet capitalized by Daesh through an article published in Dabiq Magazine (Dabiq, 2015c, pp. 22-23). In a rather serious policy reversal and to prove their presence around the globe, Daesh asked its followers not to perform Hijrah, stay in the infidel lands, and serve Daesh cause by conducting Daesh sponsored home grown terrorist attacks (Dabiq, 2016, p. 57). Coupled with this was call for ‘Reverse Hijrah’ to be performed by those who had previously joined Daesh for Jihad. Resultantly, some terrorists moved back to Western lands under the cover of refugee waves. This call acted as the last nail in the coffin of Middle Eastern refugee kinetics. The climax of these two colliding discourses convinced thousands to migrate to Islamic State to take part in Jihad. Scores decided to stay back in Europe and participate in Daesh sponsored and claimed terrorism. But worst of all, millions of those refugees trying to escape war to Europe and other lands were resisted, doubted and even manhandled at almost every vector of their kinetics.

The ‘Push’ and ‘Pull’ Factors
As previously mentioned, choices for refugees are dominated by a very hard decision to uproot and move from the country of their residence and give up in face of excessive ‘push’ factor, and sometimes a meager
hope for his future prospects in settling in the destination country or complete absence of ‘pull’ factor. In case of forced movements such as those caused by Civil War in Syria and Iraq, the ‘push factor’ weighs in heavily while the ‘pull’ factor is generally subsided and is dominated by will for self and family survival.

Kinetics as a refugee terminology has been adopted from Kunz (1973, p. 131) for the same reasons that this, ‘branch of dynamics investigates the relations between the motions of the bodies and the forces acting upon them’. The term attains preference to ‘dynamics’ which suggests the existence of inner self propelling force. This inner force to move is completely absent from the movement of refugees with excessive ‘push factor’ and minimal or no ‘pull factor’ at work. Their progress resembles the movement of billiard ball, which is missing inner direction and the path is governed by the kinetic factors of inertia, friction, resistance and the vectors of outside applicable forces.

Moreover, every migration and refugee movement cannot be represented by a single vector (Kunz, 1973). In certain cases such as Afghanistan–Pakistan, the refugee movement could be a one step process connecting an origination and a destination point. However, mostly forced refugee movements are multifaceted and can best be conceptualized as multi-vector movements, with significant forces acting at each step. This necessitates a separate analysis of each step, in spatial and temporal frames. These kinds of multiple step movements can be seen at play in Middle Eastern refugees aspiring to move to Europe. As argued by Murphy (1955, p.11), “Flight and the compulsory displacement of populations engender a considerable amount of contemporary feeling and this had tended to affect both social attitudes and individual objectivity . . . and even when reasonable objectivity might be permitted, it is often difficult for the observer to attain it”. Millions of Syrians stuck within the internationally recognized borders of Syria have been trapped between the Assad Regime fighters, rebels, and a plethora of violent non-state actors operating all over Syria. As argued by poststructuralists, choice of certain concepts and absence of some words has a political motivation and far reaching consequences with transnational dimensions. If all those leaving their native lands or internally displaced due to war are declared refugees, just like all those who crossed into Turkey or other countries, international community would be bound to initiate action to fulfill their obligations under international law. In present scenario, it is ‘desirable’ to stop the civil war in Syria as means to end suffering of those trapped and displaced. International community is certainly trying
to find a solution for internally displaced and trapped; however, they are not bound to take any measures.

**Hospitality to Hostility**

To find the impact of another ‘push’ factor at play in case of Middle Eastern refugees and to weigh an additional reason for conversion of European refugee hospitality to hostility nine of Trump’s pre-election speeches were textually analyzed. His lexical collection surrounding Syrian and Iraqi refugees had a direct and significant impact on already fledgling European desire to allow refugees. Europeans had made a deal with Turkey to control and possibly stop the movement of these refugees pouring into Europe (O’Brien, 2016). This discourse creates ‘otherness’ in immigrants who have been labeled as evil, job snatching, criminals, who (as per Trump) are also Islamist, radicalized Muslims and include people from Syria, Iraq and ISIS. Table 1 below shows the use of few key words by Trump in each of his speeches on varying domestic and foreign policy issues. Leaving rest of his vocabulary and choice of words out of discussion for this paper, his obsession with radicalized Islamic migrants is alarming if not out of place. He has also effectively misled American public and Europeans on the segregation between the ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’.

**Table 1: Trump’s Speeches Textual Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Issue</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Refugee</th>
<th>Illegal</th>
<th>ISIS</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Election Stakes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Security (September)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>143</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

As per World Economic Forum, out of 193 countries around the globe, ten of the poorest are hosting half of the world’s entire refugee population with Pakistan being third largest recipient of refugee
population (Thomson, 2016). Trump’s presidential speeches have not only dented the already fledgling equation of hosting refugees rather motivated many Europeans to refuse entry to women, elderly, sick and children.

**Three Pronged ‘Push’**

French sociologist Jacque Derrida contended that language is composed of dichotomies (Derrida, 1974), which results in dichotomies in discourse and in social actions. If those Syrians or Iraqis who have been subjected to excessive ‘push’ factor, and have been forced to leave their homes are referred as ‘refugees’ it has an action demanding international implication. However, if same people are labeled ‘Islamist radicalized Muslims trying to leave Middle East for jobs’ as contended by (then) US Presidential candidate Donald Trump, or they are referred as radicalized Muslim youth returning to Europe the impact is completely different, and desired actions would include resisting their movement with all political and physical barricades, walls, fences and use of force. ‘Push’ factor from three different prongs can thus be seen on Middle Eastern refugees. The most significant ‘push’ originates from presence of multiple VNSAs in Syria and Iraq especially Daesh, forcing people to perform Bay’ah, flee or die. When they opted for flight from this plight, they were restricted and barricades and fences were erected by Europeans, a second ‘push’ factor. Final and probably most damaging ‘push’ was manipulated by Daesh, when they ordered their loyalists to join these refugee waves heading to Europe, go back to their native lands through reverse Hijrah and perform acts of terrorism when they reach there. While this should not have been taken as the only motive by Europeans for refugee refusal, unfortunately this remained a dominant motivating factor.

Impact of European resistance to refugees kinetics can be analyzed in the light of ‘danger discourse’ applied by USA, imposing entry ban on HIV/AIDS people from 1987 to January 2010 (Hansen, 2014). The intention was to prevent spread of HIV/AIDS among US population. But, what about those HIV/AIDS victims who were disciplined and did not pose danger? Even they were banned alongside the entire group. As per Kunz, ‘refugee movements may become a social force, carrying with them individuals who have neither much to fear nor much to lose’ (Kunz, 1973, p. 136), which unfortunately is true for Middle Eastern refugees. Presumed radicalized terrorists travelling among refugees (performing reverse Hijrah) have little to fear or lose and definitely pose imminent threat to destination countries, but what about those refugees who do not? The barriers aimed at keeping
terrorists at bay has also kept genuine refugees from taking any further
steps (Sharkov, 2016).

**Middle Eastern Refugee Kinetics: Way Forward**

For those who settle in refugees camps, the UNHCR has identified three ‘durable solutions’. The best choice is voluntary repatriation; the second is local integration; and finally, limited opportunity for third country resettlement. More often than not, a situation arises when none of this happens and refugees are warehoused for years if not decades (Smith, 2004). In case of Middle Eastern refugees, many countries had elaborate preparations to warehouse these refugees but due to collective EU decisions the plans have changed (Delman, 2016).

According to UNHCR some governments will not want to give full rights because they fear that if the first 10,000 are allowed in another 30,000 will arrive (Agalawatta, 2004). Middle Eastern refugees have been a product of war, they did not opt for becoming refugee and therefore within the larger conflict discourse, the phenomenological birth of refugees needs to be recognized by the international community. In this case catastrophe has been triggered and hastened by all classic ingredients, civil war, belligerent government, genocidal and violent non state actors, international intervention etc. At collective levels governments around the globe manage the entire population of refugees making selections in whom to take or refuse the refugee status (Canada, 2016). This is helping the overall refugee issue to some extent but much more needs to be done especially by the nations who have the resources but lack will to accommodate these refugees. To begin with, efforts to bring an end to Syrian Civil war might be a good starting point. State level geopolitics has caused immense damage at individual level and this need to end.

**Conclusion**

This has explained the traditional Islamic concept of Hijrah and multiple discussions with reference to existing differences amongst the Muslims. These differences have been effectively utilized by Daesh to their advantage. ‘Push and pull factors’ have been linked to the Middle Eastern refugees and an effort has been made to highlight the direct impact on the lives of millions of refugees and those stuck up in the middle of Syrian Civil war and Iraqi turmoil. The ‘push factor’ has effectively redefined Syrian refugees’ ecology involving friends, family and community, even religion and entire struggle for survival. On arrival to borders of a third, fourth or fifth country, they find that the borders have been closed. They effectively find themselves in a no
man’s land spiritually, spatially, temporally and emotionally. They feel themselves in state of anarchy and abandonment by international community. They are overwhelmed by the sense of absence of belonging as well as ownership; they belong nowhere and own nothing. Their community, society, status of being a citizen of a state and economic standing are all lost. Living in the high-tech refugee camps they feel unsure of tomorrow, frustrated, life of hopelessness and moral vacuum, a ‘pull factor’ they had never envisaged nor had hoped for.

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