The Influence of Globalization on Insurgency: Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in the Age of Information Technology

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Abstract

Without a doubt, Africa is presently faced with violence, war, and acts of terrorism arising from the activities of insurgents. This paper examines the ways globalization aids insurgent activities and increasing manipulation of globalization by insurgents. It also looks at the negative impacts of violence and the need to find solutions to the insurgents' activities that have generated concerns for the contemporary global system. The issues raised are significant considering the need to find solutions to the violence in the continent. This paper argues that just as globalization has encouraged increased technology, lowered transportation cost, increased trade and capital flow and the overall economic growth of nation-states; it has also allowed insurgency and terrorism to spread easily; serving as a sanctuary to insurgent groups and aiding the activities of insurgents. Although globalization has been fingered as a factor in some cases of insurgency, it is not itself the main cause of insurgency; however, globalization has dramatically helped transform the strategies, tactics, and the overall activities of insurgents in the past two decades. This is because insurgents have directly and indirectly manipulated the faceless character of globalization to carry out their activities, especially Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria. The paper states that just as insurgents have exploited globalization to perpetrate terror, globalization can also be used as a vital tool in counter-insurgency (COIN) and the War on Terror (WoT).

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Introduction

Two fundamental statements are germane in the discussion entailed in this paper. The first is that the contemporary international system faces multiple security challenges, with many states being threatened by conflicts, violence, and terrorism. Many of these are often occasioned by individuals and groups who disagree with other individuals, groups, or the state. The second assertion is that with the passage of time, the world is increasingly shrinking into a global village, posing a formidable challenge to many states, particularly the developing countries in Africa. This has, thereby, led to an ongoing debate as to whether or not globalization is likely and/or capable of creating a better world. The proponents of globalization argue that it helps generate openness in government and business, the strong rule of law, and greater opportunities for people to experience personal freedom (Rudra, 2005; James & Tulloch, 2010). The opposing view suggests that globalization tends to cause more turbulence in the world (Barber, 2000). While this article is not concerned with this discussion, it asserts that Africa (hosting two of the deadliest insurgent groups in the world, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram) is currently troubled by violence and that the insurgent groups in Africa have continued to manipulate the process of globalization to enhance their strategies and tactics. The present article has been extracted from a broader Ph.D. thesis study, submitted to the North-West University. It is premised on the idea that globalization has consistently created enabling environments for insurgents to better operate i.e., by offering them sanctuary; and making their communication, disguise, and ability to move freely and carry out their operation anonymously easier. The research concludes that globalization is being manipulated by the insurgents and has improved their combat and non-combat operational strategies.

The reports of the Global Peace Index have also, since 2010, repeatedly listed sub-Saharan Africa as the most affected region by violent conflicts (Dowd, 2015). This ceaseless manifestation of violence perpetrated by these insurgents has turned a significant part of the African landscape into a theatre of war and conflict. In addition, there are substantial social implications of globalization and social change that have produced marginalization, social exclusion, and increasing impoverishment of a large population in Africa (Ikotun, 2009, p. 187). And one of the consequences is the series of tension, political unrest, and violence perpetrated by the insurgents in the region.

As stated earlier, in addition to the states benefitting from the globalization regime, the insurgent groups also manipulate their economic, political, technological, and cultural variants to improve their tactics, strategies, and overall operational capabilities. This position is succinctly captured by Bandyopadhyay and colleagues (2015) when they observed that the new technology — occasioned by globalization that has lowered transportation cost and increased trade and capital flow across borders and countries — has also been manipulated by the insurgents in their operations. This submission is further confirmed by the field research conducted by the first author in 2017 (see, for details, Adeyeye, 2017).

Navigating the Labyrinth of Concepts and Theory: Terrorism, Insurgency, Strategy and Tactics

Globalization has often been perceived as an imprecise term that has been defined and interpreted in multiple forms. The result of the crowded and multifarious opinions on globalization is the lack of consensus on the definition of the term (Appadurai, 2001; Hanlon, 2009). Four major variants have been identified for globalization — economic, technological, cultural, and political. It has been argued that globalization

can be credited to have brought large-scale interdependence and driven cut-off populations and regions into modernity (Appadurai, 2001, 1996; Clapham, 2012; Cronin, 2003; Griffin, 2004).

With a brief overview of globalization, the following subsections discuss and lay down the functional and operational definitions of the terminology used in this article. For this article, these two terms are used interchangeably to describe individuals and groups overtly and/or covertly engaging themselves in insurgent or terrorist activities. They mostly adopt terrorism strategies and tactics not only to accomplish their socio-cultural, economic, political, and religious ends but also to force states to surrender to their demands (Hoffman, 1988, 1998, pp. 94-95; Rogers, 2008). Their modes of operation often include (i) *disorientation:* alienating governments from the citizens, tarnishing the repute of governments in the eyes of the people; (ii) *target response:* to influence and stimulate their targets to act favourably to their cause; (iii) *gaining legitimacy:* exploiting the emotional impacts of violence to introduce alternative demands and messages (Abdulahi, 2015; Ibaba, 2011).

Insurgency

Gompert and Gordon (2008, p. 60) have defined insurgency as the pre-determined and work-out adoption of violence or its threat against state forces and unarmed civilians to achieve political, religious, ideological, and ethno-national goals. For this study, an 'insurgency' describes actual acts of rebellion against the state and the people. This conception recognizes that not all cases of rebellion are insurgencies. The use of the concept in this study is premised on individuals or groups adopting the position of armed rebellion (Abdulahi, 2015; Gompert & Gordon, 2008, p. 60; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Okoli & Philip, 2014).

The insurgency has also been defined as political-military activity directed towards complete or partial control of the state resources by using irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activities include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization that may help in recruitment, propaganda, and covert party organization and international activity (Rineheart, 2010). This international activity is often designed to weaken the control of the government and adversely influence its legitimacy. The general denominator is the objective to control some particular geographical location (Analysis of Insurgency, 2012).

Terrorism

Without much doubt, terrorism, similar to several other political disciplinary concepts, is difficult to define in ways that holistically capture the phenomenon. As a social construct, terrorism has been defined within the context of shifting social and political realities (Bayo, 2013; Cooper, 2001; Lizardo, 2008; Primoratz, 2004). If one throws into this mix of economic, cultural and religious perceptions, then the conceptualization task becomes more complex. In attempting to develop a comprehensive definition of terrorism, Schmid and Jongman (1983, 1992) gathered 109 official and academic definitions of terrorism and subjected them to analysis; to identify their main components. The result of this rigorous academic pursuit reveals that elements of violence ranked highest with 83.5 per cent; the aspect of political goal accounted for 65 per cent; and the element of inflicting fear and terror was recorded at 51 per cent. Additionally, the components of targeting indiscriminately and arbitrarily — also related to the victimization of non-combatant civilians and outsiders — scored 17.5 per cent (Schmid & Jongman, 1983, 1992). Hence, it

becomes clear that causing violence, intending to hurt others physically, physiologically, economically, politically, racially, ethnically, and culturally, is the most common reason for informing or motivating the terror attacks by insurgent groups (Dyson, 2008). Perhaps, this is in agreement with the violence component of terrorism, which, as Blair (2007, pp. 79-90) has argued, is criminal and unfair and/or constitutes an illegitimate use of force.

Chomsky (2002) argues that the endeavour to understand terrorism can be undertaken in two ways. It is possible to either adopt a literal approach to the study of terrorism or employ the propagandist method — analyzing the term as a weapon that can be taken advantage of. As for this paper, terrorism is defined in relation to the strategies and tactics employed by the insurgents (Omitola et al., 2021).

Strategy and Tactics

Essentially, strategy means taking and using available material means to accomplish a desired end (Pratt, 2010). Outwit, outbid, outmanoeuvre, and deceiving are all forms of strategies that could be adopted in political and military battles. Strategies can acquire many concrete forms, depending on when and where they are put to use. Lee (2008, pp. 13-17) has defined strategy as an organized plan of action that is put in place to accomplish a specified goal and objective. It is defined as the planning, synchronization, and overall focus of the military and non-military operations. Different strategies also have political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions (Ogundiya & Azmat, 2008). In addition, a terrorism strategy may be referred to as the one premised on yielding psychological effects; causing violence that leads to deaths and destruction of properties and inculcating fear of the insurgents. This also has the potential to adversely impact the morale of the opposing force-party in the conflict, such as the government forces (Amusan & Adeyeye, 2014, pp. 1866-1874; Guglielmo, 2011; Crenshaw, 2004, pp. 74-79).

On the contrary, tactics are located in instrumental actions. Tactics could be in the form of hit-and-run or flanking and aiming targets for accuracy. It could also refer to the military and non-military art concerned with achieving the goals and objectives laid down in the strategy (Lee, 2008; Pratt, 2010; Bell & Bell, 1976).

Terrorism as Insurgency

It is recognized in this article that the insurgents can and do employ both — strategies pertaining to terrorism as well as insurgency. While insurgency is most effective when there is wide mobilization, terrorism can be effective with limited mobilization (Wardlaw, 1989). Usually, the strategies and tactics used by insurgents are often premised and conditioned by the environments in which they operate. Terrorism is one of the easiest and readily available strategies for insurgents (Wardlaw, 1989). Insurgents adopt combat and non-combat, asymmetric modes of warfare. Some of the elements of terrorism strategies and tactics often adopted by insurgent groups include ambush in forms of annihilation, harassment, and containment. When adopting ambush tactics, the insurgents carry out mass-direct fires and often increase the lethality/causalities with indirect fires, manufactured obstacles, mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); many of the tactics are taught and learned through modern technology using the internet (Lee, 2008). The elements of assault, intimidation, hit-an-run, attrition (physical and moral), and criminal and chaos are parts of insurgents' terrorism strategies and tactics. An important feature of insurgents' strategies is operational dynamism and fluidity, the ability to move around and change their operational strategies and tactics (Olawoyin, Omodunbi, &

Akinrinde, 2021). Insurgent strategies and tactics involve attacking, controlling, and/or constraining opposing forces, as the ability to move quickly and strike is significant for insurgents. Characteristically, insurgents' terrorist operations look like military warfare. As striking power is important for insurgent forces; they also require a sanctuary, that is, a secured base, such as Boko Haram had in the Sambisa Forest. Insurgents seek for a secured and impregnable base(s) against any attack from the military forces of the state (Horowitz, 2001; Owen, 2009). Sanctuary is not only defined in geographic terms but also in abstract terms i.e., the minds of the people who are friendly or sympathetic to the goals of insurgents. In such a case, the penetration strategy gains even more importance in any related discussion since the insurgents' mix with the people and hide to avoid rival forces.

The insurgents also use knowledge transfer and learning as a strategy. This is made possible through their clandestine networks that are self-organized and geographically dispersed, comprising of formal, informal, family, and cultural organizations connected by different and almost invisible means. The insurgents also adopt the genetic speculation strategy by kidnapping and abducting women and young girls to get pregnant and give birth to future insurgents (as successors of their activities). The manipulation of socio-cultural and religious beliefs is equally part of insurgents' methods (Udama, 2013).

Examining the Different Variants of Globalization in Practice

In line with the objective of this study, which is to examine the roles of globalization in insurgents' terrorism strategy, the fundamental question asked here is: how has the elements of globalization, such as the advanced information communication technology (ICT), aided the overall strategy and tactics of insurgents in Africa? Attempting to answer this question, this contribution looks at how these particular components of globalization have contributed to the transformation of insurgents (such as Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria) from domestic or indigenous rebellion to regional actors to the extent that they now assume a fundamental security challenge to their respective governments and the citizens, and have become a source of sub-regional, regional, and continental security threat. Scholars such as Bandyopadhyay and colleagues (2015) have argued that this has been made possible owing to the new technology that accompanied the globalization regime; resulting in the lowering of transportation cost and increasing trade and capital flows across nations which have aided the activities of the insurgent groups such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. Undoubtedly, technological globalization has not only increased the number of available tools of communication but has also contributed to the effectiveness and efficiency of communication. Also, globalization has increased and provided faster and cheaper means of transport — by air, road, and rail. It is also argued that just as globalization has fostered the economic growth of states, it has also threatened and, in many cases, resulted in reducing the sovereignty and power of many African states (Ikotun, 2009, p. 183). The outcome of manipulating the supposed benefits of globalization is that it has allowed an easy spread of the acts and effects of insurgency and terrorism. This is because globalization has aided them in their operational dynamics to the extent that insurgent operations, such as those of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, are no longer a local issue, as their networks have the capacity to execute a destructive strike even from thousands of miles away. Hence, Powell (2014) has asserted that globalization has changed the form and nature of terrorism and how the world responds to it in its attempts to tackle the crisis.

Globalization is certainly not being presented here as the cause of terrorism; instead, this paper argues that the overall strategies and tactics of insurgents have been greatly transformed especially in the past two decades owing to the globalization process. This is very prominently evidenced in the operations of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. It is not wrong to say that globalization has added potency to the operations of the insurgents and has transformed such insurgent and terrorist organizations into fearful actors. Globalization has not only heightened the organizational effectiveness of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, but it has also increased their lethality and capability to carry out operations on a wider scale. For instance, with the ease of instant connection and almost untraceable communication made possible by the globalized ICT, they now find sanctuary in less controlled and relatively weak areas (Nasiri, 2006). As parts of their propaganda strategies, both Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram would record scenes of their in-house trainings and trials as well as punishments and use ICT (such as the social media platforms including YouTube) to ensure a wider reach of the content with a view of terrifying the civilian population and cowing them into submission (Alli, 2015, p. 63). Furthermore, the globalization-induced integrated global economy provides the markets and means to move goods, also arms and weapons, thereby increasing the financial and military power of Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and other similar organizations. Equally, the reconnaissance tactics usually deployed by terrorists are aided by obtaining information using digital means with easy access to information made possible by globalization (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015; Clapham, 2012; Griffin, 2004).

Economic globalization involves enormous and swift modifications with respect to the flow of trade, investment, finance, capital, and labor. While the economies of developed countries have grown and their global market shares increased, those of African states have dwindled. This inequality, differences, and incongruity have further undermined the sovereignty, security, and legitimacy of many African states (Backhaus, 2003; Griffin, 2004; Hanlon, 2009; Hoffman, 2002). Therefore, insurgent groups get the opportunity to manipulate the inequality created through this globalization, especially in the African societies, such as Nigeria, where the benefits of globalization have not been fully utilized for development.

Secondly, technological globalization largely depends on fundamental advancements in ICT, such as the Internet, which offers open and free access to knowledge and information, and instant communication. Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have continued to take advantage of these technologies to transmit their ideologies and underlying themes to the nooks and crannies of the world, to recruit, mobilize, conduct, and control their operations (Onuoha, 2014). No doubt, being equipped with such modern technologies has transformed the nature of contemporary terrorist and insurgent groups into dreadful and fearful foes to the extent that their operations are harsh, hostile, severe, and difficult to fight, as currently being witnessed in the operations of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in Kenya and Nigeria respectively.

In addition, for the structural and cultural variant of globalization that is predominantly perceived to be synonymous with the notion of 'Americanization', it has been described as the source of a new unbridled neo-imperialism which poses a potential threat to the traditional societies and already existing distinct cultures and civilizations (Bakier, 2006; White, 2014). This cultural transmission is made possible through individually accessible interconnected communications using different traditional and new (mass) media platforms. The content transmitted often extols 'branded products' and 'branded lifestyles' primarily associated with the US-led

western culture. While an extreme view of this version considers globalization as a cultural invasion with the aspiration to achieve global homogenization, a more detailed view acknowledges that globalization has the potential to result in conflict and resentment (an opinion that describes the anti-American movement among the armed groups in the Islamist Arab States) (Zopf, 2018). One of the factors contributing to this is that people get an increased awareness of the stark contrast between their living conditions and those of the developed state which gain more benefits from this process. Consequently, societies that feel excluded from the benefits of globalization increasingly challenge their governments. Of course, these dislocated and powerless people are readily available tools to be exploited at the hands of the insurgent and terrorist groups (White, 2014).

Lastly, briefly touching upon political globalization, it is observed that this particular variant generally explains the impacts of economic, cultural, and technological variants on the state and its policies (Akinrinde & Tegbe, 2020). This implies that as the weak states become weaker, they are increasingly exposed to the impact of opposing asymmetric forces such as Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria (Hanlon, 2009, pp. 124-132; Wolf, 2001, p. 182). Having discussed how the globalization has contributed to the activities of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, the next section is premised on how these broad globalization changes have facilitated and implored their operations.

The Use of Exploitation Strategies

This section discusses the different strategies Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram employed in their operations. These strategies owe their existence and effectiveness to the process of globalization and are exploited by these groups for their benefit and better functioning. Insurgent groups adopting terrorism strategies, such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, have often manipulated the faceless character of globalization in several ways.

Both Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have manipulated the large volume of the global economy to hide and disguise their illegal operations such as piracy, kidnapping for ransom, robbery, and a host of others. The members of both the groups/networks have been able to move around with their goods and, in many cases, getaway and escape from being detected in their areas of operations. In many instances, some African states have had difficulty tracking transit and proliferation of illegal goods (especially arms and weapons) and illicit funds to terrorist and insurgent groups. This is because the exercise requires quite complicated and complex security capability and highly dependable anticipatory intelligence which are often beyond the abilities of many African states, where insurgents such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram operate (Oyetunbi & Akinrinde, 2021). For example, Nigeria has been battling with the problem of the culpability of Boko Haram in the illegal proliferation and circulation of small and light weapons in the country (Akubor, 2014; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015). Also, not only have Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram been able to exploit the failings of Kenya and Nigeria, respectively, but they have also been able to escape from being accosted. To that extent, it has been relatively easy for them to acquire illicit arms and weapons, including large weapons, and purchase unlawful goods by disguising and covering their shipments among the vast trade of legal goods (Shelley, 2020).

The integrated global economy also encourages the capacities of the Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and other insurgents to benefit from the trade in illegal goods and resources and to outwit and outsmart states from penetrating their financial

networks. Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram often seize and control the production of important resources within their Operating Environments (OEs). For instance, Boko Haram now controls the fishing industry around the Lake Chad region and the Baga town in Born State, Nigeria. The insurgent groups are ultimately expected to plough resources into the international market in order to finance wider operations; further weakening the capabilities of their host states. For example, the control of Al-Shabaab of the main port of Somalia and piracy in the Arden region before its dislodgement by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a case in point (Abdulahi, 2015; Carrol, 2012; Owens, 2009).

Furthermore, the enormous number of people who travel for legitimate purposes also enables insurgents to mix with the people and infiltrate states, particularly in the ones where laws regarding the movement of people are not adequate. (Ikome, 2012). Even in developed countries, where there are sufficient resources to trace people and anticipate population movements, the movements of insurgents (such as the ones related to Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram) are left somewhat unhindered. Evidence has shown that Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram members have adapted and found ways to infiltrate their host societies, often through disguised and high-level technological operations (Akinrinde & Tegbe, 2020). The claim of Al-Shabaab, in 2015, smuggling thousands of its members into Europe indicates the same (Brown, 2015). Also, the ability to hide and be faceless — that accompanies the technological globalization regime — has made connections among different insurgent groups highly possible and realistic (Akinrinde & Tegbe, 2020). For example, Al-Shabaab proclaimed it was connected and fully integrated into the al Qaeda network in 2008, and the Al Shabaab Media Foundation claimed that the instructors of Al-Qaeda were the ones who trained the members of Al-Shabaab in guerrilla tactics (Agbiboa, 2014; Lorenzo, Pantucci, & Kohlmann, 2010; Roggio, 2010). Also, the cross-border assault strategy of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, to ensure a safe passage to allied countries and create a buffer zone at their borders, has been made possible because of the globalization process. For this purpose, they intensify the linkages with other terror groups outside of their own OEs. For example, Al Shabaab in Kenya is reported to be connected to the Salafi ideological groups in Iran and has often adopted and manipulated the infrastructural communication facilities with which they promote anti-western ideology (Menner, 2014; Zenn, 2014).

In the same vein, there have been reports that Al-Qaeda is connected to other groups beyond national boundaries, such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), and MUJAO (Onapajo, Uzodike, & Whetho, 2012). Carter Ham, Commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), reported, in 2011, that the members of Boko Haram received training from the Al-Shabaab group (Agbiboa, 2013; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2014). Globalization has a great role in developing these bonds and connections among insurgent and terrorist groups, such as between Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram (Cronin, 2006; Emilio, 2010; Mackinlay, 2002; White, 2014).

The increasing ability to connect with one another has helped terrorist organizations convey and send information and recruit domestically and across international borders. (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 2006; Hoffman, 2002; Owens, 2009). As mentioned earlier, the modern means of (mass) communication serve as potent and capable instruments for the mobilization of people. Also, the image-based nature of information has a particularly overwhelming impact and influence, especially for the population with low literacy levels. This further facilitates the

recruitment and mobilization of members easy for terrorist and insurgent groups (Cronin, 2006; Hanlon, 2009; Lutz & Lutz, 2014; Owens, 2009; White, 2014).

Confirming the manipulation of the information communication technology (ICT) that has been made possible by globalization, a UN report claims that 'the Internet is a prime example of how terrorists can behave in a truly transnational way; in response, States need to think and function in an equally transnational manner' (World Drug Report, 2012, p. 85). Therefore, it can be conveniently argued that technological globalization has helped Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram to transform their organization, combat operational capabilities and tactical attacks. Cybercrimes also provide funds for their functioning, especially through identity theft which, according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), criminals use it to generate one billion dollars every year. The UNODC has also confirmed that insurgents exploit the internet to access bank accounts and private information and to extract information from credit cards (World Drug Report, 2012). Through the use of the World Wide Web and technologies, e-mails and electronic bulletin boards, cell phones, fax machines, and computer conferencing, insurgents have shared operational information and coordinated attacks over a vast landscape. The cell phone is extensively used to detonate bombs and facilitate coordination among the connected groups.

It is quite evident that the changes brought about by globalization have increased the resilience of both Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. This lets these organizations survive even after the death of a prominent leader. For example, after the leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed, Shekau emerged as his successor (Bamgbose, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2014; Owens, 2009; Powell, 2014; Sani, 2011). Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and some other insurgent groups covertly take advantage of globalization in order to advance their influence on state actors in the international system, particularly in the African states. The capabilities of African states to act proactively in finding solutions to the challenges posed by the insurgent groups, such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, are severely limited and plagued by enormous constraints. One of the reasons for this is that the majority of states in the continent are on the margins of the globalization regime, with little or no power, importance, and influence both within their territories and at the international level (Mills, 2012). In Africa, virtually all the states experiencing the insurgency-related crises exhibit very little or a complete lack of ability to provide essential services to their citizens, with large departments of some states are almost left un-administered (Rothberg, 2004). This fundamental weakness creates both political and geographical vacuums for the insurgents to exploit and thrive on (Abdulahi, 2015; Henley, 2015; Mills, 2012).

In states like Nigeria (affected by terrorism), it is likely for the insurgents to manipulate the ethnic, cultural and religious divides and the trust and legitimacy deficits in any society as is currently being practised by the Boko Haram insurgents in the North-eastern parts of Nigeria. They step into the vacuum, created by the legitimacy deficit, to offer alternative governments; that will provide security, employment, and even the basic services, as expressed by Boko Haram (in Nigeria) in the wake of the failures of the Nigerian government to provide security to the populace (Bamgbose, 2011; Sani, 2011). In instances such as these, insurgents like Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram function as states within a state. They impose taxes and, in some instances, also participate in international diplomacy. In addition, they also provide welfare goods and services within their Operating Environments (OEs) and

mobilize operational forces that are capable and efficient enough to challenge the security forces of the state, offering an alternative government and governance.

As aforementioned, similar to Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, many insurgent groups economically benefit from globalization to the extent that some insurgent groups have budgets greater than the budget of the states they are fighting. For example, the 2014 *Forbes* report states that the financial base of ISIS was two billion dollars, HAMAS had an annual turnover of one billion dollars, FARC ($600 million), Hezbollah ($500 million), Afghan Taliban ($400 million), Al-Qaeda ($150 million), Boko Haram ($52 million), and Al-Shabaab ($70 million). This reveals that these insurgent groups possess the financial capability to carry out their terrorist activities and challenge states' hither to sovereignty (Zehorai, 2014).

And therefore, with lean and inadequate resources at their disposal, the ability of poor states to provide for their citizens is further stretched and constrained. Hence, the states find themselves in a situation whereby the attempts of proactive defense and the search for insurgent operations further create a chain of problems, aggravated by ubiquitous and ever-present demands on the meagre resources available to them against a strong enemy capable of exploiting the benefits of globalization in ways that these states cannot (Ganor, 2015; Hanlon, 2009; Kesselman, Krieger, & Joseph, 2010).

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that just as globalization has improved national and global development, it has also aided the political, social and economic forces that work to undermine the sovereignty of states and has been manipulated by the insurgent/terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. They have manipulated the supposed benefits of technological globalization to move around; transport arms and weapons, mobilize, pass their messages, and recruit members using modern and advanced communication tools, mostly available through the internet. Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have been able to carry out propaganda through the use of the information communication technology that accompanies globalization, and this has facilitated them in improving their funding by getting connected with their members and sympathizers.

To tackle the activities of the insurgents, African states would need to adopt both hard and soft measures to security. This is possible by adequately utilizing the benefits of globalization to improve national economy and provide good governance to the extent that it improves the level of education, solves the problem of unemployment, and reduces poverty — the factors that have repeatedly been pointed at as the contributing elements for many cases of insurgency in the African continent. Also, improving the political, economic, military, and technological bilateral and multilateral relations of the states at the sub-regional, regional, and continental levels, through the processes of globalization, will help them fight insurgency. It is equally expedient for the African states to invest in technology (beyond the insurgent groups) to the extent that technological globalization provides effective counter-insurgency tools. States, where insurgent and terrorist activities pervade, may invest in space technologies that would help in early warning, intelligence gathering, and improved military operational capabilities against these sub-state entities.

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